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This article is about the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946. For the later tribunals held solely under United States military jurisdiction, see subsequent Nuremberg trials. For the 1948 Soviet film about the trials, see Nuremberg Trials (film).
"International Military Tribunal" redirects here. For the Tokyo trials, see International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Coordinates: 49°27′16″N 11°02′54″E / 49.45444°N 11.04833°E / 49.45444; 11.04833

International Military Tribunal
Color photograph of judges' bench at IMT.jpg
Judges' panel
IndictmentConspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity
Started20 November 1945
Decided1 October 1946
Defendant24; list
Case history
Related action(s)subsequent Nuremberg trials
Tokyo trial
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting
and alternates

The Nuremberg trials were held by the Allies after World War II against the surviving political, military, judicial, and economic leadership of Nazi Germany.

Between 1939 and 1945, Nazi Germany invaded many countries across Europe, inflicting 27 million deaths in the Soviet Union alone. Proposals for how to punish the defeated Nazi leaders ranged from a show trial (the Soviet Union) to summary execution (the United Kingdom). In mid-1945, the Allies agreed to convene an international tribunal, drawing up the Nuremberg Charter as its legal instrument. Between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) tried 24 of the most important political and military leaders of Nazi Germany. The purpose of the trial was not just to convict the defendants but also to assemble irrefutable evidence of Nazi crimes, offer a history lesson to the defeated Germans, and delegitimize the traditional German elite.

The IMT focused on the crime of aggression—plotting and waging aggressive war, which the verdict declared "the supreme international crime" because "it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole".[1] This crime had been invented by Soviet jurist Aron Trainin during the war. Some of the defendants were also charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Twelve further trials were conducted by the United States against lower-level perpetrators, which focused more on the Holocaust. Although controversial at the time for their use of ex post facto law, the trials' innovation of holding individuals responsible for violations of international law established international criminal law.

Origin[edit]

Stalingrad in ruins, December 1942
Mass execution of Soviet civilians, 1941

Between 1939 and 1945, Nazi Germany waged wars of aggression across Europe, invading among others Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Low Countries, France, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Soviet Union.[2] The war saw immense brutality in occupied areas and the systematic murder of millions of Jews in the Holocaust.[3] War losses in the Soviet Union alone amounted to 27 million people, mostly civilians, comprising 1/7 of the prewar population.[4] In contrast, the United States suffered very few civilian casualties and many Americans were unaware of the scale of the devastation.[5]

In early 1942, representatives of several governments-in-exile joined together to demand an international court to try the Axis crimes committed in occupied countries. The United States and United Kingdom refused to endorse this proposal, considering the failure of war crimes prosecutions after World War I.[6] During the war, Soviet jurist Aron Trainin developed the concept of crimes against peace (waging aggressive war) which would later be central to the proceedings at Nuremberg.[7][8] Trainin's ideas were reprinted in the West and widely adopted.[9][10] Of all the Allies, the Soviet Union lobbied most intensely for trying the defeated German leaders for aggression in addition to war crimes.[7]

On 1 November 1943, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States issued the Moscow Declaration to "give full warning" to the Nazi leadership of the Allies' intent to "pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth…in order that justice may be done".[11] The declaration also stated that those high-ranking Nazis who had committed crimes over multiple countries would be dealt with jointly.[11][12] The Soviet Union wanted to hold a show trial similar to the Moscow trials in order to demonstrate the Nazi leaders' guilt and build a case for war reparations to rebuild the Soviet economy, which had been devastated by the war.[13] The Western Allies also considered a trial, but in their vision it would be a fair trial where the defendants were presumed innocent. The British, who could not see a benefit from such a trial, proposed summary execution.[14] The Americans insisted on a fair trial as a means of reforming Germany.[15]

The United Nations War Crimes Commission—without Soviet participation—bogged down in the scope of its mandate, with Belgian jurist Marcel de Baer and Czech legal scholar Bohuslav Ečer [cs] arguing for a broader definition of "war crime" that would include waging aggressive war.[16] In early 1945, American policymakers Henry L. Stimson, Edward Stettinius Jr., and Francis Biddle advised their government to convene an international tribunal to try the top Nazi leaders.[17][18] Borrowing from Trainin's ideas as well as the French legal concept of a criminal organization, they supported trying the Nazi leadership for aggression. At this time, the United Kingdom still opposed an international tribunal,[18][19] proposing instead a closed military hearing as an alternative to summary executions.[20] The exact form that retribution would take was left unresolved at the Yalta Conference in February 1945.[21] On 2 May at the San Francisco Conference, the United States' new president Harry S. Truman announced the formation an international military tribunal.[22] On 8 May, Germany surrendered unconditionally.[17]

Establishment[edit]

Legal basis[edit]

Main article: Charter of the International Military Tribunal
Aron Trainin (center, with mustache) speaks at the London Conference

At the London Conference, held from 26 June to 2 August 1945, representatives of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States negotiated over the exact form that the trial would take. Until the end of the negotiations, it was not clear that any trial would be held at all due to acrimonious disputes over fundamental matters; the American delegation threatened to walk out.[23] Ultimately, the Allies decided to hold the trial under modified common law.[24] The Nuremberg Charter strictly limited the jurisdiction of the court to the Axis powers in Europe because the Allies did not want to answer to an international court.[25] It was carefully drafted to avoid Allied failings such as the German–Soviet pact or slavery and segregation in the United States from coming to light.[26] Article 7 prevented the defendants from claiming immunity for their actions under the act of state doctrine,[27] and the plea of superior orders was left for the judges to decide.[28] Article 8 enabled the court to rule on the criminality of Nazi organizations. After legally establishing the criminality of these organizations, it would be possible to try their members for membership in lower-level courts.[28][29]

One key innovation of the charter was its holding of individuals, rather than states, responsible for breaches of international law. The offenses that would be prosecuted were crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.[30] At the conference, it was debated if wars of aggression were prohibited in existing international law.[31] Although war crimes already existed in international law as criminal violations of the laws and customs of war,[32] this did not cover some of the Nazis' most severe crimes, committed against German citizens on racial or political grounds.[33] "Crimes against humanity" had been mentioned in a 1915 declaration by the Allies in which they protested against the Armenian genocide,[34] and this term was repurposed to cover German atrocities that did not fall under the legal definition of war crimes.[33] The final version of the charter only gave the court the ability to punish those crimes against humanity that had been committed "in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal".[35] Although the French delegation wanted to stick to prosecuting war crimes proper to avoid seeming politicized, they were overruled.[36]

Despite extensive debate on the legal basis for the trial, the negotiators did not discuss historical narratives, which later led to inconsistencies between prosecutors.[26] The negotiators decided that the tribunal's permanent seat would be located in Berlin, while the first trials would be held at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg.[37] On 8 August, the final document was signed in London.[38] Nineteen countries ratified the charter and were admitted as observers.[39]

Judges and prosecutors[edit]

Judges sitting in Nuremberg, from left to right: Volchkov, Nikitchenko, Birkett, Lawrence, Biddle, Parker, Donnedieu de Vabres and Falco

Because the Soviet Union expected a show trial, its appointees were familiar with this form.[40] Initially, Iona Nikitchenko, who had presided over the Moscow trials, was planned to serve as the chief prosecutor, but he was replaced at the last minute by Roman Rudenko, a show trial prosecutor[41] chosen for his skill as an orator.[42] Nikitchenko was appointed the main Soviet judge with his alternate the obscure Soviet professor Aleksandr Volchkov.[43] The Soviet judges and prosecutors had to answer to Andrei Vyshinsky in Moscow via secret channels, and Vyshinsky had to consult with higher-ranking Soviet leaders including Stalin, making it difficult for the Soviet judges and prosecutors to adjust to events in Nuremberg and hampering their effort to set the agenda.[40] The Soviet personnel's lack of knowledge of English, lack of interpreters, unfamiliarity with diplomacy and international institutions also limited their influence.[44]

The United States' chief prosecutor was Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson.[45] The United States prosecution saw the crimes of the Nazi regime as a aberration of Westernness and sought to correct this deviation with a trial that would serve both retributive and educational purposes.[46] As the numerically strongest delegation, it would take on the bulk of the prosecution effort.[47] At Jackson's recommendation, the United States appointed judges Francis Biddle and John Parker.[48] The British chief prosecutor was Hartley Shawcross, assisted by David Maxwell Fyfe, who had been the attorney general in Churchill's government.[49] Although the main British judge Sir Geoffrey Lawrence (Lord Justice of Appeal) was the nominal president of the tribunal, in practice Biddle exercised more authority.[48] Norman Birkett, a Liberal MP, was the alternate judge for the United Kingdom.[48]

The French delegation initially consisted of 62 people and reached its largest size, 100, in January 1946.[50] The French prosecutor, François de Menthon, was the attorney general of France and had just overseen trials of the leaders of Vichy France;[38] he resigned in January 1946 and was replaced by Auguste Champetier de Ribes.[51] The French judges were Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, a professor of criminal law, and alternate Robert Falco, who had represented France at the London Conference.[43][51] The French government tried to appoint jurists who were not tainted by collaboration with the Vichy regime; some had been in the French resistance.[52][53]

Indictment[edit]

United States Army clerks with evidence collected for the Nuremberg trials

The work of drafting the indictment was divided up by the national delegations. The British worked on putting together the aggressive war charge; the French and Soviet delegations were assigned the task of covering crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the Western Front and the Eastern Front respectively. The United States delegation outlined the overall Nazi conspiracy and criminality of Nazi organizations.[54][55] After this division of the charges, the British and American delegations decided to work jointly in drafting the charges of conspiracy to wage aggressive war. On 17 September, the various delegations met to discuss the indictment.[56]

The charge of conspiracy was spearheaded by the United States prosecution and was less popular with the other Allies.[26] The conspiracy charge was used to charge the top Nazi leaders as well as bureaucrats who had never killed anyone or perhaps even directly ordered killing. It was also a way to indirectly charge crimes committed before the beginning of World War II, which the charter placed outside the court's jurisdiction.[57] Conspiracy charges were especially central to the cases against propagandists and industrialists; the former were charged with providing the ideological justification for war and other crimes, while the latter were accused of economic mobilization without which no war would have been possible.[58]

The problem of translating the indictment and evidence into the three official language of the tribunal and German were severe due to the scale of the task and difficulty recruiting interpreters, especially in the Soviet Union.[59] Vyshinsky demanded extensive corrections to the crimes against peace charges, especially regarding the role of the German–Soviet pact in the start of World War II.[60] Vyshinsky also insisted on listing the Katyn massacre as a crime committed by Germany, even though it was committed by the Soviet Union.[61][62] Jackson also rewrote the indictment with the intent of keeping the proceedings under American control by separating out an overall conspiracy charge from the other three charges.[63] The division of labor and the haste with which it was prepared resulted in duplication, imprecise language, and lack of attribution of specific charges to each defendant.[64]

Defendants[edit]

Main article: List of defendants at the International Military Tribunal
The defendants in the dock, guarded by American military police

Most of the defendants had surrendered to the United States Army, but the Soviet Union also held a few top Nazis, of whom only Admiral Erich Raeder and propagandist Hans Fritzsche were chosen for trial.[65][66] The French did not hold many potential defendants either, and only Konstantin von Neurath was chosen from their suggestions; Martin Bormann was tried in absentia.[65] The defendants, who were largely unrepentant,[67] included some of the most famous Nazis, including Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Wilhelm Keitel. Also represented were some leaders of the German economy, such as Gustav Krupp (of the conglomerate Krupp AG) and former Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht.[68] As late as October, Jackson demanded changes and expansion of the defendants list, but this was rejected.[69] In mid-October, the 24 defendants were served the indictment. Former Nazis were allowed to serve as counsel[47] and by mid-November all defendants had lawyers. The defendants' lawyers jointly appealed to the court, claiming it did not have jurisdiction against the accused, but this motion was rejected. The defense lawyers saw themselves as acting on behalf of their clients, but also the German nation.[70] In addition to natural persons, the following six organizations were also defendants at the trial: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the SS, the SD, and the General Staff and High Command of the Wehrmacht.[71]

Course of the trial[edit]

As Jackson made it clear, the purpose of the trial was not just to convict the defendants but also to assemble irrefutable evidence of Nazi crimes, establish individual responsibility and the crime of aggression in international law, offer a history lesson to the defeated Germans, and delegitimize the traditional German elite.[72] The American and British prosecutors focused on documentary evidence and affidavits rather than testimony from survivors, as the latter was considered less reliable and less liable to accusations of bias, but at the expense of reducing public interest in the proceedings.[73][74] Overall, the prosecution called 37 witnesses compared to the defense's 83, not including 19 defendants who testified on their own behalf.[74] The prosecution entered around 4,000 documents, 30 kilometres (19 mi) of film, and 25,000 photographs into evidence.[75]

Opening[edit]

Robert H. Jackson opens the prosecution case

The International Military Tribunal opened on 20 November 1945.[76] On 21 November, Jackson gave the opening speech for the prosecution.[77] He described the fact that the defeated Nazis received a trial as "one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason".[78] Jackson's focus was on the aggressive war charge, which he described as the root of the crimes against humanity and war crimes. He promoted an intentionalist view of the Nazi state and its overall conspiracy to commit all of the crimes mentioned in the indictment. The speech was favorably received by the prosecution, the tribunal, the audience, historians, and even the defendants.[79] The other prosecution statements partly complemented, partly contradicted Jackson's speech. While Jackson emphasized innovations in international law, Shawcross argued that none were necessary.[80] Rudenko listed a long list of crimes committed by the German occupiers against the Soviet people. The United States prosecution focused on the Nazi conspiracy that they argued dated to 1920, when the Nazi Party was founded.[81] In contrast, the French prosecution emphasized how Nazi ideology and pan-Germanism had led to the Nazis' crimes, and delved into the Sonderweg theory of Germany's development in the nineteenth century.[82]

American and British prosecution[edit]

"Nazi Concentration and Prison Camps" film produced by US armed forces and used as evidence.

On 29 November, the film Nazi Concentration and Prison Camps was screened because the American prosecution was unprepared to continue its presentation on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.[83]

French prosecution[edit]

France presented its charges and supporting evidence from 17 January to 7 February 1946.[84] The French prosecutors, more than their British or American counterparts, emphasized the guilt of the German people.[85] The French prosecutors barely mentioned the charge of aggressive war and instead focused on forced labor, economic plunder, massacres, and Germanization.[86] Unlike the British and American prosecution strategy, which focused on using German documents to make their case, the French prosecutors took the perspective of the victims, submitting postwar police reports and calling eleven witnesses.[87] Ultimately, the French prosecution was unable to convince the court that Germanization was a crime against humanity and incidents such as the German annexation of Alsace–Lorraine went unmentioned in the final verdict. The only part of the French charges that were accepted by the judges was the deportation of Jews from France and other parts of Western Europe.[88]

Soviet prosecution[edit]

On 8 February, the Soviet prosecution opened its case with a speech by Rudenko that covered all four prosecution charges, highlighting both aggressive war and the devastation of Eastern Europe.[89] Although the tribunal had accepted photocopied evidence from the other prosecution teams, Lawrence questioned the photocopied evidence entered by the Soviet prosecution. After a recess, it was decided to accept photocopied evidence but only when a certificate of their authenticity could be provided.[90] The next week, the Soviet prosecution suddenly produced former Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus, captured after the Battle of Stalingrad, as a witness and questioned him about the preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.[91] Paulus incriminated his former associates, pointing to Keitel, Jodl, and Göring as the defendants most responsible for the war.[92] The prosecution also questioned another German general, Erich Buschenhagen, about the preparations for the joint Finnish-German invasion of the Soviet Union, without mentioning the previous Soviet invasion of Finland.[93]

External video
video icon Atrocities Committed by the German Fascist Invaders in the USSR, 57 minutes; shown on 19 February 1946
video icon Testimony of Abraham Sutzkever, 27 February 1946

Inspired by the films shown by the American prosecution, the Soviet Union commissioned three films to enter as evidence: The German Fascist Destruction of the Cultural Treasures of the Peoples of the USSR, Atrocities Committed by the German Fascist Invaders in the USSR, The German Fascist Destruction of Soviet Cities, using footage from Soviet filmmakers as well as shots from German newsreels. The second film included shots from the liberation of Majdanek and the liberation of Auschwitz.[94] The Soviet Union also called two Holocaust survivors as witnesses, Samuel Rajzman—a Treblinka survivor—and poet Abraham Sutzkever, who eloquently described the murder of 80,000 Jews from Vilna, although their testimony did not directly incriminate any of the defendants.[95][96]

Defense[edit]

Over the course of the trial, Western judges allowed the defendants additional leeway to denounce the Soviet Union, which was ultimately revealed to be a co-conspirator in the outbreak of World War II.[97] The United States controlled the prison where the defendants and some of the witnesses were held, and tried its best to shut the Soviets out of the proceedings.[98] In the context of the brewing Cold War, the trial became a means of condemning not only Germany but also the Soviet Union.[99] Although the proceedings presented irrefutable evidence of Nazi crimes, including the Holocaust, different explanations of these events were presented. While some in the prosecution expounded upon how Germany had gone off course, others presented the Nazi elite as a deranged cult. This enabled some defendants seen as normal, such as Albert Speer, to distance themselves from the rest.[100]

Closing[edit]

In contrast to the opening prosecution statements, all eight closing statements highlighted the Holocaust and the French and British prosecutors made this the main charge, as opposed to aggression.[101] Throughout the proceedings, Jews were mentioned as victims of Nazi atrocities far more than any other group.[95]

Verdict[edit]

Newsreel of the sentencing

The International Military Tribunal agreed with the prosecution that aggression was the gravest charge against the accused, stating in its judgement that because war in general is evil, "To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."[1][102] These words, originally written in a letter by British judge Robert Wright,[1] have been widely quoted. The judgement found that there was a premeditated conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, whose goals were "the disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty of Versailles" and "the creation of a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers of 1914".[102]

The planning of aggression was traced to Hitler's 1925 book Mein Kampf and specific secret meetings held on 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, and 23 November 1939.[103] The court considered the planning of acts of aggression against against Austria and Czechoslovakia,[104] as well as wars of aggression against Poland,[105] Denmark and Norway,[106] Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg,[107] Yugoslavia, Greece,[108] and the Soviet Union,[109] as well as the declaration of war on the United States and prior encouragement of Japanese aggression against the United States.[110] All 22 defendants were charged with crimes against peace, and 12 were convicted: Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Rosenberg, Wilhelm Frick, Walther Funk, Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Alfred Jodl, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Konstantin von Neurath.[103]

The exact sentences to be allocated for each defendant were debated at length by the judges. Half of the defendants were sentenced to death.[111] All three acquittals (Papen, Schacht, and Fritzsche) were based on a deadlock between the judges and surprised observers. Despite being accused of the same crimes, Sauckel was sentenced to death while Speer was given a prison sentence because the judges considered that he could reform.[112]

The judgement was issued in English, French, and Russian, with all three versions being equally authoritative. There are discrepancies between the different language versions.[113]

Nuremberg Military Tribunals[edit]

Telford Taylor opens for the prosecution in the Ministries trial, 6 January 1948

Initially, it was planned to hold a second international tribunal for German industrialists, but this was never held because of differences between the Allies.[114] Twelve additional trials were heard before Nuremberg Military Tribunals convened solely by the United States, in the same courtroom that had hosted the International Military Tribunal.[115] These trials were held under Law No. 10 issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[116] Pursuant to this law, United States forces had arrested almost 100,000 Germans as war criminals.[117]

The trials judged the criminal actions of German professionals (Doctors' trial, Judges' trial, Ministries trial),[118] industrialists (Flick trial, IG Farben trial, Krupp trial),[119] the SS (Pohl trial, RuSHA trial, Einsatzgruppen trial),[120] and the military (Milch trial, Hostages trial, High Command trial).[121] These trials emphasized the crimes committed during the Holocaust.[122] The trials heard 1,300 witnesses and more than 30,000 documents in evidence and left 132,855 pages of transcript, with the judgements totaling 3,828 pages.[123] The trials targeted 177 defendants and obtained 142 convictions, including 25 death sentences;[124] the severity of sentencing was related to the defendant's proximity to mass murder.[125]

Contemporary reactions[edit]

Germans read Süddeutsche Zeitung reporting the verdict, 1 October 1946

During the two decades after the trial, opinions were predominantly negative.[126] The main legal criticisms of the trial focused on questions of retroactivity, selectivity, and jurisdiction. The most controversial charge was crimes against peace. The crimes against humanity charge, use of conspiracy, and imposing criminal penalties on individuals for breaches of international law also led to retroactive punishment but attracted less criticism.[127] Defenders did not consider the legal principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) to be binding in international proceedings, when the acts which were committed clearly violated morality or natural law at the time of their commission.[128] The selectivity charge—that the Allies had committed many of the same crimes as they tried the Nazis for, yet did not subject themselves to judgement—has been the most persistent criticism.[129]

Although the IMT evidence rejected collective guilt for the aggressive war charge, observers concluded that the German people must have known about the Holocaust as it was going on.[130] In a 1946 poll, 78 percent of Germans assessed the trial as fair, but four years later that rate had fallen to 38 percent with 30 percent considering it unfair.[131] Many Germans lumped criminal trials with denazification, internment, and confrontation with the concentration camps as illegitimate victor's justice and collective guilt.[132] The convicted war criminals came to be seen as martyrs of victor's justice, generating cross-party support for a complete amnesty.[133] By 1949, the Americans were hoping to use the offer of pardon to convicted war criminals in order to bind West Germany into the Western Bloc.[134] Almost all prisoners were released by the end of the 1950s.[135]

In France, the verdict met with outrage from the media and especially from organizations for deportees and resistance fighters, as it was perceived as too lenient.[136] In the United Kingdom, although a variety of responses were reported, it was difficult to sustain interest in a long trial.[137]

Legacy[edit]

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in session, 2009

The International Military Tribunal, and the drafters of its charter, invented international criminal law essentially from nothing.[138][139][140] The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo trial) borrowed many of its ideas from the IMT, including all four charges.[141] On 11 December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution affirming the criminal liability for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity regardless of state immunity. In 1950, the International Law Commission drafted the Nuremberg principles to codify the legal basis for the trial, although these principles were not adopted until the 1990s. Further developments in international criminal law in the aftermath of the trials included the Genocide Convention (1948) and Fourth Geneva Convention (1949).[142]

In the 1990s, a revival of international criminal law included the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), which were widely seen as part of the legacy of Nuremberg and the Tokyo trial. The Rome Statute establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), which had been proposed in 1953, was finally agreed in 1998.[143][144] The ad hoc tribunals excluded aggression from the crimes that could be prosecuted, as did the ICC until a definition of the crime was fixed at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010.[145][146] Despite its role at Nuremberg, the United States later adopted a critical view of international criminal law.[147]

The trials were the first use of simultaneous interpretation and stimulated technical advances in translation methods.[148][149] The Palace of Justice houses a museum on the trial and courtroom became a tourist attraction, drawing 13,138 visitors in 2005.[150] The IMT is one of the most well-studied trials in history, and has been the subject of an abundance of books and scholarly publications, along with motion pictures such as Judgment at Nuremberg (1961) and The Memory of Justice (1976).[151][152]

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  106. ^ Sayapin 2014, pp. 154–155.
  107. ^ Sayapin 2014, pp. 155–156.
  108. ^ Sayapin 2014, pp. 156–157.
  109. ^ Sayapin 2014, pp. 157–159.
  110. ^ Sayapin 2014, p. 159.
  111. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 145.
  112. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 146.
  113. ^ Acquaviva 2011, pp. 886–887.
  114. ^ Hirsch 2020, pp. 353, 400.
  115. ^ Heller 2011, p. 1.
  116. ^ Heller 2011, pp. 11–12.
  117. ^ Heller 2011, p. 12.
  118. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 308.
  119. ^ Heller 2011, pp. 3, 4.
  120. ^ Priemel 2016, pp. 296, 298.
  121. ^ Priemel 2016, pp. 247, 310.
  122. ^ Heller 2011, pp. 1, 4.
  123. ^ Heller 2011, p. 4.
  124. ^ Heller 2011, pp. 1–2.
  125. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 306.
  126. ^ Sellars 2010, p. 1091.
  127. ^ Sellars 2010, p. 1089.
  128. ^ Acquaviva 2011, pp. 898–899.
  129. ^ Sellars 2010, p. 1090.
  130. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 150.
  131. ^ Weinke 2006, p. 99.
  132. ^ Weinke 2006, p. 100.
  133. ^ Weinke 2006, pp. 105–107.
  134. ^ Weinke 2006, p. 105.
  135. ^ Weinke 2006, p. 111.
  136. ^ Gemählich 2019, 27, 34.
  137. ^ Sharples 2013, pp. 46–47.
  138. ^ Sellars 2013, p. 67.
  139. ^ Sayapin 2014, p. 148.
  140. ^ Heller 2011, p. 3.
  141. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 412.
  142. ^ Weinke 2006, p. 117.
  143. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 7.
  144. ^ Mouralis 2019, p. 207.
  145. ^ Tomuschat 2006, p. 842.
  146. ^ Sellars 2013, pp. 290, 293.
  147. ^ Mouralis 2019, pp. 206–207.
  148. ^ Acquaviva 2011, p. 896.
  149. ^ Hirsch 2020, p. 114.
  150. ^ Sharples 2013, p. 31.
  151. ^ Priemel 2016, p. 16.
  152. ^ Sharples 2013, pp. 31–32.

Sources[edit]

See also: Nuremberg Trials bibliography

Books[edit]

  • Brüggemann, Jens (2018). Männer von Ehre?: die Wehrmachtgeneralität im Nürnberger Prozess 1945/46 : zur Entstehung einer Legende (in German). Ferdinand Schöningh. ISBN 978-3-506-79259-4.
  • Heller, Kevin Jon (2011). The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-923233-8.
  • Hirsch, Francine (2020). Soviet Judgment at Nuremberg: A New History of the International Military Tribunal after World War II. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-937795-4.
  • Mouralis, Guillaume (2019). Le moment Nuremberg: Le procès international, les lawyers et la question raciale [The Nuremberg moment: The international trial, the lawyers and the racial question] (in French). Presses de Sciences Po. ISBN 978-2-7246-2422-9.
  • Priemel, Kim Christian (2016). The Betrayal: The Nuremberg Trials and German Divergence. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-256374-3.
  • Sayapin, Sergey (2014). The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, Comparative Analysis and Present State. T.M.C. Asser Press. ISBN 978-90-6704-927-6.
  • Sellars, Kirsten (2013). 'Crimes Against Peace' and International Law. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-02884-5.
  • Sharples, Caroline (2013). "Holocaust on Trial: Mass Observation and British Media Responses to the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945–1946". Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War and Genocide. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 31–50. ISBN 978-1-137-35077-0.
  • Weinke, Annette (2006). Die Nürnberger Prozesse [The Nuremberg trials] (in German). C.H.Beck. ISBN 978-3-406-53604-5.

Journal articles[edit]

External links[edit]

source: https://web.archive.org/web/20220310053053/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_trials

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