Trichome

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Topic codeArea of conflictDecision linked to
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=aa}}politics, ethnic relations, and conflicts involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, or bothWikipedia:General sanctions/Armenia and Azerbaijan
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=crypto}}blockchain and cryptocurrenciesWikipedia:General sanctions/Blockchain and cryptocurrencies
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=kurd}}Kurds and KurdistanWikipedia:General sanctions/Kurds and Kurdistan
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=mj}}Michael JacksonWikipedia:General sanctions/Michael Jackson
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=pw}}professional wrestlingWikipedia:General sanctions/Professional wrestling
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=rusukr}}the Russo-Ukrainian WarWikipedia:General sanctions/Russo-Ukrainian War
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=sasg}}South Asian social groupsWikipedia:General sanctions/South Asian social groups
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=syria}}the Syrian Civil War and ISILWikipedia:General sanctions/Syrian Civil War and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=uku}}measurement units in the United KingdomWikipedia:General sanctions/Units in the United Kingdom
{{People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran|topic=uyghur}}Uyghurs, Uyghur genocide, or topics that are related to Uyghurs or Uyghur genocideWikipedia:General sanctions/Uyghur genocide

Rough word count of each section

In order to determine which sections need the most trimming we have to consider two things: 1) how much coverage are we giving the topic and 2) how much coverage a topic receives in literature. I'm doing #1 here:

  • Lead: 639 words
  • Other names: 139 words
  • History: 8457 words
    • Overview: 1365 words
    • Founding: 575 words
    • Schism: 801 words
    • Political phase: 610 words
    • Conflict with the Islamic Republic: 2333 words
    • Post-war Saddam era: 731 words
    • Post-U.S. invasion of Iraq: 1169 words
    • Settlement in Albania: 790 words
  • Ideology: 2124 words
  • Membership: 387 words
  • Designation as a terrorist organization: 1103 words
  • Designation as a cult: 342 words
  • Assassinations: 681 words
  • Intelligence and misinformation campaign against the MEK: 1067 words
  • Assassination of MEK members outside Iran: 268 words
  • Islamic Republic of Iran allegations against the MEK: 457 words
  • Ties to foreign and non-state actors: 260 words
  • Intelligence and operational capabilities: 254 words
  • Propaganda campaign: 469 words
  • Human rights record: 809 words
  • Fundraising: 494 words
  • Perception: 654 words

VR talk 20:46, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks VR, but how can we determine #2? I believe it's not that easy. Do you have any suggestions? --Mhhossein talk 04:36, 25 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vanamonde93, what does policy say in terms of how much size we are giving to each section? It seems WP:WEIGHT should guide that discussion? Someguy1221 (an admin) said seemed to favor using sources that give a broad overview to determine weight. If so, we can first compile a list of such sources and use them.VR talk 23:14, 27 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Correct, WP:DUE is the relevant policy. Someguy is of course correct that broad sources are best to determine due weight; media sources and very specific analyses are useful for detail, but less useful for determinining due weight (of course, some recent details may only be covered in media sources). Specifics of how long each section should be are a content-decision that I will not comment on. Vanamonde (Talk) 20:22, 28 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

RfC follow-up

In closure of the last RfC on cult claims, Chetsford encouraged us to "open a new and more focused discussion as to whether or not the just-adopted shortened form should be modified in the way suggested by VK [VR]."

My proposal is given below and would replace "Designation as a cult" section. Currently that section has 342 words (2200 characters). My proposal would reduce it to 227 words (1600 characters). Please give specific feedback on what is good about it, what is not good about it, and how the not good part can be changed. Please do not simply "support" or "oppose" it, this is not a vote. Proposal:

The MEK has been described as a "cult" by governments and officials in Iran, the United States,[1] France,[2] United Kingdom,[3] and Iraq.[4] It has also been described as a cult by numerous academics,[5][6][7][8][9] by former MEK members who defected,[10][11] and by journalists who visited MEK camps in Iraq.[12][13] Some sources argue that the Iranian government regularly exploits such allegations to demonize the MEK.[14][15][16]

According to a US government report, the MEK had "many of the typical characteristics of a cult, such as authoritarian control, confiscation of assets, sexual control (including mandatory divorce and celibacy), emotional isolation, forced labour, sleep deprivation, physical abuse and limited exit options".[17] Critics often describe the MEK as the "cult of Rajavi",[18][19] arguing that it revolves around the husband-and-wife duo, Maryam and Massoud Rajavi,[18][20] to whom members must give "near-religious devotion".[21] Members reportedly had to participate in regular "ideological cleansings".[22] Members are forbidden from marrying and those already married were ordered to divorce and are not allowed to see their children.[23][24] They must suppress all sexual thoughts.[25] According to RAND Corporation members were lured in through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries" and then prevented from leaving.[21]

The MEK is believed to have become a cult to survive.[26][27] After a major defeat in 1990, MEK leadership ordered all couples to divorce and send away their children.[25][17]

I am very willing to compromise the text of this proposal to reach consensus. I would be grateful if an outside party (polite mentions of Chetsford, Vanamonde93 and Fences and windows) can help guide our discussion. If this discussion stalls, my next step would be WP:DRN.VR talk 16:32, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

VR: you are overlooking the main issues with this section: the title, counter views, summary of major points (removing redundancy). For over a year now we've known that the title "Designation as a cult" is not supported by a single source (which would make this heading WP:OR and WP:ATTACK); yet it has not been changed despite my efforts to correct this. You are also not acknowledging the many RSs available that say the IRI pays international press to discredit the MEK through propaganda (which, among other things, involve characterizing the MEK as a cult). Vanamonde already suggested the article is "twice as long as it should be, and is mired in allegations, counter-allegations, and denials by all parties involved" (here is another list of recommendations complied by Idealigic that Vanamonde made to help us fix the article). Let's summarize this text with views on both sides of the argument, remove the misleading heading, and put this text in another section where it makes more sense (like "Perception"; which is what Vanamonde and Bahar have suggested). That is what I'd support. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 17:31, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Stefka, I did not propose (in this section) a name or location for the text. I proposed replacing what I feel is poorly written text with better written text. In my proposed text I did include a sentence on Iran exploiting cult allegations to demonize the MEK. Once again, what specifically do you dislike here?VR talk 18:38, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I was specific in last comment. If it hasn't been obvious already by the countless talk page discussions here, I'll make it obvious now: for a long time there has been relentless attempts to change the narrative of this page, from the MEK being the Islamic Republic's main democratic political opposition, into the MEK "being nothing more than a cult" (the same narrative that the Islamic Republic has spent millions in getting the international press to say about the MEK). I really don't understand why that has been tolerated here. It wouldn't have been tolerated with a Western political group; there are many sources calling the Trump administration a "Cult" ([1] [2] [3] [4] etc...); yet there isn't a single mention about that in that article, and rightly so. Your proposed "better written text" does just that: compiles allegations of entities that have called the MEK a cult, even though there have been US, UK, France officials dismissing such claims (something you fail to say in your version). You're also WP:IDHT the issue with the title. To close, your text uses cherry picked sentences from cherry picked sources to give prominence to a narrative that the MEK is a nothing more than a cult, and that's the equivalent of using Wikipedia as a platform for mischaracterisation. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:39, 23 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Stefka Bulgaria you yourself admitted, after input from Vanamonde, that none of the sources "dismissed" claims that MEK was a cult. I don't believe I cherrypicked sources. I have yet to find a single scholarly source that says MEK is not a cult. Which scholarly sources have I missed on this topic? VR talk 13:12, 23 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
VR, you keep responding with WP:IDHT. To put it another way (and that's the last I'll say here) I could use the sources I provided here on the Donald Trump administration being called a cult, and create a narrative (even a section titled "Designation as a cult", as it has happened here) on that article saying the Trump administration is a cult. But obviously, that wouldn't fly. Yet, you are trying to do just that here. Through RfC consensus, we determined to summarise a vast amount of POV pushing into "The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"."[337][338] Various sources have also described the MEK as a “cult”,[339][340] “cult-like",[341][342] or having a “cult of personality”,[343][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[344][345][346]. We really don't need more than this in the article (Vanamonde has been repeating that the article needs to be summarised). Yet here you continue to try to develop a narrative that the MEK is a cult (as well as that the MEK is unpopular). That infringes WP:NPOV.Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 13:54, 23 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Stefka Bulgaria I am trying to reduce the size: the current version is 342 words (2200 characters), my proposal is 227 words (1600 characters). Unless my word counts are wrong, you seem to have misunderstood. Consider that Ghazaalch just pointed out an entire chapter devoted to MEK's cultishness in the RAND report, and I recently found a book that extensively covers MEK's cultishness (that book is published by Routledge and got a positive review in the Journal of Mental Health). I think 1600 characters (just 0.6% of the article size) is a fair proposal.VR talk 17:27, 23 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • @Stefka Bulgaria: It seems that you would like to summarize the section "Designation as a Cult" to Various sources have described the MEK as a “cult”,[339][340] “cult-like",[341][342] or having a “cult of personality”,[343][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[344][345][346] which roughly means Some say MEK is a cult and some say no. Is it the way people write an article? Shouldn't we explain different aspects of cultic characteristics of MeK to the readers who want to know why MEK is called a cult, and why some others say it is not a cult? So I am going to use the chapter Cultic Characteristics of the MeK in the RAND report to improve this section, as I proposed below. Ghazaalch (talk) 04:57, 24 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • While the suggestion is brief enough – in accordance with the consensus among the users – it is in accordance with WP:DUE and hence WP:NPOV by mentioning all the major viewpoints mentioned by the reliable sources. Digging through the comments, there's NO compelling argument why these well-sourced but brief material should be included in the text. --Mhhossein talk 04:48, 1 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Moreover, I think this version is highly in accordance with the notion by Someguy (that's endorsed by Vanamonde) since VR's version takes the "broad sources" to determine due weight. --Mhhossein talk 04:54, 1 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • At the previous RFC, the matter/suggestion of VR is completely reasonable -- according to the comment of the administrator who closed the previous discussion. This suggestion specifically complies with WP: DUE and WP: Verifiability policies. Not only the current version is brief, but also due to the agreement between all users to use scholarly-sources, this version makes good use of those sources and expresses very important content without mentioning unnecessary details. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:22, 8 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The most neutral version is the one that already received consensus through the RfC. If VR is interested in cleaning up the article from redundancy, then why not focus on the "Human Rights record" section? There is a lot of redundancy there. Idealigic (talk) 16:16, 8 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
What is clear is that the sources disagree with you. In truth, I mean that the decision for neutrality ought to be based on sources. Deleting some outstanding views can make neutrality problem. Currently, the outstanding comments have been removed. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 06:19, 11 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • This proposal has many problems. It isn’t neutral. It starts with the “governments and officials” that described the MEK as a “cult”. What about the government officials that have negated these allegations? The same thing with “academics”, “journalists”, and the rest. Also “former MEK members who defected” - have you read the Disinformation through recruited MEK members in the article? Also it’s not that the Iranian government “regularly exploits such allegations to demonize the MEK”, the Iranian government makes up these allegations and pays the press to publish them through a disinformation campaign ([28][29][30]). This proposal focuses on all the sources that call the MEK a cult, and leaves out all the ones that say these allegations are disinformation from the Iranian government. It violates neutrality guidelines. I am in favor of making that section shorter, but this is not the way to do it. Barca (talk) 12:40, 9 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Barca can you present the sources that deny that MEK is a cult? I provided 15 scholarly sources that describe MEK as a cult (Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran#Scholarly sources describe MEK as a cult). How many scholarly sources say that it is not? If you can't find a similar number of scholarly sources that deny the cult allegation then your argument amounts to WP:FALSEBALANCE.VR talk 02:09, 13 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I have already given sources in my last comment (and linked to sections with even more sources). You can also see the sources Mhhossein removed from the article that say the Iranian regime pays the press to say the MEK is a cult, and you can see the past discussions where editors have talked about this, like this RFC for example, where Nika2020 provided sources like these.
  • "retired US general saying "Cult? How about admirably focused group?".[31]
  • "Former French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal criticized the MEK for having a ″cult nature”; while Former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that he was “ashamed” by this statement.[32]
  • "Despite these, Rudy Guiliani, president Trump's personal lawyer, addressed a meeting of the MEK at their Tirana compound, saying: "And if you think that's a cult, then there is something wrong with you".
  • "An investigation by the European Parliament and the U.S. military concluded that the accusations of it being a cult were unfounded: "the European Parliament’s report uncovered falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence".[33] According to Raymond Tanter, "Tehran uses allegations that the MEK is a 'cult' as propaganda to target liberal democracies, attempting to persuade them to refrain from providing support to the MEK",[34] not addressing claims of being a cult by various journalists.".
That amounts to a lot of sources. Barca (talk) 23:51, 19 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
We were actually expecting to see scholarly sources on your part. It is clear that these claims can safely be ignored in the face of the strong scholarly sources provided by me and Vice Regent. --Mhhossein talk 07:23, 24 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent: Do you have comments on this? --Mhhossein talk 13:01, 23 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

BarcrMac recently Vanamonde closed an RfC where they said The sources presented below using the "cult" descriptor are patently more reliable than those challenging that descriptor. That RfC included the very sources you mentioned above. Do you have any other objections to the proposal?VR talk 22:23, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • "The MEK is believed to have become a cult to survive"? Then " Critics often describe the MEK as the "cult of Rajavi" That is only two sources that have said this according to what you've provided. Then all the things you write about marriage? why? it's already starting to look like the other section about 'Ideological revolution and women's rights'. Would it be acceptable if I propose a way to shorten this section that is not as biased? Bahar1397 (talk) 19:25, 5 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Bahar1397 I provided 15 scholarly sources that call MEK a cult, in which 7 scholarly sources refer to it as either "Rajavi cult" or "cult of personality [around Rajavi]". Is that not enough?VR talk 17:25, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
My objection with your proposal, VR, os that it isn't neutral. It starts with the “governments and officials” that described the MEK as a “cult”, when there are other government officials that negated these allegations. The same thing with “academics”, “journalists”, and the rest. Also “former MEK members who defected” (see Disinformation through recruited MEK members). Like I already said, this proposal focuses on all the sources that call the MEK a cult, and leaves out all the ones that say these allegations are disinformation from the Iranian government. It violates neutrality guidelines. I am in favor of making that section shorter, but if we do that, it also needs to be neutral, which now it clearly lacks.

Here are balancing sources copy pasted from other posts:

1* "The United States Congress, United States House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Affairs published an enquiry on derogatory descriptions of the MEK, including "cult"-like allegations. The enquiry found that since 1979, the Iranian government had gone through "extraordinary lengths to shape the international perception and narrative attached to the MEK/PMOI", adding that for years, MOIS had conducted an "information operations' campaign in the West aimed at discrediting and defaming the MEK/PMOI.""[35]

2* "According to Majid Rafizadeh, there is an organized and well-funded misinformation campaign aimed at demonizing the MEK.[36] On July 5, 2010, during a testimony at the Canadian Parliament, John Thompson (head of the Mackenzie Institute) stated that he had been offered $80,000 by a man tied to Iran's mission in Canada, adding that "they wanted me to publish a piece on the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). Iran is trying to get other countries to label it as a terrorist cult.”"[37][38]

3* "A 2011 report by the General Intelligence and Security Service stated that the government in Iran continued to coordinate a campaign financed by the Iranian intelligence services to undermine and portray the MEK in a highly negative manner. This campaign also involved the media, politicians, and public servants."[39]

4* "According to reports by Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Ministry of Intelligence (Iran)'s main focus (in Iran and abroad) is to monitor and combat the main political opposition, and as of 2016, the Iranian intelligence service continued with its strategy of discrediting the MEK through propaganda."[40]

5* "Political scientist Dr. Majid Rafizadeh stated that “The Iranian regime has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to demonize the PMOI and portrayed it as a group without popular support.”[41]

6* "According to Hamid Bahrami the Iranian regime has ran "a vast and costly demonization campaign against the main Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran", adding that Iran's propaganda against the MEK has spread also in Western and Middle Eastern media."[42]

7*"retired US general saying "Cult? How about admirably focused group?".[43]

8*"Former French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal criticized the MEK for having a ″cult nature”; while Former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that he was “ashamed” by this statement.[44]

9*"Despite these, Rudy Guiliani, president Trump's personal lawyer, addressed a meeting of the MEK at their Tirana compound, saying: "And if you think that's a cult, then there is something wrong with you".

10*"An investigation by the European Parliament and the U.S. military concluded that the accusations of it being a cult were unfounded: "the European Parliament’s report uncovered falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence".[45] According to Raymond Tanter, "Tehran uses allegations that the MEK is a 'cult' as propaganda to target liberal democracies, attempting to persuade them to refrain from providing support to the MEK",[46] not addressing claims of being a cult by various journalists.". Barca (talk) 23:50, 5 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

These "denies " that you mentioned above, have been denied by sources more reliable than what you provided above. According to RAND report for example, MEK's supporters "vigorously deny that the MeK is a cult. They allege that former MeK members and critics of the MeK are either Iranian agents or their dupes. However, interviews with U.S. military and civilian officials, information voluntarily furnished by former MeK members at the ARC, and visits to Camp Ashraf suggest that these denials are not credible. The cult characteristics described in this appendix have been widely reported by former MeK members and by Human Rights Watch.(For example, see Singleton, 2003; Banisadr, 2004, Iran-Interlink, undated, 2008; and Human Rights Watch, 2005. For typical characteristics of cults, see, e.g., Bale, 2001; Lalich, 2004; and Lalich and Langone, undated.) They have also been substantiated, at least in part, by interviews with JIATF-Ashraf officers and by information volunteered by former MeK members at the ARC.[47] Ghazaalch (talk) 14:12, 6 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Responding to the ping below from Vice Regent. I don't personally give two hoots whether the MEK is called a cult or not, or how its organizational aspects are analyzed in this article. However, given weighty sources making a given argument, e.g., the MEK shares organizational aspects of a cult, anyone disputing that narrative needs to provide equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions. In particular, academic sources need to be answered by academic sources. I am particularly tired of "The MEK is the subject of propaganda by the Iranian government" being used to stonewall any and all criticism. Reliable sources discussing such propaganda belong in the article, duly weighted, but they are not directly germane to this discussion unless they are explicitly also discussing the cult-like nature, or lack thereof, of the MEK. Vanamonde (Talk) 20:00, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@VR: What is it that you're trying to add to the article, that isn't already in the article? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:41, 13 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
As TheTimesAreAChanging correctly points out, the current version (that you wrote) "grossly minimizes the many cult-like features of the MEK described in academic sources". Scholars are clear that MEK is a cult. Vanamonde's analysis of sources is consistent with this. At this point any attempts to impede this consensus are WP:IDONTLIKEIT and WP:STONEWALLING.VR talk 02:52, 25 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I would also like to add MEK's ideological revolution during which its members had to surrender their individuality to the organization,[2][3] to the lead, since it was omitted based on the same accusation. Ghazaalch (talk) 06:44, 25 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VR: We currently have this much in the article about this (in an article that Vanamonde has said repeated times needs trimming):

  • Critics have described the group as "resembling a cult".
  • The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"." Various sources have also described the MEK as a “cult”, “cult-like", or having a “cult of personality”,[353][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".
  • According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Masoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution", which required members an increased study and devotion that later expanded into "near religious devotion to the Rajavis". After its settlement in Iraq, however, it experienced a shortfall of volunteers. This led to the recruitment of members including Iranian dissidents, as well as Iranian economic migrants in countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq". MEK also gave free visit trips to its camps to the relatives of the members. According to the RAND report, the recruited members were mostly brought by MEK into Iraq illegally and then were asked to submit their identity documents for "safekeeping", an act which would "effectively trap" them. With the assistance of Saddam's government, MEK also recruited some of its members from the Iranian prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war. During the second phase of the ideological revolution, all members were forced to surrender their individuality to the organization.
  • Five weeks later, the MEK announced that its Politburo and Central Committee had asked Rajavi and Azondalu, who was already married, to marry one another to deepen and pave the way for the "ideological revolution. At the time Maryam Azodanlu was known as only the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi. According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate this 'great revolution'. According to Ervand Abrahamian "in the eyes of traditionalists, particularly among the bazaar middle class, the whole incident was indecent. It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister. It involved women with young children and wives of close friends – a taboo in traditional Iranian culture;" something that further isolated the Mojahedin and also upset some members of the organization. Also according to Ervand Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."[297] Many criticized Maryam Azodanlu's giving up her own maiden name (something most Iranian women did not do and she herself had not done in her previous marriage). They would question whether this was in line with her claims of being a staunch feminist.
  • In 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki told the MEK it had to leave Iraq, but the MEK responded that the "request violated their status under the Geneva Convention". Al-Maliki and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice maintained that the MEK had committed human rights abuses in the early 1990s when it aided Saddam Hussain's campaign against the Shia uprising. According to Time magazine, the MEK has denied aiding Saddam in quashing Kurdish and Shia rebellions.
  • In a 2004 public release, Amnesty International stated it continues to receive reports[by whom?] of human rights violations carried out by the MEK against its own members.[445] In 2018, Amnesty International also condemned the government of Iran for executing MEK prisoners in 1988 and presented the MEK as being mainly peaceful political dissidents despite reports that they have killed thousands of Iranians and Iraqis since 1981.
  • In May 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report named "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps", describing prison camps run by the MEK and severe human rights violations committed by the group against its members, ranging from prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that in two cases led to death. However, disagreements over this provided evidence has been expressed.
  • The report prompted a response by the MEK and four European MPs named "Friends of a Free Iran" (FOFI), who published a counter-report in September 2005.[448] They stated that HRW had "relied only on 12 hours [sic] interviews with 12 suspicious individuals", and stated that "a delegation of MEPs visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq" and "conducted impromptu inspections of the sites of alleged abuses". Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (PP), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, said that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was the source of the evidence against the MEK.[448] In a letter of May 2005 to HRW, the senior US military police commander responsible for the Camp Ashraf area, Brigadier General David Phillips, who had been in charge during 2004 for the protective custody of the MEK members in the camp, disputed the alleged human rights violations.[449] Former military officers who had aided in guarding the MEK camp in Iraq said "its members had been free to leave since American military began protecting it in 2003." The officers said they had not found any prison or torture facilities.
  • Human Rights Watch released a statement in February 2006, stating: "We have investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the [No Exit] report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted". It provided responses to the FOFI document, whose findings "have no relevance" to the HRW report.
  • In July 2013, the United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, accused the leaders the group of human rights abuses, an allegation the MEK dismissed as "baseless" and "cover-up". The United Nations spokesperson defended Kobler and his allegations, stating: "We regret that MEK and its supporters continue to focus on public distortions of the U.N.'s efforts to promote a peaceful, humanitarian solution on Camp Ashraf and, in particular, its highly personalized attacks on the U.N. envoy for Iraq".
  • Hyeran Jo, in her work examining humanitarian violations of rebel groups to international law, states that the MEK has not accepted International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits to its detention centers.[452] According to Ronen A. Cohen, the MEK controlled their people most importantly by "abuse of women".[428] According to criticism of Human Right groups, marriage had been banned in the camp.[453] Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in ideology and a revisionist history of Iran. All members are required to participate in weekly "ideologic cleansings".
  • Journalist Jason Rezaian remarked in his detailing the connections between John R. Bolton and the MEK that "the few who were able to escape" were "cut off from their loved ones, forced into arranged marriages, brainwashed, sexually abused, and tortured".[455][456] Members who defected from the MEK and some experts say that these Mao-style self-criticism sessions are intended to enforce control over sex and marriage in the organization as a total institution.[270] MEK denied the brainwashing claims and described the former members as Iranian spies,[313] also saying that "any cult' comparisons were coming from the Iranian regime as part of its 'misinformation campaign.'"
  • Some MEK defectors have accused the MEK of human right abuses, while the MEK has denied these claims saying they are part of a misinformation campaign by the Iranian regime.
  • In March 2019 a Hamburg court ruled that Der Spiegel had "acted illegally in publishing false allegations of 'torture' and 'terrorist training' by the MEK in Albania". In July 2020 a German court ordered the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to remove false information about the MEK including untrue reports of human right abuses by the MEK against its members.

As this shows, the article has been filled with text suggestive of so-called MEK cult attributes. This should be summarized in a more clear manner, but you are trying to add more instead. So I need to ask again: what is it that you are trying to add that isn't already in the article? Once you provide that response, I'll do my best to offer a compromise proposing a trim of what you are trying to add together with what's already in the article. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:02, 25 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I have been trying to clean up some of this, but Mhhossein won't accept any of my proposals or propose anything himself even though he agrees that this needs trimming. Isn't that WP:IDONTLIKEIT and WP:STONEWALLING? All this content should be in one place and trimmed to keep the most important points only. That is the guiding format used for most Wikipedia articles and it is common sense editing. - MA Javadi (talk) 16:20, 25 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
You were actually trying to mass remove the section and could not justify your proposal even after I asked you multiple times to explain yourself. You even did not follow my offer for compromise. @Stefka Bulgaria: Please focus on the "Cult of personality" section. Also, you need to are responsible here for falsely bringing irrelevant items to our attention. Look at your bullets #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #12 and #13. The mentioned items are not even talking about cultish/cult-like aspects of the group. Can you please stop stonewalling the consensus building process? Given the Vanamonde93's comment, and your failure to find and present "equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions", VR's suggestion needs to be implemented. --Mhhossein talk 06:22, 4 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Looking at that TP discussion, I see MA Javadi justifying and proposing solutions (see here, here here); and even asking Mhhossein for solutions (see here, here, here, here, etc.) - but Mhhossein seems to be sidestepping any form of compromise. In this discussion here, I'm asking what is VR trying to include that isn't already in the article. We all seem to be in agreement that the article is too long and has a redundancy problem, correct? Here is a chance to sum up all the allegations concerning the MEK's "cult of personality" traits in a concise and clear manner. If we all agree that that's what we want to do here, then I propose the following: include only information about who has made these claims, what do the "personality cult" traits involve (summary), and what opposing POVs have said about this. Once this has been determined, we can remove any other redundancy about this (which the article is filled with as I've pointed out above). Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 09:16, 4 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
If you are not sidestepping any form of compromise please stop stonewalling the already built consensus here. What to be covered is largely determined by the reliable sources. It seems there's not further serious objection against the proposal here. --Mhhossein talk 14:41, 4 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Sidenote: Why are you and MA Javadi trying to change this topic to an irrelevant subject? In that discussion MA Javadi was only seeking to mass remove the content without trying to explain which portions are redundant. I showed his suggestion was POVish and I offered him solutions for reaching compromise a couple of times (including here). --Mhhossein talk 14:41, 4 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Soon I will offer a compromise between VR's, Stefka's, and my proposal. I need to prepare it first. - MA Javadi (talk) 18:13, 4 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Look, Vice regent's proposal covers MEK's cultish nature and has nothing to do with yours being regarding MEK's human rights record. You and Stefka Bulgaria are stonewalling the discussion by skewing this topic. Stop this before it's too late. VR's proposal will be implemented according to this comment by Vanamonde93. --Mhhossein talk 01:09, 7 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Clear statement that MEK is a cult, period

Stefka Bulgaria keeps asking me what is VR trying to include that isn't already in the article. Well currently the article doesn't state anywhere that "MEK is a personality cult", period. We have overwhelming scholarly consensus that it is (Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive_42#Scholarly sources describe MEK as a cult). The article should reflect that. This is just one of the things that is not in the article, but I'm making a new subsection because I don't want this point to get overlooked.VR talk 01:29, 7 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Clarification: My exact proposal is to add "MEK is widely regarded as a cult of personality". The attribution is important as per MOS:TERRORIST as Idealigic and Mhhossein correctly pointed out below.VR talk 04:08, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I see a section titled "Cult of personality" in the article. The article reflects that already. Barca (talk) 13:38, 8 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I don't see any sentences in the article that clearly say that. An article's sentences ought to reflect section titles. So if there's no substantive objective, I'll go ahead and put that in the article.VR talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Like Stefka said before, the sentences Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult", "cult-like", or having a "cult of personality" already address this. "Cult of personality" also makes this insinuation. If you do not agree, you can start a RFC. I have seen enough reliable sources in this talk page to challenge what you are trying to do. Idealigic (talk) 13:05, 3 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Admin Vanamonde has pointed out twice that sources that consider MEK to be a cult are more reliable and should be given more WP:WEIGHT. If you disagree, lets take it to WP:RSN. Given the multitude of sources here and more below, I'm going to go ahead and make this clear in the article. Enough stonewalling!VR talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Just came across a few more scholarly sources that consider MEK to be a cult:

  • "Gradually, the MEK has lost much of its appeal to the masses and has evolved into something similar to a religious cult that demanded absolute loyalty to the leadership."[48]
  • "Its evolution into a cult demanding absolute loyalty to its husband-wife leadrship has detracted immensely from the movement's credibility in Iran."[49]
  • "...the MEK has evolved into a religious cult, not a transparent and democratic resistance movement."[50]

VR talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Vanamonde's input was done before you even made clear what it was that you were trying to add to the article and RSN is used to enquire about if a source is reliable or not. You are trying put a contentious MOS:TERRORIST label as something that isn't challenged, and there are many problems with that ("Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult", "cult-like", or having a "cult of personality"" already address this. "Cult of personality" also makes this insinuation.) You can start a RFC like other editors have been doing here. Despite the GAMING around RFCs you and Mhhossein are trying to do, your edits are not above RFC consensus building. Idealigic (talk) 08:56, 8 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vanamonde's comment was clearly made after VR clarified his suggestion and comments were exchanged between the editors. Also, there is no "label" concern, since VR's suggestion is making proper attributions to scholarly reliable sources. Materials supported by scholarly sources need to be weighed much more than others. I would suggest Vice Regent going ahead with implementing this consensus. --Mhhossein talk 07:11, 9 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
No it wasn't, and there is a "label" concern since cherrypicking sources to add contentious MOS:TERRORIST label as something that isn't challenged is a problem. Also there is a lot about cult in the article already. So no consensus for this. Idealigic (talk) 09:18, 9 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Idealigic and Mhhossein you are both correct about the attribution as per MOS:TERRORIST so here's what I propose:

The MEK is widely regarded to have evolved into a cult of personality...

Scholars believe that the MEK evolved into a cult of personality...

Either of these statements can be sourced to 18 scholarly sources.VR talk 04:08, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent: Let's look at the following comments:

"However, given weighty sources making a given argument, e.g., the MEK shares organizational aspects of a cult, anyone disputing that narrative needs to provide equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions"
— User:Vanamonde93

"...there is a "label" concern since cherrypicking sources to add contentious MOS:TERRORIST label as something that isn't challenged is a problem."
— User:Idealigic

See? Had Idealigic heeded Vanamonde's comment, they had to provide "equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions"". What is it if it's not stonewalling? As for your suggestions, both are making proper attributions and I think both are correct with the first one being more general and accurate per those weighty sources. Looking at your original proposal, almost everything is well attributed, which is what the guideline demands. What's the difference? --Mhhossein talk 12:39, 23 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Mhhossein: this has been said, but I will say it again. This is already in the article:

"Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult",[351][352] "cult-like",[353][354] or having a "cult of personality",[355][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[356][357][358]"

Then Vanamonde's closing comments on the RfC about this:
"With the caveat that I am only assessing the arguments and the source material presented here, it's fairly clear that the "critics describe it as a cult" narrative is far more prevalent among RS than the "MEK is a cult" narrative". This is especially true when, as has been discussed, a lot of the sources specifically use the terms "personality cult" or "cult of personality". Analyzing whether or not a personality cult is a true cult or not falls within the realm of original research."[5]
We also have sections "[Cult of personality]", "[Human rights record]", and "[Ideological revolution and women's rights]", all talking about "cult" elements of MEK in detail. The continuing efforts by you and VR to to change the article into "MEK is a cult" narrative is a testament to what you are both trying to do here. Idealigic (talk) 09:44, 24 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  1. This is not in the article. FYI, "Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult"..." is in the lead, but the body does not support this at the moment. Other sections you mentioned are not supporting this.
  2. As far as I remember, previous RFCs showed that the sections you mentioned should stand alone. Also, Vanamonde's closing comment is commenting on the correct wording not moving/adding materials.
  3. Moreover, Vanamonde closed an RFC as such: The sources presented below using the "cult" descriptor are patently more reliable than those challenging that descriptor.
  4. I already showed you his latest comment saying there are "weighty sources making a given argument, e.g., the MEK shares organizational aspects of a cult". With all of these clear cut comments, you are bludgeoning the process, instead of providing "equally weight sources either making the opposite argument, or covering the same aspects of the organization while coming to very different conclusions". I hope all these clues be evaluated in the Arbcom case. --Mhhossein talk 08:08, 25 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Idealigic the current text is problematic for several reasons:

  • The first sentence in the cult section is The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"
    • This is a straw man argument sourced to a non-scholarly source. By contrast, we have several scholarly sources saying that MEK operates as a cult because it demands absolute loyalty to the Rajavi couple. The absolute loyalty is one of the top reasons, not the "no kids in camp ashraf" rule. This article does a disservice my misrepresenting the real reason scholars consider MEK to operate like a cult.
  • The second sentence is Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult",[352][353] "cult-like",[354][355] or having a "cult of personality",[356][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult". This has several problems too:
    • It is phrased as "several sources say X, while other sources say Y". This wording implies equal legitimacy to both views and is hence WP:FALSEBALANCE. You can not equate the 18 scholarly sources that say MEK operates like a cult to three op-eds who provide an alternate view (see WP:RSEDITORIAL).
    • Why is "cult" in scare quotes? It should not be, see MOS:SCAREQUOTES.
    • Why does the text redundantly say "cult", "cult-like", or having a "cult of personality"? Instead it needs to explain to the reader why scholars say MEK behaves like a cult, and the historical context behind this behavior. This is exactly what my version attempts to do while using less words than the current version. In fact, filling up the section with redundant text instead of actual information is another type of straw man argument.

VR talk 03:30, 26 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Extended content

References

  1. ^ Merat, Owen Bennett Jones (15 April 2012). "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
  2. ^ "France lashes out at Iranian opposition group" The Associated Press, June 27, 2014
  3. ^ "COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAN 6 AUGUST 2009". Archived from the original on 2013-01-28.
  4. ^ Rogin, Josh (25 August 2011), "MEK rally planned for Friday at State Department", Foreign Policy, retrieved 25 March 2018
  5. ^ Abrahamian 1989, pp. 260–261.
  6. ^ Cronin, Stephanie (2013). Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left. Routledge/BIPS Persian Studies Series. Routledge. p. 274. ISBN 978-1-134-32890-1.
  7. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 144, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  8. ^ Cite error: The named reference Saeed Kamali was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  9. ^ Axworthy, Michael (2008). Empire of the Mind: A History of Iran. Hachette Books. p. 272. ISBN 978-0-465-01920-5. ...the MKO kept up its opposition and its violent attacks, but dwindled over time to take on the character of a paramilitary cult, largely subordinated to the interests of the Baathist regime in Iraq.
  10. ^ Khodabandeh, Massoud (January 2015). "The Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and Its Media Strategy: Methods of Information Manufacture". Asian Politics & Policy. 7 (1): 173–177. doi:10.1111/aspp.12164. ISSN 1943-0787.
  11. ^ Banisadr, Masoud (2009). "Terrorist Organizations Are Cults" (PDF). Cultic Studies Review. 8 (2): 156–186.
  12. ^ Reese Erlich, Robert Scheer (2016). Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis. Routledge. pp. 99–100. ISBN 978-1-317-25737-0.
  13. ^ Elizabeth Rubin (13 July 2003). "The Cult of Rajavi". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 March 2016.
  14. ^ Raymond Tanter (2006). Appeasing the Ayatollahs and Suppressing Democracy: U.S. Policy and the Iranian Opposition. Iran Policy Committee. ISBN 978-1599752976.
  15. ^ DR. MAJID RAFIZADEH who is a world-renowned political scientist and recipient of numerous awards including from Oxford University, Annenberg, and University of California Santa Barbara).Arab News
  16. ^ IntPolicyDigest
  17. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference r4 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  18. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Rubin was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  19. ^ Fadel, Leila. "Cult-like Iranian militant group worries about its future in Iraq". mcclatchydc.com. McClatchy. Retrieved 10 April 2019. However, they have little support inside Iran, where they're seen as traitors for taking refuge in an enemy state and are often referred to as the cult of Rajavi, coined after the leaders of the movement, Mariam and Massoud Rajavi.
  20. ^ Fadel, Leila. "Cult-like Iranian militant group worries about its future in Iraq". mcclatchydc.com. McClatchy. Retrieved 10 April 2019. However, they have little support inside Iran, where they're seen as traitors for taking refuge in an enemy state and are often referred to as the cult of Rajavi, coined after the leaders of the movement, Mariam and Massoud Rajavi.
  21. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference RAND was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  22. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman; Adam C. Seitz (2009), Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race?, Praeger Security International Series, ABC-LIO, pp. 325–326, ISBN 9780313380884
  23. ^ "Iranian dissidents plot a revolution from Albania". Japan Times.
  24. ^ "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC.
  25. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference BBC1 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  26. ^ Banisadr, Masoud (2016), "The metamorphosis of MEK (Mujahedin e Khalq)", in Barker, Eileen (ed.), Revisionism and Diversification in New Religious Movements, Ashgate Inform Series on Minority Religions and Spiritual Movements, Routledge, p. 172, ISBN 9781317063612, to survive, MEK...had no choice but to complete its transformation into an extreme, violent and destructive cult, employing the most destructive methods of mind control and 'brainwashing'.
  27. ^ "A Former MEK Member Talks About the Extremist Iranian 'Cult'". www.vice.com. Retrieved 2020-11-03.
  28. ^ Arab News
  29. ^ IntPolicyDigest
  30. ^ National Interest
  31. ^ Merat, Owen Bennett Jones (15 April 2012). "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
  32. ^ "France lashes out at Iranian opposition group" The Associated Press, June 27, 2014
  33. ^ Brie, André; Martins Casaca, José Paulo; Zabeti, Azadeh (2005). People's Mojahedin of Iran. L'Harmattan. ISBN 9782747593816.
  34. ^ Raymond Tanter (2006). Appeasing the Ayatollahs and Suppressing Democracy: U.S. Policy and the Iranian Opposition. Iran Policy Committee. ISBN 978-1599752976.
  35. ^ Camp Ashraf : Iraqi obligations and State Department accountability. 2017. ISBN 978-1981888559. {{cite book}}: Cite uses deprecated parameter |authors= (help)
  36. ^ "West should beware Iranian regime's opposition smear campaign". Arab News.
  37. ^ "Iran's Heightened Fears of MEK Dissidents Are a Sign of Changing Times". Int Policy Digest.
  38. ^ "Confronting Iran". National Interest.
  39. ^ General Intelligence and Security Service (2009), Annual Report 20011
  40. ^ "Verfassungsschutzbericht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen über das Jahr 2016" (PDF).
  41. ^ "Iranian opposition abroad finds new voice amid protests".
  42. ^ "Mullahs Demonize Opposition In Response To Crises: Will Iran Survive?".
  43. ^ Merat, Owen Bennett Jones (15 April 2012). "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
  44. ^ "France lashes out at Iranian opposition group" The Associated Press, June 27, 2014
  45. ^ Brie, André; Martins Casaca, José Paulo; Zabeti, Azadeh (2005). People's Mojahedin of Iran. L'Harmattan. ISBN 9782747593816.
  46. ^ Raymond Tanter (2006). Appeasing the Ayatollahs and Suppressing Democracy: U.S. Policy and the Iranian Opposition. Iran Policy Committee. ISBN 978-1599752976.
  47. ^ Goulka 2009, p. 69.
  48. ^ Gawdat Bahgat (2004). "The War on Terrorism: The Mujahedeen e-Khalk Saga". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 27 (5): 384.
  49. ^ Mohammed Ayoob. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. University of Michigan Press. p. 61.
  50. ^ Gawdat Bahgat, "United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge," Parameters 38, no. 4 (2008)

Iran-Iraq war

The lead currently states By 1983, Masud Rajavi had sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq War in exchange for financial support, a decision that was viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians and that destroyed the MEK's appeal in its homeland". Discussions about this piece of content have gone in circles. I am going to attempt a more closely monitored discussion about it. As I see it, there's some facts that are not contested. 1) The MEK's support declined during the 1980s, as the result of something. 2) The MEK collaborated with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. 3) The decision to collaborate with Hussein was made in 1983. The questions that remain to be answered are; 1) Why did the support decline? 2) How is this to be phrased in the lead, if at all? In support of the current wording, or VR's proposal above, or Fences&Windows wording, supporters have presented the Ronan Cohen source. If you think there are other weighty sources supporting this content, or a similar version, please present it here. If you think there are sources supporting a radically different version, including removal, please present those. Please keep the discussion focused on this short time-period, and on heavy-weight, directly-relevant, sources. Vanamonde (Talk) 23:55, 14 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the moderated discussion. I presented 19 reliable sources that say the MEK became unpopular (see Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive 39#Mek Unpopular) and observe that:
  • 19/19 of them say the decrease in popularity happened due to collaboration with Saddam.
  • 16/19 say the MEK came to be viewed negatively by at least "most" (if not more) Iranians.
  • In terms of intensity of their unpopularity, 9/19 use the word "traitor" or "treason" to describe the perception of the Iranian people towards the MEK, 5/19 use adjectives like "disdain", "detested", "discredited", "strongly opposed", "magnified Iranian public opinion against", while 5/19 do not use any adjective to describe drop in popularity.
  • 11/19 implied (through tense or otherwise) that MEK's unpopularity had remained as of the time of source publication (10 out of 11 of such sources were published in last 20 years).
If needed, I can post a detailed source analysis below. In conclusion I think 1) the support declined due to their collaboration with Saddam. 2) The wording belongs in the lead and should include their unpopularity among most Iranians, the Iranian perception of MEK's collaboration as treacherous and that this unpopularity has lasted to present day.VR talk 02:54, 15 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vanamonde by "heavy-weight" sources do you mean we should focus on scholarly sources as opposed to news/magazine articles? VR talk 20:08, 15 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent: we can certainly consider non-scholarly sources, but where they exist, academic sources need to be given more weight. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:15, 16 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Meeting with Tariq Aziz

  1. “The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.[1]
  2. “At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty.[2]
  3. “The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of thier kind. He said the exhcnage of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the wrold in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"[3]
  4. “Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.[4]
  5. “The Paris meeting between Rajavi and Iraqi Vice-Premier Tariq Aziz in December 1982 was widely criticized. The Mujahidin justified it on the grounds that it highlighted their desire for peace.”[5]
  6. “The peace formula which was thrashed out after nine hours of talks between Masood Rajavi (who heads the coalition of Irnanianb opposition between called National Council of Resistance) and Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister in Paris last year includes points (a) Declaration of immediate ceasefire. (b) Formation of a Commission to supervise the ceasefire. c) withdrawal of forces behind the borders, both on land and the river, as stipulated by the 1975 Algiers Accord. d) Exchange of all Prisoners of War....”[6]
  7. “Following his Paris meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983, Rajavi signed an agreement with Iraq whereby Baghdad promised not to attack Iran's civilian areas.”[7]
  8. “In January 1983 Masood Rajavi, the leader of the exiled Mujahedeen National Council of Resistance (NCR), one of the principal forces of opposition to Khomeini's Islamic regime, met in Paris with Iraqi Vice-Premier Tariq Aziz. The Two issued a joint call for peace between their countries.”[8]
  9. “The Paris meeting between Rajavi and Iraqi Vice Premier Tariq Aziz in December 1982 was widely criticized. The Mojahedin justified it on the grounds that it highlighted their desire for peace. According to the Mojahedin, the Iraqis initially promised to halt attacks on civilian targets inside Iran, but they did not keep to this when the war flared up again in February 1983”. * Middle East Research and Information Project [Quotes: Point 4 of the Joint Communique issued by Tariq Aziz and Masud Rajavi on January 9, 1983, stated that Rajavi had asked the Iraqis not to attack Iranian cities and villages. Reports from the front stated that on February 10 Iraqi planes attacked the cities of Abadan, Dezful and Khvaz (International Herald Tribune, February 11, 1983)].
  10. “The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should be brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq war.New York Times
  11. “The Iranian guerrilla chief opposing Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni's regime met unexpectedly Sunday with the Iraqi deputy prime minister and said afterwards the 28-month Iran-Iraq war could be ended by negotiations. Massoud Rajavi, head of the Iranian Mojahideen Khalq guerrilla group, met for four hours with Iraqi Deputy Priem Minister Tarek Aziz at Rajavi's exile home in Auvers-sur-Oise outside Paris”UPI

Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 21:32, 15 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Stefka, that's a lot of sources; but what is the narrative being offered here that contradicts the narrative in the content being discussed? Vanamonde (Talk) 15:15, 16 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I may be wrong, but to me it looks like the most significant and definite episode between the MEK and Iraq prior to 1986 pertains to this meeting between Massoud Rajavi and Tariq Aziz. This narrative is currently missing from the relevant section in the lede:

By 1983, Masud Rajavi had sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq War in exchange for financial support, a decision that was viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians and that destroyed the MEK's appeal in its homeland. In 1986, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) requested France to expel the MEK from its base in Paris. In response, it re-established its base in Iraq, where it was involved, alongside Saddam Hussein, in Operation Mersad, Operation Forty Stars, Operation Shining Sun, and the 1991 nationwide uprisings."

Then in 1986, this happened:
  • “In June of 1986, the conservative French rime Minister formally expelled the Mojahedin, justifying his decision by statin that their last actions, including their role in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the bombing of the IRP headquarters in 1981, were to be considered, "actions contrary to the standing of political refugees." The Islamic Republic had further encouraged France's complicity in granting the request to deport the Mojahedin by promising to use its influence on Shi'i mmilitias in southern Lebanon to relinquish French hostages whcih they were holding. On June 8, Rajavi visited Baghdad and held a series of publicized meetings with various high-ranking Ba'athist officials in which he effectively secured Iraq as a base for the opposition and cultivated what was to be a long-lasting, relationship with the Iraqi regime. The Mojahedin, effectively backtracking Khomeyni's move a decade before, had secured a desirable base for their paramilitary operations and a valuable patron in Baghdad. The deportation from Paris and move to Baghdad remains an intriguing and crucial episode in the history of the Mojahedin's exile. In Examining both the accounts provided by the Islamic Republic's media sources and the press organs of the Mojahedin, it seems clear that they Khomeyni regime intended the Mojahedin to be exiled to an obscure and distant country which would weaken their contacts with allied oppositions and keep them out of the European limelight. Instead, Iraq hastened to court the Mojahedin prior to its outsting, and the Islamic Republic found the opposition moved to a location which allowed the Mojahedin to resume its border raids"[9]  
I think we need to determine if the matter concerning the MEK's popularity derives from events occurring from 1986 onwards, or from events that occurred prior to 1986. Determining this would help us formulate a more accurate narrative of events as they unfolded. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 17:12, 16 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Stefka, you've provided a number of sources discussing the occurrence of a meeting in 1983. The content we are discussing here presumably refers to the outcome of that meeting. If the meeting had other outcomes that the current content does not discuss, then you need to elaborate on what those were, with sources. Likewise, VR above has provided sources stating that a decision the MEK (or their leader) made in 1983 led to a decline in popularity. If you believe there is evidence directly supporting a different narrative, please provide it. I want to emphasize the need for direct evidence. Weighty sources discussing the Iranian governments attemps to portray the MEK in a poor light are worthy of inclusion in the article in their own right, but the mere existence of propaganda does not obviate other sources provided above. Vanamonde (Talk) 19:30, 16 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Vanamonde. As far as I can see, the only source that VR provided "stating that a decision the MEK (or their leader) made in 1983 led to a decline in popularity" is this one (which does not mention anything about the MEK's decline in popularity):

By 1983, Massud Rajavi had come to side with Saddam Hussein in the war in exchange for financial support.
— Vanguard of the Imam

Then there are these two sources, which basically say the MEK received financial support from Hussein since 1980?:

Since 1982, the MEK had received substantial financial support from the nemesis of the Iranian people, Saddam Hussein.
— Terronomics

After invading Iran in 1980, Saddam Hussein began funding the MeK to extend the reach of the NCRI’s European publicity campaign opposing the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and to secure any intelligence that the MeK collected regarding Iran.
— RAND report

And then there is this last source by Amir Taheri (who has been said to fabricate stories; so we should consider better sources).
The majority of remaining sources refer to a decline in popularity as a result of collaborating with Iraq/Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, but as far as I can see, are vague about weather this is about before or after 1986 (this year is significant because that was when the MEK was kicked out of France and put its hearquarters in Iraq, launching raids agains the IRI from then until the end of the Iran-Iraq war). These are the sources I've found that are a bit more specific about the MEK losing popularity in Iran after it based in Iraq:
  • "Following exile from Iran and Paris, the MEK relocated to Iraq and provided Saddam Hussein’s regime support against Iran. By MEK’s own estimate, it killed over 50,000 Iranian troops—a decision seen as a betrayal by many Iranians, which Tehran continues to weaponize as a narrative against the group."

    The Observer
  • "Prior to establishing an alliance with Saddam, the MEK had been a popular organization. However, once it settled in Iraq and fought against Iranian forces in alliance with Saddam, the group incurred the ire of the Iranian people and, as a result, faced a shortfall of volunteers."

    RAND
  • "At the height of the war between Iran and Iraq, the MEK sided with Baghdad, sending as many as 7,000 of its members to Iraq’s Camp Ashraf near the border with Iran... That decision by the MEK to collaborate with Saddam only magnified Iranian public opinion against the group, Javadi said."

    Al Jazeera
So my arguments are the following:
  • If we include anything prior to 1986 in the lede, WP:DUEWEIGHT would suggest it'd be about Rajavi and Tariq's peace treaty meeting; which, according to James Piazza,

    "was highly significant in that it marked the beginning of what was to become a long-term relationship between Baghdad and the Mojahedin, one which would guarantee future Mojahedin funding and military support, and it marked the first diplomatic act of the NCR as a true government in exile"

    [10]
  • We can then include the circumstances that led to the MEK moving to Iraq in 1986 (kicked out of France / support from Iraq / launch raids against the IRI / etc.), and the impact sources say this had on its popularity in Iran (also considering the sources that say the IRI used this as propaganda against the MEK).
There are considerable amounts of sources/details here, so sorry if I missed anything. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 13:57, 17 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Okay, I see what you are getting at. However, the only portions of the current content your sources challenge are a) the date "1983", and b) the use of Rajavi's name in place of "the MEK" or equivalent. I am still not seeing evidence against the strength of the language used about the decline in support. ViceRegent, do you you have sources specifically stating that the 1983 is the correct one? Vanamonde (Talk) 15:44, 17 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Vanamonde I agree with Stefka that most sources attribute decline in popularity as a result of collaborating with Iraq/Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war as opposed to being specific about a date. So I changed the wording to say that in this edit (which stefka reverted). Can we agree that edit was correct and should be restored?

On the other hand, we have solid scholarly evidence of MEK-Iraq collaboration by (meaning on or before) 1983. Stefka already presented 3 scholarly sources that discuss MEK-Iraq collaboration as happening "by 1983", "since 1982" and "after 1980". Here are 4 other scholarly sources on this collaboration:

  • During 1983, Rajavi began building connections with the Iraqi leadership. This was done through KDPI, who were connected to Saddam Hussein. Iraq and the DPI allowed the Mojahedin to set up bases in the northern part of Iraqi Kurdistan. During the first phase, these bases were used for training and military coaching.
    — Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. p 60

  • Third, the Mojahedin's unbashed willingness to openly side with the Iraqi regime in the war against Iran disturbed some of their allies. The issue came to the fore in January 1983 when, in the midst of some of the most intense fighting of the war, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister. Many observers suspected that it was predominantly Iraqi money that funded the expensive projects undertaken by the Mojahedin...[long list of MEK projects that Iraq funded]
    — Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, Yale University Press, p 248

  • As it went into exile, MEK’s willingness to side with Saddam’s Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war disturbed its already diminished cadre. During a key 1983 meeting between Masud Rajavi and Tariq Aziz, an alliance was forged.
    — Ray Takeyh, Council of Foreign Relations,[6]

  • In his opposition to Khomeini, Masoud Rajavi had taken to cooperating with the Iraqi leadership. In January 1983 Rajavi had a publicly acknowledged meeting with Tariq Aziz, deputy premier of Iraq, in Paris.
    — Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (Routledge Revivals), p 230

VR talk 02:59, 20 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VR: you were trying to modify this text during an active RfC specifically about editing this text, which would render that whole RfC void. That's why I reverted you, and that's what I told you was the reason why I reverted you. There are also several other problems with the text you are proposing:

  • Most of the sources you provided in your last post re-inforce my argument that the most significant event that happened between the MEK and Iraq prior to 1986 involves Masoud Rajavi's peace treaty with Tariq Aziz.
  • In your proposed edit, you've placed the mention of the MEK's decline in popularity right after the quote saying that Masoud Rajavi "By 1983, Masud Rajavi had sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq War in exchange for financial support", which chronologically gives the misleading impression that this pertains to 1983 (and, by your own account, that doesn't reflect what the majority scholarship says).
  • Your proposed edit also doesn't solve the issue with the proceeding statement in the lede: "...where it was involved, alongside Saddam Hussein, in Operation Mersad, Operation Forty Stars, Operation Shining Sun, and the 1991 nationwide uprisings." - can you provide the sources that say the MEK "was involved, alongside Saddam Hussein" in these operations? I think wording here is important, and needs to reflect concrete scholarship narrative. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:41, 20 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
You are both being unnecessarily stubborn here. It's patently obvious, based on most of the sources presented in this section, that the alliance between the MEK and Iraq being initiated in 1983 was a significant point in the MEK's history. It's also clear, again based on these sources, that the MEK's alliance with Iraq during the war was what led to it's decline in support, and most of these sources do not provide a clear date for when the MEK was fighting with Iraq in the war. Essentially, there is consensus to say, in the lead, that a) the MEK and Iraq forged an alliance in 1983, following a meeting between Rajavi and Aziz; b) the MEK fought alongside Iraq in the war, with consequences as already stated in the lead. I am not seeing consensus to imply that the MEK fought in the war beginning in 1983, as the current version does. I am not seeing an issue with the ordering of sentences (Stefka's second bullet point above); these are successive events in the history; they will necessarily be in successive sentences. The issue about the different operations is a separate point; Stefka, if you take issue with the current wording, please raise it separately; this discussion is about the first two sentences in that paragraph, and does not establish consensus for anything else. Please craft a proposal along those lines, and please be aware that I have little patience for further stonewalling. Vanamonde (Talk) 21:47, 21 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Vanamonde: sorry for the late response; off-wiki life getting in the way. I agree with both your points in your last comment. Shall we go with that? Shall we also mention that the meeting in 1983 was "justified" by the MEK "on the grounds that it highlighted their desire for peace."[11])? (...Rajavi signed an agreement with Iraq whereby Baghdad promised not to attack Iran's civilian areas.”[12]) ("The Two issued a joint call for peace between their countries.”[13])(“...which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty.[14]) Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 14:28, 1 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
One of your sources also adds that this was a part of MEK's propaganda plan. --Mhhossein talk 07:32, 2 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry everyone for the late response. Like Stefka, off-wiki life getting in the way. I agree with Vanamonde's points a and b and agree that the lead shouldn't imply MEK fought in the war beginning in 1983. I agree that operations should be covered in a different subsection.
Regarding MEK's view that the 1983 meeting "highlighted their desire for peace": that is a significant POV but not the only one regarding the meeting. As Mhhossein points out, Dilip Hiro calls this MEK's "propaganda". Several of Stefka's sources (#5, #9 etc) say this meeting was "widely criticized". There are a lot of sources that cover opposition by Bani-Sadr (a major partner in MEK's NCRI) to both the meeting and MEK's agreement with Iraq. Ronan Cohen argues MEK's agreement with Saddam constituted Rajavi’s virtual concession regarding Iran's territorial lands (p 63). All of these aspects of the MEK-Iraq agreement should be covered in the body but not sure if they belong in the lead.VR talk 01:24, 4 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Stefka, any analysis of the motivations behind that meeting will require a separate discussion. This discussion has clearly established consensus for modifying one extremely contentious sentence in a manner that is consistent with the sources all of you have provided. Anyone is free to implement this consensus in a reasonable way. If you have disagreements about the phrasing, further discussion may be required, but again, I will not look kindly on stone-walling. Vanamonde (Talk) 18:45, 11 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Vanamonde: would this implement the consensus in a reasonable way?:

In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq following a meeting between Rajavi and Aziz.[15][16][17][18]

Then for the second part, could this phrasing be considered neutral/representative of the sources?:

The MEK then sided with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, which has since had a lasting negative impact on its popularity in Iran.[19][20][21][22]

If there is another fair/neutral phrasing option, then I'd be open to it. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 12:50, 13 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Stefka Bulgaria, You've considerably watered down the language currently in the article in the second part of your proposal. I have no opinion on the specific wording, but unless you persuade Viceregent and others that this is the correct wording, a reformulation that more closely approximates the current wording has a stronger claim to consensus. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:50, 13 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Cherry picking some handful of sources against a lot of other reliable sources looks like in vain (though none of the provided sources are saying MEK was not seen as a betrayer). In other words, your suggestion is not representing most of the scholarly sources. Needless to say your suggestion is factually wrong. --Mhhossein talk 04:50, 16 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Mhhossein How's my suggestion "factually wrong"? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 06:56, 16 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Mhhossein pinging you again. How's my suggestion "factually wrong"? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 13:58, 22 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Factual inaccuracy is the least problem with your suggestion. However, no one can find sources supporting the statement that MEK's siding with Iraq during the war had "a lasting negative impact on its popularity in Iran". I believe it's made/synthesized by you. The soul of your suggestion goes against the vast amount of reliable sources commenting on the consequences of the MEK supporting Iraq in attacks against Iran. --Mhhossein talk 12:51, 23 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I've cleaned this up and implemented some of the consensus, leaving the current "a decision that was viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians and that destroyed the MEK's appeal in its homeland" as is. My proposal offered this version:

  • which has since had a lasting negative impact on its popularity in Iran."

This was based on the following sources:

  • “This has further weakened them in the eyes of many Iranians who correctly saw them siding with Iraq against their own country during the Iran-Iraq War.”[23]
  • "there was a decrease in the Iranian people's support for the Mojahedin since it had joined since it had joined and cooperated with their worst enemy - Iraq - during the long years of the war."[24]
  • "...its goals and violent activities were strongly opposed by the Iranian population–even more so its alignment with Iraq”[25]
  • "“During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the MEK carried out several armed attacks on Iran in coordination with Saddam's army, losing much of its domestic support in the process.”[26]

For those wishing to keep the lede as is, can you provide the sources and respective quotes that supports the current wording? Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 11:36, 1 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

No opinion on the proposal, obviously; but since I am so frequently critical of behavior on this page, I wanted to commend both this post and the edits implementing consensus from this discussion. If more of you folks were willing to implement a consensus that you didn't like, progress here would be quicker. Vanamonde (Talk) 16:40, 2 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I mainly agree with your edit Stefka, but have made a few edits of my own. If I made an error, feel free to point it out. I kept my edit summaries detailed enough to speak for themselves but if something is unclear lemme know and I'll explain.VR talk 00:22, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@VR: you changed text that we had consensus for (and some long standing text) but said nothing about the part I’m trying to get consensus for (see my last post above). I’ve reverted you. Please discuss providing sources for any proposed changes (as I've done above). Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 13:00, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Your revert is not constructive. Can you give an actual reason for reverting me? I gave three detailed edit summaries explaining my changes ([7], [8], [9]). What exactly do you not like about my edit?
Can you point me to where we have consensus for the exact wording that you prefer? I see broad consensus for certain things but not for exact wording.
Which changes of mine do you think were unsourced? I didn't introduce any new content, but only worded it differently and removed one logical error that you introduced.VR talk 14:44, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

We had consensus for:

"The MEK then sided with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war"

You also changed "Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)" to "Iran" (it was the government who made that request). Then, the lede already establishes that "The MEK then sided with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war taking part in several operations against the Islamic Republic, a decision that was viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians and that destroyed the MEK's appeal in its homeland. It was involved in Operation Mersad, Operation Forty Stars, Operation Shining Sun, and the 1991 nationwide uprisings"; so saying that The MEK and Iraq jointly conducted several operations against Iran" is not needed. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 16:09, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I don't recall consensus for any exact wording but instead consensus for certain concepts. If you disagree please provide talk page comment links. This wording:

"The MEK then sided with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war..."

implies two contradictory things. The paragraph starts with In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq, meaning the MEK had sided with Iraq by 1983. But your additional wording implies that MEK "then sided with Iraq" after 1986 and hadn't sided with Iraq before then (that's what "then" implies). That doesn't make sense as it implies the MEK hadn't sided with Iraq prior to 1986. I believe consensus was that MEK had formed an alliance with Iraq (and therefore sided with Iraq) by 1983. Reflecting this consensus, I wrote:

MEK's decision to side with Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war was...

My version is actually shorter and makes more sense. Secondly, shortening "Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)" to "Iran" is very common all over wikipedia, news and books. Thirdly, your version of the lead lumps the post-Iran-Iraq War 1991 Iraq uprisings with the rest of Iran-Iraq war even though they happened in separate periods. My wording merely clarified it. Also why are you separating mention of operations to two different parts of the paragraph? Your wording seems disorganized. Finally you removed all mentions of Saddam from the paragraph. Did you have consensus to do so? It wasn't just MEK's alliance with Iraq that was so repugnant to Iranians but in particular their collaboration with Saddam. Of the 19 reliable sources I presented at Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive 39#Mek Unpopular, 15 explicitly used Saddam's name when describing MEK's alliance with Iraq.VR talk 21:30, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
VR, SB, enough already. The substance of VR's edits are very obviously helpful without changing content; SB, I'm really not seeing a substantive objection. Conversely, VR, you really ought not to be changing terminology without a proper explanation; why change "Iraq" to "Saddam", in particular? I'm trying to AGF here, but the most obvious explanation is that "Saddam" has a negative emotional association that "Iraq" does not. At the very least it should have been "Hussein". Vanamonde (Talk) 20:04, 4 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vanamonde93, the belief that "Hussein" is Saddam's last name is a common misconception, but nothing more; in fact, Hussein is the name of Saddam's father, and it would make no sense to refer to him as such. Considering that Saddam's actual last name (more accurately rendered as "al-Tikriti") was suppressed during the period of Ba'athist rule in Iraq, most reliable sources—and virtually all Iraqis—generally refer to him as "Saddam."TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 01:44, 5 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Okay, point taken about Saddam's name, but the rest of my post stands. Vanamonde (Talk) 18:52, 5 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

My point about this is that the war was not known as the "Khomeini-Saddam war" but as the "Iran-Iraq war" (which is something that VR himself argued in a previous post). Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 08:08, 5 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I just came across a source that says that the MEK supported the Kurdish rebellion (I added this to the article). Idealigic (talk) 16:50, 6 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
As opposed to Stefka Bulgaria's original research, the reliable sources say something different:
  • "Unsurprisingly, the decision to fight alongside Saddam was viewed as traitorous by the vast majority of Iranians and destroyed the MKO's standing in its homeland." -Vanguard of the Imam
  • "The MEK was then welcomed into Iraq, where it supported Saddam Hussein's war..." -CFR
  • "The MEK carried out several armed attacks on Iran in coordination with Saddam's army"BBC
  • "MEK supported Saddam..."Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq
  • "By 1983, Massud Rajavi had come to side with Saddam Hussein in the war in exchange for financial support." -Vanguard of the Imam
  • "That's because in Iran, MEK is regarded as a bunch of traitors who fought alongside Saddam Hussein..." -Business Insider
  • "The group later broke with the regime and sided with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, when more than a million Iranians died"P.532
  • "...the move towards saddam hussein was allegedly an attempt by the MEK an attempt by the MEK to maneuver against the government, with the goal of acquiring arms, training facilities, and financial resources."P.67
  • "According to the RAND Corporation think-tank, the MEK launched numerous raids across the border into Iran. In exchange for its support of Saddam Hussein, MEK received "protection, funding, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, tanks, military training, and the use of land".[10][11]
  • "After invading Iran in 1980, Saddam Hussein began funding the MeK to extend the reach of the NCRI’s European publicity campaign opposing the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and to secure any intelligence that the MeK collected regarding Iran."-RAND report
These are just some of the sources using "Saddam" when referring to Iraq under Saddam. That said, the longstanding version should be restored. --Mhhossein talk 13:21, 9 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The Iran-Iraq war being internationally known as the Iran-Iraq war is not original research.

With respect to the sources you have presented, you used "Vanguard of the Imam" twice, RAND report twice (and it is also quoted by the Al Jazeera which also says "At the height of the war between Iran and Iraq, the MEK sided with Baghdad, sending as many as 7,000 of its members to Iraq’s Camp Ashraf near the border with Iran.") Also RAND and "Washington Institute for Near East Policy" look like think tanks that lack peer-review? The Business Insider link looks like questionable source by an author who does not look like an authority in their field.

This does not mean that there aren't some reliable sources (here or otherwise) saying "Saddam Hussein" instead of "Iraq". But there are many scholarly sources written by authorities in their field using "Iraq" or "Baghdad":

  • "The Mojahedin's unabashed willingness to openly side with the Iraqi regime in the war against Iran disturbed some o their allies. This issue came to the fore in January 1983 when, in the midst o some o the most intense fighting o the war, Raavi held a highly publicized meeting with Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister."[27]
  • "Many analysts believe the PMOI's decision to ally with Iraq caused its support inside Iran to evaporate."[28]
  • "Within seven days, Soviet Radio carried an official notice that Iraq had expelled the Mojahedin, disclaiming Iraq's convenient use of the movement during the Iran-Iraq War"
  • "The opposition based on the Mojahedin's alliance with the Ba'athist Republic o Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war"[29]
  • "soon siding with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and remaining in Iraq after the end o the conflict."Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).
  • "Since 1986, when the Iraq-Iran war was at its climax, the Mojahedin organization and its private army, the National Liberation Army (NLA), were fortunate to gain Iraq's financial support as well as the supply of equipment that was needed for the foundation of the army and for its continuous operations. Iraq's motives for supporting the Mojahedin are unknown, but it can be assumed that their existence justified the Iraqi struggle against the Iranian Islamic religious regime since it feared that that regime was trying to control the Iraqi Shi'ite majority and establish in it a Shi'ite Islamic Republic."[30]
  • "This has further weakened them in the eyes of many Iranians who correctly saw them siding with Iraq against their own country during the Iran-Iraq War."[31]
  • "Bani Sadr left the NCR after the MEK formally sided with Iraq against Iran in 1983"[32]
  • "The alignment with the MEK provided a strategic advantage for Iraq, including in prodding Iran towards further radicalization and increasing the international isolation of Tehran."[33]
  • "Near the end o the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Baghdad armed MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces"[34]

Idealigic (talk) 15:23, 11 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I presented more sources and some of your sources are irrelevant cause they use alternative terms such as "Ba'athist Republic of Iraq", "Baghdad". Also, the sixth bullet point can be effectively omitted since it's not directly talking about MEK's "siding" with the Iran's enemy during the war. @Vanamonde93: Given the sources I provided, can I restore the longstanding version which say "MEK sided with Saddam" until a consensus is built? That version is both longstanding and supported by the reliable sources. --Mhhossein talk 11:37, 13 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
All the sources I listed are relevant since they all talk about the MEK's relation with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Also please look at the authors and publishers of the sources I listed against the ones Mhhossein listed. The ones I listed look more scholarly and peer-reviewed (and are not repeated). Idealigic (talk) 12:35, 13 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Considering the sources I provided, there's not strong reason why the longstanding version should be altered. --Mhhossein talk 06:01, 4 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

June 7 break

  • Stefka Bulgaria I'm going to go ahead and partially re-instate my edits ([12][13][14]) that you reverted. Regarding those edits, Vanamonde said VR's edits are very obviously helpful without changing content; SB, I'm really not seeing a substantive objection. That comment and all succeeding comments have only objected to the interchanging "Iraq" with "Saddam" in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. I have not seen any objections since to my grammatical fixes. If you disagree with my edit please explain why.VR talk 23:55, 7 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
VR, by restoring content without having gained consensus after it has been reverted, you are breaking the article's "consensus required restrictions". You can't do that. About the edit, don't you see all the sources I gave about the MEK siding with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war? Why would you think it's ok to restore your edit? You are also making the lead longer, when it should be shortened. Why is the expansion is necessary. Idealigic (talk) 07:48, 8 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Idealigic, did you even read my edit before reverting? My edit had nothing to do with "MEK siding with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war". I didn't change that. Secondly, my edit reduced the size of the lead by 153 characters, so your claim You are also making the lead longer is false. Thirdly my edit fixed some grammatical and linking issues. @Vanamonde93: had explicitly said my edit "very obviously helpful". Idealigic, you also removed the link to Tariq Aziz and re-introduced other grammatical issues that I've explained in detail above. Why can't we link Tariq Aziz in the lead? Why should we only refer to him as "Aziz", that's ambiguous. It is very obvious to me you didn't read my edit before reverting. I'm really, really frustrated by you blindly reverting.VR talk 14:52, 8 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
VR, I have no issues with fixing the grammatical errors and linking (that's not what my edit was about, and I'll fix them shortly). Your edit added text like "The MEK and Iraq jointly launched several operations against Iran" (where does it say that in the sources?). Also why did you remove "the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) requested France to expel the MEK from its base in Paris"? Idealigic (talk) 19:39, 8 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
False. I never removed it, but instead wrote it more concisely.

[Prev version:] In 1986, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) requested France to expel the MEK from its base in Paris so in response, it re-established its base in Iraq.

[My version:] In 1986, after France expelled the MEK from Paris at Iran's request, the MEK re-established its base in Iraq.

There are several sources for "The MEK and Iraq jointly launched several operations against Iran" given below.
  • Operation Forty Stars: "On June 18, it [Iraq] launched a new offensive it called "Forty Stars"...A combination of Iraqi forces and Mujahideen e-Kalq forces, which had been trained and supported in Iraq, attacked the Iranian positions in the area."[35], you can see it on page 38 of this pdf
  • Operation Sunshine:"With the Iranian armed forces spread out from Fao to Kurdestan, Iraq at last went on the offensive to recapture its territory. On March 16, 1988, Iraqi artillery...Ten days later, the Mojahedin “National Liberation Army,” which had been established with Saddam’s help at a camp north of Baghdad and provided with miscellaneous munitions, overran the Fakkeh sector in a twelve-hour attack called “Operation Sunshine,” taking four hundred prisoners."[36]
  • Operation Eternal Light: "To increase the pressure on Tehran, Saddam played his final card: Operation Eternal Light.On July 26 he [Saddam] launched Massoud Rajavi’s People’s Mujahidin along the recently reopened road to Kermanshah. " (page 466 of [37]) VR talk 21:17, 8 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • First point. It was the IRI that requested France to expel the MEK. Before the IRI, it was the Shah's government that governed Iran, and that was not the government that requested France to expel the MEK. That distinction is important.
  • Second point. I think the sources establish that the MEK received support from Iraq, but that Iraq took part in these particular battles is disputed:

"The Mojahedin launched a series of offensives against front-line pasdaran positions. On March 27 of 1988, a brigade-level campaign pushing deep into Khuzistan along an impressive thirty-kilometer front was launched by the NLA and succeeded in capturing 600-kilometer of regime territory along with 508 pasdaran and soldiers from the Iranian 77th infantry division. In this offensive, which was code-named “Operation Bright Sun” and was detailed in an interview later granted by Rajavi, an alleged 2,000 Islamic Republic soldiers were killed and $100 million worth of regime weaponry and equipment was captured and displayed for foreign journalists. The NLA had scored its first victory as a conventional fighting force, and it hoped to bring the regime to its knees, both through its propaganization of the successful offensive and through its new armed program.

On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched its offensive entitled Chetel Setareh or “40 Stars” in which twenty-two organized brigades of Mojahedin recaptured the city of Mehran, which the regime had wrested from Iraqi control after the Mojahedin had set up its “provisional government” there. The Mojahedin claimed that absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation, and Iraqi Culture and Information Minister, Latif Nusayyif Jasim, later denied that Iraq had deployed air units to help the NLA or had used chemical weapons to drive the Islamic Republic’s troops from Mehran.

In July of that year, a more protracted operation named Mersad or “Eternal Brilliance” was initiated in which the two Khuzestani twins of Kerand and Eslamabad were “liberated” from the regime’s troops. Mojahed press organs displayed pictorials of NLA troops in action, destroyed regime equipment and armored vehicles, surrendered pasdaran and road signs, with the Islamic Republic, marking the direction of the two towns."

[38]

The fanatical legions of the Ayatullah Khomeini suffered another embarrassing defeat last week, this one apparently inflicted by their countrymen. In a cross-border strike from their base in Iraq, the National Liberation Army of the People's Mujahedin, a leftist Iranian dissident group, seized the border town of Mehran and drove its pro-Khomeini defenders beyond the surrounding hills. N.L.A. spokesmen claimed to have killed and wounded as many as 8,000 Iranian troops during the ten-hour battle, code-named Operation Forty Stars. Western reporters brought to the battle scene confirmed that the rebels had captured 1,500 Iranian prisoners, as well as tanks and artillery. Although the Iranians acknowledged their defeat at Mehran, they insisted it had been inflicted by Iraqi troops using chemical weapons. Baghdad denied any involvement in the battle. At week's end, however, Iraq did claim that its forces had recaptured the oil-rich Majnoun islands east of the Tigris River, where Iranian defenders had been entrenched since 1984."

[39]

"In another report by the Komite presented to the Islamic Republic on 15 August 1988, it found that "the more people defected from the Iranian army as a result of the Mojahedin's operations, the more frequent and larger they became." Komite members said in the report that it didn’t know how to prevent MEK achievements, which "had enabled the NLA to conquer Mehran".

[40]

Why don't we add this to the article? Do the majority of sources say the NLA were involved in these operations, or that Iraq took part directly as well?

"Right after the ceasefire went into effect, the MKO forces attacked Iran from Iraq in an operation they called Amaliyat-e Forough-e Javidaan [Operation Eternal Light], but referred to as Amaliyat-e Mersaad [Operations Trap] by the IRGC."

[41]

"The reason for this new round of widespread executions was Operation Mersad, a military attack on Iranian forces by the Mojahedin-e Khalq."

[42]

Etc. Idealigic (talk) 17:22, 9 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The MEK expulsion (1986) has nothing to do with the Shah (who left in 1979). Since 1979, IRI has been considered synonymous with "Iran". Post-1979 titles continue to use "Iran": Iran-Iraq war, Iran–Contra affair, Iran nuclear deal, Iran hostage crisis, 1985 Iranian presidential election.
Secondly, none of your sources deny Iraqi participation in their own voice. At most they report denials by Saddam and PMOI. Yet I provided scholarly sources that say, in their own voice, that Iraq took part. You can't compare a book published by Harvard University Press to the official statements of Baathist Iraq (a genocidal regime known for lying). If you disagree, we can take this to WP:RSN.
Finally you still haven't explained all aspects of your revert (I justified my edit in detail earlier on this talk page).VR talk 19:04, 9 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

That’s exactly what I said: The MEK expulsion (1986) has nothing to do with Shah (1979). This is why the IRI distinction is necessary. The recent protests in Iran against the IRI alone make a distinction between Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran [15] [16]. Just the same way, the MEK are an Iranian political group. This article has a lot about the power struggle between the IRI and the MEK. It was the IRI that banned the MEK from elections in Iran. It was the IRI that requested France to expel the MEK. It was the IRI that has been making attacks on the MEK in Europe in recent years. The MEK in fact received a lot of the Iranian people’s support before the IRI banned it in Iran.

Secondly, in this and other talk page discussions you keep saying that the sources need to “endorse” whatever it is that they are reporting. I don’t know where you got that from, but please explain what policy indicates that the source needs to “endorse” what they are reporting on in order for the RS to be valid. Unless I have it backwards, we report on what the sources write, not what the sources “endorse” or “don’t endorse”. Even then, I see most sources here saying it was the MEK/NLA that made these attacks, not that Saddam ordered the attacks through the NLA/MEK.

Finally, I don’t know what aspects of the revert need further explaining, but you need to make specific questions if you want me to give specific answers.

You also haven’t answered why we cannot add the sources I provided to the article, which are more WP:DUE than the claims you added of Saddam ordering the MEK/NLA to attack Iran at the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Idealigic (talk) 07:34, 10 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

In light of consensus at RSN that the sources for Iraqi involvement are reliable enough to make this a fact that can be stated in wikivoice, do you have any further objections? Do you also have any objections to any other part of my edit besides the IRI vs Iran naming? If not, I can go ahead and restore my edit except for the IRI part.VR talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I've restored the edit as before but, in compromise with Idealigic, referred to Iran as "Islamic Republic of Iran". I would hope that we can consider this to be a compromise version and finally end this really long discussion.VR talk 03:52, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vice regent, that is another WP:CRP violation that you have done here. You seem to have lost all regards for this restriction in this article. There are other problems with your edits too, like only adding the POV you want and excluding other POVs. Also Iran is the MEK's homeland. Also the link to the battles, why did you remove that? I am reverting your violation. Idealigic (talk) 19:15, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
You have literally run out of all objections against my edit: your only substantial objection is the removal of links, which is a minor issue.
If you are going to use CRP to stonewall, then we will have no choice but to go back to the longstanding version, which will render this entire discussion futile. Do you really want that to happen?VR talk 02:15, 11 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Stefka Bulgaria:, @Mhhossein: (I'd ping Vanamonde but I feel he doesn't want to be pinged): I feel I have tried my best to salvage this discussion, make compromises. I've sought external opinion and found consensus at RSN that Iraq was involved in MEK's Iran-Iraq war battles. But I'm running out of patience in face of Idealigic's persistent WP:stonewalling. The last option remaining here would be go back to the longstanding version. I don't want that, as then we'll be back to square one. Please weigh in.VR talk 02:27, 11 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent: Stability matters: I am pretty much sure that Idealigic is persistently violating the page restrictions. Likewise, I don't suggest going to the first version. I believe there had been enough discussions here and your attempts at reaching a compromise is evident from your words and patience. You waited almost a month before implementing the consensus and sought 3rd opinions (which were all ignored by Idealigic). Idealigic's persistent reverts is giving me the impression that getting blocked or banned is not a concern for them. I can list the occasions where he has received tough ban warnings from admins but he is still continuing with the previous editing pattern. That is why I think we should consider the page stability as an important criteria and seek venues for having a comprehensive judgement in over the issues of this page. This can happen by asking admins, going to Arb or other things. I am ready to work on an optimized solution, if it is needed. --Mhhossein talk 15:56, 12 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Revert in violation of CRP?

@idealigic: AFAIK, your latest revert can bring you a block or Tban given the fact that you breached the restriction of the page in the past. Are you willing to make a self revert or should I report it? --Mhhossein talk 15:21, 10 June 2021 (UTC) user:Vice regent can you explain this?[reply]

  • [diff] VR adds: “The MEK and Iraq jointly several operations against Iran” and “After the war, the MEK helped Saddam suppress...”
  • [diff] The edit is reverted.
  • [diff] Without consensus, VR adds again to the article “The MEK and Iraq jointly launched several operations against Iran” and “After the war, the MEK helped Saddam suppress...”

That appears to be a violation of the article’s restrictions (something you have been warned not to do).

user:Mhhossein can you explain this?

  • [diff]: Mhhossein uses deceptive edit summary (according to special:diff/969798085" - which is about "MEK's designation as a terrorist organization by the Japanese government") to add "Operation Shining Sun" to the lead of the article.
  • [diff]: I revert saying the source he used (The Globe Post) was not reliable.
  • [diff]: Without consensus, Mhhossein restored content using a new source (by Ronen Cohen, that by Vanamonde's own assessment, did not even support the edit).

You also did this despite prior warnings (such as this one, and actually did it more times).

So If you think I have something to explain then please ask me (here or at WP:ANI). But before you do, please explain the above. Idealigic (talk) 08:14, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Idealigic the Mhhossein reverts you're referring to are back from Aug and Sep of 2020. As for my edits, I find that you, not me, have violated the CRP because as I explained on your talk page, my edit was merely restoring the longstanding version. The longstanding version says:

it [MEK] was involved, alongside Saddam Hussein, in Operation Mersad, Operation Forty Stars, Operation Shining Sun...

Stefka removed this saying none of these sources seem to say MEK was involved with Hussein in these operations. I restored this as

The MEK and Iraq jointly launched several operations against Iran:Operation Mersad, Operation Forty Stars and Operation Shining Sun.

Note I changed the original wording from "[MEK] was involved, alongside Saddam Hussein," to "MEK and Iraq, jointly" to respect your argument that "Saddam" should be replaced by "Iraq". Please don't attack me for trying to compromise with you. Stefka reverted me. I explained my edit on the talk page on May 3. Vanadmonde responded, calling the edit helpful (except where I replaced "Iraq" with "Saddam"). I waited for a month, but Stefka never responded nor did anyone object to this aspect of my edit. So on June 7, I posted a message that I had assumed Wikipedia:Silent consensus and diff restored my edit. Then Idealigic reverted me - this last revert looks like a breach of CRP. So Idealigic kindly revert yourself. We should be able to do the right thing without constantly having to "report" each other.VR talk 13:33, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent, I see that current version has been in the article for over a month, which makes it part of the long-standing version. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:People%27s_Mujahedin_of_Iran&oldid=922243555#Defining_longstanding_text_for_this_article The edits are also different (one distinctively names Saddam, and the other distinctively names Iraq - something that has been of much debate in this talk page, so there was no "Silent-consensus"). Barca (talk) 14:42, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Barca, when Stefka introduced the current version on May 1, I reverted him on May 3. When he reverted me again on May 3, I decided to discuss and not engage in edit-war. You can't define as long-standing a version that was challenged via reversion only 2 days after it was introduced.VR talk 15:21, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Idealigic: Given the explanations by VR, I am giving you another chance of performing a self revert. --Mhhossein talk 19:20, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VR: The version before May 1st said "where it was involved, alongside Saddam Hussein", and the version you inserted on may 3rd said "The MEK and Iraq jointly several operations against Iran:". So you did not perform a revert to the original version like you are claiming. That would mean that it is you in fact who is breaking the article's restrictions now by inserting your edit again (also like Barca said, the current version has been in the article for more than a month so it's now part of the longstanding text). I don't know why you and Mhhossein keep trying to blame me for this (even threatening to report me). I'm not interested in reporting you though, just please stop all the distorted accusations. We currently have a RFC about the 1991 Uprisings in the lead, so that is where your vote should explain why your edit has more merit than the current version. Idealigic (talk) 06:46, 14 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

References

References

  1. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. ISBN 978-0765802552. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |Publisher= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 9–43. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x.
  3. ^ "IRAQI VISITS IRANIAN LEFTIST IN PARIS". The New York Times. 10 January 1983.
  4. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. ISBN 978-0765802552. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |Publisher= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help)
  5. ^ Fred Halliday (Mar. - Apr., 1983). "Year IV of the Islamic Republic". MERIP Reports No. 113, Iran Since the Revolution. 7 (4): 6. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  6. ^ SUROOSH IRFANI (Summer 1984). "IRAN-IRAQ WAR: UNCERTAINTY HALTS IRANIAN OFFENSIVE". Strategic Studies. 7 (4): 103–104. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  7. ^ Hiro, Dilip (2013). Iran Under the Ayatollahs (Routledge Revivals). Routledge; 1st edition. p. 266. ISBN 978-0415669696.
  8. ^ Shain, Yossi (2005). The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State. University of Michigan Press. p. 130. ISBN 978-0472030422.
  9. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 19. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x.
  10. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 16. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x.
  11. ^ Fred Halliday (Mar. - Apr., 1983). "Year IV of the Islamic Republic". MERIP Reports No. 113, Iran Since the Revolution. 7 (4): 6. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  12. ^ Hiro, Dilip (2013). Iran Under the Ayatollahs (Routledge Revivals). Routledge; 1st edition. p. 266. ISBN 978-0415669696.
  13. ^ Shain, Yossi (2005). The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State. University of Michigan Press. p. 130. ISBN 978-0472030422.
  14. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 9–43. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x.
  15. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. ISBN 978-0765802552. "The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside." {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |Publisher= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help)
  16. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 9–43. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x. "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  17. ^ "IRAQI VISITS IRANIAN LEFTIST IN PARIS". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  18. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. ISBN 978-0765802552. "Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside." {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |Publisher= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help)
  19. ^ Crenshaw, Martha (1995). Terrorism in Context 1st Edition. Penn State University Press; 1st edition. p. 583. ISBN 978-0271010151. "This has further weakened them in the eyes of many Iranians who correctly saw them siding with Iraq against their own country during the Iran-Iraq War."
  20. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. p. 174. ISBN 978-1845192709. "there was a decrease in the Iranian people's support for the Mojahedin since it had joined since it had joined and cooperated with their worst enemy - Iraq - during the long years of the war."
  21. ^ Western Foreign Policy and the Middle East. Routledge. 2009. p. 174. ISBN 9781317499701. "...its goals and violent activities were strongly opposed by the Iranian population–even more so its alignment with Iraq" {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); |first= missing |last= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  22. ^ "Durrës locals protest MEK members' burial in local cemetery". BBC. "During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the MEK carried out several armed attacks on Iran in coordination with Saddam's army, losing much of its domestic support in the process."
  23. ^ Crenshaw, Martha (1995). Terrorism in Context 1st Edition. Penn State University Press; 1st edition. p. 583. ISBN 978-0271010151. "This has further weakened them in the eyes of many Iranians who correctly saw them siding with Iraq against their own country during the Iran-Iraq War."
  24. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. p. 174. ISBN 978-1845192709. "there was a decrease in the Iranian people's support for the Mojahedin since it had joined since it had joined and cooperated with their worst enemy - Iraq - during the long years of the war."
  25. ^ Western Foreign Policy and the Middle East. Routledge. 2009. p. 174. ISBN 9781317499701. "...its goals and violent activities were strongly opposed by the Iranian population–even more so its alignment with Iraq" {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); |first= missing |last= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  26. ^ "Durrës local where it was involved, alongside Saddam Husseins protest MEK members' burial in local cemetery". BBC. "During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the MEK carried out several armed attacks on Iran in coordination with Saddam's army, losing much of its domestic support in the process."
  27. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 248. ISBN 1-85043-077-2.
  28. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |pg= ignored (help)
  29. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 11, 24. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  30. ^ Cohen, Ronen A. (2018-11-02). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1000–1014. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. ISSN 0026-3206. S2CID 149542445.
  31. ^ Crenshaw, Martha (1995). Terrorism in Context 1st Edition. Penn State University Press; 1st edition. p. 583. ISBN 978-0271010151. "This has further weakened them in the eyes of many Iranians who correctly saw them siding with Iraq against their own country during the Iran-Iraq War."
  32. ^ Terrornomics. Costigan, Sean S., Gold, David. London: Routledge. 2016. ISBN 978-1-315-61214-0. OCLC 948605022.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)
  33. ^ Magdalena Kirchner (2017). "'A good investment?' State sponsorship of terrorism as an instrument of Iraqi foreign policy (1979–1991)". In Christian Kaunert; Sarah Leonard; Lars Berger; Gaynor Johnson (eds.). Western Foreign Policy and the Middle East. Routledge. pp. 36–37. ISBN 9781317499701.
  34. ^ Ephraim Kahana; Muhammad Suwaed (2009). The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence. Scarecrow Press. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-8108-7070-3.
  35. ^ Abraham R. Wagner and Anthony H. Cordesman. "10.14 "Iraq's Offensives At Mehran and Majnoon"". The Lessons of Modern War – Volume II: Iran–Iraq War.
  36. ^ Buchan, James (15 October 2013). Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. Simon and Schuster. p. 317. ISBN 978-1-4165-9777-3. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  37. ^ Cite error: The named reference hup was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  38. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 22. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x".
  39. ^ "The Gulf: Fraternal Drubbing". Time magazine.
  40. ^ Cohen, Ronen (August 2018). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1003–1004. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. S2CID 149542445.
  41. ^ "The Bloody Red Summer of 1988". PBS.
  42. ^ Siavoshi, Sussan (2017). Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran's Revolutionary Ayatollah. Cambridge University Press. p. 131. ISBN 978-1316509463.

Distorting article

@Vanamonde93: Some one is picking up information from its place, under the pretext of shortening article, and put it in the wrong place, under the pretext of self revert. Ghazaalch (talk) 06:53, 24 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • I removed it because it’s repeated here:

”The MEK is accused of detonating a bomb at the Islamic Republican Party headquarters on 28 June 1981. Two days later after the incident, Ruhollah Khomeini accused the MEK. The incident, called Hafte Tir bombing in Iran, killed 73, including Mohammad Beheshti, the party's secretary-general and Chief Justice of Iran, 4 cabinet ministers, 10 vice ministers and 27 members of the Parliament of Iran.”

  • I then realized that the part ”From 26 August 1981 to December 1982, it orchestrated 336 attacks.” was not repeated, so I restored this (my logic was to restore according to date, but perhaps the text should have been modified to explain that it was the MEK who carried out these attacks?).
  • Ghazaalch then undid my restore saying “The sections need to be shortened”.
  • Then Ghazaalch put everything back in the article again saying “You are picking up information from its place and put it in a irrelevant place.”
  • Then Ghazaalch reports me here to Vanamonde instead of just putting the text where they think it should go or making it clear that it was the MEK who carried out these attacks.
  • Currently the information about 1981 remains repeated in the article. Bahar1397 (talk) 18:25, 24 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@BarcrMac: you are repeating the information that already exist in another section, in a new section. Then you delete the old information. This is a kind of moving information to another section, without consensus. The following part however should move, since it is more related to the new section. I'll do it for you.

On 22 June 1981, IRGC and Hezbollahis responded to anti-regime demonstrations against the dismissal of President Abolhassan Banisadr, to what came to be known as "reign of terror" in Iran. The Warden of Evin prison announced the firing squad executions of demonstrators, including teenage girls.[citation needed]

Ghazaalch (talk) 06:07, 12 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: I was actually trying to put everything in one place so that we don't have repeated information in the article.
Now we have this in "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)":
  1. "On 30 August a bomb was detonated killing the elected President Rajai and Premier Mohammad Javad Bahonar. Khomeini's government identified Massoud Keshmiri (secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and active MEK member) as the perpetrator"
  2. "although there has been much speculation among academics and observers that the bombings may have been carried out by IRP leaders to rid themselves of political rivals.
  3. "The reaction to both bombings was intense with many arrests and executions of Mujahedin and other leftist groups, but "assassinations of leading officials and active supporters of the government by the Mujahedin were to continue for the next year or two"."
And this in "Assassinations":
  1. "On 30 August 1981, a bomb was detonated killing the elected President Rajai and Premier Mohammad Javad Bahonar. Iranian authorities announced that Massoud Keshmiri, "a close aide to the late President Muhammad Ali Rajai and secretary of the Supreme Security Council, had been responsible"."
  2. "According to Kenneth Katzman, "there has been much speculation among academics and observers that these bombings may have actually been planned by senior IRP leaders, to rid themselves of rivals within the IRP""
  3. "The reaction to both bombings was intense with many arrests and executions of MEK and other leftist groups."
This information is also repeated in "History":
"until June 1981, when they declared war against the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran and initiated a number of bombings and assassinations targeting the clerical leadership. Many MEK sympathizers and middle-level organizers were detained and executed after June 1981."
Please explain your revert. Barca (talk) 14:16, 12 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Why do you pretend that you were trying to reduce repetitions, while you your edits [17] [18] show that you increased it? Ghazaalch (talk) 02:16, 13 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: As I say in my last message, I was actually trying to put everything in place so that the information is not repeated. Do you agree or disagree that the information I showed in my last message is repeated? If you agree that it's repeated, then we should remove one of the repetitions. If you don't agree, then maybe RFC is the next step. Barca (talk) 15:01, 13 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

You could delete the repeated information, as I did. What I objected here was another subject. Ghazaalch (talk) 10:13, 14 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: With your revert, you put back in the beginning of section Assassinations that "According to Sandra Mackey, the MEK responded by targeting key Iranian official figures for assassination: they bombed the Prime Minister's office, attacked low-ranking civil servants and members of the Revolutionary Guards, along with ordinary citizens who supported the new government." "MEK responded" to what exactly? Can you please explain how it makes sense to have this at the beginning of that section? Barca (talk) 14:18, 15 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

It was not because of my revert. however, I made it right.Ghazaalch (talk) 00:24, 16 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: I think the remaining problem is that now the section Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988) is missing all this information about attacks and counter-attacks between the MEK and the Iranian regime. Is there a reason why this information can't be part of "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"? Barca (talk) 15:31, 16 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vanamonde93: Ghazaalch stopped responding. My question was if there is a valid reason why the information in "Assassinations" can't be part of "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)". It isn't necessary to have two separate sections since the assassinations that took place around that time form part of the "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)". Having all the information in one place also provides better context for the reader. Do I have consensus to make this edit? or should I start a RfC? Barca (talk) 15:35, 23 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
BarcrMac, Ghazaalch seems to have agreed above that removing repetitions is okay. However, please interpret very very narrowly; we have had far too many conflicts over edits that some see as reducing repetition, and others see as removing important content. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:57, 23 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vanamonde93: My question was if it was ok to move the information in "Assassinations" to the section "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" since having all the information in one place provides better context for the reader. Can I go ahead with this edit, or do I need to start a RFC? Barca (talk) 11:50, 25 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
BarcrMac, all this discussion has done is establish that reducing redundancy is okay. Any other edit will have to follow the usual BRD process. You may make it, but if it is challenged, you will have to obtain consensus here. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:41, 25 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The proposed edit and the justification provided is not acceptable. In other words, "having all the information in one place" makes the sections unnecessarily long and make the navigation of the page more difficult for the readers. Needless to say that the "Assassination" section is well justified given the history of MEK reflected in the sources. --Mhhossein talk 11:49, 26 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vanamonde93: I argued that having all the information about the 1981 conflicts between the MEK and the Islamic Republic in "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" provides a context to these conflicts, but Mhhossein is saying now that the won't give consensus for this (not that he has to), but the way it is now in "Assassinations" reads like the MEK and the Islamic Republic attacked each other without reason, and the reasons why they attacked each other are listed in “Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" (a section that is also missing these important attacks). What do you suggest I do here please? Barca (talk) 15:04, 27 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Have you tried pointing to specific redundancies, and asking Mhhossein how he would resolve them? Vanamonde (Talk) 15:14, 27 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Hi @Vanamonde93: yes, I do believe I have tried this. In this instance the problem is not redundancies, the problem is that we have a section with information about attacks between the MEK and the Islamic Republic but the section doesn't have any context about the attacks ("Assassinations"), and then we have another section with information about the context of the attacks, but the section does not mention the attacks ("Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"). I have offered to solve this by combining information about the attacks and their context in one section, having all the information in one place, but Mhhossein is saying this is not acceptable (see his objection). I disagree with Mhhossein's objection. What do you suggest I do here now? Barca (talk) 14:42, 28 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
BarcrMac, a discussion requires more than just one post and one reply. I don't see either of your positions as unreasonable, so maybe you can come to an agreement. If you can't, obviously, an RfC is the next step. Regardless, running to me every day or so isn't going to get you anywhere; given the attitudes of all the editors involved, this page is likely to remain deadlocked for the foreseeable future, and there's nothing I can do about it. If anyone was interested in seeing large changes made, they're going to have to offer compromises. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:56, 28 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Hi @Mhhossein: can we come to some kind of agreement or compromise in moving some of this information to "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"? Barca (talk) 14:41, 4 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Hi, if you are actually asking to remove a well sourced section so that there's effectively no "Assassination" section, then such a move is not in accordance with the scholarly sources and WP:DUE should be applied. However, what do you mean exactly by "some of this information"? --Mhhossein talk 05:16, 6 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • BarcrMac The section ("Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)") need to be shortened but you want to embed more information into it. You are saying the "Assassinations" section doesn't have any context about the attacks. Could you name the contexts related to assassinations, one by one? Then we can discuss which information are related together, and would decide on moving them to the section they belong.Ghazaalch (talk) 03:54, 15 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Chrono-order

@Vanamonde93: Am I correct saying that in a talk page discussion, older comments should be placed at the bottom of the discussion as per WP:BOTTOMPOST? I was reverted. --Mhhossein talk 11:50, 18 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

(*sigh*) Stefka Bulgaria, that was unnecessary. WP:TPO allows for chronological reordering, when that does not change the meaning of a comment. Vanamonde (Talk) 16:33, 18 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the explanation, Vanamonde; just thought that "Scholarly sources describe MEK as a cult" is a subsection or threaded discussion within the RfC? (shouldn't votes go where the RFC is being proposed rather than in subsections or threaded discussions?) Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 19:59, 19 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Well, then you ought to have moved all the !votes, not just one. Vanamonde (Talk) 21:44, 19 April 2021 (UTC) Never mind, I have that backwards. This is a silly dispute, but it comes down to poor organization in that section. The subsection is bloody confusing for anyone trying to get a sense of the whole discussion. I have moved all !votes into the main section; let this be an end to this particular dispute. Vanamonde (Talk) 21:49, 19 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks Vanamonde. I know it was silly and sorry for pinging you for such a clear thing. I can't realize how there could be an objection to what the MOS says. Thanks again. --Mhhossein talk 14:07, 20 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vanamonde93: In this RFC Mhhossein also writes that my vote is "original research" following with "There's a trend in this TP by the pro-MEK users saying we should ignore a lot of reliable sources because allegedly there is a propaganda against MEK." Can you please comment about this? Nika2020 (talk) 02:07, 21 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Nika2020, I see a lot of poor arguments by all parties in that thread, but I do not see the need for admin intervention. Vanamonde (Talk) 02:46, 21 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vanamonde93, poor arguments aside, writing "pro MEK users saying we should ignore a lot of reliable sources" - isn't that Ad hominem? (I never said that I'm either a pro MEK user or that we should ignore a lot of reliable sources) Nika2020 (talk) 17:45, 21 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
It's not a particularly helpful manner of speaking, but none of you have been discussing this dispute in a helpful manner, and I am sick to the teeth of it. When some users have been continuously seeking to minimize criticism of the MEK, and others continuously seeking to maximise it, that language still isn't ideal but isn't something I can sanction over. Vanamonde (Talk) 17:56, 21 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Vanamonde, why are you grouping me with Mhhossein or others here? All I did was write a (civil) vote in a RFC, and Mhhossein then alluded that I (and others in that RFC) said something that nobody really said. That's a considerable difference. Nika2020 (talk) 19:41, 22 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I think these sort of comments are not helpful to our discussion. But, I don't see a considerable difference and I did not describe you in person. Needless to mention that this description was also used by an admin here referring to the parties being involved here. --Mhhossein talk 12:58, 23 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Mhhossein which admin used the description "There's a trend in this TP by the pro-MEK users saying we should ignore a lot of reliable sources because allegedly there is a propaganda against MEK."? Nika2020 (talk) 19:05, 24 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry, but I'm not willing to continue this useless discussion.--Mhhossein talk 07:45, 26 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Shatt al-Arab

Stefka Bulgaria can you explain why you reverted this? There is a scholarly source that says MeK considered Shatt al-Arab as belonging to Iraq, not Iran, and this was recognition was significant. So why did you remove it from the article?VR talk 02:08, 26 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Stefka Bulgaria:.VR talk 22:19, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
VR, In your edit you removed "that co-outlined a peace plan "based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders"; why? You also added "Rajavi and Aziz held another meeting sometime before 1986. The agreement between MEK and Iraq in this meeting "went beyond" the 1975 Algiers Accords and guaranteed Iraq's military support for the MEK."; why? I wrote in my edit summary that the section was "less redundant before"; which is the reason why I reverted you. About the MeK considering Shatt al-Arab as belonging to Iraq, is there more than just one source supporting this? If not, we could ask others to see if this one source is enough to include this in the article. I mainly reverted you for the first points, but don't really mind if others think it's ok to add the Shatt al-Arab part back to the article. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 10:47, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Because the previous reversion stated as fact something that is actually disputed by at least one scholarly source. Hence the previous version violated WP:NPOV. The "one source" you are referring to appears to be one of the most scholarly sources on the MEK and so its views are DUE if we are going to talk about MEK and the Algiers Accord.VR talk 17:07, 22 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Is there any further comment to be made here?VR talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Is there any scholarly dispute that MEK is a cult?

I provided a list of 15 scholarly sources that clearly say the MEK is a cult (Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran#Scholarly sources describe MEK as a cult). In response, Nika2020, Ypatch and BarcrMac argued that this assertion was disputed and provided some sources. But looking at their sources (below) it should be obvious that this argument violates WP:FALSEBALANCE. None of their sources (except one) are scholarly and many of their sources aren't even WP:RS. I would like Vanamonde93 to advise whether Nika's, Ypatch's and Barca's sources are as strong as the sources I provided and if not then can we safely say that the view that MEK is a cult is much more common among scholars than the view that MEK is not a cult?VR talk 03:33, 26 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • @Vanamonde93:. After I posted my source analysis below you closed an RfC writing that {[tq|The sources presented below using the "cult" descriptor are patently more reliable than those challenging that descriptor.}} I thought that settled the issue regarding the sources, yet BarcrMac continues to repeatedly present the exact same unreliable sources as they presented at the RfC you closed. Here they presented Rudy Guiliani, "retired US general" (who is unnamed) etc as counter-weight to sources that call MEK a cult. This is going in circles and seems like WP:STONEWALLING. Barca didn't even bother responding to my detailed rebuttal below.VR talk 17:45, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@VR: unless I've missed something, I see several editors already responded to you about this already including myself here, @Idealigic: here, and @Nika2020: here. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 18:13, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Stefka, your proposal"The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being 'cultish'.[337][338] Various sources have also described the MEK as a 'cult',[339][340] 'cult-like',[341][342] or having a 'cult of personality',[343][13] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a 'cult'.[344][345][346]"—is a textbook violation of WP:FALSEBALANCE and also grossly minimizes the many cult-like features of the MEK described in academic sources.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 18:48, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
This was the consensus of a lengthy RFC. Like other editors have already said here, sources calling the MEK a cult are already in the article. Moreover, I invite you to read the article (sections like "Cult of Personality", Human rights record, or even the Ideological revolution and women's rights sections) - all already robust with "cult" pov. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 19:04, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Source analysis

Nika2020's and Barca's provided sources are weak:

  • "retired US general saying "Cult? How about admirably focused group?".[19]
    • This US general is unnamed and described by the source as an "active lobbyist on the MEK's behalf" (which would make him a WP:COISOURCE). The fact that he's anonymous makes it impossible to verify any scholarly credentials he may hold.
  • "Former French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal criticized the MEK for having a ″cult nature”; while Former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that he was “ashamed” by this statement.[20]
    • Barca didn't fully quote the the source which says French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal criticized the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran, or Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, for “its violent and non-democratic inspirations,” ″cult nature” and “intense campaign of influence and disinformation.” The terms were unusually harsh for the French government...Former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said he was “ashamed” by the French government statement. It would be a stretch to say that Kouchner specifically denied that MEK was a cult based on this alone. In any case Kouchner is not a scholarly source.
  • "Despite these, Rudy Guiliani, president Trump's personal lawyer, addressed a meeting of the MEK at their Tirana compound, saying: "And if you think that's a cult, then there is something wrong with you".
  • An investigation by the European Parliament and the U.S. military concluded that the accusations of it being a cult were unfounded.
    • Once again Barca didn't quote the source fully. According to Stefka, the book's position is more complicated: "In terms of the accusation that the organization operates like a cult, there is no question that the MEK commands strong dedication to its cause and to the organization, perhaps to an extent that can strike observers as cult-like. However, no hard evidence has been found to support the claims, occasionally forwarded by their opponents, that the members are forcibly prevented from leaving the group, involuntarily separated from spouses or children, physically abused or the like. A delegation of the European Parliament and the U.S. military investigated the claims and concluded that they were unfounded: the European Parliament’s report uncovered falsified information traceable to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (“MOI”). Indeed, accusations that the group operates like a cult represent a degree of confusion about the organization. The discipline and dedication shown by MEK members is more akin to what one might observe within..." Stefka's quote cut off here and I have no idea what the authors say after this. So the source says that some of the claims behind the cult assertion are unfounded but we also need the full quote to evaluate the source's position.
    • Two of the authors of the source (Cheryl Benard and Austin Long) are professors. But who is the publisher? According to Amazon, it is "Metis Analytics" but when I google "Metis Analytics" publisher this book shows as the top result. Has this publisher published any other books? According to this site the author of the book "Cheryl Benard is the president of Metis Analytics, a Washington, DC-based research company." So is this akin to a WP:Self-published source?
  • According to Raymond Tanter, "Tehran uses allegations that the MEK is a 'cult' as propaganda to target liberal democracies, attempting to persuade them to refrain from providing support to the MEK".
    • Nowhere is Tanter saying the MEK is not a cult.

Ypatch provided some additional sources. But none of these sources deny that MEK is a cult, only that Iran wants MEK to be labelled as a cult. There is no logic to the idea that just because Iran says something it must necessarily be false.

  • "A well-funded, highly organized misinformation campaign attempts to demonize the only viable alternative to Tehran’s rulers, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), whose four decades of opposition to one of the world’s most evil regimes apparently equates with being some sort of terrorist cult."[21]
  • Iran is trying to get other countries to label it as a terrorist cult.[22]
  • the Iranian regime embassy offered him up to $80,000 to refer to the MEK as a "cult" in his publications.[23]
    • Just because Iran is trying to do something doesn't make it false. The sources I provided were not connected to Iran.

VR talk 03:33, 26 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Vice regent: Sources that say the MEK is cult-like are already represented in the article. Vanamonde also suggested that the article needs trimming, not expanding. Nika2020 (talk) 18:24, 26 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

"biggest and most active political opposition group"

The first paragraph of the article currently says

It is also considered the Islamic Republic of Iran's biggest and most active political opposition group.

This is both poorly sourced and a violation of WP:NPOV.

Abrahamian is referring to MEK's popularity in the early 1980s, a long time ago. Katzman only describes MEK as Iran's "most active" opposition group, not the biggest, and is dated to 2001 (20 years ago). This source describes MEK as The MEK, which has been in exile for years, is Iran’s most organised and only armed opposition group. It makes no mention of MEK being the biggest.

Having this statement at the top of the lead without any indication of MEK's unpopularity is very WP:BIASED. High quality journalistic sources published in recent years have called the MEK a "fringe" group: New York Times, CBC News, Washington Post and an expert quoted inNBC News. We have consensus at Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran#Iran-Iraq war that MEK became unpopular inside Iran due to its collaboration with Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war.

I was able to find only one source (currently not in the article) that refers to MEK as the "largest Iranian opposition group" in the context of "opposition outside Iranian borders". But if we include it, we should also consider sources that give the opposite view.VR talk 22:18, 3 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The MEK has been the Islamic Republic's main political opposition since the revolution.

  • "The MEK has been the leading opposition voice against the Islamic Republic for years."[1]
  • "The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran, also known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq or MEK, comprised most of the victims of 1988’s “summer of blood,” and it has been expressly identified by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the driving force behind the recent uprisings. His warnings no doubt helped to justify the killing of 1,500 peaceful protesters last November, as well as the imposition of multiple death sentences in the ensuing months. Ever since coming to power, Iran’s clerical leaders have claimed that the MEK is a cult that lacks meaningful support inside Iran. If that is the case, how can they logically claim that the group is responsible for the ongoing protests in Iran? Why would Tehran spend massive sums of money and decades of political energy on demonizing a movement that allegedly has only a marginal impact? Why would the regime risk its already heavily damaged relations with the international community by using its embassies and diplomats in 2018 to execute terrorist attacks on the MEK in Europe?"[2]
  • "But it also continued its anti-regime activities within Iran, where it had emerged as the clerical regime’s most potent and capable foe—the “public enemy number one” of Iran’s ayatollahs."[3]
  • "Having been removed from the US list of terrorist organizations in 2012, the NCRI is increasingly being recognized as the most important player in the landscape of resistance to Tehran’s clerical regime — both at home and abroad."[4]

It is a an established fact. Ypatch (talk) 05:01, 7 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Ypatch you have quoted the sourced improperly and some of your sources aren't reliable.
  • "The MEK has been the leading opposition voice against the Islamic Republic for years."[5]
This source also says Many former U.S. officials and Iran experts question the MEK's democratic credentials, as well as the depth of its support base inside Iran...Many independent scholars say the MEK's alliance with Saddam in that long and bloody war turned the group into traitors in the eyes of most Iranians. In the 1990s, the Rajavis instituted a number of cult-like measures to prevent defections.
  • This source simply questions Iran's claims about MEK without saying MEK is the largest opposition group.
  • You took the third quote out of context, here is the full quote: "But it also continued its anti-regime activities within Iran, where it had emerged as the clerical regime’s most potent and capable foe—the “public enemy number one” of Iran’s ayatollahs. Then, in the late 1990s, the MeK became..."[6] Obviously, this is a reference to MEK's potency before the 1990s. It has no relevance to today. In fact, the same source also says "To its detractors, MEK represents a fringe element that promotes an unpopular, unworkable vision of Iran’s future." And also, Iranian opposition elements remain deeply distrustful of the organization, citing its insular, exclusionary nature and claiming that, among other things, it fundamentally lacks support on the Iranian “street.”
  • This source is not reliable as it is controlled by the Saudi gov't, which also funds the MEK.VR talk 23:17, 10 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I quoted directly from the sources. About Arab News, show me where it says this is not not a reliable source. Ypatch (talk) 04:13, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Read Wikipedia:Reliable_sources/Perennial_sources#Arab_News, Arab News is not a good source for matters related to Saudi govt. We have New York Times, Washington Post, CBC News, NBC News all saying MEK is fringe vs Arab News saying they are popular. Which sources are more reliable? NYT or Arab News? So which source should be given more weight?VR talk 03:02, 25 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Still waiting for Ypatch's response.VR talk 02:48, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The International Policy Digest link provided by Ypatch: "Ever since coming to power, Iran’s clerical leaders have claimed that the MEK is a cult that lacks meaningful support inside Iran. If that is the case, how can they logically claim that the group is responsible for the ongoing protests in Iran? Why would Tehran spend massive sums of money and decades of political energy on demonizing a movement that allegedly has only a marginal impact?" Exactly. Idealigic (talk) 09:15, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Idealigic Can you remember your discussion here, when you wrote If we add one POV, then we need to add all, and the lead is not for that? Ghazaalch (talk) 19:55, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

MeK repeatedly claims to be the most influential opposition group in that country, in reality it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded. [7] Ghazaalch (talk) 06:03, 15 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Can we now omit the disputed sentence from the lede? Ghazaalch (talk) 04:08, 23 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I am going to remove the sentence if there is no objection. Ghazaalch (talk) 09:43, 5 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Ghazaalch: You seem to have missed Ypatch and Idealigic's objections. I think we could add the new sources here to the section "Perception" though, and then clean the section up since it's kinda messy. Alex-h (talk) 21:49, 6 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
For now, we can just note both views as I've done here. But I think the sources are being misused and I will wait for Ypatch to respond.VR talk 01:04, 7 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I agree that this should go in the Perception section, in the Outside Iran part. That's my suggestion.Ypatch (talk) 05:08, 9 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Ypatch can explain this revert? If we are going include one POV in the first sentence of the lead then we should include the alternate POV as well. Otherwise this is a violation of WP:NPOV. And giving one POV less weight (by moving it out of the lead) is a violation of WP:DUE.VR talk 02:48, 11 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • I fixed all the tagging done by VR. Since everything else is obviously disputed, it should go in the perception section where all the POVs can be explained. Idealigic (talk) 09:42, 28 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Actually this addition is misleading and implies that MEK is still a major political force. But most scholars including Abrahamian say that MEK peaked in popularity in the 1980s and then its popularity has declined since then. In his final subchapter From mass movement to religio-political sect, Abrahamian argues that MEK's popularity peaked in June 1981 (p 258) and by 1988: The Mojahedin had formulated its own vision...Clearly by 1988 very few outside the inner circles of true believers accepted such a far-fethce vision. (p 281). Conen also says since 1981 until the mid 1980s, the organization lost its social hold in Iran (p 174). There is a long list of reliable (and scholarly) sources that agree that MEK his unpopular in Iran today: Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive 39#Mek Unpopular.VR talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
If you think you can make a better edit then make a better edit but don't tag everything or remove it from the lead like Mhhossein did, that is fixing nothing. I will restore the longstanding version until we can come to an agreement. Make a proposal here before making it in the article so we avoid edit warring. Idealigic (talk) 08:14, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Idealigic if a claim is unsourced or has a citation that doesn't support the text, then this is a serious WP:V issue. Tags are absolutely necessary in that case.VR talk 15:53, 1 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I will source and organise the claims (for the second time). By the way, what you did was another WP:CRP violation. The next one I will report it. Idealigic (talk) 13:00, 2 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I added verification failed tags to sources that don't support the text. You can't use CRP as a an excuse to violate the most fundamental policy of wikipedia.VR talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

This edit is problematic. First you are once again misquoting Abrahamnian who says that MEK had declined by 1988.[8] Cohen says that by "the mid 1980s, the organization lost its social hold in Iran"[9] A 2008 journal article said MEK had a "diminished status";[10] a 2020 scholarly book called it "a spent force in Iranian politics"[11]. Another scholarly book says "it gradually lost popularity inside and outside Iran"[12], yet another scholarly source says MEK "lost much of its support in Iran" and "reached a dead end."[13] In fact here are 19 more sources that say that MEK is no longer popular in Iran: Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran/Archive 39#Mek Unpopular.

Also who is Iran's "main opposition" is disputed. Since 2009, Mousavi and the Green Movement have been called Iran's "main opposition" by Reuters, Guardian, NBC News and this scholarly source[14]. Before then, a 2008 report said "Since [1979], the group Mehdi Bazargan (and Ibrahim Yazdi)'s Iranian Freedom Movement has existed as the primary opposition to the regime and the concept of velayat-e-faqih." A 1986 artice in the Christian Science Monitor says there isnt just one "main opposition" group, but many including the "royalists".

So why do you insist on putting such a controversial fact in the first paragraph?VR talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I am not misquoting, and the fact that you continue to make these types of false accusations (like Mhhossein) shows you are violating WP:NPA. Idealigic (talk) 08:59, 8 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • The summary of this discussion serves to show the sentence in question is disputed. As Vice Regent showed by providing reliable sources, MEK's being the largest/biggest opposition group is not a fact and there are serious counter POVs against it. Moreover, if Katzman is referring to MEK as the most active opposition group, then it should be framed as "according to Katamzn..." and hence should be taken to the body (Katzman is should be generalized). If there is no substantiated objection, I am going to act based on this suggestion by Idealigic. --Mhhossein talk 12:24, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Mhhossein you're right, NPOV requires us to attribute contentious views. Idealigic and Ypatch insist that the POV that MEK is the largest opposition belongs in the lead's 1st paragraph, but opposing POVs do not, violates WP:DUE. I'm have moved recently added material by Idealigic to the body.VR talk 12:53, 16 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Vice regent:: This is not "recently added material", that the MEK is the IRI's main political opposition is part of the longstanding text for which you asked more sources to be provided, and I provided them. Mhoossein tried moving this to the body too, so your edit is yet another GAMING of restrictions so you leave with no choice to restore longstanding version again. Idealigic (talk) 14:56, 16 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Request for comment (Assassinations)

Should we move the information in "Assassinations" so that it reads chronologically within the section "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"? Barca (talk) 13:32, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • The discussion regarding this move is ongoing in Talk:People's Mujahedin of Iran#Distorting article where the OP failed to answer the last question. RFCs should not be misused as Shortcuts for reaching goals. --Mhhossein talk 12:46, 14 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Barca your proposal is unclear. Are you proposing to put all the assassinations in "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"? Even MEK-linked assassinations that took place before 1981 and after 1988? Please clarify.VR talk 16:03, 14 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
All of the incidents in the section "Assassinations" fall within the scope of "1981-1988 conflicts with the Islamic Republic". Like I said already the problem with the current "Assassinations" section is that none of the conflicts between the MEK and Islamic Republic provide information about the context of these conflicts (the context of these conflicts are given in the section "1981-1988 conflicts with the Islamic Republic"). Context is important, so it makes sense to have all the information (with context) in the same section instead of having hints of information scattered throughout the article where the reader is forced to look at different sections to get the full information. Barca (talk) 16:25, 26 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Once again you didn't answer the questions:
  • Should MEK-linked assassinations before 1981 be put in the section "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"?
  • Should MEK-linked assassinations after 1988 be put in the section "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"?VR talk 04:47, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Survey

  • Yes - the problem is that currently we have a section with information about attacks between the MEK and the Islamic Republic but the section doesn't have any context about the attacks ("Assassinations"), and then we have another section with information about the context of the attacks, but the section does not mention the attacks ("Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"). Having all the information in one section provides better context for the reader. Barca (talk) 13:32, 12 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes - I don't see why not. Since I have been involved here, "chrono order" has been something that's been constantly applied in this article, and having two separate sections in different parts of the article about the same incidents (as it is now) doesn't make any sense. - MA Javadi (talk) 20:43, 16 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes I agree it doesn't make sense to have information about the same topic spread in different sections throughout the article. This forces the reader to piece together bits of information from different parts of the article to get a general idea of what happened. That's the wrong way to layout an article. All the information about a topic should go in a single section about that topic. Idealigic (talk) 09:49, 18 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • No. It was obvious form the very beginning, that you don't like the "Assassination" title (as you didn't like the "Cult" one) so you started to empty the section from its content,(via your smart job [24][25]) so that you could omit the title. I reverted and warned you, but you, instead of building consensus(You did not answer the last two questions here), brought the case here. I am repeating my question again: You are saying the "Assassinations" section doesn't have any context about the attacks. Could you name the contexts related to assassinations, one by one? Then we can discuss which information are related together, and would decide on moving them to the section they belong. Ghazaalch (talk) 04:14, 21 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • No As per Ghazaalch; of note, if the sources are going to be the criteria, as a result, a stand alone section --or factually subsection-- is considered to be well justified. We have a separate page for this List of people assassinated by the People's Mujahedin of Iran; so, why not having a section for it. I believe that Mhhossein also mentioned a true point that "The discussion regarding this move is ongoing". Ali Ahwazi (talk) 07:54, 3 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes. The section "Assassinations" is a real mess and the main reason for this is that there is no context to the information like Barca says. It mentions a couple of bombings, but why did the bombings happen? What were the incidents that led to them? What happened after? All this goes beyond just "Assassinations", this was a Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988), so put that information there. Alex-h (talk) 14:59, 3 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Why don't you name the "contexts" and "reasons" which you say led to the assassinations, if there is a reason, beyond the fact that MeK wants to overthrow the Islamic republic of Iran. And if there is really such a reasons, why shouldn't we move them to the "Assassinations" section? The answer is easy. You don't like the title above the section (as you don't like the "cult" one), and want to remove it.Ghazaalch (talk) 09:26, 5 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Ghazaalch: all you need to do is read the section Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988) (the first clue is in the section title):

"By the middle of the year 1980, clerics close to Khomeini were openly referring to the MEK as "monafeghin", "kafer", and "elteqatigari". The MEK, instead accused Khomeini of "monopolizing power", "hijacking the revolution", "trampling over democratic right", and "plotting to set up a fascistic one-party dictatorship"."

"In February 1980 concentrated attacks by hezbollahi pro-Khomeini militia began on the meeting places, bookstores and newsstands of Mujahideen and other leftists[154] driving the left underground in Iran. Hundreds of MEK supporters and members were killed from 1979 to 1981, and some 3,000 were arrested.

"On 22 June 1981, IRGC and Hezbollahis responded to anti-regime demonstrations against the dismissal of President Abolhassan Banisadr, to what came to be known as "reign of terror" in Iran. The Warden of Evin prison announced the firing squad executions of demonstrators, including teenage girls.[155] According to Sandra Mackey, the MEK responded by targeting key Iranian official figures for assassination: they bombed the Prime Minister's office, attacked low-ranking civil servants and members of the Revolutionary Guards, along with ordinary citizens who supported the new government. The MEK was the first group carrying out suicide attacks in Iran."

"According to Ervand Abrahamian, the MEK attacked the regime for "disrupting rallies and meetings, banning newspapers and burning down bookstores, rigging elections and closing down Universities; kidnapping imprisoning, and torturing political activists; reviving SAVAK and using the tribunals to terrorize their opponents, and engineering the American hostage crises to impose on the nation the ‘medieval’ concept of the velayat-e faqih".

"In 1981, Massoud Rajavi issued a statement shortly after it went into exile. This statement, according to James Piazza, identified the MEK not as a rival for power but rather a vanguard of popular struggle: Our struggle against Khomeini is not the conflict between two vengeful tribes. It is the struggle of a revolutionary organisation against a totalitarian regime... This struggle, as I said, is the conflict for liberating a people; for informing and mobilizing a people in order to overthrow the usurping reaction and to build its own glorious future with its own hands."

There is more information there but I don't want to bludgeon this RFC. But it's clear that this describes the escalation and conflicts between the MeK and the clerics. To mention the bombings without any context of the conflicts between the MeK and the Islamic Republic is very confusing and misleading . Alex-h (talk) 21:45, 6 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

"Assassination" and "conflict" are two different words which are used differently.Ghazaalch (talk) 10:58, 7 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Yes: Per Alex-h's comprehensive analysis above, which shows that information clearly belongs in the Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988) section. Stefka Bulgaria (talk) 16:33, 7 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Question: I think organizing the sections is a good idea. But MEK's assassination campaign stretches several historical periods. The MEK was conducting assassinations before the 1979 revolution, then during the 1980s and, according to several reliable sources, even recently. So how can we pigeon-hole something that spans several historical periods into one section?VR talk 00:16, 8 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Are you saying we should remove the sections for which we have a page? Per which policy or guideline? --Mhhossein talk 17:46, 12 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
No response to my question? --Mhhossein talk 06:52, 15 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Obviously there is no guideline for removing sections if there is an standalone article. It's actually the opposite, see: The original article should contain a section with a summary of the subtopic's article as well as a link to it. (WP:SUMMARY). MarioGom (talk) 17:23, 22 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
This is an editorial-based suggestion for the purpose of good organizational and writing principles. This RFC proposes putting all the information in the same section and outlined chronologically so that it be less confusing for the reader and so that the information is presented with context (a more complete manner). "Context matters tremendously". Barca (talk) 16:27, 26 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Your comment shows we should not remove this important section. You say "all the information [should be] in the same section", but assassination and terrorist attack targets of MEK did not include only Iranian people. Moreover, according to reliable sources, they are suspected of being involved in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists (which apparently does not have any specific context). So, this notable topic should not be removed. --Mhhossein talk 12:46, 27 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
You are talking about rumours that have not been confirmed. This RFC is clear that it talks about the section "Assassinations", and how all of the incidents named in that section fit within the "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" section (which provides context to all the incidents). Barca (talk) 14:33, 28 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
So, those American people attacked by MEK were citizens of Islamic Republic government? How about those who where killed by MEK during the Shah era? Were they citizens of IRI? --Mhhossein talk 12:53, 29 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Mhhossein you really should read the article and comments here with more attention. I must repeat once again This RFC talks about the section "Assassinations", and how all of the incidents named in that section fit within the "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" section. The controversies with the American people is in the section "Schism (1971–1979)" (where the Department of State attributs the assassinations to Peykar), and the MEK playing an active role in the downfall of the Shah is already covered in the "History" section. All the content in the "Assassinations" section is relevant to the "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" section. Barca (talk) 15:05, 5 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
You really need to read the history of MEK. The bitter fact is that MEK is fully responsible for assassination American personnel ("The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime and was responsible for the assassination of several U.S. military personnel and civilians in the 1970's."[26]) They did the same to the officials of Shah government. Those are Assassinations carried out by MEK. --Mhhossein talk 18:56, 5 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • No. The purpose of the RFC is unclear. There seems to be several misunderstandings of editing guidelines in previous rationales. MarioGom (talk) 17:23, 22 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes. I think the purpose of the RFC is clear: put incidents in the section where context is provided. I agree with Barca that context matters (the attacks and counter attacks did not happen out of spite but the were a result of escalating incidents). That is not clear right now in the article. Ypatch (talk) 13:31, 29 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The purpose of this RFC is to Remove the 'Assassination' section (which has a stand alone article!!!). There are serious issues and unanswered questions like those asked by Vice Regent [27]. --Mhhossein talk 19:00, 5 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Here are the answers you are seeking: "Should MEK-linked assassinations before 1981 be put in the section "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"? Answer: NO. "Should MEK-linked assassinations after 1988 be put in the section "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)"? Answer: NO. All the content in the "Assassinations" section is relevant to the "Conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988)" section. I thought this was clear already. This has been repeated many times, so I won't repeat it anymore. Barca (talk) 12:05, 6 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The Assassinations section should adequately summarize List of people assassinated by the People's Mujahedin of Iran, adding further commentary if necessary. Maybe merging it with the Assassination of MEK members outside Iran section. IMHO this proposal is a step in the wrong direction. MarioGom (talk) 14:24, 6 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • what is the purpose of having different sections in an article in the first place? why don't we merge them all in one section? Isn't it true that all the sections in an article are somehow related together? So why don't we merge them all? Why don't we arrange them all in chronological order? why we should have different sections?

One of the answers to this question could be that; having different sections with different/special titles make the article more interesting and more readable. The other answer could be that the readers are not interested in reading all the article. They want to pick the information they need as soon as possible. Now the other question arise here is that why some people insist on merging the sections; starting from Cult section, continuing with Assassination one, and so on? Ghazaalch (talk) 21:17, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Request for comment

Should we replace "...a decision that was viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians and that destroyed the MEK's appeal in its homeland." with -

..."which has since had a negative impact on its popularity in Iran."

Idealigic (talk) 06:48, 14 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Support. Because it is more neutral than the current version, and also because it represents the more neutral scholarly sources as it has been shown here in the talk page. Idealigic (talk) 06:48, 14 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
More neutral scholarly sources? What kind of sources are they exactly? Also, I have provided highly reliable 20 sources ([28] and [29]), 10 of them being scholarly works that support the current wording. Further, can you please say how your suggestion is "more neutral"? --Mhhossein talk 19:37, 15 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Strongly oppose removing "viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians". The lead currently has two statements about MEK's popularity:
    • 1. "[MEK is Iran's] biggest and most active political opposition group" (a positive statement)
    • 2. "[MEK's alliance with Iraq] was viewed as treason by the vast majority of Iranians" (a negative statement)
Idealigic opposed removing #1 from the lead by citing a single non-scholarly source. By contrast #2 is supported by dozens of reliable sources. Mhhossein provided 20 reliable sources[30][31] (including several scholarly sources published by Oxford University Press, University of Chicago Press and several peer-reviewed journals) that say Iranians viewed MEK's actions as treason. View #2 is way more prevalent in scholarly sources yet Idealigic wishes to remove it. View #1 is hardly mentioned in scholarly sources yet Idealigic tries to keep it in the first paragraph of the lead. This is a strong violation of WP:DUE. It is obvious that this is WP:POVPUSHing.VR talk 15:07, 14 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Note I proposed a compromise version that included mentions of both the treason perception and the text Idealigic has proposed adding. But Idealigic didn't even bother responding to my proposal.VR talk 15:07, 14 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
This analysis by VR is original research. There are lots of ("positive" and "negative") statements in the lead (the lead in fact is too long and needs to be made shorter). The more neutral version ("which has since had a negative impact on its popularity in Iran.") is supported by more high quality scholarly sources than the biased version. So the more neutral version is WP:DUE, and it is in fact VR and Mhhossein who are WP:POVPUSHing. Idealigic (talk) 09:37, 29 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
What do you mean by biased version? By the way, you are accusing me of POV pushing, which is certainly a personal attack against me. You should comment on the content, not the editors. You need to strike this attack. --Mhhossein talk 12:48, 29 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Admin assistance needed

Hello. IP 5.211.193.240 made an edit to the article, which was reverted (per cherrypicking WP:CITEKILL), but the IP reinstated the edit. I explained to the IP that the article has WP:CRP restrictions but IP did not respond or self-revert. Can an admin please revert the IPs edit? (I cannot because that would infringe the CRP restrictions). Thank you. Idealigic (talk) 09:38, 29 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The IP is correctly adding citations to a text which is being discussed on the talk page. There's no WP:CITEKILL concern. --Mhhossein talk 12:44, 29 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
This is a CRP violation, and Mhhossein is supporting it. All regards for policies seem to be going out the window in this article. Idealigic (talk) 08:13, 30 June 2021 (UTC)[reply]
 Not done for now: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y". Melmann 00:03, 3 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Melmann: thank you for your assistance. The edit that needs to be reverted (or undone) is this one: [32]. Idealigic (talk) 13:04, 3 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Melmann: I am against CRP violation and I have reported Idealigic for this. As for the IP's edit, before any revert, there should be substantiated objection from Idealigic which is missing here. As I said before, There's no WP:CITEKILL concern. In contrary to what is pretended, the citations are in accordance with WP:CHALLENGE. The materials being supported by this edit are falsely challenged by Idealigic et al. So, addition of a citation is quite OK. --Mhhossein talk 18:43, 5 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Mhhossein: this is clearly a CRP violation which you won't stop defending it. Do you have a COI with this IP? It gives that impression. Idealigic (talk) 08:12, 6 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Idealigic, you just added 8 citations to a sentence in the lead. How can you then complain about WP:CITEKILL?VR talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@idealigic: Your personal attack is now followed by casting aspersions against me. You are strongly advised to see Wikipedia:Etiquette, Wikipedia:Civility and Wikipedia:No personal attacks. --Mhhossein talk 06:19, 9 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
By the way, since there's no substantial objection against the IP's edit, I think there's no concern. --Mhhossein talk 06:25, 9 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • @Idealigic: You already said you could not revert the IP since it would be counted as a CRP violation. But now, you have reverted them without substantiating your objection. You were told that CITEKILL is not a concern here (it's indeed not a concern). So, you should not have made the revert. This example well represents your editing pattern. (pinging @Melmann: for their attention) --Mhhossein talk 12:23, 23 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I realize that restoring to the longstanding version is not a CRP violation (you've done this many times). I did substantiate my revert. Cherry-picking sources (when there are other sources using other terminology) in a sentence that already has many sources is POV pushing. The IP also made a CRP violation by adding this after it was reverted, which you are still defending. Idealigic (talk) 09:42, 24 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
1- I have provided 20 reliable sources (10 of them being scholarly ones) [33]&[34] supporting the current wording. So, NO cherrypicking is happening here. 2- You are even still challenging the wording which automatically calls for more sources to be added, hence there is no citekill concern (also you did not say why this edit by you is not a citekill. You were told these things in the past, making the issue with your reverts more problematic. --Mhhossein talk 07:48, 25 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Removal of scholarly source

Idealigic can you explain this removal of a scholarly source cited material that Saddam ordered the operation?VR talk 15:53, 1 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I reinstated longstanding version because Saddam making orders to the NLA seems WP:UNDUE. If I'm wrong, then please provide more sources which say Saddam made such orders to the NLA and we will compare them to other sources. Idealigic (talk) 12:59, 2 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The view that Saddam ordered the attack comes from a WP:SCHOLARLY source published by Harvard University Press. Is that not enough? Here's a book published by University Press of Kentucky that says the unsuccessful attack on 26-28 July...That mission was personally assigned to the group by Saddam. Please self-revert.VR talk 01:09, 7 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Why don’ t we quote the second source saying Saddam “assigned” the attack on 26-28 July to the Iranian National Liberation Army “after the successful conquest of Mehran a month earlier, based on the Iraqi’s assumption that the Iranian Army had been considerably weakened and that an additional atack there might be just as successful as the Iraqi liberation battles.”

The rest of the text in that source is also very insightful, we should also include it:

  • " On 26 July the Mujahidin Khalq reported that a number of its divisions had opened a large-scale attack in western Iran whose objective was the city of Kermanshah. They claimed to have taken control of two cities - Karand and Eslam Abad Gharb - on the main road leading to Kermanshah. The forces passed through territory inside Iran that had been conquered by Iraq eastward into the Iranian heartland. In its course, they took many Iranian prisoners and seized large amounts of plunder. According to their reports, the residents of the two conquered cities had received their “liberators” warmly. In the battles that took place during the operation, the 27th Division of the Revolutionary Guards, which was deployed in the city of Eslam Abad Ghard, was seriously damaged. However, the Mujahidin were not successful, and their forces did not succeed in advancing eastward toward Hamadan, but were blocked by a counterattack mounted by Iranian reinforcements (Operation “Mersad” on 27 July). The Mujahidin were forced to retreat from the cities they had occupied 72 hours earlier. Their report claimed that they had retreated in order to regroup for further operations directed at bringing down the iranian regime. The Iraqis hurriedly contradicted the Iranian’s accusations that the operation had been carried out by their forces, which had in fact remained at Serbil Zehab and Ghilan-e-Gharb.”

We can also include the other sources that you and Mhhossein have been stonewalling from being included:

  • " In spring 1987, the NLA launched its first major operation, code-named "Shining Sun," in the southern province of Khuzistan. Women were organized into two separate brigades, and, for the first time, took the field and fought face-to-face with Khomeini's forces on the front lines. The enemy's forces were shocked to find themselves captured by one of the women's brigades. Scenes of their capture, their surprise evident for all to see, were featured in some of the world's leading newspapers. Despite all the objections you have heard, women were fighting on the frontlines and reality was laid bare. Like their male counterparts, the women of the NLA demonstrated they were capable and qualified. These units took part in the "Forty Stars" operation together, during which the strategic city of Mehran in western Iran was conquered. One of the Khomeini regime's best-armored units was destroyed, and billions of dollars in tanks and weapons were seized as booty. Fifteen hundred of the regime's soldiers were taken prisoner. Immediately after this operation, only a week later, the National Liberation Army staged the "Eternal Light" operation. "Eternal Light was the NLA's largest operation and penetrated 150 kilometers into Iran. The fighting raged over four days. Two cities were liberated, and the NLA reached the gates of Kermanshah, the largest city in western Iran. The Khomeini regime suffered 55,000 casualties in this operation, the first in which women commanded many divisions and brigades. The operation, and in particular the fighting spirit of the NLA's women, had a tremendous impact”

    [15]
  • "The women trained to drive tanks, fire mortars, and conduct an invasion, which launched in 1987 with operations Shining Sun, Forty Stars, and Eternal Light. The NLA claims to have killed 55,000 Iranians before being forced to retreat."

    [16]
  • "On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched another offensive called “Chetel Setareh or “Operation Forty Stars” where twenty-two MEK brigades recaptured Mehran."

    [17]
  • " On 26 July the NLA, advancing under heavy Iraqi air cover, seized Karand and Islamabad-e Gharb.”

    [18]
  • "while according to the MEK, “absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation”. Iraqi Minister Latif Nassif Jassim too denied Iraq deploying air units to help the NLA or that it used chemical weapons to drive Islamic Republic soldiers from Mehran.”

    [19]
  • "In July of 1988, the NLA carried out Operation Mersad (also known as "operation Eternal Light) “in which the two Khuzestani towns of Kerand and Eslamabad were ‘liberated’ from the regime’s troops”. MEK press displayed photos of NLA troops in action and destroyed Iranian regime weapons and equipment.

    [20]
  • "on 29 July the NLA announced a voluntary withdrawal from Islamabad-e Gharb and Karand”

    [21]
  • "In another report by the Komite presented to the Islamic Republic on 15 August 1988, it found that "the more people defected from the Iranian army as a result of the Mojahedin's operations, the more frequent and larger they became." Komite members said in the report that it didn’t know how to prevent MEK achievements, which "had enabled the NLA to conquer Mehran".

    [22]
  • "According to MEK intelligence, the Islamic Republic set up a "Psychological Welfare Committee" made of clergymen chosen by Ayatollah Khomeini. This committee emerged as a think tank. An intelligence document gathered by the MEK said that the Komite advised their leadership that it "had to take the Mojahedin’s speedy developments and attacks seriously as they had demonstrated their ability to penetrate Iranian territory and destroy one of the Iranian brigades".

    [23]
  • "The Mojahedin launched a series of offensives against front-line pasdaran positions. On March 27 of 1988, a brigade-level campaign pushing deep into Khuzistan along an impressive thirty-kilometer front was launched by the NLA and succeeded in capturing 600-kilometer of regime territory along with 508 pasdaran and soldiers from the Iranian 77th infantry division. In this offensive, which was code-named “Operation Bright Sun” and was detailed in an interview later granted by Rajavi, an alleged 2,000 Islamic Republic soldiers were killed and $100 million worth of regime weaponry and equipment was captured and displayed for foreign journalists. The NLA had scored its first victory as a conventional fighting force, and it hoped to bring the regime to its knees, both through its propaganization of the successful offensive and through its new armed program. On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched its offensive entitled Chetel Setareh or “40 Stars” in which twenty-two organized brigades of Mojahedin recaptured the city of Mehran, which the regime had wrested from Iraqi control after the Mojahedin had set up its “provisional government” there. The Mojahedin claimed that absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation, and Iraqi Culture and Information Minister, Latif Nusayyif Jasim, later denied that Iraq had deployed air units to help the NLA or had used chemical weapons to drive the Islamic Republic’s troops from Mehran. In July of that year, a more protracted operation named Mersad or “Eternal Brilliance” was initiated in which the two Khuzestani twins of Kerand and Eslamabad were “liberated” from the regime’s troops. Mojahed press organs displayed pictorials of NLA troops in action, destroyed regime equipment and armored vehicles, surrendered pasdaran and road signs, with the Islamic Republic, marking the direction of the two towns."

    [24]
  • The fanatical legions of the Ayatullah Khomeini suffered another embarrassing defeat last week, this one apparently inflicted by their countrymen. In a cross-border strike from their base in Iraq, the National Liberation Army of the People's Mujahedin, a leftist Iranian dissident group, seized the border town of Mehran and drove its pro-Khomeini defenders beyond the surrounding hills. N.L.A. spokesmen claimed to have killed and wounded as many as 8,000 Iranian troops during the ten-hour battle, code-named Operation Forty Stars. Western reporters brought to the battle scene confirmed that the rebels had captured 1,500 Iranian prisoners, as well as tanks and artillery. Although the Iranians acknowledged their defeat at Mehran, they insisted it had been inflicted by Iraqi troops using chemical weapons. Baghdad denied any involvement in the battle. At week's end, however, Iraq did claim that its forces had recaptured the oil-rich Majnoun islands east of the Tigris River, where Iranian defenders had been entrenched since 1984."

    [25]
  • "In another report by the Komite presented to the Islamic Republic on 15 August 1988, it found that "the more people defected from the Iranian army as a result of the Mojahedin's operations, the more frequent and larger they became." Komite members said in the report that it didn’t know how to prevent MEK achievements, which "had enabled the NLA to conquer Mehran".

    [26]
  • "Right after the ceasefire went into effect, the MKO forces attacked Iran from Iraq in an operation they called Amaliyat-e Forough-e Javidaan [Operation Eternal Light], but referred to as Amaliyat-e Mersaad [Operations Trap] by the IRGC."

    [27]
  • "The reason for this new round of widespread executions was Operation Mersad, a military attack on Iranian forces by the Mojahedin-e Khalq."

    [28]
  • "A Komite report reached the conclusion that in order to prevent the MEK from achieving its goals, a strategy for collecting intelligence needed to be created. The Iran regime carried out the Komite's recommendation and started focusing its activities on MEK supporters in Iran (particularly in Iranian jailhouses). After the Iran-Iraq ceasefire agreement, the regime started executing Iranian citizens accused of assisting the MEK in Western Iran"

    [29]
  • "inflicting heavy casualties on the 77 Khorassan Division"

    [30] Idealigic (talk) 08:54, 8 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I'm fine with restoring my earlier edit with the word "ordered" replaced with "assigned" as a compromise. Regarding the rest of the text you proposed, wikipedia shows it to be 13,000 characters, which is too much for an article that is already too long. If you think this material is relevant then consider creating a separate article on History of the People's Mujahedin of Iran.VR talk 04:00, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Katzman source

@Idealigic: You have reverted my edit and restored a portion which I think is not supported by the cited source on p.97. Can you provide the words from the p.97 of the sources of the text saying MEK is "Iran's most active opposition group"? --Mhhossein talk 11:21, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Mhhossein I checked the source and Katzman indeed says that, you can view the book here.VR talk 15:38, 10 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you VR. But we can not wikivoice Katzman's words, can we?– the lead is wrongly reflecting Katzman's words as a fact. --Mhhossein talk 15:36, 12 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Idealigic was right to restore Katzman in the article body, but yes Katzman is being inappropriately in the lead. I have moved that material down.VR talk 12:53, 16 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]
References

References

  1. ^ Newsweek
  2. ^ IntPolicyDigest
  3. ^ National Interest
  4. ^ Arab News
  5. ^ Newsweek
  6. ^ National Interest
  7. ^ Goulka 2009, p. 77.
  8. ^ Abrahamian p 281
  9. ^ Cohen p 174
  10. ^ Gawdat Bahgat, "United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge," Parameters 38, no. 4 (2008)
  11. ^ Mohammed Ayoob. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. University of Michigan Press. p. 61.
  12. ^ Minoo Moallem. "Cultural Nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The case of Iran". Antinomies of Modernity. Duke University Press. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  13. ^ Gawdat Bahgat (2004). "The War on Terrorism: The Mujahedeen e-Khalk Saga". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 27 (5): 384.
  14. ^ Containing Iran Obama's Policy of "tough Diplomacy". Cambridge Scholars Publishing. p. 134. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |title= at position 16 (help)
  15. ^ Marguerite Waller (editor). Frontline Feminisms: Women, War, and Resistance (Gender, Culture and Global Politics). Routledge. p. 185.
  16. ^ Margaret Sankey. Women and War in the 21st Century: A Country-by-Country Guide. ABC-CLIO. p. 117.
  17. ^ [The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile The Mojahedin-eKhalq and its Struggle for Survival by James A. Piazza in Domes Digest of Middle Eastern Studies]
  18. ^ Dilip Hiro. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. Routledge. p. 246-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  19. ^ [The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile The Mojahedin-eKhalq and its Struggle for Survival by James A. Piazza in Domes Digest of Middle Eastern Studies]
  20. ^ [The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile The Mojahedin-eKhalq and its Struggle for Survival by James A. Piazza in Domes Digest of Middle Eastern Studies]
  21. ^ Dilip Hiro. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. Routledge. p. 246-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  22. ^ Cohen, Ronen (August 2018). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1003–1004. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. S2CID 149542445.
  23. ^ Cohen, Ronen (August 2018). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1003–1004. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. S2CID 149542445.
  24. ^ Piazza, James A. (October 1994). "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile". Digest of Middle East Studies. 3 (4): 22. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x".
  25. ^ "The Gulf: Fraternal Drubbing". Time magazine.
  26. ^ Cohen, Ronen (August 2018). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1003–1004. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. S2CID 149542445.
  27. ^ "The Bloody Red Summer of 1988". PBS.
  28. ^ Siavoshi, Sussan (2017). Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran's Revolutionary Ayatollah. Cambridge University Press. p. 131. ISBN 978-1316509463.
  29. ^ Cohen, Ronen (August 2018). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1005–1006. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. S2CID 149542445.
  30. ^ Al-Hassan, Omar. Strategic Survey of the Middle East. Brassey's. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-08-037703-2. Retrieved 17 October 2020.

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