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''This is for the result in the infobox.''
''This is for the result in the infobox.''


'''Result:''' Soviet victory
'''Result:''' "Soviet victory" or at least "Soviet strategic victory"


'''Explanation:''' The main strategic goal of the offensive was to force Finland from the war and this was accomplished. That is what reliable sources say.[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Vyborg%E2%80%93Petrozavodsk_Offensive#Quotes] The offensive did not advance into Finland as planned, but that was not its main purpose; this was only a means to help accomplish the strategic goal. Should not a strategic offensive be judged by the strategic goals it achieved, and not by whether it accomplished all of its tactical-operational objectives?<br>
'''Explanation:''' The main strategic goal of the offensive was to force Finland from the war and this was accomplished. That is what reliable sources say.[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Vyborg%E2%80%93Petrozavodsk_Offensive#Quotes] The offensive did not advance into Finland as planned, but that was not its main purpose; this was only a means to help accomplish the strategic goal. Should not a strategic offensive be judged by the strategic goals it achieved, and not by whether it accomplished all of its tactical-operational objectives?<br>

Revision as of 03:05, 10 July 2012

Misuse of sources (for 3rd opinion)

User:Wanderer602 keeps inserting text which says that the offensive failed to force Finland out of the war:

However some sources state that the offensive forced Finland from the war and to accept Soviet peace terms[1][2][3][4] while others state that though the offensive succeeded in clearing the area north of Leningrad it failed in its goals of destroying Finnish Army or driving Finland out of the war.[5][6][7][refs: Glantz (2002), p. 458; Platonov (1964), p.486; Moisala (1988)]

However, one of the sources he uses says the complete opposite:

During the summer campaign, the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts completed liberating the Leningrad region by mounting yet another major offensive, this time to liberate the northern Leningrad region on the Karelian Isthmus and in southern Karelia. While the Red Army was able to overcome the vaunted Mannerheim Line, capture Vyborg, and, ultimately, force Finland to leave the war, this offensive too fell far short of Stavka expectations.
The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944, by Glantz (p. 461)

The other source he uses says:

Regardless of the defeat of its army Finland continued the war. The Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Belorussia, the Baltics and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force the Finnish reactionary government to accept conditions of the Soviet government and separate from the war, from the side of Hitler's Germany.
Battle for Leningrad, by Platonov (p. 486)

Based on this he makes the interpretation that the offensive failed; he claims that the offensive failed in its goal to drive Finland from the war because it did not do it all by itself... All or nothing logic... This is obviously his interpretation and is, therefore, original research.


Can someone explain to him that using these sources for that statement (failed to drive Finland out of the war) is illogical and does not make sense; it is a clear example of misusing sources. -YMB29 (talk) 14:38, 11 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Indeed, the cited sources say the offensive defeated the Finnish army. However, Glantz says the offensive forced Finland out of the war while Platonov said it did not. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 15:06, 11 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I am glad that you also see that Glantz contradicts him. As for Platonov's book, it does not say that the offensive failed to drive Finland from the war, just that other events helped to finish the job. I mean it does not say that the offensive did not play an important part in forcing Finland out, which is what the statement in the article implies. Also note that the victory in South Karelia listed in the quote was a result of this offensive (its second phase), which probably means that the quote refers to only the Vyborg part of the offensive (the first phase) and not the whole offensive (I don't have the book so I can't check). -YMB29 (talk) 15:46, 11 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Yet you are still totally ignoring the third source which explicitly states that Soviet offensive failed. Also your conjectures on what Platonov is saying and stating that it actually would support the view that the offensive was the primary cause is OR just as well. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:05, 11 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Please pay attention to what is going on. The problem we are discussing here is not that there is a Finnish source that supports you. The issue here is you misusing the two non-Finnish sources. I did not misuse Platonov's book for anything in the article, unlike you. -YMB29 (talk) 00:13, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Hardly misusing Platonov when he is explictly stating that the Red Army needed more than the offensive against the Finns to get Finns to negotiating table. Besides the matter is resolved in article already. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:52, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
No it is not resolved as you still wrongly cite Platonov. So what if they needed more? That does not mean it failed...
Secondly, the quote is not even talking about the whole offensive. I found an expanded quote in Russian:
В середине июля линия фронта на всех направлениях Карельского перешейка стабилизировалась, и дальнейшие наступательные действия советских войск были прекращены. Активных боевых действий здесь до конца войны больше не проводилось. Финляндия, несмотря на поражение ее армии, еще продолжала войну. Потребовались еще новые победы Советских Вооруженных Сил в Южной Карелии, Белоруссии, Прибалтике и на других участках советско-германского фронта летом 1944 г. чтобы заставить реакционное правительство Финляндии принять условия Советского правительства и выйти из войны на стороне гитлеровской Германии.
translation:
In mid-July the front line along the entire Karelian Isthmus stabilized, and further offensive operations by Soviet forces were not attempted. Active combat no longer took place here for the rest of the war. Despite the defeat of its army, Finland continued the war. The Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Belorussia, the Baltics and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force the reactionary Finnish government to accept the conditions of the Soviet government and exit the war from the side of Hitler's Germany.
So clearly it is talking about the operations on the Karelian Isthmus only. I guess Whiskey conveniently left the first two sentences out when he provided the quote. -YMB29 (talk) 02:27, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
This time it appears you are mixing issues. Platonov makes a big list of other 'required' victories which go far above and beyond the scope of the VP-offensive. In short stating that the offensive in Karelian Isthmus (and also in 'South Karelia' - though that area Soviets never reached) was not enough on its own to bring Finland to ceasefire. Which pretty much makes the offensive a failure on the 'strategic scale' - offensive contributed to the ceasefire but it did not achieve it on its own. - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:31, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Again this is completely your OR and does not belong in the article.
And "victory in South Karelia" refers to the Svir-Petrozavodsk part of the offensive. -YMB29 (talk) 05:12, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]


Also... "During the summer campaign, the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts completed liberating the Leningrad region by mounting yet another major offensive, this time to liberate the northern Leningrad region on the Karelian Isthmus and in southern Karelia. While the Red Army was able to overcome the vaunted Mannerheim Line, capture Vyborg, and, ultimately, force Finland to leave the war, this offensive too fell far short of Stavka expectations." - Ultimately (eventually, in the end, in the long run) is pretty much saying that the offensive contributed to the Finnish decision however it did not manage to force it immediately or on its own. Also unless i have misunderstood something it was Soviet expectations that the offensive would force Finns into ceasefire (including the surrender demands of June 1944), however Glantz explictly states that offensive failed to fell far short of Stavka expectations. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:14, 11 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Fell short but accomplished the main goals. No matter how you twist and turn there is no getting away from the fact that Glantz proves you wrong. Who says that the offensive had to do it "immediately or on its own"? This article is not here for you to make your own analysis and reinterpret sources the way you want to. -YMB29 (talk) 00:13, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Actually it does not say that it would accomplished the main goals at all. Reading the quote it is stating (that) offensive failed to reach Stavka expectations (goals?) - no mentions of any 'main goals' being accomplished - all it is stating is that offensive achieved something (even though there was no such thing as the vaunted Mannerheim Line at the time) however it does not imply in any manner that any of the listed achivements would have been goals, let alone main goals, in any way. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:52, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Like you don't know that forcing Finland out was a main goal... I don't have full access to that book by Glantz (The Battle for Leningrad) so I can't check what he says were the main goals in that book, but in his other book (When Titans Clashed...) Glantz clearly says that forcing Finland out was one of the main goals; there is a citation to this in this article and I provided the quote on the other talk page, so don't tell me that you did not know about it. -YMB29 (talk) 02:27, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I guess this goes to the original research category, but anyway: I asked this issue from Mr. Glantz and he responded that SU failed to force Finland out of war in this offensive. Sue me. --Whiskey (talk) 23:59, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Ok so what is next, you are going to add your supposed email as a source? -YMB29 (talk) 02:27, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Of course not. To me it was only a clarification how his work should be interpreted, so it seems Wanderer602 is more right with his interpretation than you. Anyway, I strongly recommend you to read WP:GOODFAITH. I strongly propose that you drop your hostility towards Finnish sources. They are as good as any English and Russian ones, and when concerning Finnish actions, often much better than available English or Russian ones, thus fulfilling the WP:NOENG. --Whiskey (talk) 20:41, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Are you saying that your supposed email is a Finnish source? It cannot be used for any interpretation in the article, especially for a statement that leaves no room for interpretation. -YMB29 (talk) 04:43, 14 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Private communique are quite valid sources - very often used especially with history books - assuming those can be proven - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:08, 14 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
No, I'm not saying that. Statement leaves room for interpretation because of the word "ultimately". I was just referring to your belittling and dissing of Finnish sources in general. Not a constructive way to act.--Whiskey (talk) 16:30, 14 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I was not "belittling and dissing" Finnish sources, but just saying that they can't be the only sources that are used here.
And I don't know what you can interpret from the word "ultimately"... It certainly can't negate his statement... -YMB29 (talk) 16:12, 15 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

And more sources:

As a result of its offensive against Finland, the Soviet Union removed the threat to Leningrad and expelled the occupier from Soviet Karelia. However, the massive Soviet offensive against Germans in Byelorussia had begun on 22 June, and it could not afford to send reinforcements needed to break Finnish resistance to a peripheral theatre of war in the north.
Finland in the Second World War by Olli Vehviläinen, p. 143 --Whiskey (talk) 19:24, 11 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
So what does this prove? Again please pay attention to what is being discussed. -YMB29 (talk) 00:13, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I agree, Platonov is a poor source to support the claim that the offensive failed to drive Finland out of the war. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 09:11, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Could you please elaborate? For example, the Jassy–Kishinev Operation drove Romania out of the war. In that case, Romania surrendered during the operation. In V-P operation, Finland signed the armistice a month after the operation had ended.--Whiskey (talk) 23:49, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
The offensive did its damage and the position Finland was in changed dramatically. Again why do you think the result had to be immediate? However, we are not talking about that here. He is talking about Platonov not backing up your claim. Please stick to the topic. -YMB29 (talk) 02:27, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Unless the result is immediate it is highly likely that there would have been (several) other factors contributing to the decisions (exactly like Platonov states). Also presumably had the offensive forced Finns to ceasefire there would have been negotiations going on during the offensive, while in reality after Soviet surrender demand which Finns refused on June 22 all negotiations were held until the offensive had ended. - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:31, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
You are just repeating your OR. Other factors helping don't make it a failure. That is a ridiculous claim. -YMB29 (talk) 05:12, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
That depends on how its result is represented. Exactly what i was after earlier with a post. If you state that offensive forced the ceasefire you are stating that the offensive (alone) was the reason for ceasefire - which is disputed. If you state that offensive contributed to the ceasefire you are stating that the offensive did not alone cause of the ceasefire - which is not disputed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:24, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Again, I am not using the quote from Platonov's book for that statement ("forced Finland from the war"), but you are using it for yours ("failed to force Finland from the war"). That is the issue here. -YMB29 (talk) 05:33, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Actually i'm using pretty much the same argument as Platonov - offensive on its own failed to force Finland from the war. However i do not deny that the offensive would not have been an important factor in the negotiations that followed, see the change i made to the lead section. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:54, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Well before you just said that it failed... -YMB29 (talk) 04:43, 14 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Assuming your claim that it was supposed to drive Finland from the war is true then it did fail. It did not drive Finland from the war on its own. It however indeed contributed to the ceasefire as said before several times. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:08, 14 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Well you have your own theory that an offensive can only be successful if it achieves its goals immediately and completely by itself. -YMB29 (talk) 16:12, 15 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
YMB's ignorance of every interpretation that does not fit his one is kind of annoying. Very often a statement can be understood ambivalently and Glantz's conclusions seem to be among them. Even courts of law use stenograms and other commentaries from parliament members to interpret the law, why on earth not we. I would just like to see Glantz's original answer though, to be sure. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:50, 14 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
So now I am ignorant? We can't make wide interpretations here. You yourself agreed with me so I don't know what you are talking about now... -YMB29 (talk) 16:12, 15 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
My quetion:"3) While reading Yours and Platonov's books, I have got an impression that STAVKA had three strategic objectives with V-P offensive: 1.Removing threat from the north side of Leningrad, 2.Destruction of Finnish army and 3.Pushing Finland out of war. I consider Red Army succeeding in the First but failing in the Second and the Third. How far I am from the target?"
And David Glantz's answer:"3) As far as Soviet intentions were concerned, I believe the Stavka wanted to remove the threat to Leningrad from the north, destroy the Finnish Army as a threat, drive Finland from the war, and, if possible, even threaten or possibly occupy Helsinki. They tried to accomplish the last three aims in the continuation struggle during July. However, clear and somewhat embarrassing defeats ensued which prevented the Russians from achieving their last three aims. In no case, however, did the Russian want to repeat their performance of 1939. Therefore, they ended their offensive before achieving their ultimate goals." --Whiskey (talk) 16:29, 15 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Apparently I have misinterpreted Glantz before. I guess we should go by his interpretation. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 09:44, 16 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
You sure you were talking to Glantz? Anyway, what matters here is what he writes in his books, not private emails... -YMB29 (talk) 05:23, 19 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
If the book discusses the events in ambiguous manner then the issues can be clarified from the author. Which is the case in point here. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:03, 19 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
That's right, what matters here is what he writes in his books. And it's our job to interpret what he writes. And the author's comments are a pretty good help. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 08:36, 19 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Only published comments can be used here, or else everyone will start claiming to have emails from authors... -YMB29 (talk) 14:49, 21 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
We are indeed interpreting a published comment, and as we have different interpretations, we need comments from the author himself. As for 'everyone will start claiming', the burden of proof lies on the presenter of the evidence and you are welcome to apply scrutiny to this piece of evidence. We will not just dismiss it as irrelevant. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:55, 23 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Emailing, not talking. And yes.--Whiskey (talk) 19:56, 19 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Anyway, If we sit down, calm a little and think about the issue thoroughly, it is self evident how this should be written to the article: "Some consider it blaa-blaa, while some others consider it blaa-blaa-blaa." (And I think there are too many of us discussing it now to ask 3rd opinion...) Also, I'd like to hear your opinions, should it really be in the lead section at all. --Whiskey (talk) 23:49, 12 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Well if you put that the offensive failed to reach the Kymi River there then this has to go there too...
I don't have a problem with mentioning both views but just don't use Platonov for your statement ("failed to force Finland out"). Some of the Finnish sources you added, like the one above, also don't support that statement. -YMB29 (talk) 02:27, 13 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

I think both sides have locked themselves to quarreling about sentences in a book. I think we should look at the bigger picture of war and finnish front at the time. I think some things should be corrected in the article. For example, in my opinion battle was clear strategical victory for soviet union. They pushed the lines back for 100km (oughta be enough to be considered strategical gain) and even though they didn't gain all the objectives they were set to gain, 100km gain in WW2 is still strategical victory. So i propose that we change the outcome to show soviet victory and then explain in the article itself the things that finns did gain by defending ferociously and blunting the attack when they did. About the objectives of the campaign i'd agree that this offensive wasn't THE reason why finland pulled out of the war, though it contributed in it. Generally from what i have read and is mentioned in literature, the finnish generals were dubious about the result of war already in 1943 and Mannerheim and other finnish war leadership continuously informed germans about the importance of estonia front to finland. While the offensive soviets mounted was able to push finnish army 100km back and created lots of casualties, finnish army wasn't in critical shape after the offensive. More importantly, germans were pushed out from estonia and soviets would have gained easy access to amphibious attacks to southern finland. I didn't make any edits and i hope my opinions gives something to your discussion about this article and we can make it better. Muhvi 20:28, 08 september 2011 (UTC+2)

Viipuri/Vyborg naming RfC

For editors who are interested, there is an RfC over at Talk:Continuation War about which name we should use for the town of Vyborg/Viipuri during World War II. This will affect this article, as well as quite a others on the Finnish/Soviet conflict. Some of the other articles affected include Winter War Continuation War, Battle of Tali-Ihantala, Battle of Tienhaara, Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944), and Baltic Sea campaigns (1939–1945). If you could comment, it would be very much appreciated. The RfC thread can be found here. Regards — Mr. Stradivarius ♫ 15:01, 14 November 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Tactical Soviet Victory?

How can this be a tactical Soviet victory when Soviets had planned to occupy whole Finland but they failed to do that? --Taistelu-Jaska (talk) 07:48, 6 February 2012 (UTC)[reply]

They achieved tactical goals, including Vyborg, didn't they? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 08:26, 6 February 2012 (UTC)[reply]
There were many tactical goals... It should say strategic Soviet victory. -YMB29 (talk) 22:17, 1 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
And why exactly would it should it state so? Soviet offensive failed in 1944 didn't it? War as a whole might have been Soviet victory but the offensive was not - as proven by the fact that as the result of the offensive Soviets reduced their demands on the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:01, 2 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
No matter how many sources I bring up that prove you wrong, you will not change your mind. It is all because of that "polished historiography" you adhere to... -YMB29 (talk) 00:27, 3 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
No, that is a matter of an opinion, not polished historiography. Besides there are sources against your statement. On the other hand hiding matters, like done with LF 21 June - mid July, is totally different. How would you describe Soviet result of the offensive as from the sources it is quite apparent that offensive resulted in Soviet concessions to their offer done before it? - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:07, 3 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Soviet "concessions," if you can call them that, were due to international pressure if you forgot.[1] We have been through all this many times. You brought up some Finnish source that says the offensive failed strategically, but that hardly changes anything. -YMB29 (talk) 01:37, 4 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Can't really see anything there which would state it had been due to international pressure. The whole statement starts with 'was probably in part' which can be said also as 'had an effect to' not that they would be the sole cause which is saying that even the writer only notes that the listed issues contributed to it not that they would have caused it alone. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:18, 4 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well we don't see him mentioning that Finland won those "concessions." There is just your speculation about it. -YMB29 (talk) 21:02, 5 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
We see nothing you claimed there was either so i fail to see how that proves anything. On the other hand like you said there are several sources which state that the Soviet Offensive failed. End result is still the same, terms from the Soviets perspective were worse after than before the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:28, 5 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The terms were changed a little, but where is your proof that it was due to Finnish "victories" and not international pressure like the source suggests?
And I said that you found only one source that says the offensive failed. -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 7 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
A little? Cutting reparations by 50% (which was not the sole Soviet concession) was apparently little? I suppose Finnish land yields (10%) were then marginal or non-existing in that case? Actually there were several sources stating so feel free to search for the discussions. So far there has been no sources stating it would have been because of the international pressure, only speculation in a source that it might have been partially be caused by it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:14, 7 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well "speculation" by an author is always better than your speculation... What sources would those be?
Finland was making concessions, not the USSR... There was little changed besides that reduction in reparations, and that did not make much of a difference since 1938 prices were then demanded... -YMB29 (talk) 00:21, 11 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
We were discussing the effect of the offensive - not the whole war. And with regards to the offensive it's only apparent result is that Soviets made concessions to their earlier demands. Also the claim regarding 1938 prices is of very dubious value since we have no idea if the earlier sum would have been in the same currency like has been discussed several times - neither of the agreements mentioned anything with this regards. You also need to remember that 1938 was the last year currencies were still stable and not in rapid inflation in Europe - so on hindsight it is likely both reparation demands would have been in 1938 currency (last stable). - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:46, 11 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
That is not what the source suggests, as the Finns complained that the Soviets pretended to relent.
You can continue making dubious claims about the offensive and have your own opinion, but it is all about what reliable sources say. -YMB29 (talk) 20:54, 11 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The source you provided says nothing of it as it clearly states that it is mere speculation and even then it only could have contributed to it. Not that it would have been the cause. Several sources (reliable) state that Soviet offensive failed. There is not much more to say. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:38, 11 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So far I only saw one Finnish source.
Once again, speculation in a source is much better than your speculation. -YMB29 (talk) 21:14, 13 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Again, what is in the source you provided is nothing but speculation. And that does not even try to claim that foreign politics would have caused the events but rather it speculates that foreign politics contributed to the events. Quite a bit different from what you claimed it said. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:24, 13 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
That is the only reason for the changes it talked about, so we have nothing else to go by. It said nothing about Finland winning these new terms like you speculate. -YMB29 (talk) 21:47, 13 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
It is not 'a reason' it is talking about. It is speculating that foreign politics might have contributed to it. By representing it as 'a reason' you are already abusing the source - it does not state in any manner that foreign politics would have even been a reason for it, it only speculates that in some part it might have contributed. Source is indeed saying nothing, it is saying nothing at all with regards to the events. You seem to be forgetting the sources which were presented to you earlier but which you seem to have dismissed - as they were Finnish. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:03, 13 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Once again there was only one quote from a Finnish book provided.
So yes, I guess the source (Ziemke) is saying nothing at all... In fact I think I can convince myself that you are saying nothing at all too; it is just my imagination... -YMB29 (talk) 21:19, 17 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
That is not what i meant and you know it too. You just can not represent something specifically stated already in the source as a speculation for having a contribution as a solid and sole reason. First the speculation part already makes it clear that it is not solid and second the fact that author writes that it may have contributed means that even if the speculation was true it would not be the sole cause for the event. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:46, 18 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well the fact that the author does not mention any other reason gives it much more weight.
If you don't like that source here is another (War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Major Belligerents, 1939–45 by V. Rothwell, p. 144):
More important, Britain helped in persuading the Soviet government to back down from two earlier demands that would have threatened Finland's independence. One of these was that the Red Army should have the right to enter the country if Finland could not itself immediately expel all German forces from its soil. It was now given a period of grace to do that. The other was that Russia reduced its demand for reparations from $600 million to be paid over five years to $300 million to be paid over six years. The latter amount could be paid, albeit with pain; the former would have been impossible and would have afforded another excuse to intervene. [2]
-YMB29 (talk) 21:26, 19 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Actually it does not. In case like this absence of something is not evidence of the opposite. Again, this source states that Britain helped in persuaiding, it is more solid than what the previous source was but still is not stating at any level that it would have been the sole cause and thus can not be represented as such even if other causes are not mentioned. Stating contributed to would be correct with this source. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:39, 19 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Helped means that Britain was not the only country.
The quote is very clear. You are in denial again... -YMB29 (talk) 21:47, 19 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Not actually, it is merely stating British influence contributed to the matter and that other factors also affected it. Those might have been other countries but the source does not in any way disclose that they would have been, you can not extrapolate from the source that it would be stating something that it in reality is not. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:02, 19 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well it is always amusing to read your excuses when sources prove you wrong.
You are the one trying hard to extrapolate something that is not there. The source clearly says that the Soviets had to be persuaded; there is nothing about them being forced to soften the terms due to those Finnish "defensive victories"... -YMB29 (talk) 21:27, 21 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Again, source does not any way disclose what exactly the persuasions were, Finnish success in blunting Soviet offensives could well be understood as 'persuasion'. Also the phrasing 'helped in persuading' is already stating that some other factors also persuaded the Soviet government. Neither of your sources actually discloses what these factors could have been. All what they are saying is that British government contributed to the Soviet decision making, nothing more, nothing less. So you can not state from either of the sources that Finnish successes were not the reason behind it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:49, 21 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So where does it say that they were? You can speculate and see something that is not there all you want, but you have no sources supporting your claim.
Anyway, the sources obviously say the offensive was a strategic victory, so I am going to change the result to that. -YMB29 (talk) 22:21, 23 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Neither of the sources you presented actually disclosed anything with that regard. Both only mentioned that they either believed or had information that British diplomatic efforts contributed to the result. Not that they would have caused it. And neither of the sources is stating (of the quotes you presented) that it would have been a victory of any kind - even more so as the sources seem to be discussing the war and not the offensive, since they are separate matters they should be handled separately as you seem to be forgetting that war did not end into the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:31, 23 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I meant the sources about the offensive that I quoted before, see below. They mention the main strategic goal (knocking Finland out of the war) and then say that it was accomplished as a result of the offensive, so it is a strategic victory at least.
As far as the softening of terms, yes the sources say nothing about your claim and you can't find any that do, so it remains your claim... -YMB29 (talk) 21:04, 25 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Except the sources represent the pushing Finland out of the war as the goal of the offensive. That was the goal of the war, not of the offensive. Goal of the offensive was something else and it never reached those as discussed several times before. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:10, 25 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Comments regarding the quotes; As it is known offensive ended in all practical form well over a month before any talks were made. That is only area with combat activity was Ilomantsi, battle which Finns soundly won (Lunde p.298-299 After July 17 the front became stabilized and later actions can best be described as positional warfare - describing the area north of Ladoga). Soviet offensive (& the perceived unconditional surrender demand) led to President Ryti's personal alliance with Germany, which happens to be the opposite of the offensive's its stated goal. Only after the offensive had ended was Finland again willing to talk (Lunde p. 315-316). Sources seem to be neglecting to mention what took place in Karelian isthmus after 20 June, which seems rather blatant omission. Second source even contains error, Meretskov received his accolades only after Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, not after this one unlike Govorov. Also Mannerheim's letter to Hitler hardly passes for an actual situation report. And again a slight problem, on July 28 only area with any activity was Ilomantsi. The reason Ryti brought the matter up was because the Soviet offensive had been dealt with (see Lunde p. 314). Also described in several other sources. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:10, 25 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
We have been through this many times. The sources speak for themselves. Your own analysis (or that of other wiki users) means nothing here. -YMB29 (talk) 21:43, 27 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
In other words you chose to disregard all the sources opposing you and present only the sources which endorse the result you wish to achieve even though you are perfectly aware that it is now the whole issue as there exists several opposing sources your point of view just as well? How is that NPOV? - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:10, 27 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The other sources actually make clear separation between the war and the offensive. And as can be seen offensive was a failure for the Soviet Union. Discussion of the war on the other hand is out of scope of the article at hand. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:40, 28 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Like always you ignore what you don't want to see. The sources I quoted clearly say that the offensive led to the end of the war for Finland.
As for the sources you quoted, again only one Finnish source says that it was a failure.
The other sources you misuse for your purpose. You quote Platonov out of context, as he clearly is talking about only the Vyborg part of the offensive. Glantz also only talks about the first part of the offensive and the failure to advance into southern Finland, not the whole offensive like he does in his other book. The Ziemke quote you took from an older version of the book; he corrected the text in his newer version. The passage from Lunde does not analyze the offensive at all and just talks about the situation, while you make the conclusion that it failed (because the situation was quiet) without taking into consideration its strategic consequences. -YMB29 (talk) 22:59, 28 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
And i pointed out that there are plenty of sources which state the opposite. That the result of the offensive was tighter integration between Finland and Germany, and that only after the offensive had been stopped, but not because of it did progress towards cease fire continue - given that Soviets themselves had cut off the negotiations with Finns in Spring 1944 that also is telling. Platonov actually states that even the offensive in Southern Karelia (ie. north of Ladoga) was not enough. Glantz's Southern Finland is vague enough expression that it could refer to any offensive south of the operational boundary between Finns and Germans - as it has been used in such a context before. Ziemke's 'corrected' version has exact same message in it. And again you are mixing the result of the offensive with that of the war. They are not the same, either discuss what the offensive did or place it in some other article.

You could well add section (if there isn't one already) that offensive did contribute the ceasefire between Finland and the Soviet Union. That part is not the problem. Problem is that you are representing the offensive as a success because of the events that took place around it instead of in it. This article is about the offensive, it is not even about the war in general in Karelia in summer 1944 let alone whole of the Continuation War - it is just about the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:54, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]

The article is about the offensive that forced Finland from the war or played a great part in this, so it has to be a strategic victory. This is not my conclusion but that of the sources.
You can manipulate and misinterpret sources all you want, but that is not going to change the fact that sources (at least non-Finnish ones) are against you on this. -YMB29 (talk) 05:23, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
No, the article is solely about the offensive - of which we know what goals it had, ie. where it was supposed to advance to. Not of anything else, by discussing the actual end of the war you are already stepping out of the scope of the article. Same is true with the articles you provided they are discussing the whole of the war, not the offensive which happens to be the topic of this article. In addition some of the sources you added are not in any way relevant or have actually anything to say with regards to the result of the offensive. All of them neglecting to mention the actual goal of the offensive which was never achieved (again, goal of the war =/= goal of the offensive).

Also similar results with 'Finland stopped the offensive' can be provided with quick google search but i see no point in doing so since everyone interested in the matter can do that on their own. Also deleting sources added to the page, like you did, or changing them so that their meaning changes, like you also did, is not exactly polite. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:13, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]

It is ridiculous to use quotes that are outdated. Also keep your quotes separate; I know you are trying to confuse people...
The strategic goal of the offensive and the war was the same; don't pretend that you do not know that.
My quotes unlike yours talk about the strategic results of the whole offensive. -YMB29 (talk) 14:10, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The quotes are all of equal value when they are referring to the event in question. Goals of the offensive were well defined (ie. the river lines and the destruction of Finnish Army), the success of the offensive must be measured against those (operational goals), not against the ideas as to how to win the whole of the war (ie. by definition strategic goals). Your quotes are discussing the perceived - yet still opposed by several sources - effect of the offensive to the war which, while worthwhile to be mentioned in the article, is not the actual result of the offensive itself. The actual result of the offensive is still separate from that as explained by several authors in the quotes below. Which has been the point i have referred to for this whole discussion. - Wanderer602 (talk) 14:30, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Furthermore it seems rather dubious to use claims like "led to the reopening of bilateral negotiations" as basis for Soviet success since it was the Soviet Union which broke off from the negotiations in April 1944 - not to mention the reduction of Soviet demands on the terms which had been the points of contention in April or the surrender demand of June 1944. - Wanderer602 (talk) 14:39, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
You are just repeating the same claims that have been proven wrong to you many times. Will you ever learn?
So the main goals in a strategic offensive are operational and tactical goals, not strategic ones? The offensive must be judged only by the tactical and operational goals achieved? This is just amusing... You are making yourself look bad. Just admit that you are wrong. -YMB29 (talk) 16:18, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Which of the claims were false? You have made this statement before but never actually saying what exactly was wrong. Could you finally define what exactly is it that you are referring to? If the article is about the offensive then the article should concentrate on the offensive. Not on some extrapolation of the offensive. Soviet offensive had strictly defined goals so it should be considered as per that criteria.

How would you define the result? Take into consideration that Soviet offensive failed in all but one of it's stated goals - only stated goal achieved was the Viborg. Keep in mind that there are several sources which dispute the claim of the Soviet victory (even in strategic level). - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:43, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Only one Finnish source disputes it.
You are getting desperate... I am not going to repeat something I just explained hundreds of times. If you don't get it then that is your problem.
It will probably take another RfC again for you to admit that you are wrong...
Also, I suggest you stop reverting my changes here to the quotes section. I have a right to separate my quotes from your poorly selected ones. -YMB29 (talk) 17:52, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Please read through the quotes, several of them dispute the result you stated. Furthermore that view (that offensive was a failure) is even more predominant in the sources which actually handle the Continuation War or the offensive itself - compared to sources which are generic descriptions of the Eastern Front. So you refuse to state what was, according to you, false? And then go off claiming that it apparently blatantly obvious which it clearly is not. Could you please tell what exactly what it is? And you still did not answer my question. Regardless of that your hostile or negative attitude does not help to resolve the issue. Please try more constructive methods of conversion. Also you already stated there the reason why i reversed the change - by placing it you are already predefining those quotes as of being 'of poor quality' or 'poorly selected' which is not in any way in accordance with NPOV that wikipedians should be following - instead you are trying (as per your stated reason) to predispose any one actually participating to the debate. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:10, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I told you I have the right to separate the quotes I found. You put the ones that you think support your view into another section. You are trying to confuse others. This is the last time I am going to tell you this.
You were told that your quotes (except the Finnish one) are taken out of context, don't talk about the entire offensive, and are not about its strategic results. Again, both Platonov and Glantz only talk about the Vyborg part of the offensive; they don't comment on the strategic value of the entire offensive. The first Glantz quote is actually about the situation prior to the fighting after June 20. Lunde does not even talk about any goals or consequences of the offensive. And Ziemke corrected his error in the new version of his book, but you still cling on to his mistake...
You are manipulating sources as you always have done. You were doing the same thing with the unconditional surrender "as it was written" claim. This is disruptive behavior. -YMB29 (talk) 18:50, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
How exactly are they taken out of context, as they refer exactly and precisely just to the offensive, not to anything else? Lunde discusses the events related to the offensive so his comments are valid while Platonov separately mentions that not even 'South Karelian' offensive was enough. Ziemke does not actually change his 'error' at all its just more politely phrased 'failure'. How exactly are they manipulated? You are seem to refusing to take any opposing views into account which also is hostile & disruptive behavior. So far you have steadfastly refused to build any type of consensus or even acknowledge the sources on the opposing side. Also given how you have setup the headers trying to toss opposing ones into separate group 'other' is already trying to form predispositions on the matter and hence NPOV - try forming more neutral setup and i have no problems with it. Also you have not answered the question, how would you define the result knowing that offensive failed to gain its set objectives (as it failed to do, proven both by several sources as well as even by STAVKA source)? - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:47, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So you are pretending to forget everything that was explained hundreds of times to you? Some tactical or operational goals failed, but the strategic goal was accomplished.
I would accept opposing sources if they actually were opposing... Just because there was no advance into Finland, does not make the overall offensive a failure... You are doing a selective quoting of sources, which don't say that the offensive was a strategic failure and don't judge the entire offensive at all, and concluding from this that it failed strategically, which is original research.
Once again, Lunde does not make any conclusions about the offensive being a failure and neither does Platonov. You are making that conclusion yourself. "Failed" and "did not have the success it ought to have had" are two different things, but you like to think that they are the same... -YMB29 (talk) 21:12, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Also I am warning you to stop edit warring. If you don't like the header's name, change it but don't remove it. -YMB29 (talk) 21:13, 29 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Operation failed to achieve most of the goals set for it. Sole part of the operation that actually succeeded was capture of Viborg, like you are perfectly aware. Even the Karelian Front's offensive failed to reach its goals and less said what LF actually achieved after Viborg the better. I'm still trying to figure out what result you are actually after. Operationally it was Soviet failure. Also given that Soviets had broken off the negotiations in April 1944 i can't really see how it forced the Finns to the negotiations and even then the terms were reduced according to what Finns had complained in the spring (so 'victory' would be stretching it). So Operational Soviet failure, Strategic Soviet success?

They are perfectly valid sources, just because you do not like what they are saying does not make them any less valuable. There is no selective quoting, i only picked the sections that actually handle the offensive. Not anything else. For example your addition of Koivisto's quote is on the other hand selective. It in no way connects the offensive to the armistice (like was your premise) but yet you chose to include it the quotes while it has no relevance to the offensive or its result.

So what do you think Platonov refers to when he quite clearly mentions that operation in South Karelia was not enough to force Finns to negotiation table? "Did not have the success it ought to have had" is the same as "failed to reach its goals" which when we are examining an operation is the same as failure. Lunde on the other hand makes it clear that by mid July operation (in any practical sense, what took place at Ilomantsi by 2 divisions is not exactly 'strategic') had ended and that Finns had stabilized the fronts - indirectly stating that Soviet had failed to reach their goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:36, 30 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Failed to reach what goals? Not strategic ones, but you are giving more weight to tactical and operational goals... "Did not have the success it ought to have had" means it had success but could have done better, not failed, but I guess you are desperate... Platonov does not talk about the operation in South Karelia nor the entire offensive. Are you seeing things?
You can't just quote that the offensive was stopped and omit the part where the consequences are mentioned. Your quotes don't talk about the actual topic; they don't judge the entire offensive by the effect it had on the war. So that is why your quoting is a poor attempt to counter my quotes.
You also continue to repeat the same claims that were proven wrong and are not backed up by sources. The offensive cannot even be said to be a tactical-operational failure, since major tactical-operational goals, like breaching the Finnish defensive lines, capturing Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Vyborg Bay islands, were accomplished. The result should be Soviet strategic victory, or at least the reverse of what it is now - tactical-operational stalemate and Soviet strategic victory. -YMB29 (talk) 22:42, 30 June 2012 (UTC)[reply]
We are not discussing the whole of the war in this article, we are not even defining the eventual effect it had to the war - though there is 'aftermath' section for discussing exactly this in the article. The article is solely about the offensive hence we need to observe the result of the offensive it self - not that of the war. "Did not have the success it ought to have had" is stating that it failed to reach it's goals. Platonov actually makes the point of mentioning that even operation in Southern Karelia was not enough. You were already earlier shown to be wrong with in your interpretation of the result when matter was queried directly from Glantz (who stated that SU failed to force Finland out of war in this offensive).

You seem to be forgetting that breaching of the lines was not a major goal of the operation and neither was capture of the islands - even capture of Petrozavodsk is rather dubious as being 'major goal' of the offensive. Known major goals were i) Capture of Viborg by LF (was achieved), ii) breakthrough Finnish defenses by KF (was never achieved) to threaten Karelian Isthmus from the north (didn't happen either), iii) trapping bulk of Finnish army against the northern the shore of Ladoga (since breakthroughs did not materialize neither did this) by LF & KF, iv) advancing to Virojoki-Lappeenranta line by LF (never achieved), v) further advance to Kouvola-Kymi River line by LF (never achieved). You even got the smaller ones wrong, at Viborg Bay the goal of the 59th Army was never to capture the islands but instead to create a beachhead to the northern shore of the bay (to achieve which they needed the islands but those were not the goal of the 59th Army's attack). You seem to be grasping straws here. Fighting stalemated indeed, but operationally the offensive failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:22, 1 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

You are the one grasping at straws here. Sources prove you wrong about the strategic result of the offensive, but you cling on to failures to achieve secondary non-strategic goals.
The goal of the Vyborg Bay operation was to capture the islands and the shore, and the islands were captured.
The goals you list are tactical-operational, just like the ones I listed. The capture of Petrozavodsk was important (why do you think the offensive was partially named after it), so you can't just dismiss it.
You are talking about the email Whiskey claimed he received from Glantz? You think that should be taken seriously as a source here? I know you are desperate for sources, but that is too much...
Your interpretations of Platonov and Ziemke are also dubious. I don't know how you think the two phrases from Ziemke mean the same thing. Maybe you are limited in your understanding of the English language...
So are you saying that the strategic impact of a strategic offensive cannot be taken into account? The result of the offensive led or greatly contributed to the result of the war, which was the offensive's purpose. This is what reliable sources say, including Glantz.
Anyway, this will probably need to be resolved through third opinion, dispute resolution or an RfC, where you will be confirmed to be wrong once again. Do you really want to waste time with this?
Arguing with such historians as Glantz and Erickson is beyond ridiculous... -YMB29 (talk) 00:05, 5 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Goal of the 59th Army was to flank Finnish positions at Karelian Isthmus. To do that it needed to actually land onto the opposing shore. As stated several times. You seem to be quite willing to use lower level (tactical) goals to determine success when it suits to you and ignore higher level (operational) ones, while on the next turn ignore the lower level goals and only accept the higher level goals. Petrozavodsk was probably used since it was the only other notable town Soviets captured in addition to Viborg - it however was not goal of the operation like Kymijoki or Viborg or other such. And I'm not interpreting anything, in neither case there are anything left into doubt. Both Platonov and Ziemke make it quite clear. I did not say they could not be taken into account, I'm saying they cannot solely used like you are doing. You cannot arbitrarily decide to ignore the actual 'non-strategic' progress and goals of the offensive in favor of 'strategic' ones. You can demand RfC, and i have no problems with it, that is your right after all. Also could you finally cut out the insinuations, they are childish not to mention degrading your own position. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:47, 5 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
To get to the shore the Soviets needed to capture the islands first and they did that. From that position they could have tried to capture the shore again after they could not do it the first time. So you can't ignore the capture of the islands and say that the operation was a total failure, but this discussion should be left for the article dealing with this battle.
I don't use lower level goals to determine the success or failure of the whole offensive. That is what you do, and plus you only look at the lower level goals that were not accomplished (like claiming that the capture of Petrozavodsk was insignificant compared to advancing to the Kymi River).
Once again, for a strategic offensive the strategic goals are the ones that matter. You can dispute this, but that is just your opinion.
After you claimed that two different phrases are the same, you can't blame me for questioning your English.
So I am going to try getting third options first. Enter your point of view below.[3] -YMB29 (talk) 20:47, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Capture of the islands was required for crossing, no one is disputing that, but it was not the goal of the 59th Army. Goal was to cross the Bay of Viborg. No you not using lower level goals, you are using goals which suit your own preferences. Which is far worse because it is in no way neutral. Offensive is only 'strategic' in Soviet/Russian parlance, no others attach such tag to it. Offensive is an offensive and it should be judged as such regardless of added tags. Opinion added. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:57, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
It is a strategic offensive; you can't ignore this fact. It is also a Soviet offensive, so we have to look at how the Soviet military defined it. I guess I should not look at strategic goals because they do not suit you...
And no, the goal of the Vyborg Bay operation was to capture the islands also, but, again, leave this discussion for the actual article. -YMB29 (talk) 03:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Just because the name of the offensive in one language includes term 'strategic' does not mean all other aspects should be ignored as by doing so you are introducing bias to the article. Actually it is stated in sources that the goal of the 59th Army was to cross and to flank Finnish positions at Karelian Isthmus. Capture of the islands was not the goal of the operation but required for it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:38, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well we can look at what sources say later, but not here.
Again, for the final result, the main goal is what matters. -YMB29 (talk) 17:35, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Main goal which is not constant but dependents heavily on your deliberate choice to consider only strategic effect of the offensive. We can just as well consider the main goal purely on the operational level in which case offensive was a failure. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:27, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry, but you don't make sense... -YMB29 (talk) 20:46, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]


Something about the goals of the operation from Solonin's book: 25 июня. Глупость или агрессия?
Со взятием Выборга все еще только начиналось. Вечером (в 23.30) 21 июня была подписана оперативная директива штаба Ленинградского фронта № 74/оп, в которой войскам фронта было приказано: «…продолжать наступление с задачей не позднее 26.6.44 г. главными силами овладеть рубежом Иматра, Лаппеенранта, Виройоки (подчеркнуто мной. — М.С.). Одновременно очистить от противника Карельский перешеек северо-восточнее реки и озера Вуокси наступлением части сил на Хиитола–Кексгольм…» [365]. citation 365. ЦАМО, ф. 375, оп. 6675, д. 76, л. 22–23.
В многостраничной директиве нет ни одного упоминания о том, что после выхода на рубеж Иматра–Лаппеенранта (т.е. ЗА линию границы 1940 г.) войска должны были остановиться и перейти к обороне. Фактически выход на этот рубеж был обозначен лишь как задача ближайшей (после взятия Выборга) недели! Интересная, хотя и не вполне конкретизированная информация обнаруживается и в опубликованных 40 лет назад воспоминаниях генерал-полковника М.М. Попова. В апреле 1944 г. он вернулся на «свой» Ленинградский фронт, на этот раз — в должности начальника штаба фронта. Генерал Попов по-солдатски прямо пишет: «Задачей операции было уничтожение основных сил финских войск на Карельском перешейке и выход наших войск северо-западнее и западнее Выборга с тем. чтобы создать угрозу важнейшим жизненным центрам Финляндии на юге страны (здесь и далее подчеркнуто мной. — М.С.)… 21 июня 1944 г. Ставка приказала Ленинградскому фронту продолжить наступление на перешейке для вторжения вглубь Финляндии» [194]. citation 194. Оборона Ленинграда. 1941–1944. Воспоминания и дневники участников. Л.: Наука, 1968, С. 32, 35, 41–42, 61, 73.
После прекращения наступления на главном стратегическом направлении Выборг–Хельсинки боевые действия в Приладожской Карелии и вовсе потеряли всякий разумный смысл
In other words it describes the various goals of the offensive - none of which were achieved. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:53, 1 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
What was the point of quoting an amateur historian? Your sources are bad enough already...
This is not about strategic goals. Advancing into Finnish territory and creating a threat to the major population centers was meant to only serve the main strategic goal - forcing Finland from the war. -YMB29 (talk) 00:05, 5 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So every source provide is perfect but opposing sources are worthless? How is that NPOV attitude with regards to the issue. Its about the whole of the offensive - you can not arbitrarily decide that it is solely strategic goals that needs to be taken into consideration. And by the way, creating a threat failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:47, 5 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
All I can say is that you do not know what a strategic offensive is. Enough of a threat to Finland's survival was created for Finland to be forced from the war.
You don't even know who Solonin is... If there are books written by real historians, why use a book by a controversial amateur historian? -YMB29 (talk) 20:47, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Again, we are discussing the offensive itself. Not just single aspect of it. Soviet failure of achieve their set goals of the offensive is as valid point as any other. Solonin is an author who has written fairly well referenced books regarding historical events, often with critical view. There seems no reason not to use him. Just because you don't like his writing is not a reason to ignore or censor him. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:57, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
You read Solonin's books? How do you know that they are well referenced? If you want to, you can use him here, but that won't help you. I reference historians like Glantz, while you a publicist like Solonin... It is not what I think about him; Russian historians consider his works to have no historical value. -YMB29 (talk) 03:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]


Quotes

The Soviet General Staff then recommended that the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts launch an offensive against Finnish forces in the sector from Leningrad to Petrozavodsk. The strategic objective of the offensive was to defeat the Finnish Army and force Finland from the war. On 10 June 1944, the Red Army began the offensive against Finnish forces north of Leningrad and quickly captured Vyborg, thereby threatening the capital, Helsinki. As soon as the Finnish military command transferred forces from southern Karelia to meet this threat, Soviet forces of the Karelian Front, under Army General K. A. Meretskov, attacked northward and westward out of Soviet Karelia and quickly advanced through the area between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. This offensive, known as the Svir-Petrozavodsk Operation, continued until 9 August and was strategically significant in that it led to the reopening of bilateral negotiations between Finland and the U.S.S.R. on 25 August. On 4 September, the two sides signed an armistice that required Finland to expel or disarm all German troops still on its soil by 15 September.

Leavenworth Papers # 17 - The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, by Gebhardt [4]


The Karelian operations of 1944, the first phase of the summer campaign, were designed to drive Finland from the war, divert attention from Soviet offensive preparations further south, and embarrass the Germans by driving one of their allies from the war. The Stavka ordered the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts to secure the Karelo-Finnish isthmus and the expanse of Karelia north and northwest of Leningrad. Govorov's front, supported by the Baltic Fleet, was ordered to attack on 10 June 1944 to secure Vyborg within 10 days and Meretskov's front was to strike north of Lake Ladoga beginning on 21 June. The Soviets commanders well recalled the difficulties they had experienced penetrating the Mannerheim Line in 1939/40. To avoid replicating the earlier four month struggle, planning was careful, and the Soviets built up a sizable force superiority prior to the offensive. Govorov's offensive unfolded virtually as planned. By 21 June, the left flank of his 21st Army had secured Vyborg despite intense and sordid negotiations between the Finns and Germans over the possible dispatch of German assistance. Govorov then reinforced his forward forces at Vyborg with units of 59th Army, which were transported by ship to the Finnish city. The same day Meretskov's 7th Army commenced operations into Central Karelia from its positions along the Svir River. The combined Soviet operations north and south of Lake Ladoga ultimately forced the Finns to sue for peace in September, and although token German assistance finally did arrive, the die was already cast for the Finns. Soon events elsewhere rendered the Karelian operations a distinct sideshow to the main military effort taking place to the south of Belorussia. For their efforts against the Finns, both Govorov and Meretskov were promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Finnish campaign had the added bonus of keeping German attention focused away from Army Group Center. In fact, an organized strategic deception campaign portrayed major Soviet offensives on the northern and southern flanks, with only limited attacks on Army Group Center expected later in the summer.

When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, by Glantz (pp. 202-203)


The General Staff plan envisaged the summer offensive being opened with the Leningrad Front attack, timed for the beginning of June and aimed at Vyborg, to be supplemented by the Karelian Front striking out for Svirsk—Petrozavodsk to knock Finland right out of the war...
The moment to tighten the screw on Finland had finally come; the first June attacks, though ultimately contained, virtually exhausted Finnish reserves (so Marshal Mannerheim reported to Hitler), and after another month of ceaseless hammering the situation had grown desperate. The Finns struggled furiously to seal up every path and passage from the defile between the two great lakes but it was, as Meretskov observed, a losing battle. Soviet troops bored on with Finnish resistance stiffening nearer to the frontier; roads were mined and barricaded, bridges blown, stretches of open country mined. The Red Army pounded the Finns into asking for an armistice and into repudiating the Waffenbrudenchaft with Germany. Already on 28 July President Ryti appeared at Finnish Headquarters to inform Mannerheim of his decision to lay down his office and begged the Marshal to assume the presidency. President Ryti resigned on 1 August and Mannerheim took up his new post, intent on leading Finland out of the war.

The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany, by Erickson (pp. 197, 329-330) [5] [6]


The Russians now made plans for a major attack which would take Finland out of the war by crushing it as the first step in the 1944 summer offensive...

As a preliminary to the planned Soviet major offensive, the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts opened an attack against Finland on June 10. The Finns were both surprised and overwhelmed as the Red Army battered in the westernmost section of the Finnish front facing Leningrad. In a few days the Red Army forced the Finns back on the Karelian isthmus, breaking their intermediate defensive position and pushing them back to their last line of defense on the Soviet side of the 1940 border. The Finns appealed for help to the Germans, who sent supplies and weapons withheld earlier when it looked as if Finland might leave the war.
The assistance of the Germans, an evacuation under Soviet pressure of almost all of the eastern Karelian territory occupied by the Finnish army in 1941, the exhaustion of the Red Army offensive, and the transfer of Soviet units from the Leningrad Front to the south enabled the Finns to hold on during July. Their situation was, however, most precarious. They could not replace the casualties suffered. They had promised the Germans, in effect in exchange for the aid received, that they would stay in the war; but there was no real prospect of halting any new major Soviet attack.
...the Finnish government realized that there was no choice but to accept whatever terms the Soviet Union offered. The President who had promised the Germans to stay in the war resigned and was replaced by Marshal Mannerheim, who persuaded the Finnish parliament to agree to the demands placed before them and sign an armistice on September 4, 1944.

A World At Arms: A Global History Of World War II, by Weinberg (pp. 660, 703) [7][8]


Diversionary moves were co-ordinated at the extreme southern and northern ends of the whole theatre of operations — the latter not merely diversionary, since a subsidiary component of the summer offensive was intended to be a surprise attack designed to drive Finland out of the war...
 The attack on Finland by the Leningrad Front began on 9 June and, though mounted only with marginal force, soon consumed the tiny Finnish army's reserves. On 28 July the Finnish President asked leave to transfer his office to the national leader, Marshal Mannerheim, who at once began negotiations for a separate peace.

The Second World War, by Keegan (pp. 479-480)


While commander of the Leningrad Front, Govorov cracked the Wehrmacht's siege of Leningrad in January 1943, planned and conducted the massive offensives that raised the siege of Leningrad entirely and liberated the southern portion of the Leningrad region in January and February 1944, and orchestrated the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, which liberated the region from Finnish control and ultimately drove Finland from the war, in June and July 1944.

Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943, by Glantz (p. 494)


After Stalingrad in February 1943, Finland's leaders realized a German defeat was inevitable and re-established contacts with the Soviets. The intermittent negotiations broke down in February 1944. but the massive Soviet offensive of June 1944 forced Finland out of the war. Mannerheim stabilized the front with the help of emergency aid purchased from Germany. In return Ryti, the Finnish president, gave an undertaking that Finland would not make a separate peace. However, after the Soviets shifted troops away from Finland for the drive on Germany, Mannerheim replaced Ryti and promptly reneged on the promise. To the disgust of Hitler, Finland made that separate peace and subsequently used force to evict German forces from its territory.

Hitler's Arctic War: The German Campaigns in Norway, Finland and the USSR, 1940-1945, by Mann and Jörgensen (p. 208) [9]


As a prologue to the main operation in White Russia, an offensive against Finland began on 9 June 1944, and Viipuri (Vyborg), the Finnish stronghold (which had German troops among its defenders), was taken on 20 June. On 21 June another attack was begun in southern Karelia north of Lake Ladoga. Both offensives were successful, and in September 1944 the Finns asked for peace.

Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944, by Dunn (p. 18) [10]


The Vyborg and Svir-Petrozavodsk front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk strategic operation... Soviet troops liberated the territory of the Karelo-Finnish ASSR, the northern regions of the Leningrad oblast, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Finnish Army. Successful actions of this operation significantly changed the situation in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front, predetermined the withdrawal of Finland from the war, and created conditions for the liberation of the Soviet Arctic and northern regions of Norway.

The Stamp of Secrecy Is Removed: Soviet Armed Forces Losses in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts, by Krivosheev (pp. 177-178)


In order to divert enemy troops away from the target area, Soviet troops would attack Finland prior to the beginning of the main offensive. On 10 June 1944 the assault on Finland began and continued through the next phase of 'Operation Bagration'. Despite German reinforcements, by late August Finland sued for peace.

Strategy and Tactics: Infantry Warfare, by Wiest and Barbier (p. 65) [11]


After the Soviet government failed to drive Finland from the war by diplomatic means in the spring of 1944, the Soviet forces did so militarily in June of that year. On June 10, the troops of General Govorov's Leningrad Front began the Vyborg operation to drive the Finnish forces from the Karelian Isthmus. On June 20 they succeeded in seizing Vyborg but were then rebuffed in their attempts to penetrate deeper into Finland between June 23 and July 13. At the same time, the Soviet forces of the Karelian Front commanded by General Meretskov carried out the Svir-Petrozavodsk offensive... The offensive was designed to clear Finnish forces from the area east of Lake Ladoga. The offensive lasted until August 9 during which time General Meretskov's troops liberated the territory between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega. By August 10, 1944, the battle for Leningrad had come to an end. All the German and Finnish forces had been driven from the Leningrad region.

Frozen Tears: The Blockade and Battle of Leningrad, by Pleysier (p. 163) [12]


The Soviet summer offensive in the Baltic region brought Finland to an armistice on 4 September and by breaking through to Riga in mid-August, also made the German position in the Gulf of Finland untenable

Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, by Polmar and Noot (p. 108) [13]


In September 1944 Finland was at the end of its tether. The resources of this tiny Scandinavian country had been stretched to the limits in its war against Russia. The Soviet offensive in June 1944 had shown Finland this, and Finnish delegates began asking for terms.

WWII Journal: Waffen-SS, by Merriam (p. 23) [14]


In June 1944, Soviet troops began the destruction of German Army Group Center (Operation Bagration), while supplementary offensives drove Romania and Finland out of the war in August and September, respectively.

Stress of War, Conflict and Disaster, by George Fink (p. 279) [15]


The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation of 1944, although small in scope and conducted by a portion of the forces of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts as well as the Baltic Fleet, ended with a major defeat for the enemy troops on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia. The enemy was thrown back to the Soviet-Finnish frontier virtually along its entire extent and this accelerated the pulling out of Finland from the war.

Military History Journal - On the Question of Strategic Operations in the Great Patriotic War, by Gurkin and Golovnin (p. 12) [16]


When the cease-fire came into effect at noon on the 2nd, the remaining 207,000 Germans in Italy surrendered. On the eastern front, meanwhile, a Soviet offensive, begun on June 9, had driven Finland out of the war by September 19.

German Wars 1914-1945, by Goodspeed (p. 502)


Quotes 2

After July 17 the front became stabilized and later actions can best be described as positional warfare (p. 298-299) The Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement had served Mannerheim's purposes by obtaining the aid needed from Germany to stabilize the fronts. By the end of July the fronts were quiet and Germany was withdrawing the reinforcements it had sent to Finland. (p. 314) The military situation in Finland had returned to positional warfare and the Soviets continued to withdraw forces from the fronts. The Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus were reduced to 10 infantry divisions and 5 tank brigades by mid-August. The military situation looked more promising than even the most optimistic observer could have predicted only four to six weeks earlier. (p. 315-316)

Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in WWII, By Henrik Lunde, 2011.


It appeared that as in the Winter War of 1939-40, although the Soviet Union could claim a victory, its offensive fell short of the success it ought to have had, largely for the same reasons — underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical leadership.

Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East, by Earl Ziemke (p. 388)


It appeared that as in the Winter War, although the Soviet Union could claim a victory, its offensive had failed, largely for the same reasons - underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical leadership.

German Northern Theatre Of Operations 1940-45, by Ziemke, p.288
Hitler's Forgotten Armies: Combat in Norway and Finland, by Bob Carruthers (2012)


Which quite bluntly states that Stalin's great offensive against Finns failed to reach its conclusion: Finland was not defeated militarily. In fact from military strategic view point the offensive was Soviet Union's failure, which was caused by the fact that neither of the fronts participating to the offensive managed to accomplish their respective operational/strategic missions...

Kun hyökkääjän tie suljettiin, by Moisala & Alanen (1988) (When attackers road was blocked)


In mid-July the front line along the entire Karelian Isthmus stabilized, and further offensive operations by Soviet forces were not attempted. Active combat no longer took place here for the rest of the war. Despite the defeat of its army, Finland continued the war. The Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Belorussia, the Baltics and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force the reactionary Finnish government to accept the conditions of the Soviet government and exit the war from the side of Hitler's Germany.

Bitva za Leningrad, by Platonov


During the final assault on Vyborg, the Stavka radioed a directive to the Leningrad Front promoting Govorov to the rank of Marshall of the Soviet Union and both Zhdanov and Gusev to the rank of Colonel General. Although the capture of Vyborg and the Red Army advance to the Vuoksi River line essentially ended the Vyborg operation, it did not satisfy the STAVKA's strategic aims. & By 14 July it was clear to Soviet and Finn alike that Govorov's offensive into Southern Finland had failed.

The Battle for Leningrad, by David Glantz


By the middle of July, the Soviet offensive was stopped before it had reached the 1940 border. The Finnish army was severely bloodied but still unbeaten. Once again Finnish resistance succeeded in raising the cost of conquest beyond what Soviet leaders were willing to invest on a peripheral front

Finland in the New Europe, by Max Jacobson


In the event, when this Soviet offensive emerged in 1944, it did push the Finns back out of East Karelia, but the Finnish lines then held further to the west, at great cost to the Finns, but also at great costs to the Soviets

Preemption, Prevention and Proliferation: The Threat and Use of Weapons in History - Page 92by George H. Quester


The danger was averted all thanks to the fact that the Soviet offensive had been stopped close to out borders... && Finland's second war with the Soviet Union began in June 1941 and ended in September 1944. The Finnish army weathered the storm, and the main offensive mounted by the Soviet Union in June 1944 was stopped after heavy fighting... In consequence Finland lost territory to the Soviet Union, and in addition the armistice concluded in September 1944 obliged Finland to lease to the Soviet Union an area west of Helsinki for use as a naval and military base. Finland also had to pay considerable war reparations. Its situation was weak.

Witness to History, by Mauno Koivisto


Following their successes on the German front in 1943-44, the Soviet Red Army carried out the fourth of its ten strategic attacks, and it proved to be the only one which failed to reach its goal

Finnish Aces of World War 2 by Kari Stenman

Result of the offensive

This is for the result in the infobox.

Result: "Soviet victory" or at least "Soviet strategic victory"

Explanation: The main strategic goal of the offensive was to force Finland from the war and this was accomplished. That is what reliable sources say.[17] The offensive did not advance into Finland as planned, but that was not its main purpose; this was only a means to help accomplish the strategic goal. Should not a strategic offensive be judged by the strategic goals it achieved, and not by whether it accomplished all of its tactical-operational objectives?
Some Finnish sources say that the offensive failed, but they incorrectly assume that the main strategic goal was to conquer Finland.
I don't understand why there is even an argument about this. If historians such as Glantz and Erickson define the main strategic goal of the offensive and then say that the offensive accomplished it, how could the result not be a Soviet victory? -YMB29 (talk) 20:53, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]


Result: blank or link to Aftermath section (as per suggestions made by others)

Explanation: Soviet stated goals (as per several reliable sources) of reaching Virojoki-Lappeenranta line and further Kymijoki river let alone the destruction of Finnish Army, all which were stated goals of the offensive failed. Whole offensive in the Karelian Isthmus after 20 June achieved very little even though it continued until mid July - though Soviet literature generally downplays this fact (see Battle of Tali-Ihantala, Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944), Battle of Vuosalmi). I left the actual phrasing of the result open since i'm not sure what it should be however blanket statement regarding 'Soviet victory' is not consistent with what took place in the Karelian Isthmus and in Ladoga Karelia in summer 1944 when Soviet goals of the operations are known. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:11, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Due to the rather complicated case of the result and after reading comments by others i'll go with what template documentation suggests, and go with either blank result or then result entry which directs to more detailed explanation in the article ('see aftermath'). - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:21, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Comments by others

Result: Soviet victory
As this is currently a choice between a result and a non-result, it is easy. Although a number of recent Finnish and Russian works conclude the campaign was a Finnish defensive victory, mainstream sources such as Glantz and Erickson seem to state this as a Soviet victory. Let me also point out that this is currently marked as the only succesful Soviet operation in the Continuation War, so anything below a Soviet victory here would raise the question where did the Soviets win this war? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 21:09, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

This is a difficult battle to summarize in a few words. While the Soviets clearly came out ahead, they also didn't do as well as they'd expected to. However, it's hard to see how this was anything other than a Soviet victory; it sure wasn't a Finnish success except perhaps in purely tactical terms (in that they were not over-run, as could have happened given the Red Army's significant superiority in firepower). It's important to note that this war ended in a negotiated peace (with terms which were very much in the USSR's favour) as the Finns knew that this battle was a 'near miss' and they couldn't hold the Red Army off for much longer, and the Soviets wanted to focus on defeating Germany rather than waste resources slugging it out with the Finns in a secondary theatre. As such, I'd suggest either going with 'Soviet victory' or, perhaps better still, leaving this field of the infobox blank, and explaining the results of the battle in more detail in the lead. Nick-D (talk) 11:30, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Yes indeed, even the infobox template documentation suggest the 'See the Aftermath section." as an alternative in complicated cases. I am even inclined to this now. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 13:07, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion about goals

It would be appreciated if you would remove the bias from the question because in its current form it is not NPOV which unfortunately means it has really no value. First you state the perceived goal of the operation while leaving out the actual stated operative goals of the offensive. Second you use hindsight in evaluating offensives success. Furthermore term 'strategic' is not always attached to the name of the offensive so it should be left out. Such terms are not included in English nomenclature to the name of the offensive in any case. Make the question neutral and then leave it there. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:40, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

What are you talking about? It is a strategic offensive... The main goal is not perceived by me; it is what reliable sources say. I stated my view and you stated yours about operational-tactical goals, so what do you want? -YMB29 (talk) 23:46, 6 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Also before I ask for a third opinion, I suggest you write a real result, like "Decisive Finnish victory" or whatever. Otherwise, others might think that you have no position of your own and are simply denying what is being pointed out to you. -YMB29 (talk) 03:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Just because the name in one language includes term 'strategic' does not mean it should be only considered as such. I don't have a good statement for the result since you have repeatedly refused to take part in actually discussing what it could be. How can there be collaborative effort with this regard with such a denial? Given the extent of Soviet failures in capturing or accomplishing stated and set goals of the offensive using a blanket statement such as 'Soviet victory' is just not in any way neutral - neither is the one you appear to be trying to insert as my statement (ie. 'Finnish victory'). - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:46, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well I suggested "Soviet strategic victory", but you don't want that too. You accuse me of what you yourself do. I am the one discussing the result, presenting sources and proving my point, while all you do is deny what I suggest and what reliable sources say.
So are you going to suggest a result or not? -YMB29 (talk) 17:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Actually you are again wrong so please do not try to say what i stated. I already made a suggestion regarding the result for you to evaluate earlier but you seemingly refused to acknowledge that it even existed quite clearly showing that you had no interest in collaborative effort - 'Operational Soviet failure, Strategic Soviet success' as per sources, if you want to avoid edit wars (not by me but knowing the history of the topic) i would suggest on not insisting on term 'victory' - it will bring only grief since i doubt very much it would be accepted as NPOV. Reliable sources speak of the result of the offensive on two separate levels so you can not just choose one and ignore the other according to your preferences. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:35, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Re: 'Operational Soviet failure, Strategic Soviet success' - stating a negative result would be anti-Soviet POV and also confusing - if that means Finnish operational victory or stalemate then why cover it with a negative statement?. Also, the English Wikipedia logic would be to state the strategic outcome first. And, the standard vocabulary here is 'victory' rather than 'success'. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:50, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Wanderer602 does not want to accept that this was a victory of any kind for the Soviets. -YMB29 (talk) 20:58, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Earlier comment is still valid: I left the actual phrasing of the result open. So strategic could go first, nothing there to prevent it. It was never a Finnish operation nor was it a Finnish campaign so determining it to be Finnish victory is impossible since there were nothing for Finns to achieve as far as goals for the operation are concerned (separate engagements within the campaign are a different case) - well other than stop the Soviet offensive, but that is a perceived greater (ie. strategic) goal instead of stated goal AFAIK, in which Finns succeeded. From Finnish point of view the fighting in the summer of 1944 is considered to be part of the 'Soviet grand (great/huge/massive) offensive (attack/assault)'. Victory might be closer to the standard vocabulary but it is not a strictly enforced rule, furthermore i find no reason to cause undue griefing with the article by intentionally choosing a phrasing that is likely to be contested. I would rather try to find a lasting resolution instead of creating potential battlefield.

@YMB29: Again it is rather insulting for you to state something regarding my opinions that is blatantly false. Either stay quiet or behave like any respectful editor should. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:14, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

I just stated what I observed. -YMB29 (talk) 21:59, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The strategic level is most important; you know this and don't want to admit it.
You are threatening me that Finnish users will edit war if it says Soviet victory because in Finland they are taught something else?
I told you that operational failure is dubious because you only look at the operational goals not accomplished. -YMB29 (talk) 20:58, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I have never threatened you in any way. I only noted given the page history that insisting on weighted statements in the results will end up in edit warring. That much is obvious from the past page history. Unless your goal is to intentionally aggravate other editors and cause battlefield situation then it would be preferable to use less weighted statement for the result to be used. Statements regarding the operative goals are quite clear, including to the land targets goal was to destroy Finnish army (see Solonin, who quoted Chief of LF Staff). - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:14, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
What do you mean by they are clear?
If other users cannot accept the result that is based on reliable sources, then too bad. We just have to deal with the edit warring. Similar thing happened with Soviet victory in the Continuation War article. I told you that "less weighted" would be "Soviet strategic victory", but you don't want to consider that too. -YMB29 (talk) 21:59, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Meaning that they are known in several sources. Repeatedly using the statement 'reliable sources' is rather dubious behavior for you since my statements are also supported by reliable sources. I gave you an option which would use both views but so far you have refused to even discuss its merits. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:53, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I told you that I think your "option" (operational failure...) is dubious.
Your statements are mostly based not on sources, but on misinterpretations of sources (Platonov, Glantz, Ziemke...). -YMB29 (talk) 18:21, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Not any more interpretations that what you have with your sources. All those sources state that offensive failed to achieve its (operational) goals. What else do you need? - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:00, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I don't manipulate sources like you.
Failure to achieve some operational goals does not mean the whole operation is not a victory. You may think that operational goals are more important or on the same level as strategic goals, but that is just your opinion... -YMB29 (talk) 19:30, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Show me a single instance where sources would have been manipulated. So you are saying that failure is not a failure? By same logic you are using there Finland won the war, after all it remained independent. You are only one who has been 'rating' different levels but so far there has been nothing to support such an act. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:56, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
If you by now don't understand the difference between strategic, operational and tactical goals and the importance of each, you are lost... Or most likely you are denying the obvious again because you don't want to admit that you are wrong.
The goal for Finland when it started the war was not remaining independent, and you know this.
I have explained how you manipulate sources many times now on this page. Using an outdated quote from Ziemke, which he corrected, and then claiming that it is the same thing is not a manipulation? You have always done this, see the old section above [18]. -YMB29 (talk) 21:40, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I do perceive the difference between them but i try not to discriminate according to that. You can not decide to ignore operations stated operative goals because you consider its strategic effect more important - that already is NPOV, it involves you opinion on what is important with regards to the article. You can not consider Finland and Continuation War without taking into account what preceded it. Finland intended to stay out of the coming war but was forced into it by the Soviet Union when it invaded Finland in the Winter War. Ziemke's 'corrected' quote, like you state it, does not change what he is saying. Last i checked the third opinion argument ended with you disagreeing when the opinion was inquired from the author when the authors comment disagreed with your interpretation on the matter. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:11, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
What are you talking about? What author?
Ziemke's corrected quote totally changes what he is saying. Your continued denial of this only proves my point, that you manipulate sources.
It is not about my opinion; military science considers strategic goals to be more important (see below). It is amusing how you keep denying this...
And don't give me excuses for Finland starting the war. -YMB29 (talk) 00:13, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Glantz, as discussed in the sections you linked into. Ziemke's quote does not really change. For Ziemke, first one states "its offensive had failed", which is obvious, and other one "its offensive fell short of the success it ought to have had" which clearly states that the offensive failed to reached its (planned) goals. Actually that is the Soviet perspective to the matter which is hardly valid for all comparisons let alone this. Yet even if it was you can not ignore operational goals and the failures to accomplish them just because you dislike them. Again, we are discussing this offensive itself, not the war as a whole in this article. Winter War is acknowledged as the reason why Finns ended up into the WWII in the first place, reasons for taking part to the Continuation War nonwithstanding. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:34, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So the goal for Finland was to take back the lost land and add more, not independence...
We are discussing a strategic offensive, which is judged by whether or not it accomplished its strategic goals (or aims).
Again, this is a Soviet offensive, so we have to look at it from a Soviet perspective, and it is not like the view on strategic operations is much different for other countries.
Ziemke means that some goals were not reached. The first quote said failed, which would mean that almost no goals were achieved.
So you still want Glantz's supposed email to be used as a source here? What he writes in his books is what matters, not what he supposedly wrote in an email... -YMB29 (talk) 17:28, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
It is only your deduction that only strategic goals need to be considered. You actually need to provide some reasons (ie. sources) why only strategic goals would need to be included for consideration. Not reaching the goals is failing in accomplishing the goals, i see conflict there. As discussed in length in the referred section what Glantz states in this books is ambiguous. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:14, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
No, you make it sound ambiguous.
As for the goals, see below again. -YMB29 (talk) 22:36, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Strategic outcome goes first. Should we, however, want to state an alternative operational result such as 'Finnish operational victory' or 'operational stalemate' we would need sources that actually state that. The Soviet failure to achieve some or even most of its operational goals is not sufficient to label it a Finnish victory or a stalemate as Finland failed to defend some major targets as well. The result is not obvious enough to decide it upon our own analysis without OR. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 21:27, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
See several of the quotes above, also Moisala & Alanen (translated)
Stalin's great offensive against Finns failed to reach its conclusion: Finland was not defeated militarily. In fact from military strategic view point the offensive was Soviet Union's failure, which was caused by the fact that neither of the fronts participating to the offensive managed to accomplish their respective operational/strategic missions..
Military strategic here does not refer to overall strategic situation but instead to what Soviet/Russian parlance would call operational goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:40, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Even if we focus specifically on this source, what positive result would you make out of this? 'Finland not defeated' and 'Soviet Union's failure' are negative and therefore ill-suited for our purpose. I can see the authors do not support 'Soviet victory' as the result but where do they suggest the Continuation War was lost then, at the negotiation table? Anyways, the post-Soviet Finnish research unfortunately does not qualify as mainstream. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 21:54, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Like I said, you only have one Finnish source supporting you, with regard to the offensive being a strategic failure.
Looking at the translation, it is not even clear what the author refers to.
What was the main goal of the Soviet offensive according to the source? Conquest of Finland? -YMB29 (talk) 21:59, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
You are perfectly aware that it is not the sole source that states that the offensive failed so please do not try to insinuate that it would have been. Goals according to the source were the same as the goals for the phases of the offensive. Also authors include destruction of Finnish army on the north shore of Ladoga by pincer movement by both LF and KF as one (verified by the quote from LF chief of staff) and leave open exactly how far offensive would have reached in the west stating that likely end line would actually have been Helsinki-Lahti line.

@Jaan: If you consider the time when Finnish leadership started making moves toward ending hostilities then you can look for Stalingrad and Kursk (and events between) as a reason for it. Because that is the time Finnish leaders perceived the ultimate German defeat in the war. By 1944 it was even acknowledged that 1939 borders would not be acceptable for the Soviet Union. In other words it was the overall strategic situation in the WWII. Offensive did not change much in that regard, before the offensive parties were in negotiations and after the offensive parties were at negotiations (but this time with reduced Soviet demands). Only time they were not negotiating was during the offensive when Finns rejected the Soviet note perceived as demand for unconditional surrender. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:53, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

The Finns were unwilling to accept Soviet terms, but after the offensive they changed their minds. Any reduction in demands was due to international pressure, especially British.[19]
Historians say that the offensive forced the Finns to exit the war on the Axis side, so we don't need your analysis.
I am talking about strategic goals and evaluating the offensive strategically; you have only one Finnish source that does that... -YMB29 (talk) 18:21, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Again the source you placed, just like the others, only mention that British (ie. foreign powers) influenced it. Not that they would have caused it like you stated. Sources is quite clear about this 'helped in persuading' only means that they contributed to the decision not that they would have forced it or even having been primary force behind the decision. Except those are not all what the offensive was about. You can not go ignoring certain aspects of the offensive just because you dislike them. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:00, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I am not ignoring anything; a strategic offensive is about accomplishing strategic goals.
So where is your source that the Soviet decision was influenced by something other than international pressure? -YMB29 (talk) 19:30, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
You are ignoring several sources which state that offensive failed, just because you do not like them does not grant you a free pass to ignore them regardless how you consider them. Offensive had also other goals than strategic ones as discussed in quite a length before, again just because you refuse to accept them does not mean they would not have been there. Such a source is actually the one you provided. It explicitly mentions that Britain 'helped in persuading' not that 'Britain persuaded'. First one (used by source) is an acknowledgment of contribution while the other one is statement of accomplishing the whole action. Using it a source for a statement that 'any reduction in demands was due to international pressure' is actually (blatant) source manipulation of which you just accused me of. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:56, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
No, there are no other reasons given by any other source, so it can be assumed that it was due to international pressure only. Plus "Britain helped" in that context means that Britain was not the only country that helped, not that there were other reasons.
Once again, a strategic offensive is meant to accomplish strategic goals. All other type of goals only serve those strategic goals and by themselves mean nothing. If you don't want to understand this, it is your problem.
Two Finnish sources you found say that it failed; one says strategically and the other does not clarify. Considering that patriotic Finnish historiography often assumes that the main strategic goal was to conquer Finland, this is not surprising. However, this cannot be taken seriously when the real main goal is well known. -YMB29 (talk) 21:40, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Just because other reason(s) is (are) not stated does not mean you can interpret the statement in the way prefer it to be interpreted, again you are inserting your own bias into interpreting the articles which is source manipulation. You can not assume something that the source is not saying. Nor can you argue that lack of something is proof of its absence when the existence of the other reasons is clearly noted in the text. And again, source does not state if it was another country or other reason that contributed to the issue only that British diplomatic effort contributed to it, it does not in any way disclose what the other reasons were or even their relative importance to the matter of any of the factors. Yet again you arbitrarily decide to ignore all other aspects - yet the fact remains that the offensive had operative goals which Soviet forces failed to accomplish. Article discusses the whole of the offensive, not just strategic aspect of it. There are several more sources (non-Finnish) than just the Finnish ones as you are perfectly aware of so please try to stick with the facts. Just because you do not like them does not mean they would not exist. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:11, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So where are the other sources that say that the whole offensive failed?
The result in the infobox has to reflect the outcome of the offensive. The failed operational objectives cannot make the offensive a failure when the main goal was achieved. You still did not write what result you are after...
Read the source again. It says that the Soviets were persuaded, not forced. Britain helped persuade them means that there were others who were persuading them, not forcing them as you imply. Again, where are your sources for the other reasons? You have none, so you just keep on speculating and denying... -YMB29 (talk) 00:13, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Please read the quoted sources again in that case. Failed operational objectives means that on operational level the offensive failed which is still valid statement for the infobox. For operational failure it does not really matter what the strategic outcome was. And as for the source, it does not say that Soviets were persuaded by the British, it does not even state that Britain helped persuade, it states merely that Britain helped in persuading. Which only states that Britain contributed as one of the possibly several factors that affected the Soviet decision, not that they would have caused or that it would have been the sole cause of it like your earlier statement said. Which was source manipulation from your part, either use what the source states or don't use it at all. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:34, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The source does not suggest that there were other reasons. You are trying to manipulate it to make it sound like it does.
As for operational "failure", see below. -YMB29 (talk) 17:28, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Actually it is saying that there were other reasons. It is in the phrasing. It is merely noting that British diplomatic influence contributed to the matter, not that they would have caused it. Difference between doing something and taking part in doing something. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:14, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Yes they took part in persuading the Soviets. Others took part in persuading them too. There is no indication that there were other reasons, besides persuasion (diplomatic pressure), for the decision. -YMB29 (talk) 22:36, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]


Response to third opinion request:
As it appears, the offensive was neither utter success, nor utter failure. I see two possible text templates that would be consistent with the sources given:
  1. Though Soviet army failed to fulfill the goal of reaching of reaching Virojoki-Lappeenranta line, it enjoyed the strategic benefit of forcing Finland from the war.
  2. The historians divide on evaluation of the results... + all major viewpoints with references.

The first option seems by far better to me, as it demonstrates that the operation was neither flawless victory or utter defeat. The second option is a fallback solution, as it is less clear, though easier to agree upon in general (thus pushing argument down to each viewpoint and its weight in terms of general acceptance). As far as we are not entitled to cherry-pick sources according to over opinions, I see no third option. —Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 22:30, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, the first option is similar to what the text in the article says, but we can't use that for the result in the infobox. The result there is usually very brief, a few words (some kind of a victory for one side or a stalemate). -YMB29 (talk) 23:16, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
I would consider reading the template documentation then. In this case it states (emphasis added):
A military conflict infobox (sometimes referred to as a warbox) may be used to summarize information about a particular military conflict (a battle, campaign, war, or group of related wars) in a standard manner.

[...]

  • result – optional – this parameter may use one of several standard terms: "X victory", "Decisive X victory" or "Inconclusive". The choice of term should reflect what the sources say. In cases where the standard terms do not accurately describe the outcome, a link to the section of the article where the result is discussed in detail (such as "See the 'Aftermath' section") should be used instead of introducing non-standard terms like "marginal" or "tactical" or contradictory statements like "decisive tactical victory but strategic defeat". It is better to omit this parameter altogether than to engage in speculation about which side won or by how much.
Obviously, the choices of |result= value are "Inconclusive" or "". — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 01:21, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
There is no need for that as there are sources that can be used to get the result. I already asked a general question related to that on the military history page.[20] -YMB29 (talk) 02:59, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
See below. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 08:36, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

I would also note, that several sources talking about success of the operation seem to evaluate the effect the operation had on the war, not the fulfillment of goals. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 22:53, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, the effect on the war is the strategic result of the offensive - if the strategic goals were accomplished or not.
The other goals are tactical-operational and are meant to help achieve the strategic goals. -YMB29 (talk) 23:16, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Military operations (especially this one since it is a strategic offensive) are meant to have an effect on the war; there is no point of just achieving goals.
So my point is that we have to evaluate the offensive by its effect on the war, whether the strategic goals were accomplished or not. -YMB29 (talk) 23:37, 7 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Even if we assume the primary strategic goal to be generally driving Finland out of the war, the fulfillment of other, supposedly secondary, goals really doesn't allow us to claim Soviet victory. This looks more like "Inconclusive" from the aforementioned documentation. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 01:21, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So you mean that a victory is achieved not only by accomplishing the main goal, but also by how well the goal was accomplished? That is like saying that the Allies cannot claim victory in WWII because they lost many battles and many of their operations failed. I mean that those "secondary" goals in this offensive were only meant to serve the fulfillment of the main goal, just like battles or operations in a war.
Also there is no assumption being made; the sources above define the primary strategic goal. -YMB29 (talk) 02:59, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Your assumption that the overall effect on the war is supposed to be noted in infobox is simply false, as it directly contradicts the template's documentation. See Battle of Heraclea for example. The Infobox should contain the result of the particular conflict, not the influence of the whole war. In this case, the offensive was successful in accomplishing on of the strategic goals in the war, but the goals of the offensive were not fulfilled neither by Soviets, nor by Fins. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 08:36, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So you tell me what is the point in achieving goals if they have no effect on the war?
The article you pointed to is about a battle that resulted in a tactical victory for one side, but no strategic result. -YMB29 (talk) 18:21, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The direct consequence of Battle of Heraclea was the fact that Greece became incapable of military defence and fell to Romans. It secured the Roman victory in war, though the battle was won by Greece. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 18:39, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
So it was a strategic defeat, which is implied by Pyrrhic victory. -YMB29 (talk) 19:30, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, but notice no "Roman victory" in infobox: the outcome of the described event prevails over parent war. That's why the fact that this offensive was a strategic victory regarding Soviet performance in WWII, the infobox should be based on events of offensive, which are not decisive. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 19:44, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Not quite, pyrrhic victory has a bit different meaning as discussed in the article you linked. It does not necessarily refer to strategic effect at all, only to the cost of the victory - which may or may not have had any strategic effect. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:56, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Well in this case it did.
We have to let the sources decide if the offensive was decisive or not, and there are more than enough that say that it was.
That article is only about one battle, so there is no reason to talk about a Roman victory. This offensive is a series of battles; you can't say that it was like a big battle... -YMB29 (talk) 21:40, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
That was the point. I specifically linked that article to illustrate that the infobox entry should only report the result of the battle, decoupling it from the strategic impact on the war. The result of the battle was Greek victory, the strategic impact resulted in the Roman victory, and the |result= in the infobox reports in Greek victory.
The result of this offensive was inconclusive, so the |result= in the infobox should be "Inconclusive", regardless the strategic impact on the war, which indeed was largely beneficial for Soviets. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 10:14, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
If it had a strategic impact then how could the result be inconclusive?
The strategic defeat for the Greeks was not from just the mentioned battle, but from a series of such battles, so there was no point in adding Roman strategic victory to the result of the battle.
You can't compare an ancient battle with a 20th century offensive, which included many battles. -YMB29 (talk) 22:36, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Actually sources agree that Finns stopped the offensive so it clearly was not decisive. You can not use the strategic effect of the offensive as the sole yardstick for the determining its outcome. By doing so you are knowingly inserting bias as to how the result of the offensive is interpreted. Which is not NPOV at any level. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:11, 8 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
The outcomes of wars or major military operations are decided by strategy, how well the strategic goals are set and if they are accomplished. See below.
Decisive means it had a direct impact on the fighting, which it did according to the sources above. -YMB29 (talk) 00:13, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Possible success on strategic level does not diminish the failure on the operational level which is also highly relevant to the article as it concerns the operation, not the war. Also which one of the sources states it was decisive? - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:34, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
See the quotes above. If it forced Finland from the war, it can be said to be decisive.
For this strategic offensive, the operational failures were not important because the main goal was still accomplished without them. The strategic level concerns the operation also. The operational level is only a link between the tactical and strategic levels.
So what result do you want the infobox to have now? "Soviet strategic victory; operational failure"? Again, failure is not accurate since many operational goals were accomplished. -YMB29 (talk) 17:28, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Which of them explicitly states it would have been decisive? If there are none then it is only deduction and not valid. Again, we are discussing the whole of the offensive, not just some aspects of it. And neither are we discussing the war. So you can not ignore others aspects of the offensive because you do not like them. Actually I'm going to edit what i suggest in the result screen after reading 3rd opinions. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:14, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
Editing it after third opinions were given does not seem right... Just as I noted, you had no position and just wanted to deny what I was explaining...
If this was one battle or a limited offensive then you can argue that operational goals matter, but this was a large scale strategic offensive that was meant to achieve a strategic aim, which, as Glantz writes, is above everything else. Operational goals don't matter unless they affect strategic ones. Strategic goals don't only apply to a war in general, but also to separate military operations. Glantz mentions this below (overall vs. particular strategic aims).
I told you why it can be said to be decisive. I could also ask you where does it explicitly say that it was not decisive, like was originally claimed. -YMB29 (talk) 22:36, 9 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]
As for the result you want now, I guess it is one solution, but it has to be consistent then and apply for other articles for which such disputes arise, like battles of Vyborg Bay, Vuosalmi and Tali-Ihantala. -YMB29 (talk) 02:54, 10 July 2012 (UTC)[reply]


The strategic aim (strategicheskaia tsel') of any conflict dictates the nature, scope and form of military operations. Established by the political leadership of a nation, strategic aims represent the desired end of strategic-scale military actions. Achievement of strategic aims generally leads to significant, and sometimes fundamental, changes in military-political and strategic conditions, which, in turn, can contribute to the victorious conclusion of a war. The Soviets subdivided strategic aims into overall (obshchie) strategic aims which represent the "fundamental results of the war" and particular (chastnye) strategic aims, which result from successful campaigns or strategic operations. The strategic war aims determine the size and nature of strategic groupings of forces within a theater of military operations or on a strategic direction and determine the form of military actions undertaken. These aims transcend all other considerations.

Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, by Glantz (p. 39)
  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference MoDRF was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  2. ^ Cite error: The named reference Gebhardt-2 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  3. ^ Cite error: The named reference Glantz2-201 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ Cite error: The named reference Erickson-329 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Glantz-458 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference Platonov-486 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference MoisalaAlanen was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
source: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk%3AVyborg%E2%80%93Petrozavodsk_Offensive&diff=501500489&oldid=501499424

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