| Inner German border | |
|---|---|
| North and central Germany | |
 | |
| Type | Border fortification system |
| Height | Up to 4 metres (13 ft) |
| Site information | |
| Controlled by | German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany |
| Condition | Mostly demolished |
| Site history | |
| Built | 1945 |
| Built by | German Democratic Republic |
| In use | 1945–1990 |
| Materials | Steel, concrete |
| Demolished | 1990 |
| Battles/wars | Cold War |
| Garrison information | |
| Garrison | National People's Army, Stasi (East); Bundesgrenzschutz, Bayerische Grenzpolizei, Bundeszollverwaltung, US Army, British Frontier Service (West) |
The inner German border (German: Innerdeutsche Grenze or deutsch-deutsche Grenze, informally Zonengrenze) was the frontier between the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) between 1945 and 1990. It was 1,381 kilometres (858 mi) long, reaching from the Baltic Sea to the border of Czechoslovakia. Formally established on 1 July 1945, the border originally marked the boundary between the Western and Soviet occupation zones of Germany. It became the most heavily fortified frontier in the world, defined by a continuous line of high metal fences and walls, barbed wire, electrified alarms, trenches, watchtowers, automatic booby-traps and minefields. It was guarded around the clock by 50,000 armed East German border guards who faced tens of thousands of West German, British and US border guards and soldiers on the other side.[1] Over a million NATO and Warsaw Pact troops were stationed further back, constantly alert for an invasion that ultimately never came.
The border was a physical manifestation of Winston Churchill's metaphor of an Iron Curtain separating the Soviet and Western blocs during the Cold War. It marked the boundary between the two ideological systems – capitalist and communist, democratic and totalitarian. Built in phases from 1952 to the late 1980s,[2] the border fortifications were constructed by East Germany in response to the ever-increasing numbers of its citizens fleeing to the West.[3] The inner German border caused widespread economic and social disruption on both sides, with East Germans living in the border region suffering especially draconian restrictions. Around 1,000 people died trying to cross the border during its 45-year existence.[4]
The internationally more famous Berlin Wall was a physically separate, less elaborate and much shorter border system surrounding the enclave of West Berlin, more than 170 kilometres (110 mi) to the east of the inner German border. The day after the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, the inner German border was also opened and millions of East Germans poured into the West. The inner German border was not finally abandoned until 1 July 1990[5] – exactly 45 years to the day since it was established – only three months before German reunification formally ended the division of Germany.
Today, relatively little remains of the inner German border. The route of the border has been declared part of a "European Green Belt" along the course of the old Iron Curtain stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea, linking various national parks and nature reserves. Numerous museums and memorials along the old border commemorate the division and reunification of Germany and, in some places, preserve elements of the border fortifications.[6]
Origins of the border
The inner German border owed its origins to the agreements reached at the Tehran Conference in November–December 1943. The conference established the European Advisory Commission (EAC) to outline proposals for the partition of a defeated Germany into British, American and Soviet occupation zones (a French occupation zone was established later).[7] At the time, Germany was divided into a series of gaue – Nazi administrative subdivisions – which had succeeded the administrative divisions of Weimar Germany. These had in turn replaced the earlier duchies and kingdoms of the German Empire and pre-unification Germany.[8]
The demarcation line was based on a British proposal of 15 January 1944 which was devised by a special committee of the British Cabinet. It envisaged a line of control along the borders of the old states or provinces of Mecklenburg, Saxony, Anhalt and Thuringia, which had ceased to exist as separate entities when the Prussians unified Germany in 1871.[9] Additional minor adjustments were made for practical reasons.[7] The British would occupy the north-west of Germany, the United States would occupy the south and the Soviet Union would occupy the east. Berlin was to be treated as a separate joint zone of occupation, deep inside the Soviet zone. The rationale behind this arrangement was that it would give the Soviets a powerful incentive to see the war through to the end. It would give the British an occupation zone that was physically close to the UK and on the coast, making it easier to resupply it from the UK. It was also hoped that decentralising forces in Germany would be promoted by reviving traditional provincial boundaries. The old domination of Prussia would be undermined through "the revival of loyalties to States and Provinces with certain natural internal boundaries dictated by geography, history and economic considerations ... An anti-Prussian bias may well develop in certain areas, and there are strong grounds for weakening the present preponderance of Prussia."[10]
The United States envisaged a very different division of Germany. The US put forward a proposal with a large American zone in the north, a smaller zone for the Soviets in the east – with the American and Soviet zones meeting at Berlin – and another smaller zone for the British in the south. President Franklin D. Roosevelt disliked the idea of a US occupation zone in the south, as its supply routes would be dependent on access through France, which it was feared would be unstable following its liberation. To forestall expected American objections, the British proposal was presented directly to the EAC without prior agreement with the Americans. The Russians immediately accepted the proposal and left the United States with little choice but to accept as well. The final division of Germany was thus mainly along the lines of the British proposal, with the Americans being given the North Sea port-cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven as an enclave within the British zone to ease President Roosevelt's concerns about supply routes.[11]
The division of Germany went into effect on 1 July 1945. Because of the unexpectedly rapid Allied advance in central Germany in the final weeks of the war, British and American troops occupied large areas of territory that were assigned to the Soviet zones of occupation. These included a broad area of what was to become the western parts of East Germany, as well as parts of Czechoslovakia and Austria. The redeployment of Western troops at the start of July 1945 was an unpleasant surprise for many German refugees, who had fled west to escape the Russian advance. A fresh wave of refugees headed further west as the Americans and British withdrew and Soviet troops entered the areas allocated to the Soviet occupation zone.[12]
It was originally intended that post-war Germany would be governed jointly by the Allies. Following Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, the Allied Control Council (ACC) was formed under the terms of the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany, signed in Berlin on 5 June 1945. The council was "the highest authority for matters concerning the whole of Germany". Each of the four powers – France, the UK, the US and the USSR – were represented by their supreme commanders in Germany. The council operated from 30 August 1945 until it was suspended on 20 March 1948.[13] By the time of its demise, cooperation between the Western Allies and the Soviets had broken down completely over the issue of Germany's political and economic future. In May 1949 the three western occupation zones were merged to form the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a democratically governed federal state with a free market economy. The Soviets responded in October 1949 with the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a highly centralised communist dictatorship organised on Stalinist lines.[14] The former demarcation lines between the western and eastern zones had now become a de facto international frontier – the inner German border.
From the outset, West Germany did not accept the legitimacy of East Germany. The Basic Law (constitution) of West Germany set out the principle (known as the Alleinvertretungsanspruch, or "claim of sole representation") that the Federal Republic of Germany was the single and only legitimate representative of the German people and of their national will. According to Article 1 of the Basic Law, "Germany is an indivisible democratic republic, composed of German states ... There is only one German citizenship."[15] Under this interpretation, the East German government was for many years regarded by the West German government as an illegal organisation intent on depriving Germans of their constitutional rights. It had not been freely or fairly elected, and the creation of East Germany itself was a fait accompli by the East German Communists and their Soviet allies. Acts by other countries that lent legitimacy to East Germany and strengthened the division of Germany were strongly resisted. The government of West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, applied what became known as the Hallstein Doctrine: "The Federal Republic will view the establishment of diplomatic relations with the so-called German Democratic Republic by third parties as an unfriendly act tending to aggravate the division of Germany", as Adenauer put it in 1955. Until the late 1960s, the West German government would only maintain diplomatic relations with countries that did not recognise East Germany, and severed relations with countries that did so, including Yugoslavia in 1957 and Cuba in 1963.[16][17] By 1963 West Germany had 87 embassies around the world while the GDR had only thirteen, including the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries plus such other Communist states as North Korea and Vietnam.[18]
The principle of sole representation had important consequences for the inner German border. West Germany regarded German citizenship and rights as unitary, applying equally to East and West German citizens alike. An East German who escaped or was released to the West automatically entered into full enjoyment of those rights, including West German citizenship and social benefits.[17] A would-be immigrant from another country who could get to East Germany could not be barred from entering West Germany across the internal border, which had great significance in later decades. West German laws were deemed to be applicable in the East; violations of human rights in East Germany could be prosecuted in the West. East Germans thus had a powerful incentive to move to the West, where they would enjoy greater freedoms as well as improved economic prospects. The East German government had an equally important incentive – indeed, a political imperative – to define the country as a legitimate state in its own right, not merely the "Soviet occupation zone" (sowjetische Besatzungszone) as West Germany referred to it.[19] In the terminology of the GDR's rulers, West Germany was enemy territory (feindliches Ausland). It was portrayed as a capitalist, semi-fascist state that exploited its citizens, sought to regain the lost territories of the Third Reich and stood opposed to the peaceful socialism of the GDR.[20]
Development of the border
1945 to 1952: the "Green Border"
In the early days of the occupation, the Allies maintained controls on so-called "interzonal traffic" between all the zones of Germany, as well as controlling Germany's international frontiers. The aim was to manage the flow of refugees and prevent the escape of wanted persons such as former Nazi officials and intelligence officers.[21] Travel restrictions in the western zones were gradually lifted as the western German economy was revived by the Allies. In the Soviet zone, however, the poverty and lack of personal freedom led to huge numbers of eastern Germans emigrating to western Germany. Between October 1945 and June 1946, 1.6 million Germans left the Soviet zone and moved to the west.[22] In response, the Soviets persuaded the Allied Control Council to close all zonal borders on 30 June 1946. A system of interzonal passes was introduced to restrict traffic between the zones.[23]
The interzonal and international borders were initially controlled directly by the Allied militaries. The pre-war Grenzpolizei (German national border police service) had been abolished because of its wartime takeover by the Nazis and infiltration by the SS.[24] The situation was initially somewhat anarchic immediately after the war, with large numbers of refugees still in transit. There were a number of incidents of both Soviet and American troops mounting unauthorised expeditions into each others' zones to loot and kidnap, as well as unauthorised shooting across the boundary line.[25] It became apparent that the armies of the Western Allies by themselves could not effectively seal off the borders and interzonal boundaries. From the spring of 1946, newly trained German police forces under the control of the individual German states took on the task of patrolling the borders alongside Allied troops.[26]
The east-west interzonal border became steadily more tense as the relationship between the Western Allies and the Soviets broke down. Whereas early incidents of Soviet incursions across the line could be attributed to "outlaw" elements, the Soviets now began to actively promote the infiltration of spies and the smuggling of black-market goods across the interzonal border.[27] They also encouraged the emigration to the West of numerous unwanted German refugees, to rid them of the burden of supporting such individuals. By late August 1947, over 5,000 illegal border crossers were being detained by US forces each week. However, an increasing number of the crossers were of economic value to the Soviets. From September 1947 an increasingly strict control regime was imposed on the eastern boundary. The number of Soviet soldiers on the boundary was increased and they were supplemented with border guards from the newly established East German Volkspolizei ("People's Police").[28]
The West Germans likewise stepped up border security at the start of the 1950s. On 2 March 1951 the West German government authorised the establishment of a federal frontier protection authority, initially composed of 10,000 men organised as the Bundesgrenzschutz or BGS (Federal Border Guard).[29] Their numbers were raised to 20,000 a few months later.[30] The BGS was constituted as a highly mobile, lightly armed force tasked with guarding the borders and capable of combating internal threats constituting a national emergency. It became operational on 15 February 1952, supporting the local border police in handling routine border control problems such as illegal crossings of a nonmilitary nature.[30] Allied troops (the British in the north, the Americans in the south) retained responsibility for the military security of the border. They could take operational control of the local border police and the BGS in a military emergency.[31]
The boundary line was nonetheless still fairly easy to cross. Local inhabitants could cross the line to maintain fields on the other side, or even to live on one side and work on the other. Those who were unable to obtain passes could usually bribe the border guards or sneak across at various points. Refugees from the east, who were often Germans expelled from other countries in central and eastern Europe, were guided across the boundary by villagers in exchange for hefty fees. Other locals smuggled goods from east to west and vice versa to supplement their often meagre incomes.[32] The number of border migrants remained high despite the increase in East German security measures, with 675,000 people fleeing to West Germany between 1949 and 1952.[33] In one incident in 1950 that demonstrated the porosity of the border at this time, an entire circus, consisting of 90 wagons with 35 horses and sundry elephants, tigers and monkeys, was able to cross the border secretly without being detected by patrols.[34]
There were major differences in the way that the Western and Eastern sides tackled illegal border crossings. Because the GDR did not at this stage officially regard the inner German border as a "state border", those who were caught while trying to cross it illegally could not be punished under passport control legislation; instead, they were to be punished for crimes against the economy, principally sabotage.[35] The Western side did not attempt to stop people crossing from the east, but faced the challenge of keeping Soviet and East German military personnel and spies out. US and West German border patrollers were authorised to use reasonable force, including firearms, if they came across soldiers crossing from the other side who were attempting to flee or resist arrest. Civilians, on the other hand, would merely be kept under surveillance until they could be picked up by the West German border guards or police.[36]
1952 to 1967: the "Special Regime"
The border remained largely unfortified for several years after the East and West German republics were established in 1949, although by this time the East Germans had already blocked many unofficial crossing points with ditches and barricades. This changed abruptly on 26 May 1952 when the GDR Council of Ministers ordered the implementation of a "special regime on the demarcation line" in what the GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl justified as a measure to keep out the "spies, diversionists, terrorists and smugglers" who were allegedly being sent across the border in ever-increasing numbers.[37] In reality, though, the decision to fortify the border had been taken some time earlier. East Germany was haemorrhaging citizens at the rate of 10,000-20,000 a month, many of them from the skilled, educated and professional classes. The exodus threatened the viability of East Germany's already beleaguered economy.[38] The Soviets were as alarmed by the problem as their East German protegés. On 1 April 1952, members of the East German leadership met the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Moscow. Stalin's foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov proposed that the East Germans should "introduce a system of passes for visits of West Berlin residents to the territory of East Berlin [so as to stop] free movement of Western agents" in the GDR. Stalin agreed, calling the situation "intolerable". He advised the East Germans to build up their border defences, telling them: "The demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border – and not just any border, but a dangerous one ... The Germans will guard the first line of defence, and we will put Russian troops on the second line." [39]
The introduction of the "special regime" was carried out as abruptly as the construction of the Berlin Wall nine years later. A ploughed 10 m (30 ft) strip was created along the entire length of the inner German border. An adjoining 500 m (1,500 ft) wide "protective strip" (Schutzstreifen) was placed under severe restrictions and a further 5 km (3 mile) wide "restricted zone" (Sperrzone) was created in which only those holding a special permit could live or work. Trees and brush were cut down along the border to clear lines of sight for the border guards and eliminate cover for would-be border crossers. Houses adjoining the border were torn down, bridges were closed and barbed-wire fencing was put up in many places. Tight restrictions were placed on farming, with fields along the border being worked only in daylight hours and under the watch of armed border guards. The guards were authorised to use "weapons ... in case of failure to observe the orders of border patrols".[37]
The sudden closure of the border caused acute disruption for communities on both sides. As it had previously been merely an administrative boundary, homes, businesses, industrial sites and municipal amenities had been constructed straddling the border. They were now literally split down the middle. In Oebisfelde, the residents found that they could no longer access the shallow end of their swimming pool; in Buddenstedt, the border ran just behind the goal posts of a football field, putting the goalkeeper at risk of being shot by the border guards. An open-cast coal mine at Schöningen was split in half, causing Western and Eastern engineers to engage in a race to cart away equipment before the other side could seize it. Workers on both sides found themselves cut off from their homes and jobs. Farmers with land on the other side of the border effectively lost it, as they could no longer reach it.[40] In Philippsthal, a house containing a printing shop was split in two by the border, which ran through the middle of the building. The doors leading to the East German portion of the building were bricked up and blocked until 1976.[41] The disruption on the eastern side of the border was, however, far worse. Some 8,369 civilians living in the Sperrgebiet were forcibly resettled by the East German government in a programme codenamed "Operation Vermin" (Aktion Ungeziefer). Those expelled included foreigners, people who were not registered with the police, convicted criminals and "people who because of their position in or toward society pose a threat to the antifascist, democratic order."[42] Another 3,000 residents, realising that they were about to be expelled from their homes, fled to the West.[33] By the end of 1952 the inner German border was virtually sealed.
The border between East and West Berlin was also significantly tightened, although it was not fully closed at this stage. By the end of September 1952, about 200 of the 277 streets which ran from the Western sectors to the East were closed to traffic and the remainder were subjected to constant police observation. Railway traffic was routed around the Western sectors and all workers and employees of nationalised factories had to pledge not to visit West Berlin; if they did so, they would be fired. Even with these restrictions, however, the border in Berlin remained considerably more accessible than the main inner German border. Berlin consequently became the main route by which East Germans left for the West.[43] The outflow of people remained considerable. Between 1949 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, an estimated 3.5 million East Germans – one-sixth of East Germany's entire population – emigrated to the West. After 1952, the majority left via West Berlin. Events such as the crushing of the 1953 uprising and the shortages caused by the introduction of collectivisation resulted in major increases in refugee numbers, swamping West Berlin with fleeing easterners.[43]
A further expansion of the border regime occurred in July 1962 when the entire Baltic coast of East Germany was made a border zone. A 500-metre (1,600 ft) wide strip on the eastern side of the Bay of Mecklenburg was added to the tightly controlled protective strip, while strict limits were put on a variety of coastal activities that could be useful to would-be escapees. The use and movement of boats was restricted – for instance, not allowing their use during the night – and camping and accommodating visitors in the coastal zone required official permission.[44]
1967 to 1989: The "Modern Frontier"
Towards the end of the 1960s, the East German government decided to upgrade the border to establish what East German leader Walter Ulbricht termed the "modern frontier" (die moderne Grenze). The redeveloped border system took advantage of the knowledge that had been obtained in building and maintaining the Berlin Wall. Many of the lessons from Berlin were transferred to the inner German border, where the border defences were systematically upgraded to make it far harder to cross successfully. Barbed wire fences were replaced with harder-to-climb steel mesh. Directional anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle ditches were introduced to block the movement of people and vehicles. Tripwires and electric signals were introduced to make it easier for the border guards to detect escapees. All-weather patrol roads were built to enable rapid access to any point along the border and wooden guard towers were replaced with prefabricated concrete towers and observation bunkers. The changes were intended to make the border far more secure as well as enabling manpower to be used more effectively.[45] The East Germans also hoped to make the border system less intrusive to reduce its negative psychological impact on Western public opinion.[46]
Construction of the new border system started in September 1967. The first phase of the upgrading programme, from 1967 to 1972, was initially seen as a strengthening of weak points in the existing system but from then onwards it became a general rolling programme of work along the entire length of the border.[47] Nearly 1,300 km of new fencing was built, usually further back from the geographical border line than the old barbed wire fences had been.[45] The entire system was expected to be completed by 1975 but delays resulted in the modernisation programme continuing well into the 1980s.[48] The new border system had an immediate effect in reducing the number of escapes. During the mid-1960s, an average of about 1,000 people a year had made it across the border. Ten years later, that figure had fallen to about 120 per year.[49]
At the same time, tensions between the two Germanies eased with the inauguration of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. The Brandt government sought to normalise relations between West Germany and its eastern neighbours, and produced a series of treaties and agreements. Most significantly, on 21 December 1972 the two Germanies signed a "Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic". East and West Germany agreed to recognise each other's sovereignty and support each other's applications for UN membership (achieved in September 1973). Reunification remained a theoretical objective for West Germany, but in practice the issue was put to one side by the West and was abandoned entirely by the East.[50] East German's international isolation was rapidly ended, with the number of countries recognising the GDR rising from thirteen in 1962 to 115 by 1975.[51]
The agreement had significant implications for the border. The two Germanies established a border commission (Grenzkommission) which met from 1973 to the mid-1980s to resolve practical problems arising from the existence of the border. One early key task was to survey and agree on a definitive border line, as the existing line was somewhat imprecise. Boundary stones and poles were installed to mark the agreed-upon line. Its work was largely completed by 1983, though it was unable to resolve the persistent problem of what to do about the Elbe river. The West Germans considered the border to run along the East German bank of the river, while the East Germans regarded the river's middle point or Thalweg to be the border line.[52] This led to a number of clashes, some of which came close to armed conflict.[53] The normalisation of relations between East and West Germany also led to a degree of relaxation in the border controls, although the border fortifications were as rigorously maintained as ever.[54]
In 1988, the increasingly unsustainable costs of maintaining the border installations led the GDR leadership to propose replacing them with a high-technology system codenamed Grenze 2000. Drawing on technology which the Red Army had deployed in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, it would have replaced the border fences with a network of signal tripwires, seismic detectors to detect footsteps, infrared beams, microwave detectors and other electronic sensors. It was never implemented, not least because of the high costs of construction, which were estimated at 257 million East German marks.[55][56]
The impact of the border
Economic and social impact
The closure of the border had a substantial economic and social impact on both East and West Germany. Cross-border transport links were largely severed; ten main railway lines, 24 secondary lines, 23 autobahns or national roads, 140 regional roads and thousands of smaller roads, paths and waterways were blocked or otherwise interrupted. The tightest level of closure came in 1966, by which time only six railway lines were left open along with three autobahns, one regional road and two waterways. When relations between the two Germanies eased in the 1970s, the East Germans agreed to open up more crossing points in exchange for economic assistance. Telephone and mail communications remained open throughout, although packages and letters sent through the mail were routinely opened and telephone calls were monitored.[7]
The economic impact of the border's effective closure was severe. Many towns and villages were severed from their markets and economic hinterlands. The border areas became significantly poorer and less economically healthy than localities located further away. The two German states responded to the problem in different ways. West Germany gave substantial subsidies to border communities under the "aid to border regions" (Zonenrandförderung) programme, an initiative begun in 1971 to save the border area from total decline. Special aid was given to communities and districts if more than 50% of their area, or 50% of their population, was located within 40 kilometres (25 mi) of the inner German border, the Czechoslovak border or the Baltic coast. Infrastructure and businesses along the border benefited from substantial state investment. Many border communities were thereby saved from total decline.[57]
East Germany's border towns had a much harder time, partly because their country was poorer to begin with but also because of the much harsher restrictions imposed on the border areas by the GDR government. Industry withered in many districts, with agriculture becoming the largest employer. In the northern district of Nordwestmecklenburg, for instance, over 42% of the working population was employed in agriculture by 1989.[58] The border region was progressively depopulated though the clearance of numerous villages and the forcible relocation of border inhabitants. Towns along the border suffered draconian building restrictions; inhabitants were forbidden not only to build new houses but were not allowed to repair existing ones, causing communities to fall into severe decay.[59] The state did nothing to improve the border economy or infrastructure. On the other hand, it did provide some compensation for those remaining in the border zone. A 15% income supplement was given to those living in the Sperrzone and Schutzstreifen, though this did not halt the shrinkage of the border population as younger people moved elsewhere to find employment and better living conditions.[57]
The creation of the border zone and the building and maintenance of its fortifications had a very substantial cost for the East German state. The border zone occupied a great deal of land, taking up around 6,900 square kilometres (2,700 sq mi) (over six per cent) of East German territory [60]. In nominal terms this was slightly larger than the US state of Connecticut or about the same size as the British county of Lincolnshire, but as a proportion of East Germany's land area it was equivalent to around the size of Texas or two-thirds the size of Wales. Within this area, normal economic activities were severely curtailed or ceased entirely in some areas where residents were forced to leave. The actual cost of the border system was such a closely guarded secret that even today it is still uncertain exactly how much it cost to build and maintain. The cost of some individual elements is known; for instance, the BT-9 watchtowers each cost around 65,000 East German marks to build and the expanded metal fences cost around 151,800 marks per kilometre. The implementation of the "modern frontier" in the 1970s led to a major increase in personnel costs. Figures for the total annual expenditure on GDR border troops show a rise from 600 million marks per annum in 1970 to nearly 1 billion by 1983. In early 1989, East German economists sought to assess the cost-effectiveness of the border by dividing the cost of the border by the number of arrests. They found that the border was grossly inefficient from a financial perspective. Each arrest cost 2.1 million marks, while the average value of each working person was only 700,000. In other words, the average cost of an arrest was nearly three times the value of the prisoner.[61]
Views of the border
The West and East German governments promoted very different views of the border. The GDR's official name for the border was the Staatsgrenze der DDR zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland und West-Berlin ("state border between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin")[62] As the name indicates, the border was seen by the GDR as a bona fide international frontier of a sovereign state. The East German government presented border as a defensive rampart against Western aggression. In Grenzer ("Border Guard"), a 1981 propaganda film made by the East German Army, NATO and West German troops and tanks are depicted as ruthless militarists advancing towards East Germany. The "imperialist" West Germans are accused of pursuing "revanchism as a state doctrine" and seeking to reclaim not only East Germany but also the "Eastern Territories", the former German lands annexed by Poland and Russia in 1945. The border is described as "the dividing line between socialism and imperialism". Grenztruppen interviewed in the film speak of the rightness of their cause and the threat of Western agents, spies and provocateurs. The role played by the Grenztruppen in protecting the state is emphasised with songs such as "This state is our life, we stand for it with our lives". Grenztruppen killed on the border are hailed as heroes and their memorial in East Berlin is saluted by schoolchildren.[63][64]
For many years, the West German government's policy of regarding East Germany as an illegitimate Soviet-controlled entity led to it rejecting East Germany's claims to international legitimacy. Whereas the GDR referred to "the state border", West Germany called it merely the "demarcation line" (Demarkationslinie) of the "Soviet occupation zone" (Sowjetische Besatzungszone). The government's public statements emphasised the cruelty and injustice of the division of Germany. Signs along the Western side of the frontier declared "Hier ist Deutschland noch geteilt – Auch drüben ist Deutschland!" ("Here Germany is still divided – Germany is over there, too!"). The official view was put succinctly in a leaflet distributed to Western visitors to the border zone in the 1960s:
An echelonned system of barbed wire fences, wire entanglements, mines, observation posts and prohibited zones divides both men and women of our people more poignantly than oceans, mountains and state frontiers could do. Behind these fortifications there live Germans like ourselves. They, too, want human rights and freedom. Yet informers, fanatics and misguided persons together with a draconic system of justice see to it that they cannot take advantage of these basic rights. Do not let us forget: Germany is over there, too![65]
Whereas civilians were kept well away from the border by the East German government, the West Germans actively encouraged border tourism. The border itself became a popular theme for postage cards, while locations where the border was especially intrusive became tourist attractions. One such example was the divided village of Mödlareuth in Bavaria. The Associated Press reported in 1976 that "Western tourists by the busload come out to have their pictures taken against the backdrop of the latest Communist walled city [sic]. Several cars of sightseers pulled up while we were there; some even stopped to have a family picnic in view of the concrete blockhouse and the bunker-slits protruding from the green hillock where a collective's cows were grazing."[49] Facilities were built to permit the tourists to view the border zone. At Zimmerau in Bavaria, for instance, a 38-metre (125 ft) observation tower (the Bayernturm) was constructed in 1966 to give visitors a view across the hills into East Germany.[66] The inhabitants of the East German village of Kella found themselves becoming a tourist attraction for Westerners in the 1970s and 1980s. A viewing point, the "Window on Kella", was established on a nearby hilltop. Tourists could peer across the border with binoculars and telescopes, and could enjoy a meal at a restaurant overlooking the border zone.[67] Perhaps most surreally, a nudist beach was opened on the Western side in 1975 immediately adjoining the border's terminus near the Baltic Sea port of Travemünde. Visitors often sought to have a nude photograph taken below a looming East German watchtower, though the West Germans noted "a lot more movement on that watchtower since the nudist beach opened."[68][69]
Fortifications on the border
Overview
The eastern side of the inner German border was dominated by a complex system of interlocking fortifications and security zones over 1,300 kilometres (810 mi) long and several kilometres deep. The outer fences and walls were the most familiar and visible aspect of the system for Western visitors to the border zone, but they were merely the final obstacle for a would-be escapee. The complexity of the border system increased steadily until it reached its full extent in the early 1980s. The following description and the accompanying diagram describe the border as it was around 1980.
Travelling notionally from east to west[70], an escapee would first reach the edge of the to the restricted zone (Sperrzone), a closely controlled 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) wide strip of land parallel with the border. If he made it past the patrols and watchful inhabitants he would have reached the first of the border fences, the signal fence (Signalzaun) situated around 500 to 1,000 metres (1,600 to 3,300 ft) from the actual border. Climbing or cutting the barbed wire running along the top and side of the fence would cause audible, flashing or silent alarms to be activated to alert the border guards.
Beyond the signal fence was the "protective strip" (Schutzstreifen). It was brightly lit by floodlights in many places to reduce an escapee's chances of using the cover of darkness. Guard towers, bunkers and dog runs were positioned at frequent intervals to keep a round-the-clock watch on the strip. An escapee would next reach the floodlit control strip, often called the "death strip" in the West. Tripwire-activated flare launchers were situated at various points to help the border guards to pinpoint the location of an escape. The last and most formidable obstacle was the outer fence(s). In some places there were multiple parallel rows of fencing, each up to several metres high, with minefields in between. The fences were not electrified but were booby-trapped with directional anti-personnel mines at 10 metres (33 ft) intervals, each one of which was capable of killing at a range of up to 120 metres (390 ft). Finally, the escapee had to cross whatever natural obstacles were on the western side of the border as well as traversing a strip of cleared ground that was up to 500 metres (1,600 ft) wide. While crossing this outer strip, he would appear in clear view and shooting range of the border guards before reaching the safety of West German territory.
Restricted zone
The Sperrzone, a 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) wide area to which access was heavily restricted, was the rear segment of the border defences. When it was established in May 1952 it included a number of villages and valuable agricultural land. Although the land continued to be farmed where possible, many of the inhabitants were expelled on the grounds of political unreliability or simply because they lived inconveniently close to the border line. In some instances, entire villages were razed and the inhabitants were relocated far to the east.[60]
Those who remained behind were required to be completely loyal to the regime and support the border guards, helping them by watching for strangers and unfamiliar vehicles. Even so, they had little freedom of movement; special permits were required to enter the zone and farmers worked under close supervision.[60] They could enter and leave the zone an unlimited number of times but could not travel to other villages within the zone.[71] Curfews were imposed to prevent inhabitants from crossing the border under the cover of darkness.[72]
The Sperrzone was not fenced off but was marked with warning signs. The entry roads were controlled by checkpoints (Kontrollpassierpunkte) through which only authorised individuals could pass. The first layer of border fences, the signal fence, lay on the far side of the Sperrzone to control access to the protective strip or Schutzstreifen adjoining the border itself.[73]
Signal fence
The signal or "hinterland" fence (Signalzaun) was the first of the border fences, dividing the Sperrzone from the more heavily guarded protective strip (Schutzstreifen) adjoining the actual border. Its purpose was to provide the guards with an early warning of an escape attempt. The fence itself was not a particularly formidable obstacle, standing only 2 metres (6.6 ft) high. At the top, middle and bottom, rows of electrified barbed wire strands were attached to insulators. Cutting the wires or pulling them out of place resulted in an alarm being activated, alerting the guards to a possible breach of the fence. In practice, though, the border guards found that the fence frequently malfunctioned. The signal fence also had a 2 metres (6.6 ft) wide control strip on its eastern side. The fence was built on open high ground wherever possible, to ensure that intruders would be silhouetted against the sky and thus be more easily spotted. By mid-1989, 1,185 kilometres (736 mi) of signal fencing had been constructed along the border.[74]
Watchtowers and bunkers
The border defences were overlooked by hundreds of watchtowers situated at regular intervals along the Schutzstreifen. They initially took the form of simple wooden huts mounted on legs between 4 and 12 metres (13 and 39 ft) high, usually constructed from locally sourced timber. Most were replaced with concrete watchtowers from the late 1960s onwards in conjunction with the upgrading of the border defences.[75]
By 1989, there were 529 concrete towers along the length of the inner German border and a further 155 towers of steel and wood construction, as well as various little-used observation platforms in trees.[74] The concrete towers were prefabricated from sections that could be assembled within a few days. Their height could be varied by reducing the number of sections as required. They were connected to an electricity supply and telephone line and were equipped with a powerful 1,000-watt searchlight (Suchscheinwerfer) on the roof that could be directed at targets within a 360-degree radius of the watchtower. The windows could be opened to enable the guards to fire out. In addition, the towers had firing ports emplaced in the side walls below the guard compartment.[76]
The towers were principally of three types:
- The BT-11 (Beobachtungsturm-11, "Observation Tower-11") was introduced in 1969. It stood 11 metres (36 ft) high and was constructed of eleven interlocking circular segments 1 inch (2.5 cm) thick, standing on a concrete platform. The guards were stationed in the eight-sided observation compartment at the top, which was accessed via a steel ladder running up the inside of the 1 metre (3.3 ft) wide circular column. Firing ports were located on each face below the windows. The tower proved unstable because of its top-heavy construction and there were instances of BT-11s collapsing in high winds or after heavy rain had softened the ground under the foundations.[77] On the Baltic coast, where 27 BT-11s were constructed to overlook the East German seaboard, the towers had to be evacuated if the wind was blowing at more than force 6 (50 kilometres per hour (31 mph)).[78]
- The BT-9 (Beobachtungsturm-9 , "Observation Tower-9") was introduced from the mid-1970s to remedy the defects of the BT-11. It was constructed in a similar fashion but its square 2 by 2 metres (6.6 ft × 6.6 ft) profile and lower height, at 9 metres (30 ft), made it more stable. The four-sided guard compartment at the top had distinctive copper-tinted windows. A firing port was positioned on each of the faces of the tower on the penultimate stage before the guard compartment.[76]
- The Führungsstelle or Kommandoturm ("command tower") was a shorter and less commonly seen type of tower that served as the command centre of a border sector. It contained various controls such as remote controls for border gates, fence lighting, alert lights and so on. Disturbances of the signal wire and detonations of SM-70 automatic guns would be detected by the command tower. The towers were surmounted with long-range radio antennae to communicate via R-105 radios to other units. A distinctive feature of this type of tower was the prominent air intake box located at ground level.[76]
Around a thousand observation bunkers also stood along the length of the border.[79] The commonest type was a small concrete bunker known as an "earth bunker" (Erdbunker), usually recessed into a depression in the ground with a view along the guard road and border fence. It was constructed from two base sections, each 0.8 metres (2.6 ft) high and 1.8 by 1.8 metres (5.9 ft × 5.9 ft) in cross-section. It terminated in a third section that had two firing ports in the front side and one or two on each of the other sides. The roof was a separate component nesting on top of the concrete bunker, which could accommodate up to two soldiers.[76]
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The BT-11 (Beobachtungsturm-11), an 11 metres (36 ft) high observation tower introduced in 1969. -
The BT-9 (Beobachtungsturm-9), a 9 metres (30 ft) high observation tower introduced in the mid-1970s. -
A Führungsstelle or Kommandoturm, a 6 metres (20 ft) high tower which doubled as an observation tower and command centre. -
An observation bunker, known as an Erdbunker, preserved at Observation Post Alpha. -
One of the much less common steel observation towers, manned by three East German border guards.
Guard dogs
Dog runs (Kettenlaufanlagen) were installed on high-risk sectors of the border. The dogs generally did not roam freely but were chained to steel cables measuring up to 100 metres (330 ft) long, which was suspended above the ground on bipods or tripods. This allowed them to move laterally up and down the border line while limiting their movement towards or away from the line. The runs were often portable so that they could be installed where necessary. Wooden kennels were provided to provide shelter from the weather. The dogs were occasionally turned loose in temporary pens adjoining gates or damaged sections of the fence, or in short confined sections of double fencing, to discourage escapees from entering such areas.[80] By the 1970s, there were 315 dog runs with 460 dogs[79]. This figure increased steadily until a total length of 71.5 kilometres (44.4 mi) of dog runs had been installed by mid-1989,[74] with approximately 2,500 dogs employed as watchdogs and another 2,700 so-called "horse dogs". They were a mixture of breeds, including German Shepherds, schnauzers and various mixed breeds.[81]
The fall of the border in 1989 made the dogs redundant overnight. In January 1990, the East German Defence Ministry announced that it had agreed with a West German animal protection society that the so-called "wall dogs" would be resettled with West German families. The plan produced an immediate controversy. Western newspapers claimed that the dogs were "dangerous" and "killer beasts" which had even had their teeth sharpened to a fine point to make their bite more lethal. The East Germans rejected the allegations and characterised the dogs as "the last victims of Stalinism" who were "very much in need of love", as they had been deprived of normal relationships with humans. The negative stories actually made the dogs more popular for a while. Some buyers actively sought to obtain "killer dogs" for dubious purposes. In reality, the dogs were said to be quite docile. One West German buyer was so indignant at his dog's passivity in the face of burglars that he returned it in disgust to the East Germans. The fears proved exaggerated and almost all of the border dogs were successfully adopted.[81]
Patrol roads
Rapid access to all parts of the border line was required for a quick response to escape attempts. This was initially a problem for the East Germans, as few patrol roads existed along the border in its early years. Patrols typically used a footpath that ran along the control strip alongside the inside of the fence.[75]
When the "modern frontier" was constructed in the late 1960s, an all-weather patrol road (Kolonnenweg, literally "column way") was installed to enable the guards to travel rapidly to any point along the border fence. It consisted of two parallel lines of perforated concrete blocks, each block measuring approximately 0.75 metres (2.5 ft) wide and 2.5 metres (8.2 ft) long. The blocks were pieced with four rows of rectangular concrete holes to aid drainage. In some places they were laid crosswise to provide a continuous roadway. They were also occasionally used as foundation stones for structures such as towers and revetments and to create foundations on which towers were constructed.[73]
The Kolonnenweg was usually located between the control strip and the watchtowers, located further back. Around 900 kilometres (560 mi) of patrol roads were built along the border, of which around 130 kilometres (81 mi) was fully paved.[79] In addition to the main Kolonnenweg, there were numerous short access roads built through forests and fields in the Schutzstreifen. Constructed from the same perforated concrete as the Kolonnenweg, these gave the border guards rapid access from the hinterland to the border line. Some civilians were permitted to use such access roads for forestry or farm work, though only with special permission.[82]
Control strips
The control strips (Kontrollstreifen) were lines of bare earth running parallel with the border fences. They were not an obstacle as such but provided a simple and effective way for the border guards to monitor unauthorised travel across the border. It was almost impossible to cross the strip without leaving footprints, enabling the border guards to identify escape attempts that had not otherwise been detected. They could learn how many individuals had crossed, where escape attempts were being made and at which times of day escapees were active. From this information, the border guards were able to determine where and when patrols needed to be increased, where improved surveillance from watchtowers and bunkers was required, and which areas needed additional fortifications.[75]
There were two control strips, both located on the inward-facing sides of the border fences. The secondary "K2" strip, 2 metres (6.6 ft) wide, ran alongside the signal fence to the rear of the Schutzstreifen, while the primary "K6" strip, 6 metres (20 ft) wide, ran along the inside of the border fence or wall. The K6 strip ran almost uninterrupted along the entire length of the border. Where it ran across roads, the road surface would be ripped up to make way for the control strip; where the border ran along streams and rivers, the strip was constructed in parallel to the waterways.[75] In places where the border was prone to escape attempts, the control strip was illuminated at night by high-intensity floodlights (Beleuchtungsanlage) installed on concrete poles, which were also used at vulnerable points such as rivers and streams crossing the border. The strip was patrolled several times a day by guards, who would inspect it carefully for signs of intrusions.[80]
In the West, the control strip became known as the "death strip" (Todesstreifen) because of the shoot-to-kill orders given to the border guards. The East Germans preferred to call it by the more euphemistic name of the "action strip" (Handlungsstreifen).[83] It was also nicknamed the Pieck-Allee ("Pieck Avenue") after East Germany's president Wilhelm Pieck (1949–1960).[84]
The Soviets had pioneered the use of control strips on the borders of the USSR. The same technique was adapted for use in Germany when the border was first fortified from May 1952 onwards, at a time when it was still being policed by Soviet troops.[75] The construction of the control strip in 1952 was carried out by local villagers conscripted into work brigades. One of those involved, a resident of the Thuringian village of Kella, later recalled:
The tree stumps were blown up, and there wasn't enough soil left over so they had to carry dirt up [the hill] in baskets. They also had to bring all sorts of gardening tools with them. The ten-metre strip was made into something like cultivated garden soil – so that you could see every footprint, every impression. And it was patrolled regularly ... usually by three [officers]."[32]
The control strips were later maintained by a specialist engineering corps, the Grenzpioniere. They used 3 metres (9.8 ft) wide harrows towed by KT-50 bulldozers and copious quantities of herbicide to keep the .[82]
Anti-vehicle barriers
Various types of anti-vehicle barriers were constructed along the inner German border. In the early days of the border, the East Germans blocked vehicle access to roads crossing the border by tearing up the road surface and digging a ditch or building a mound of rubble to physically block the carriageway. Some places were blocked with Czech hedgehogs or cheveaux-de-frise barricades, known in German as Panzersperre or Stahligel ("steel hedgehogs"). These were constructed from three or four pairs of 1.5 metres (4.9 ft) long rails welded to form a spiky tripod weighing over 500 kilograms (1,100 lb) – easily heavy enough to prevent a car from pushing them out of the way. They were a familiar sight on the Berlin Wall and were widely used on the inner German border as well.[85] The barricades were emplaced at intervals calculated to be narrow enough to prevent even small vehicles, such as the iconic Trabant, to pass between them.[82]
Rows of anti-vehicle ditches or Kraftfahrzeug Sperrgraben (KFZ-Sperrgraben) were built during the era of the "modern frontier". These lined 829 kilometres (515 mi) of the border and were absent only where natural obstacles such as streams, rivers, gullies or thick forests made such barriers unnecessary. The ditches were constructed as a V-shaped cut about 0.8 metres (2.6 ft) deep, with a steeply sloping western edge and shallow eastern edge. The western edge was faced with concrete slabs that were 15 centimetres (5.9 in) deep. They proved to be an extremely effective obstacle, preventing almost any type of vehicle from crossing.[85]
The outer fences and walls
The border fences were constructed in a number of phases, starting with the initial fortification of the border from May 1952. The first-generation fence was a crudely built structure comprising barbed-wire fences (Stacheldrahtzäune) standing between 1.2 and 2.5 metres (3.9 and 8.2 ft) high. The fence was overlooked by watchtowers located at strategic intervals along the border. It was, however, a flawed obstacle. In some places it was so poorly constructed or maintained that livestock were able to wander unhindered across the border. In a few places gaps were purposefully left with lowered gate poles in front of them and anti-vehicle Czech hedgehog barricades behind.[86]
The fences were strengthened in the late 1950s, particularly in areas where a high number of escapes were occurring. Parallel rows of barbed wire fences were built, with concertina wire added between the fences in some places to further hinder escapees. The outer fence was often located very close to the actual border. A further obstacle was added by placing short wooden anchor posts about 2 metres (6.6 ft) outwards from both fences. Barbed wire was strung between them to form a V-shape to hinder lateral movement by escapees. In some low-risk areas, only a single fence was installed.[87]
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Reconstruction of the "first generation" border fence as erected in 1952, with control strip in the foreground. -
The "second generation" border fences pictured in 1962, with a row of poorly maintained barbed wire in the foreground, a control strip, two rows of barbed wire further back and a watchtower at the rear. -
The third generation border fence, constructed from several overlapping horizontal tiers of expanded steel mesh fencing. A border marker pole is in the foreground. -
The border wall at Mödlareuth. The sign reads: "Warning! Border in middle of stream." Much of the wall has been preserved as a memorial.
A "third generation" border fence, much more solidly constructed, was installed in an ongoing programme of improvements from the late 1960s to the 1980s. The entire fence line was moved back to create an outer strip (see below) between the fence and the actual border. The barbed wire fences were replaced with a barrier that was usually between 3.2 and 4 metres (10 and 13 ft) high. It was constructed with expanded metal mesh (Metalgitterzaun) panels. The openings in the mesh were generally too small to provide finger-holds and were very sharp. The panels could not easily be pulled down, as they overlapped, and they could not be cut through with a bolt- or wire-cutter. Nor could they be tunnelled under easily, as the bottom segment of the fences was partially buried in the ground. In a number of places, more lightly constructed fences (Lichtsperren) consisting of mesh and barbed wire lined the border.[80]
The fence was not contiguous but was could be crossed at a number of points, other than the official border crossings. Gates were installed to enable border guards to patrol up to the border line and to give engineers access for maintenance on the outward-facing side of the barrier. Like the fence itself, the gates were designed to be escape-proof. They were hinged from the outside but opened inwards and the pivot pins were welded to prevent them from being removed. They were chained and locked with heavy-duty padlocks, and a sharp saw-toothed steel strip was bolted to the top of the gates to prevent them being climbed.[80]
In some places, villages adjoining the border were fenced with wooden board fences (Holzlattenzaun) or concrete barrier walls (Betonsperrmauern) standing around 3–4 metres (9.8–13.1 ft) high. Windows in buildings adjoining the border were bricked or boarded up, and buildings deemed too close to the border were pulled down. The barrier walls stood along only a small percentage of the border – 29.1 kilometres (18.1 mi) of the total length by 1989.[75] A notorious example was in the divided village of Mödlareuth, where the border ran along the course of a stream that bisected the village. When the border was first fortified in 1952, a wooden board fence was erected just inside East German territory. It was replaced in 1966 by a 700 metres (2,300 ft) long, 3.3 metres (11 ft) high concrete wall built through the village on the East German side of the stream. The village was nicknamed "Little Berlin" for its resemblance to the divided city. The name was well-earned, as the wall was constructed along very similar lines to the one in Berlin. Like the Berlin Wall, its top was lined with sewer pipes or steel pipes to prevent it from being climbed and its interior perimeter was floodlit at night.[88]
Anti-personnel mines
The outer border fences were lined with anti-personnel mines designed to inflict crippling injuries on would-be escapees. The mining of the border began in 1966; by the 1980s, some 1.3 million mines of various Soviet-made types had been laid. The mines were usually laid in a standardised pattern of a rectangular box, 23 by 180 metres (75 by 591 ft), containing three rows of mines. The most common type was the Soviet-made PMD-6M mine. However, its wooden construction made it unreliable and prone to decay. The PMD-6Ms were later replaced by more durable plastic mines of the PMN-2, PMP-71 and PPM-2 types. Most of the mines were pressure-activated, requiring someone to step on one to detonate it, with the exception of the tripwire-activated POMS-2 stake mine. The minefields were not marked on the East German side, though Achtung! Minen! signs were often posted by the West Germans on their side. The mines were a hazard to civilians on both sides of the border; they were frequently set off by animals such as deer and they could be washed out of position by rain or floods. It was not unknown for mines to travel hundreds of metres into fields and streams on either side of the border.[89]
In 1970, the East Germans began to introduce the SM-70 (Splittermine-70) directional anti-personnel mine, mounted on the border fence itself. Some 60,000 SM-70s were eventually installed. It was given various descriptions in the West – "spring gun", "self-firing device" and so on – though to the East Germans, it was known as the "automated firing device" or Selbstschußapparat. The device consisted of a horizontally oriented cone filled with 180 grams (6.3 oz) of TNT explosive into which was embedded around 110 small sharp-edged steel cubes. It was fitted to the inward-facing side of the border fence at intervals of around 10 metres (33 ft). The device was triggered if the tripwire connected to the firing mechanism was pulled or cut.[90] It was potentially lethal to a range of around 120 metres (390 ft). On one occasion, when a deer fell victim to an SM-70, an observer noted that "an approximately 5 meter area appeared as if it had been worked over by a rake."[47] By 1976, SM-70s had been installed along 248 km of the border and conventional minefields lined another 491 km.[91] The mines were eventually removed by the end of 1984 in the face of international condemnation of the East German government.[90]
The outer strip
Until the late 1960s the border fortifications were constructed almost up to the actual border line. The later "modern frontier", by contrast, incorporated a wide strip of cleared land on the Western side in front of the border fence. The outer strip ranged in width from 20 metres (66 ft) to as much as 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) in some places. It gave the border guards a clear field of fire to target escapees who had made it over the fence and provided a buffer zone where engineers could work on maintaining the outward face of the border defences. Access to the outer strip was very tightly controlled, to ensure that the guards themselves would not be tempted to escape. Although often described by Western sources as a "no-man's land", it was in fact wholly East German territory; trespassers could be arrested or shot.[92]
The border line
The actual border line between West and East Germany was located on the far side of the outer strip. It was marked by granite border stones (Grenzsteine), 20 centimetres (7.9 in) square with a + carved on the top and the letters "DDR" on the west-facing edge. In August 1967, the East Germans erected 2,622 distinctive border markers or "barber poles" (Grenzsäule or Grenzpfähle), each located about 500 feet (150 m) apart. They were made of concrete and were painted with the black, red and gold colours of the German flag. Some can still be seen in situ today. A metal East German coat of arms, the Staatsemblem, was fixed to the side of the column that faced West Germany. The column terminated in a metal spike. This was intended to stop birds using the border markers as a perch and thereby prevent them defecating on the coat of arms.[45]
On the West German side there were no barriers of any kind, nor even any patrol roads in most areas. Warning signs (Grenzschilder) with messages such as Achtung! Zonengrenze! ("Danger! Border zone!") or Halt! Hier Zonengrenze ("Stop! The zonal border is here") notified visitors of the presence of the border. Foreign military personnel were restricted from approaching the border to avoid clashes or other unwanted incidents. Signs in English and German provided notifications of the distance to the border to discourage accidental crossings. No such restriction applied to Western civilians, who were free to go up to the border line. There was no physically obstacles to stop them actually crossing it, and there were incidents of West Germans crossing the border to steal East German border markers as souvenirs (at considerable risk, since the East German border guards sought to prevent such "provocations").[45]
The "blue border"
The inner German border system also extended along the Baltic coast, dubbed the "blue border" or sea border of the GDR. The coastline was partly fortified along the mouth of the river Trave opposite the West German port of Travemünde. Watchtowers, walls and fences stood along the marshy shoreline to deter escape attempts and the water was patrolled by high-speed East German boats. The continuous line of the inner German border ended at the peninsula of Priwall, incongruously overlooking a nudist beach on the Western side. From Priwall to Boltenhagen, along some 15 km of the eastern shore of the Bay of Mecklenburg, the East German shoreline was part of the restricted-access Schutzgebiet. The rest of the coast up to the Polish border, including the whole of the island of Rügen, was subject to security controls.[82]
The East Germans sought to hinder seaborne escapes by implementing a variety of security measures along the Baltic coastline. Access to boats was severely limited, as was camping in the coast region. Watchtowers were built, of the same type as those used on the land border, along the entire length of the coastline from Priwall on the West German border to Altwarp on the Polish border.[82] If a suspected escape attempt was spotted, high-speed patrol boats would be dispatched to intercept the fugitives. Armed patrols equipped with powerful mobile searchlights monitored the beaches.[93]
Escapees sought to reach a number of possible destinations across the Baltic. These included the western (West German) shore of the Bay of Mecklenburg; a Danish lightship off the port of Gedser; the southern Danish islands of Lolland and Falster; or simply the international shipping lanes, where escapees would hope to be picked up by a passing freighter. The odds were, however, strongly against escapees. The Baltic Sea's cold waters and strong currents made it at least as hazardous as the man-made obstacles of the landward border. It was not unusual for the bodies of drowned escapees to wash up at various points along the Baltic shore. In all, as many as 189 people are estimated to have died attempting to flee via the Baltic.[94]
Some escapees sought to escape across the "blue border" by jumping overboard from East German ships docked in Baltic harbours. This practice reached such epidemic proportions in the 1960s that Danish harbourmasters took the precaution of installing extra life-saving equipment on quaysides where East German vessels docked. The East German regime responded by stationing armed Transportpolizei (Trapos) on East German passenger ships to deal forcefully with escape attempts. On one occasion in August 1961 the Trapos caused an international incident in the Danish port of Gedser, when they beat up a would-be escapee on the quayside and fired a number of shots, some of which hit a Danish boat in the harbour. The next day, thousands of Danes turned out to protest against "Vopo [[[Volkspolizei]]] methods." In the end, this escape route was choked off by further restricting the already limited travel rights of the East German population.[95]
Guarding the border
East Germany
The East German side of the border was guarded initially by the Border Troops (Pogranichnyie Voiska) of the Soviet NKVD (later the KGB). In 1946, the Soviets established a locally recruited paramilitary force, the German Border Police (Deutsche Grenzpolizei or DGP), under the administration of the Interior Ministry for Security of the State Frontier (Innenministerium zum Schutz der Staatsgrenze). Soviet troops and the DGP shared responsibility for patrolling the border and crossing points until 1955/56, when the Soviets handed over control to the East Germans.[96]
The DGP became increasingly militarised as the East German government decided that protecting the border was a military task. Although it was notionally a police force it was equipped with heavy weapons, including tanks and self-propelled artillery. In 1961 the DGP was converted into a military force within the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA). The newly renamed Border Troops (Grenztruppen, commonly nicknamed the "Grenzer") came under the NVA's Border Command or Grenzkommando. They were responsible for securing and defending the borders with West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic Sea and West Berlin. At their peak, the Grenztruppen had up to 50,000 personnel.[96]
Around half of the Grenztruppen were conscripts, a lower proportion than in other branches of the East German armed forces. Their political reliability was under especially close scrutiny due to the sensitive nature of their role. They were subjected to intensive ideological indoctrination, which made up as much as 50 per cent of their training time. They were not allowed to serve in areas near their homes. Some categories of individuals were not allowed to serve in the Grenztruppen at all; for instance if they had close relatives in West Germany, a record of dissent or dissenting family members, or were actively religious.[97] Even if they were accepted for service, trainee border guards who were suspected of political unreliability were weeded out at an early stage. As one later recalled: "At the officers' training school there are always 10 per cent whose loyalty is suspect who are never sent to the border."[98]
The ultimate role of the Grenztruppen was to prevent border escapes by any means necessary, including by shooting escapees. Their marksmanship was expected to be substantially better than that of regular NVA troops; they were required to be able to hit two moving targets at 200 metres (660 ft) with only four shots, by day or night. Failure to shoot was itself a punishable offence, resulting in severe consequences for a soldier and his family.[99]
The East German regime's distrust of its own citizens extended to its border guards, who were in a better position to defect than almost anyone else in the country. Many did in fact flee across the border; between 1961 and 1989, around 7,000 border guards tried to escape. 2,500 succeeded but 5,500 were caught and imprisoned for up to five years.[100] To prevent such defections, the Stasi secret police kept a close watch on the border guards with agents and informers. A special Stasi unit worked covertly within the Grenztruppen, posing as regular border guards, between 1968 and 1985.[101] The Stasi also maintained a pervasive network of informers within the ranks of the Grenztruppen. One in ten officers and one in thirty enlisted men were said to have been "liaison agents", the euphemism for an informer. The Stasi regularly interviewed and maintained files on every border guard. Stasi operatives were directly responsible for some aspects of border security; passport control stations were entirely manned by Stasi officers wearing Grenztruppen uniforms.[102]
As a further measure to prevent escapes, the patrol patterns of the Grenztruppen were carefully arranged to reduce any chance of a border guard defecting. Patrols, watchtowers and observation posts were always manned by two or three soldiers at a time. They were not allowed to go out of each others' sight in any circumstances. When changing the guard in watchtowers, they were under orders to enter and exit the buildings in such a way that there were never less than two people on the ground. Duty rosters were organised to prevent friends and roommates being assigned to the same patrols. The pairings were switched (though not randomly) to ensure that the same people did not repeatedly carry out duty together. Individual border guards did not know until the start of their shift with whom they would be working that day. If a guard attempted to escape, his colleagues were under instructions to shoot him without hesitation or prior warning.[102]
Much of the work of the border guards focused on maintaining and scrutinising the border defences. This included carrying out repair work, looking for evidence of escape attempts, examining the area for signs of suspicious activities and so on. The patrol times and routes were deliberately varied to ensure that there was no predictability, ensuring that a patrol could potentially appear at any time from either direction. Guards posted in watchtowers played an important role in monitoring the border, though shortages of personnel meant that the watchtowers were not continuously manned. During the final years of the East German state, the lack of manpower was so severe that cardboard cut-outs of guards were placed in towers to present the illusion that they were occupied.[103]
The Grenztruppen also had the task of gathering intelligence on West German and NATO activities across the border line. This task was performed primarily by the Grenzaufklärungszug (GAK), an elite reconnaissance force within the Grenztruppen. These became a familiar sight for Western observers of the border as the GAK troopers, uniquely, were tasked with patrolling the western side of the border fence – i.e. in the outer strip, adjoining the geographical border between the two Germanies. Not surprisingly, given that they could defect with only a few footsteps in the right direction, the GAKs were drawn from the most politically reliable echelons of the Grenztruppen. They worked closely with the Stasi and were often seen photographing targets across the border. They also guarded work details carrying out maintenance work on the western side of the fence. The workers would be covered by machine guns to discourage them from attempting to escape.[103]
To maintain what the East German state called Ordnung und Sicherheit ("order and security") along the border, local civilians were co-opted to assist the border guards and police. A decree of 5 June 1958 spoke of encouraging "the working population in the border districts of the GDR [to express] the desire to help by volunteering to guarantee the inviolability of the border." Civilians living in villages along the border were recruited into the "Border Helpers" (Grenzhelfer) and "People's Police Helpers" (Volkspolizeihelfer). They were tasked with patrolling the strip behind the border defences, assisting at control checkpoints and reporting any unusual activities or strangers in their area. In one border community, Kella in Thuringia, the mayor boasted in a 1967 speech that nearly two-thirds of arrests on the border that year had been made by local civilians. The locals were, however, kept away from the border strip itself. The border guards were usually recruited from far-away regions of East Germany to ensure that people living near the border would not become familiar with its workings.[104] Even children were brought into the fold. A "Young Friends of the Border Guards" organisation was established for children living in the border region, modelled on a similar Soviet organisation. The original Soviet version fostered a cult of the border guards, promoting slogans such as "The frontier runs through people's hearts."[105]
West Germany
A number of West German state organisations were responsible for policing the western side of the border. These included the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS, Federal Border Protection), the Bayerische Grenzpolizei (Bavarian Border Police) and the Bundeszollverwaltung (Federal Customs Administration).[45] In addition, the British Army, the British Frontier Service and the United States Army carried out patrols and provided backup in their respective sectors of the border. West German troops were not allowed to approach within one kilometre of the border individually or within five kilometres in formation without being accompanied by BGS personnel.[2]
The BGS – which today forms part of the Bundespolizei – was responsible for policing Germany's frontiers. It was initially a paramilitary force of 10,000, established in 1951, which was responsible for policing a zone 30 kilometres (19 mi) deep along the border. It eventually became the basis for the present national semi-militarised police force.[106] Its numbers were later expanded to 20,000 men, a mixture of conscripts and volunteers equipped with armoured cars, anti-tank guns, helicopters, trucks and jeeps. Although it was not intended to be able to repel a full-scale invasion, the BGS was tasked with dealing with small-scale threats to the security of West Germany's borders, including the international borders as well as the inner German border. It had limited police powers within its zone of operations to enable it to deal with threats to the peace of the border. The BGS had a reputation for assertiveness which made it especially unpopular with the East Germans, who routinely criticised it as a reincarnation of Hitler's SS. It also sustained a long-running feud with the Bundeszollverwaltung over which agency should have the lead responsibility for the inner German border.[107]
Although it was nominally a customs service, the Bundeszollverwaltung (BZV) was responsible for policing much of the inner German border. Its original duties focused on stopping smuggling across the border, though this task virtually ceased after the border was fortified in 1952. The BZV continued to man the few remaining border crossings but its duties now evolved into the policing of the border zone to a depth of about 10 kilometres (6.2 mi). Unlike the BGS, which was based in barracks located further back from the border, BZV personnel lived with their families in communities along the border. They carried out regular policing tasks with the power to arrest and search suspects in their area of operations (with the exception of the section of border in Bavaria). They regularly patrolled the border line – including the river border along the Elbe, where they maintained a fleet of patrol boats – in two-man patrols or with the iconic Zollhunde, trained customs dogs wearing a Zoll ("Customs") strap. The BZV was, in effect, West Germany's eyes and ears on the border.[108]
The Bayerische Grenzpolizei (BGP) were a product of Bavaria's semi-detached relationship with the rest of West Germany. The Bavarian government argued that the 1949 Basic Law vested police powers in the hands of the Länder and not the federal government, and thus that the BZV had no business carrying out police duties on Bavarian soil. It consequently raised its own border police force, the BGP, to carry out policing duties along the 390 kilometres (240 mi) length of the inner German border in Bavaria. By the late 1960s, the BGP had 600 men patrolling its sector of the border, alongside the BZV, BGS and US Army – effectively duplicating the duties of the BZV. Not surprisingly, this led to turf wars between the two agencies.[109]
The British Army conducted only symbolic patrols along its sector of the inner German border and gradually reduced the tempo of its border operations as the Cold War progressed. By the 1970s it was carrying out only one patrol a month, only rarely using helicopters or ground surveillance radar and erecting no permanent observation posts. The British border zone was divided into two sectors. The first stretched from Lübeck to Lauenburg on the Elbe and the second from Lauenburg to the border with the US Zone – a total distance of about 404 miles (650 km). Although patrols were stepped up in the 1980s, they were carried out primarily for training purposes, with soldiers being issued weapons but not ammunition.[110] Unlike the Americans, the British did not assign specific units to border duty but rotated the task between the divisions of the British Army of the Rhine.[111]
The border was also patrolled in the British sector by the British Frontier Service, the smallest of the Western border surveillance organisations. The BFS had been established (as the Frontier Control Service) in 1946 to take over control of border crossing points from the British Army. Its personnel manned frontier control posts along all of the international and interzonal borders of the British sector, including the Danish and Dutch borders as well as the inner German border. The German customs service was re-established under BFS supervision and manned crossing points on the borders of the British zone of occupation along with BFS personnel. When German sovereignty was re-established in 1955, customs responsibilities were handed over to the Germans. A heavily reduced BFS remained in operation to serve as a liaison between British military and political interests and the German agencies on the border.[112] One curiosity of the BFS was that despite being entirely land-based, its founding Director was a Royal Navy captain. He instituted the highly distinctive uniform of the BFS, designed in a quasi-naval style with silver rank badges.[113] The BFS was finally disbanded in 1990 following Germany's reunification.[114]
The United States Army maintained a substantial and continuous military presence at the inner German border throughout the entire period from 1945 to after the end of the Cold War. Regular American soldiers manned the border from the end of the war until they were replaced in 1946 by the United States Constabulary, a lightly armed constabulary force responsible for border security.[115] It was disbanded in 1952 after policing duties were transferred to the German authorities. In its place, two dedicated armoured cavalry regiments were assigned to provide a permanent border defence.[116] The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment based at Nuremburg and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment based at Fulda – later replaced by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment – were tasked with monitoring the border using observation posts, ground and air patrols, countering border intrusions and gathering intelligence on Warsaw Pact activities.[117] Unlike their East German counterparts, US soldiers did not stay for more than 30 days on the border, though they carried out regular patrols around the clock using foot and helicopter patrols. They also used a variety of technical measures such as ground surveillance radars to monitor Warsaw Pact troop movements across the border. A rapid reaction force was on constant duty further behind the border to provide backup in an emergency.[118] The American presence on the border provoked political controversy in Germany. During the 1960s the state of Hesse refused to grant US forces land rights to its observation points or allow them to install paved access roads, electricity or telephone lines. It took the view that since there was no legally recognised border, there was no legal reason for there military observation posts to be built along it.[119] By the 1980s the American border presence had become the target of peace activists, who in 1984 blockaded the US Observation Post Alpha with a human chain. The US withdrew from the inner German border in 1991.[118]
Cross-border contacts
Perhaps appropriately for a cold war, the relationship between the East and West German border guards and officials was extremely frigid. As a Bayerische Grenzpolizei report of 1968 noted, "the conduct of the Soviet zone [i.e. East German] border troops continued unfriendly and uncooperative. Officers and officials only sought contact to obtain information about refugees or to influence the border population with their propaganda."[120] There was very little official face-to-face interaction between the two sides on the ground, as the East German border guards were under orders not to speak to Westerners.[121] Klaus Grünzner, a former West German border guard, later recalled: "I served ... for eight years and the East German police never said a single word to us, except in 1974 during the World Cup, when East Germany beat us. One of the guards shouted at us: 'Sparwasser [a GDR striker] really socked it to you!'"[122] After the initiation of detente between East and West Germany in the 1970s, the two sides established procedures for maintaining formal contacts through fourteen direct telephone connections or Grenzinformationspunkt (GIP, "border information point"). They were used to resolve local problems affecting the border, such as floods, forest fires or stray animals.[123]
For many years, the two sides waged a propaganda battle across the border, erecting signs with slogans promoting their respective ideologies. Both sides used balloons, rockets and mortars to fire propaganda leaflets into the other's territory with the aim of undermining the other side's morale and sowing doubts about their government's policies. The West German government and political parties of both left and right, especially the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, participated in the campaign.[124]
West German leaflets sought to undermine the willingness of East German border guards to shoot at refugees attempting to cross the border. Some leaflets depicted dead and dying refugees alongside captions such as "The world knows that the overwhelming majority of the People's Army soldiers are decent young men who would not dream of committing murder." Other leaflets sought to encourage desertions by highlighting the material benefits enjoyed by defectors to the West.[125] According to NVA officers who defected across the border, the West German leaflets were quite effective in reaching their target audience. Border troops were said to be avid readers, despite risking severe punishment if they were caught even picking up propaganda leaflets. Reasons advanced for taking the risk included trying to find out the true facts, affirming solidarity with West Germany, the thrill of doing something forbidden, demonstrating secret opposition to the regime, and simple curiosity.[126]
East German leaflets and slogans played on Westerners' desire for peace. A common theme was the allegation that the Bonn government was threatening European peace and security by its supposed "revanchist" aim of restoring German's 1937 borders. West Germany's moral values were also criticised; one leaflet accused the government of corrupting its people with "pictures of playgirls and naked female legs".[125] West Germany's membership of NATO was a frequent target. NATO exercises in Germany were denounced as "warmongering" and the stationing of nuclear weapons on West German soil was condemned (though, of course, Soviet nuclear weapons went unmentioned). Bonn's claimed continuity with the former Nazi regime was also a theme of East German propaganda, as was the emergence of the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD). Some leaflets were aggressively bellicose, warning of the consequences of a Western attack: "The manoeuvre Oktobersturm [a Warsaw Pact military exercise in 1965] is a serious warning addressed to the Bonn militarists that an attack on the GDR will conjure up their own demise."[127]
The number of such leaflet drops was immense. During the 1950s, West Germany sent millions of propaganda leaflets into East Germany each year. In the year 1968 alone, over 4,000 projectiles containing some 450,000 leaflets were fired from East Germany into the West. Another 600 waterproof East German leaflet containers were recovered from cross-border rivers.[125] The "leaflet war" was eventually ended by mutual agreement in the early 1970s as part of the normalisation of relations between the two Germanies.[124]
Crossing the border
Although the inner German border was tightly controlled by the East Germans, it was never entirely sealed in the fashion of the border between the two Koreas. It was fairly permeable throughout the Cold War, though there were severe restrictions on the ability of East Germans citizens to cross the border.[71] The post-war agreements on the governance of Berlin specified that the Western Allies were to have access to the city via defined air, road, rail and river links. This was mostly respected by the Soviets and East Germans, albeit with periodic interruptions and harassment of travellers. Even during the Berlin Blockade of 1948, supplies could be brought in by air – the famous Berlin Airlift – and Allied military convoys could pass through East Germany en route to Berlin.
The border could be crossed legally only through a limited number of air, road, rail and river routes. Travellers to and from Denmark, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia could also pass through East Germany. Access rights for non-Germans were otherwise very restricted. Foreigners had to submit an itinerary to the East German state tourist office up to nine weeks in advance, paying booking fees and registering with the local police on arrival, purchasing fuel only from specially approved petrol stations and spending a prescribed minimum of money each day.[129] They were required to stay in state-owned "Interhotels" where rooms cost five to ten times more than in the (very few) ordinary East German hotels.[130] Not surprisingly, East Germany did not develop much of a tourist industry; even as late as May 1990, there were only 45,000 hotel beds in the entire country.[131] Westerners found crossing the inner German border to be a somewhat disturbing experience. Jan Morris wrote:
Travelling from west to east through [the inner German border] was like entering a drab and disturbing dream, peopled by all the ogres of totalitarianism, a half-lit world of shabby resentments, where anything could be done to you, I used to feel, without anybody ever hearing of it, and your every step was dogged by watchful eyes and mechanisms.[132]
Each of the different means of crossing the border had its own complications. Only aircraft of the three Western Allies were allowed to fly to or from West Berlin; civilian traffic was principally served by Air France, British European Airways (later British Airways) and Pan Am.[133] River traffic was hugely important to the survival of West Berlin, conveying around five million tons of cargo a year to the city, but was subjected to numerous inspections and petty restrictions by the East German authorities.[134] Rail traffic was excruciatingly slow; locomotives and train crews had to be changed at the border, the East German Transport Police (Trapos) carried out inspections using sniffer dogs to uncover stowaways, passports and visas had to be processed at border stations and the condition of the track was so poor that trains were limited to a maximum speed of 70 kilometres per hour (43 mph).[135] Road crossings were fairly straightforward but slow because of the extensive border formalities and inspections. Drivers were required to stay on designated transit routes across East Germany.[136]
Crossing points
Before 1952, the inner German border could be crossed at almost any point along its length. The fortification of the border resulted in the severing of 32 railway lines, three autobahns, 31 main roads, eight primary roads, about sixty secondary roads and thousands of lanes and cart tracks.[137] The number of crossing points was reduced to three air corridors, three road corridors, two railway lines and two river connections giving transit access to Berlin, plus a handful of additional crossing points for freight traffic.[138] The situation improved somewhat after the rapprochement between the two Germanies in the 1970s. Additional border crossings for so-called kleine Grenzverkehr – "small border traffic", essentially for West German day trippers – were opened at various locations along the border. By 1982, there were 19 border crossings: six roads, three autobahns, eight railway lines plus the Elbe river and the Mittellandkanal.[128]
The largest crossing point or Grenzübergangsstelle (GÜSt) between East and West Germany was at Marienborn on the Hamburg-Berlin autobahn. It was originally a set of simple huts straddling the border, where British and Soviet military police checked travellers between the eastern and western zones. In 1971–72 the East German government expanded it into a 35 hectares (86 acres) complex through which 34.6 million travellers passed between 1985–89. The British, French and Americans worked alongside the West German Bundesgrenzschutz and Customs to maintain a corresponding checkpoint near Helmstedt. Codenamed Checkpoint Alpha, this was the first of three Allied checkpoints on the road to Berlin.[139] The others were Checkpoint Bravo, where the autobahn crossed from East Germany into West Berlin, and most famous of all, Checkpoint Charlie, the only place where non-Germans could cross from West to East Berlin.[140])
On the other side of the border at Marienborn, over 1,000 East German officials worked around the clock to process travellers. A large proportion of the staff were officers of the Stasi, the much-feared secret police, although they wore the uniforms of the regular Grenztruppen. The real Grenztruppen were also present to provide military backup, as were East German customs officers and Soviet military officials who were responsible for inspecting Allied military vehicles entering East Germany. The main functions of the staff at Marienborn and other border crossing points were to combat smuggling, to "defend the state border" – by which was meant preventing escapes from East Germany – and to stop any items deemed politically or socially unacceptable from entering or leaving the country.[139] A wide variety of items were forbidden to be imported or exported. Western magazines and newspapers, recorded materials, films, radios and medicines were among the more predictable prohibited items, though it was unclear why items such as eels and asparagus could not be exported brought across the border.[141]
The prevention of escapes was a key priority at crossing points such as Marienborn. It was not possible to simply drive through the gap in the border fence that existed at crossing points, as the East Germans installed high-impact vehicle barriers mounted at chest height. These which could (and did) kill drivers who attempted to ram through them. As a last resort, massive rolling barriers (Kraftfahrzeugschnellsperre) 11 metres (36 ft) long and weighing six tons apiece could be catapulted across the carriageway using hydraulic rams. They were capable of stopping a 50-ton truck travelling at 80 kilometres per hour (50 mph). The guards at border crossings were, as elsewhere, authorised to use weapons to stop escape attempts.[142]
Vehicles were subjected to rigorous checks to uncover escapees. Inspection pits and mirrors allowed the undersides of vehicles to be scrutinised. Probes were used to investigate the chassis and even the fuel tank, where an escapee might be concealed, and vehicles could be partially dismantled in on-site garages. At Marienborn there was even a mortuary garage where coffins could be checked to confirm that the occupants really were dead.[139] From the late 1970s, the East Germans also installed concealed gamma-ray detectors at border crossings which used radioactive Caesium-137 sources to detect people concealed inside vehicles. The discovery of this practice caused a health scare after reunification. A subsequent investigation by federal authorities found that these involuntary screenings did not result in "a harmful dose" despite violating basic radiation safety protocols.[143]
Passengers, too, were checked thoroughly with an inspection of their papers and frequently an interrogation about their travel plans and reasons for travelling. The system was slow and low-technology, relying largely on vast card indexes recording travellers' details, but it was effective nonetheless; during the 28 years of operation of the Marienborn complex, no successful escapes were recorded.[144]
Border crossing restrictions
West and East Germans were treated very differently when it came to entering or leaving East Germany. West Germans were able to cross the border relatively freely to visit relatives. They had to go through numerous bureaucratic formalities imposed by the East German government. These included applying in advance for permission, registering with the local police on arrival, remaining within a specified area for a specified period and obtaining an exit visa from the police on departure.
East Germans were subjected to far more stringent restrictions. The East German constitution of 1949 granted citizens a theoretical right to leave the country, though it was hardly respected in practice. Even this limited right was ultimately removed in the constitution of 1968 which confined citizens' freedom of movement to the area within the state borders.[145] It was not until November 1964 that they were allowed to visit the West at all, and even then only pensioners were allowed. This gave rise to a joke that only in East Germany did people look forward to old age.[146] East German pensioners were able to visit the West for up to four weeks in a year, but were not permitted to take more than a token 10 East German marks with them, requiring them to depend on the support of relatives, churches and the West German government. As they were retired, they were seen by the East German government as economically unimportant and no great loss if they defected. The vast majority, though, chose to return home at the end of their stay.[147]
It was not until 1972 that younger East Germans were permitted to travel to the West, though their numbers were few until the mid-1980s. They were rarely permitted to take their own car but had to go by train or bus instead. A lengthy process had to be endured to obtain a passport and exit visa. An application to travel had to be submitted well in advance of the planned departure. Applicants were left in the dark about the success of their application until the day before their departure. They were required to register with the police for a passport and exit visa and to undergo close questioning about their reasons for wanting to travel. They also had to submit an application and undergo a personal evaluation at their workplace. Their employer would then submit a statement to the police along with various forms. The applicant would only learn on the day before his departure whether his application had been accepted. He was required to go again to the police and present various items of paperwork before obtaining a passport and visa, for which a 60 DM fee was charged – a substantial fraction of an East German's monthly salary.[148]
The odds were against applications being successful, as only around 40,000 a year were approved. Refusal was quite often arbitrary, depending on the goodwill of local officials.[149] A few categories of citizens were permitted relatively free travel. Members of the Party elite and cultural ambassadors such as sportspeople, singers, film directors and writers were frequently given permission to travel, as were essential transport workers such as barge crewmen, railway workers and truck drivers. However, they were not permitted to take their families with them.[150]
Until the late 1980s, ordinary East Germans were permitted only to travel to the West on "urgent family business" such as the marriage, serious illness or death of a close relative. In February 1986, the regime relaxed the definition of "urgent family business", though it still required travellers to leave behind "collateral" (in effect, a hostage) in the shape of a spouse, child or other close relative. This prompted a massive increase in the number of citizens able to travel to the West.[151] The number of legal East German border-crossers rose from 66,000 in 1985 to 573,000 in 1986, 1.2 million in 1987 and 2.2 million in 1988. The "pensioner traffic" increased greatly as well, from 1.6 million a year in 1985 to 3.8 million in 1987.[152] According to East German official figures, more than 99.5% of the border-crossers returned home. The relaxation of the border restrictions was said to have been motivated by a desire on the part of the East German leadership to reduce their citizens' desire to travel and shrink the number applying to emigrate. In practice, however, it had exactly the opposite effect. A Washington Post article of April 1988 wondered prophetically whether the policy would lead to East Germany "fac[ing] the prospect that the freer travel policy could be destabilizing by whetting desires for additional liberties."[151]
Even if East Germans got a visa to cross the border, they were still subject to East German government restrictions on the western side. Groups visiting West Germany were required to leave behind all of their identification, without which they could not prove their entitlement to West German citizenship. Individual members were forbidden from walking alone or collecting the 100 DM "welcome money" that the West German government gave to all East German visitors. The group as a whole was responsible for making sure none of its members defected. They could all expect punishment if someone did "take off". Such rules provided a powerful incentive to keep potential defectors in line.[153]
Ordinary East Germans strongly resented the restrictions on travel. Most holidays had to be spent at home or in state-run holiday resorts. Husbands and wives often had to take separate holidays because of the difficulty in getting approval for leave from employers. Those who could travel were free only to go to "fraternal Socialist states" – Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union (though Poland was taken off the list after 1981 to prevent the "infection" of Solidarity trade unionism spreading). Even then, they had to pay high prices to stay in second-class accommodation and were often shocked by the poor living conditions, particularly in the Soviet Union, which GDR propaganda had promoted as "the most modern and progressive state in the world."[154]
Emigrating from East Germany
The East German government did not encourage emigration, perhaps not surprisingly considering that the inner German border fortifications and Berlin Wall had been erected specifically to stop emigration occurring. There was no formal legal basis under which a citizen could emigrate from the country. In 1975, however, East Germany signed up to the Helsinki Accords, a pan-European treaty to improve relations between the countries of Europe. The accords were regarded by the East German government as being hugely important. The East German leader Erich Honecker commented that the Accords "fixed" the "territorial and political outcomes" of the Second World War, in effect ratifying the division of Germany.[51]
However, the Accords also included a provision on freedom of movement that was to lead to the regime's authority being increasingly undermined. As East German citizens learned about this provision – which was not publicised by the GDR's state-controlled media – an increasing number sought to use it to emigrate from the country. They applied for exit visas, citing Helsinki in their applications. The numbers were relatively small at first, averaging around 7,200 first-time applications and the granting of 4,600 exit visas annually during the late 1970s. By the late 1980s the yearly numbers had snowballed to over 100,000 applications with around 15–25,000 exit visas being granted annually.[155][156] Legal emigration posed a dilemma for the regime; although it provided a safety valve of sorts and allowed East Germany to portray itself as adhering to the Helsinki norms, it also ran the risk of the East German population coming to demand a general right to emigrate.[155] A Central Committee report prepared in 1988 warned that the population was not sufficiently incentivised to oppose emigration:
The necessary commitment to preventing attempts to emigrate is not yet present in many Party branches, workplaces and [FDGB] collectives, or amongst citizens. The required prevailing atmosphere of opposition to these phenomena has not yet been achieved. Even Party members, FDGB functionaries or brigade leaders sometimes state that they fail to understand why these citizens are not permitted to emigrate.[155]
The regime sought to dissuade would-be emigrés through a variety of measures. The process of applying for an exit permit was deliberately intended to be slow, demeaning and frustrating, with a low chance of success. Applicants were pushed to the margins of society. They were demoted or sacked from their jobs, excluded from universities and subjected to social ostracisation.[157] If the applicants were parents, they could face the threat of having their children taken into state custody on the grounds that they were unfit to bring up children.[158] The heavily politicised East German law code was used to punish those who continued to apply for emigration despite repeated rejections. Those who repeatedly submitted emigration applications faced charges of "impeding ... the state and social activity". If they sought assistance from contacts in the West, such as relatives or West German state bodies, they were guilty of "illegal contact" or "traitorous information transfer or activities as an agent." Criticising the political system was a crime of "public disparagement". Over 10,000 applicants were arrested by the Stasi between the 1970s and 1989 on such charges.[159]
Such repressive treatment may well have reduced the number of people who were willing to apply for an exit visa. However, it also had the effect of creating a increasing number of people who coalesced into a pro-reform movement willing to directly and publicly challenge the regime.[160] The government found it difficult to deal with such people; as one historian comments, "the scale and spontaneity of demonstrative actions, and the obstinate commitment of the applicants, repeatedly forced the [East German] power apparatus to make concessions on travel and emigration issues in order to prevent ... massive, uncontrolled eruptions." This was to have important consequences at the end of the 1980s. A report for the Central Committee's security section noted: "The emigration problem is confronting us with a fundamental problem of the GDR's development. Experience shows that the current repertoire of solutions (improved travel possibilities, expatriation of applicants, etc.) have not brought the desired results, but rather the opposite." The agitation for emigration, the report concluded presciently, "threatens to undermine beliefs in the correctness of the Party's policies."[161]
Ransoms and "humanitarian releases"
In addition to the emigration programme, East German citizens could also emigrate through the semi-secret route of being ransomed by the West German government. 33,755 political prisoners were ransomed between 1964 and 1989. A further 2,087 further prisoners being released to the West under an amnesty in 1972. 215,019 people, including 2,000 children cut off from their parents, were allowed to leave East Germany to rejoin their families. In exchange, West Germany paid the huge amount of 3,436,800,755 DM – nearly $2.3 billion at 1990 prices – in goods and hard currency.[162] The annual ransom fees became such a fixture, and so essential to the running of the East German economy, that the East German government accounted for the ransoms as a fixed item in the GDR's state budget.[163] Those who were ransomed would be taken to a detention centre in Karl-Marx-Stadt (now Chemnitz) before being driven across the border in coaches and officially expelled by the GDR authorities.[164]
As the two governments did not have any formal relations when the ransoms first began, they were arranged between two lawyers, East German Wolfgang Vogel and West German Jürgen Stange. The arrangement was secret at first but was later revealed by Rainer Barzel, the Federal Minister for All-German Affairs at the time, who wrote in his memoirs: "The price for the prisoners was determined on an individual basis. Disgusting. It was fixed according to the prisoner's human and political weight. Those serving life sentences cost more." The prices ranged from around 1,875 DM for a worker to around 11,250 DM for a doctor; the justification, according to East Germany, was that this was compensation for the money invested by the state in the prisoner's training. For a while, payments were made in kind using goods that were in short supply in East Germany, such as oranges, bananas, coffee and medical drugs. The average prisoner was worth around 4,000 DM worth of goods.[165] Ultimately the ransoms became simple cash payments, funded by a shadowy network of agencies and rich individuals that included the federal government, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the fervently anti-communist millionaire publisher Axel Springer. The scheme was highly controversial in the West. It was denounced by many as human trafficking but was defended by others as a commendable act of humanitarianism.[166]
Escapes and victims
Refugee flows and escape attempts
Between 1950 and 1988, around four million East Germans migrated to the West. 3.454 million of them left between 1950 and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The great majority of them emigrated by simply walking across the border or, after 1952, exiting through West Berlin. After the border was fortified and the Berlin Wall was constructed, the number of illegal border crossings fell drastically. The numbers fell further as the border defences were improved over the subsequent decades. In 1961, 8,507 people fled across the border, most of them through West Berlin. The construction of the Berlin Wall that year reduced the number of escapees by 75% to around 2,300 per annum for the rest of the decade. The number of escapees fell further to 868 per annum during the 1970s and to only 334 per annum between 1980 and 1988. However, escapees were never more than a small minority of the total number of emigrants from East Germany. Far more people left the country after being granted official permits, by fleeing through third countries or by being ransomed by the West German government. During the 1980s, only about 1% of those who left East Germany did so by escaping across the border.[167]
| Total | Official permits |
Escapes through other countries |
Direct escapes |
Ransomed by West Germany | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1962–70 | 229,652 | 146,129 | 56,970 | 21,105 | 5,448 |
| 1971–79 | 131,176 | 85,434 | 27,576 | 7,816 | 10,350 |
| 1980–88 | 203,619 | 150,918 | 36,152 | 2,672 | 13,872 |
| Total (+ 1961) | 616,066 | 382,481 | 163,815 | 40,100 | 29,670 |
Escapees had a variety of motives for attempting to flee East Germany. The vast majority had an essentially economic motive: they wished to improve their living conditions and opportunities in the West. Some fled for political reasons, but many were impelled to leave by specific social and political events. The imposition of collective agriculture and the crushing of the 1953 East German uprising prompted thousands to flee to the West, as did further coercive economic restructuring in 1960. Several thousand of those who fled did so to escape the clearance of their villages along the border. By the 1980s, the number of escape attempts was rising again as East German's economy stagnated and living conditions deteriorated.[168]
Attempts to flee across the border were carefully studied and recorded by the East German authorities to identify possible weak points. These would be addressed by strengthening the fortifications in vulnerable areas. The NVA and the Stasi carried out statistical surveys to identify trends. In one example, a study was carried out by the East German army at the end of the 1970s to reviewi successful and attempted "border breaches" (Grenzdurchbrüche). It found that 4,956 people had attempted to escape across the border between 1 January 1974 and 30 November 1979. Of those, 3,984 people (80.4%) were arrested by the Volkspolizei in the Sperrzone, the outer restricted zone. 205 people (4.1%) were caught at the signal fence. Within the inner security zone, the Schutzstreifen, a further 743 people (15%) were arrested by the border guards. 48 people (1%) were stopped – i.e. killed or injured – by landmines and 43 people (0.9%) by SM-70 directional mines on the border fence. A further 67 people (1.35%) were intercepted at the border fence (shot and/or arrested). The study highlighted the effectiveness of the SM-70 as a means of stopping people getting across the fence. A total of 229 people – just 4.6% of attempted escapees, representing less than one in twenty – made it across the border fence. Of these, the largest number (129, or 55% of successful escapees) succeeded in making it across the fence in unmined sectors. 89 people (39% of escapees) managed to cross both the minefields and the border fence, but just 12 people (6% of the total) succeeded in getting past the SM-70s.[169]
Escape attempts were severely punished by the East German state. From 1953, the regime described the act of escaping as Republikflucht (literally "flight from the Republic"), by analogy with the existing military term Fahnenflucht ("desertion"). A successful escapee was not a Flüchtling ("refugee") but a Republikflüchtiger ("Republic-deserter"). Those who attempted to escape were called Sperrbrecher (literally "blockade runners" but more loosely translated as "border violators").[168] Those who helped escapees were not Fluchthelfer ("escape helpers"), the Western term, but Menschenhändler ("human traffickers").[170] Such ideologically coloured language enabled the regime to portray border crossers as little better than traitors and criminals.[171] An East German propaganda booklet published in 1955 outlined the official view of escapees:
Both from the moral standpoint as well as in terms of the interests of the whole German nation, leaving the GDR is an act of political and moral backwardness and depravity.
Those who let themselves be recruited objectively serve West German Reaction and militarism, whether they know it or not. Is it not despicable when for the sake of a few alluring job offers or other false promises about a "guaranteed future" one leaves a country in which the seed for a new and more beautiful life is sprouting, and is already showing the first fruits, for the place that favors a new war and destruction?
Is it not an act of political depravity when citizens, whether young people, workers, or members of the intelligentsia, leave and betray what our people have created through common labor in our republic to offer themselves to the American or British secret services or work for the West German factory owners, Junkers, or militarists? Does not leaving the land of progress for the morass of an historically outdated social order demonstrate political backwardness and blindness? ...
[W]orkers throughout Germany will demand punishment for those who today leave the German Democratic Republic, the strong bastion of the fight for peace, to serve the deadly enemy of the German people, the imperialists and militarists.[172]
Republikflucht became a crime in 1957, punishable by heavy fines and up to three years' imprisonment. Any act associated with an escape attempt was subject to this legislation. Those caught in the act were often tried for espionage as well and given proportionately harsher sentences.[35] Some escapees were executed, sometimes being deported to the Soviet Union for the death penalty to be carried out.[173] More than 75,000 people – an average of more than seven people a day – were imprisoned for attempting to escape across the border, serving an average of one to two years' imprisonment. Border guards who attempted to escape were treated much more harshly and were on average imprisoned for five years.[174] Those who helped escapees were also subject to punishment, facing prison terms or deportation to internal exile in faraway towns. Some 50,000 East Germans suffered this fate between 1952 and 1989.[175]
Escape methods
Refugees used a variety of methods to escape across the border. The great majority crossed on foot, though some took more unusual routes. One of the most spectacular was the escape in September 1979 of eight people from two families in a home-made hot-air balloon. Their flight involved an ascent to more than 2,500 metres (8,200 ft) before landing near the West German town of Naila.[176] Other escapees relied more on physical strength and endurance. An escapee in 1987 used meat hooks to scale the border fences,[177] while in 1971 a doctor swam 45 kilometres (28 mi) across the Baltic Sea from Rostock to near the Danish island of Lolland, where he was picked up by a West German yacht.[178] Another escapee used an air mattress to escape across the Baltic in 1987[179]. Mass escapes were rare. One of the few that succeeded took place on 2 October 1961, when 53 people from the border village of Böseckendorf – a quarter of the village's population – escaped en masse, followed by another 13 inhabitants in February 1963.[180] An unusual mass escape occurred in September 1964 when 14 East Germans, including eleven children, were smuggled across the border in a refrigerated truck. They were able to escape detection by being concealed under the carcasses of slaughtered pigs being transported to the West.[181]
Those working on or near the border were occasionally able to use their privileged access and knowledge to escape. For the border guards, this presented special dangers, as their colleagues were under orders to shoot without warning if an escape attempt was made. The dilemmas they faced were highlighted in the May 1969 defection of a soldier and an NCO of the Grenztruppen. When the NCO made his escape, the soldier, Jürgen Lange, decided not to shoot him. As this exposed Lange to severe punishment by his superiors for disobeying the order to shoot, Lange made his own escape ten minutes later. When he reached the West German side, Lange found that his rifle had been sabotaged by his NCO to prevent him firing in the first place.[182] Soviet soldiers also sometimes escaped across the border, though this was very rare. Only eight such defections succeeded between 1953 and 1984.[183]
The traffic was not one-way; thousands of people a year migrated from West Germany to the east. The East German press described such individuals as "west zone refugees" who were fleeing "political pressure", "growing unlawfulness" or "worsening economic conditions". Research carried out by the West German government found more prosaic reasons, such as marital problems, family estrangement and the homesickness of those who had lived in East Germany in the past.[184] A number of Allied military personnel, including British, French, German and United States troops, also defected.[185] By the end of the Cold War, as many as 300 United States citizens were thought to have defected across the Iron Curtain for a variety of reasons[186] – whether to escape criminal charges, for political reasons or because (as the St. Petersburg Times put it) "girl-hungry GI's [were tempted] with seductive sirens, who usually desert the love-lorn soldier once he is across the border." The fate of such defectors varied considerably. Some were sent straight to labour camps on charges of espionage. Others committed suicide, while a few were able to find wives and work on the eastern side of the border.[187]
The order to fire
From 1945 onwards, unauthorised crossers of the inner German border risked being shot by Soviet or East German border guards. The use of deadly force was termed the Schießbefehl ("order to fire" or "command to shoot"). It was formally in force as early as 1948, when regulations concerning the use of firearms on the border were promulgated. A regulation issued to East German police on 27 May 1952 stipulated that "failure to obey the orders of the Border Patrol will be met by the use of arms." From the 1960s through to the end of the 1980s, the border guards were given daily verbal orders (Vergatterung) to "track down, arrest or annihilate border violators." The GDR formally codified its regulations on the use of deadly force in March 1982, when the State Border Law mandated that firearms were to be used as the "maximum measure in the use of force" against individuals who "publicly attempt to break through the state border".[188] The GDR's leadership was explicit in its endorsement of the use of deadly force. General Heinz Hoffmann, the GDR defence minister, declared in August 1966 that "anyone who does not respect our border will feel the bullet." In 1974, Erich Honecker, as Chairman of the GDR's National Defence Council, ordered: "Firearms are to be ruthlessly used in the event of attempts to break through the border, and the comrades who have successfully used their firearms are to be commended."[189]
The East German border guards were instructed to follow a standard procedure if they detected an unauthorised individual in the border zone. (Contrary to the West German use of the term "death strip" to refer to the control strip, deadly force could be used at any location along the border – it did not depend on an individual being in, or crossing, the control strip.) If the individual was less than 100 metres (330 ft) away, the border guard would first order: "Stop! Border sentry! Hands up!" ("Halt! Grenzposten! Hände hoch!") or "Stop, stand still, or I will shoot!" ("Halt! Stehenbleiben, oder ich schieße!"). If the individual was further away or on the Western side of the border fence the guard was authorised to shoot without warning. If the escapee was a fellow border guard, he could be shot immediately from any distance without prior warning. Border guards were instructed not to shoot if innocent bystanders might be hit or if the escapee had made it into West German territory, or if the line of fire was into West Germany. In practice, though, shots fired from East Germany did often land in West German territory.[190]
The border guards were under considerable pressure to obey the Schießbefehl. If they shot escapees they would be rewarded with medals, bonuses and possibly promotion. In one typical example, the killers of one would-be escapee in East Berlin in February 1972 were rewarded by being decorated with the "Order of Merit of the Border Troops of the GDR" and a bonus of 150 marks.[191] By contrast, failure to shoot or suspicion that a shooter had deliberately missed was punished.[192]
The Schießbefehl was, not surprisingly, very controversial in the West and was singled out for criticism by the West Germans. The West German authorities established a "Central Recording Office" to record details of deaths on the border, with the ultimate aim of prosecuting the offenders. This significantly discomforted the East German authorities, who repeatedly but unsuccessfully demanded the office's closure.[193] The GDR authorities occasionally suspended the Schießbefehl on occasions when it would have been politically inconvenient to have to explain dead refugees, such as during a visit to the GDR by the French foreign minister in 1985.[188] It was also a problem for many of the East German border guards and was the motivating factor behind a number of escapes, when guards facing a crisis of confidence defected because of their unwillingness to shoot fellow citizens.[194]
Deaths on the border
It is still not known for sure how many people died on the inner German border or who they were, as the East German state treated such information as a closely guarded secret.
on the inner German border has risen steadily since unification, as evidence has been gathered from East German records. Current unofficial estimates put the figure at up to 1,100 people,[195] though officially released figures give a lower count for the death toll before and after the Berlin Wall was built.
Persons killed crossing the East German borders before and after 13 August 1961: figures as of 2000 [94] Before 13 August 1961 (1) After 13 August 1961 (1) Total (1) Total (2) Inner German border 100 271 371 290 Berlin border/Wall 16 239 255 96 Baltic Sea 15 174 189 17 GDR border guards 11 16 27 – Soviet troops 1 5 6 – Berlin ring road – – – 90 Aircraft shot down 14 3 17 – Total 160 753 916 519 (1) Figures from the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 13. August
(2) Figures from the Zentrale Erfassungsstelle für Regierungs- und Vereinigungskriminalität
There were many ways to die on the inner German border. Numerous escapees were shot by the border guards, while others were killed by mines and booby-traps. A substantial number drowned while trying to cross the Baltic and the Elbe river. Some died of heart attacks during their escape attempts; in one incident, a baby died after its parents gave it sleeping pills to keep it quiet during the crossing.[173]
Not all of those killed on the border were attempting to escape. On 13 October 1961, Westfälische Rundschau journalist Kurt Lichtenstein was shot on the border near the village of Zicherie after he attempted to speak with East German farm workers. His death aroused condemnation across the political spectrum in West Germany; he was a former parliamentary representative of the German Communist Party.[196] The incident prompted students from Braunschweig to erect a sign on the border protesting the killing.[197] An apparent mix-up over papers at a border crossing point led to the shooting of an Italian truck driver in August 1976. The dead man was a member of the Italian Communist Party, which denounced the killing. The episode severely embarrassed the East German government and produced an unusual apology.[198] In one notorious shooting on 1 May 1976, a former East German political prisoner, Michael Gartenschläger, who had fled to the West some years before, was ambushed and killed by a Stasi commando squad on the border near Büchen as he tried to dismantle an SM-70 anti-personnel mine. When it was buried his body was described merely as an "unknown body fished out of the water". The Stasi's after-action report, however, declared that "before he could carry out the act [of removing the mine], Gartenschläger was liquidated by security forces of the GDR".[199][200]
Escapees were not the only ones to die on the border. 25 East German border guards also died after being shot from the Western side of the border or by escapees and (accidentally) by their own colleagues.[201] The East German government described them as "victims of armed assaults and imperialist provocations against the state border of the GDR"[202] and alleged that "bandits" in the West took potshots at border guards doing their duty – a version of events that was uncorroborated by Western accounts of border incidents.
The two sides commemorated their dead in significantly different ways. Various mostly unofficial memorials were set up on the western side by people seeking to commemorate victims of the border. West Germans such as Michael Gartenschläger and Kurt Lichtenstein were commemorated with signs and memorials, some which were supported by the government. After the policy of détente was initiated in the 1970s this became politically inconvenient and state support for border memorials largely ceased. The taboo in East Germany surrounding escapees meant that the great majority of deaths went unpublicised and uncommemorated. The border guards who died on the frontier were, however, portrayed as "martyrs" by the East German regime. Four stone memorials were erected in East Berlin to mark their deaths.[203] The regime named schools, barracks and other public facilities after the dead guards and used their memorials were used as places of pilgrimage to signify that (as a frequently-used slogan put it) "their deaths are our commitment" to maintaining the border. After 1989 the memorials were vandalised, neglected and ultimately removed.[204]
Few East German escapees were commemorated in the West, not least because their identities were mostly unknown until after 1989. One notable exception was Helmut Kleinert, a 24-year-old from Quedlinburg in Saxony-Anhalt. He was shot along with his pregnant wife on 1 August 1963 as they attempted to cross the border near Hohegeiß in the Harz mountains. A memorial dedicated to "The Unknown" was soon erected by local people on the western side of the border. When Kleinert's identity became known in the West, his name was added to the memorial. It became something of a shrine with piles of flowers and wreaths deposited by visitors. The East German regime strongly objected and erected a watchtower nearby, from which threats and Communist propaganda were broadcast across the border. Ultimately, in August 1971, the memorial was replaced by a stone set 150 metres (490 ft) away and out of sight of the border.[205]
The fall of the border
The fall of the inner German border came rapidly and unexpectedly in November 1989, on the same day as the fall of the Berlin Wall. Just as an earlier generation of Germans had found that the way to defeat the supposedly impregnable Maginot Line was simply to go around one end of it, so too hundreds of thousands of East Germans found an escape route across the border of East Germany's erstwhile ally, Hungary. The inner German border's integrity relied ultimately on other Warsaw Pact states fortifying their own borders and being willing to shoot escapees, including East Germans, around fifty of whom were shot on the borders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria between 1950 and 1989.[206] However, this meant that as soon as one of the other eastern bloc nations relaxed its border controls, the East Germans would be able to exit in large numbers.
Exactly this scenario played out in 1989 when a reformist Communist government in Hungary, with the support of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, began to dismantle its border fortifications. Hungary was already a popular tourist destination for East Germans, due to the trappings of prosperity that were absent at home – good and plentiful food and wine, pleasant camping and a lively capital city.[207] At home, the desire for reform was being driven by East Germany's worsening economic stagnation and the example of other eastern bloc nations who were following Gorbachev's example in instituting glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reform). However, the hardline East German leader, Erich Honecker – who had been responsible for the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 – remained staunchly against any reform in his country. Declaring that "Socialism and capitalism are like fire and water", he predicted in January 1989 that "the Wall will stand for another hundred years."[208]
Hungary was the earliest of any eastern bloc nation to institute reform under its reformist Prime Minister Miklós Németh, who took office in November 1988.[209] Its government was still notionally Communist but planned free elections and economic reform as part of a strategy of "rejoining Europe" and reforming its struggling economy.[210] Opening the border was essential to this effort, not least because West Germany had secretly offered a much-needed hard currency loan of DM 500 million ($250 million).[211] The Hungarians went ahead in May 1989 with the dismantling of the Iron Curtain along their border with Austria. To the consternation of the East German government, pictures of the barbed wire fences being taken down were transmitted into East Germany by West German television stations.[212] A mass exodus by hundreds of thousands of East Germans began in September 1989. Thousands more scaled the walls of the West German embassies in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest claiming asylum. The West German mission in East Berlin was forced to close because it could not cope with the numbers of East Germans seeking asylum.[213] The hardline Czechoslovak Communist leader, Milos Jakes, agreed to Erich Honecker's request to choke off the flow of refugees by closing Czechoslovakia's border with East Germany, thus preventing East Germans from reaching Hungary.[214]
This, however, proved to be the start of a series of disastrous miscalculations by Honecker. There were rowdy scenes across East Germany as furious East Germans who had paid in advance for their plane or train tickets and accommodation found that they could not travel and that their hard-earned money had been lost.[215] The 14,000 East German refugees camping in the grounds of the West German embassy in Prague had to be dealt with; Honecker sought to humiliate them publicly by expelling them through East Germany to the West, shipping them in eight sealed trains from Prague and stripping them of their East German citizenship while branding them as "traitors". The Party justified the evacuation of the refugees as a humanitarian action taken because children were involved, who had been "let down by the irresponsible actions of their parents."[215] The state newspaper Neues Deutschland ran an editorial, said to have been dictated by Honecker personally, which declared that "by their behaviour they have trampled on all moral values and excluded themselves from our society." Far from discrediting the refugees, the trains produced uproar, with citizens waving and cheering the refugees as they passed through the East German countryside. Torn-up identity papers and East German passports littered the tracks as the refugees threw them out of the windows. When the trains arrived in Dresden, 1,500 East Germans stormed the main railway station in an attempt to board the trains. Dozens were injured and the station concourse was virtually destroyed.[216]
Honecker's more fundamental miscalculation was the presumption that by closing East Germany's last open border he had finally imprisoned his country's citizens within their own borders and made it clear that there would be no reform whatsoever – a situation that most East Germans found intolerable. Small pro-democracy demonstrations rapidly swelled into crowds of hundreds of thousands of people in cities across East Germany. The demonstrators chanted slogans such as Wir bleiben hier! ("We're staying here!") – indicating their desire to stay and fight for democracy – and "Wir sind das Volk" ("We are the people"), challenging the SED's claim to speak for the people. Some in the East German leadership advocated a crackdown, particularly the veteran secret police chief Erich Mielke. Although preparations for a Tiananmen Square-style military intervention were well advanced, ultimately the leadership ducked the decision to use force. East Germany was, in any case, in a very different situation from China; it depended on loans from the West and the continued support of the Soviets, both of which would have been critically jeopardised by a massacre of unarmed demonstrators. The Soviet army units in East Germany had reportedly been ordered not to intervene, and the lack of support from the Soviet leadership weighed heavily on the SED leadership as it tried to decide what to do.[217]
After Honecker was publicly chided by Gorbachev in October 1989 for his refusal to embrace reform, reformist members of the East German Politburo sought to rescue the situation by forcing the resignation of the veteran Party chairman. He was replaced with the marginally less hardline Egon Krenz, who was seen as Honecker's protegé.[218] The new government sought to appease the protesters by reopening the border with Czechoslovakia. This, however, merely resulted in the resumption of the mass exodus through Hungary. The refugee flow had severely disruptive effects on the economy. Schools were closed because the teachers had fled; factories and offices shut down because of lack of essential staff; even milk rounds were cancelled after the milkmen departed. The chaos produced a revolt within the ranks of the SED against the corruption and incompetence of the party leadership. The formerly subservient GDR media began publishing eye-opening reports of high-level corruption, spurring demands for fundamental reform. On 8 November 1989, with mass demonstrations continuing across the country, the entire Politburo resigned and a new, more moderate Politburo was appointed under Krenz's continued leadership.[219]
The opening of the border and the fall of the GDR
The East German government eventually sought to defuse the situation by relaxing the country's border controls. The intention was to allow emigration to West Germany but only after an application had been approved, and similarly to allow thirty-day visas for travel to the West, again on application. Only four million GDR citizens had a passport, so only that number could take immediate advantage of such a change; the remaining 13 million would have to apply for a passport and then wait at least four weeks for approval. The new regime would go into effect from 10 November 1989.[220]
The decision was reportedly made with little discussion by the Politburo or understanding of the consequences. It was announced on the evening of 9 November 1989 by Politburo member Gunter Schabowski at a somewhat chaotic press conference in East Berlin. The new border control regime was proclaimed as a means of liberating the people from a situation of psychological pressure by legalising and simplifying migration. Misunderstanding the note that had been passed to him about the decision to open the border, he announced that it would be opened with "immediately, without delay", rather than from the following day, as intended. Crucially, in the light of what happened next, it was not meant to be an uncontrolled opening, nor was it meant to apply to tourists.[220] At an interview in English after the press conference, Schabowski told the NBC reporter Tom Brokaw that "it is no question of tourism. It is a permission of leaving the GDR [permanently]."[221]
Within hours, thousands of people gathered at the Berlin Wall demanding that the border guards open the gates. The guards were unable to contact their superiors for instructions and, fearing a stampede, opened the gates. The iconic scenes that followed – people pouring into West Berlin, standing on the Wall and attacking it with pickaxes – were broadcast worldwide.[222]
While the eyes of the world were on Berlin, watching the Mauerfall (fall of the Wall), a simultaneous process of Grenzöffnung (border opening) was taking place along the entire length of the inner German border. Existing border crossings were opened immediately, though their limited capacity led to long tailbacks as millions of East Germans crossed over to the West. Within the first four days, 4.3 million East Germans – a quarter of the country's entire population – poured into West Germany.[223] At the Helmstedt crossing point, on the Hamburg-Berlin autobahn, cars were backed up for 40 miles; some drivers waited 11 hours to drive across to the West.[224] The border was opened progressively over the course of the next few months. New crossing points were created at many points, reconnecting communities that had been separated for nearly 40 years. At Herrenhof on the Elbe, hundreds of East Germans pushed their way through the border fence to board the first cross-river ferry to run since April 1945.[225] Hundreds of people from the East German town of Katherinenberg surged across the border to see the West German border town of Wanfried, while West Germans poured into East Germany "to see how you live on the other side". East German border guards, overwhelmed by the flood of people, soon gave up checking passports.[226] Special trains were put on to transport people across the border. The BBC correspondent Ben Bradshaw described the jubilant scenes at the railway station of Hof in Bavaria in the early hours of 12 November:
It was not just the arrivals at Hof who wore their emotions on their sleeves. The local people turned out in their hundreds to welcome them; stout men and women in their Sunday best, twice or three times the average age of those getting off the trains, wept as they clapped. 'These are our people, free at last,' they said ... Those arriving at Hof report people lining the route of the trains in East Germany waving and clapping and holding placards saying: 'We're coming soon.'[227]
Even the East German border guards were not immune to the euphoria. Peter Zahn, a border guard at the time, described how he and his colleagues reacted to the opening of the border:
After the Wall fell, we were in a state of delirium. We submitted a request for our reserve activities to be ended, which was approved a few days later. We visited Helmstedt and Braunschweig in West Germany, which would have been impossible before. In the NVA even listening to western radio stations was punishable and there we were on an outing in the West.[228]
To the surprise of many West Germans, many East Germans spent their DM 100 "welcome money" buying great quantities of bananas, a highly prized rarity in the East. For months after the opening of the border, bananas were sold out at supermarkets along the border as East Germans bought whole crates because they did not believe that they would be on sale the next day.[229] The easterners' obsession with bananas was famously spoofed by the West German satirical magazine Titanic, which published a front cover depicting "Easterner Gaby (17), happy to be in West Germany: My first banana". Gaby is shown holding a large peeled cucumber.[230]
The opening of the border had a profound political and psychological effect on the East German public. The official mythology of the GDR had held that (in the words of the SED's official anthem) "the Party, the Party, the Party is always right / And comrades, it will stay that way. / For who fights for what's right is always right / Against lies and exploitation."[231] Those crossing the border, however, found that West Germany had achieved vastly superior prosperity without socialism, brotherhood with the Soviet Union, revolutionary values and the rest of the self-justifying mythology that underlay the SED's claims to moral superiority. The power of the SED's mythology evaporated overnight and previously prized ideological attributes became liabilities, rather than stepping stones for advancement.[232]
For many people the very existence of the GDR, which the SED had justified as the first "Socialist state on German soil", came to seem pointless. The state was bankrupt, the economy collapsing, the political class discredited, the governing institutions in chaos and the people demoralised by the evaporation of the collective assumptions which had underpinned their society for nearly fifty years. As Alan L. Nothnagle puts it, "Once its crutches were kicked away, GDR society had nothing to hold on to, least of all its national values. Not since Cortés and his conquistadors entered Mexico City has a society imploded so thoroughly."[233] The SED had hoped to regain control of the situation by opening the border but found that it had completely lost control. Membership of the Party collapsed and Krenz himself resigned on 6 December 1989 after only 50 days in office, handing over to the moderate Hans Modrow.[234] The removal of restrictions on travel prompted hundreds of thousands of East Germans to migrate to the West – over 116,000 of them between 9 November and 31 December 1989, compared with 40,000 for the whole of the previous year.[235] The new East German leadership initiated "round table" talks with opposition groups, similar to the processes that had led to multi-party elections in Hungary and Poland.[236] When the first free elections were held in March 1990, the SED was swept out of power and replaced by a pro-reunification coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and German Social Union (DSU).[237] The two Germanies progressed rapidly towards reunification following the CDU/DSU victory. In July 1990, monetary reunification was achieved with the Deutschemark replacing the old East German mark as the East German currency.[238]
The abandonment of the border
Following the opening of the border, it was progressively run down and eventually abandoned. Dozens of new crossings had been opened along the border by February 1990, though the border guards no longer carried weapons or made much effort to check travellers' passports.[239] The border guards' numbers were rapidly reduced. Half were dismissed within five months of the border opening.[240] The border was abandoned and the Grenztruppen were officially abolished on 1 July 1990,[241] with all but 2,000 of their number being dismissed or transferred to other jobs. The Bundeswehr gave the remaining border guards and other ex-NVA soldiers the task of clearing the border fortifications, which was only completed in 1994. The scale of the task was immense, as not only did the fortifications have to be cleared but hundreds of roads had to be rebuilt, as well as railway lines.[242] An additional complication was caused by the presence of mines along the border. Although the 1.4 million mines laid by the GDR were supposed to have been removed in the 1980s, it was found that 34,000 were unaccounted for.[243] A further 1,100 mines were found and removed following Germany's reunification, at a cost of over DM 250 million,[244] in a programme that was not concluded until the end of 1995.[245]
The border clearers' task was aided unofficially by German civilians from both sides of the former border who scavenged the installations for fencing, wire and blocks of concrete to use in home improvements. As one East German commented in April 1990, "Last year, they used this fence to keep us in. This year, I'll use it to keep my chickens." Much of the fence was sold to a West German scrap-metal company at the rate of about $4 per segment. Environmental groups undertook a programme of re-greening the border, planting new trees and sowing grass seeds to fill in the clear-cut area along the border line.[240]
The border area today
Very little now remains of the installations along the former inner German border. At least 30 public, private and municipal museums along the old border line present displays of equipment and other artefacts relating to the border. Among the preserved sites are several dozen watchtowers, short stretches of the border fence and associated installations (some of which have been reconstructed), sections of the border wall still in situ at Hötensleben and Mödlareuth, and a number of buildings related to the border, such as the GDR border crossing point at Marienborn.[242][246] Substantial sections of the Kolonnenweg remain in place to serve as farm and forestry access roads, though the accompanying anti-vehicles ditches, fences and other obstacles have almost entirely been removed. Artworks, commemorative stones, memorials and signs have been erected at many points along the former border to mark its opening, commemorate its victims and record the division and reunification of Germany.
The closure of the border region for nearly 40 years led to it becoming a haven for wildlife. Although parts of the East German side of the border were farmed, intensive farming of the kind practised elsewhere in Germany was absent and large areas were untouched by agriculture. Conservationists became aware as early as the 1970s that the border had become a refuge for rare species of animals and plants. Their findings led the Bavarian government to begin a programme of buying land along the border to ensure that it would be protected from development. In December 1989, only a month after the opening of the border, conservationists from East and West Germany met to work out a plan to establish a "German Green Belt" (Grünes Band Deutschland) stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Czech border.[247] The Bundestag voted unanimously in December 2004 to extend federal protection to the Green Belt and incorporate it into a "European Green Belt" being developed along the entire 6,800 kilometres (4,200 mi) length of the former Iron Curtain. The German Green Belt now links 160 natural parks, 150 flora-and-fauna areas, three UNESCO biosphere reservations and the Harz Mountains National Park.[248] It is home to a wide variety of species that are rare elsewhere in Germany, including the wild cat, black stork, otter and rare mosses and orchids. Most of Germany's Red Kites – more than half of the 25,000 that live in Europe – live along the former border.[247] The Bund Naturschutz, one of Germany's largest conservation groups, is campaigning to extend the area within the Green Belt designated as nature conservation zones.[249]
See also
Notes
- ^ Faringdon, pp. 282–84
- ^ a b Faringdon, p. 284
- ^ McDougall, Alex. Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement 1946–1968. Clarendon Press. p. 40. ISBN 0199276277.
- ^ Czuczka, Tony (13 January 2000). "Last East German communist boss going to jail unrepentant". Associated Press.
- ^ "Berlin reunites, borders fade". The Record. 2 July 1990.
- ^ Cramer, pp. 8–9
- ^ a b c Buchholz, p. 56
- ^ Arendt, Hannah (1968). Totalitarianism: part three of The Origins of totalitarianism. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. p. 94. ISBN 0156906503.
- ^ Faringdon, p. 282
- ^ Bailey, Bailey (1983). Along the Edge of the Forest. London: Faber & Faber. p. 20. ISBN 0571131956.
- ^ Weinberg, Gerhard (1995). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 56. ISBN 0521558794.
- ^ Shears, p. 29
- ^ Osmańczyk, Edmund Jan; Mango, Anthony (2004). "Allied Control Council for Germany". Encyclopedia of the United Nations and international agreements. Vol. 1. Routledge. p. 77. ISBN 0415939216.
- ^ "CIA – The World Factbook – Germany". 14 July 2009. Retrieved 29 July 2009.
- ^ Quoted in Schweitzer, Carl Christoph, Politics and government in Germany, 1944–1994: basic documents, p. 59. Berghahn Books (1995). ISBN 9781571818553
- ^ Pence, Katherine; Betts, Paul (2008). Socialist modern: East German everyday culture and politics. University of Michigan Press. p. 186. ISBN 9780472069743.
- ^ a b Gress, David (1985). Peace and survival: West Germany, the peace movement, and European security. Hoover Press. p. 15–16. ISBN 9780817980917.
- ^ Koch, Karl (1989). West Germany today. Taylor & Francis. p. 141. ISBN 9780415016858.
- ^ Loth, Wilfred (2004). Europe, Cold War and coexistence, 1953–1965. Routledge. p. 274. ISBN 9780714654652.
- ^ Schweitzer, p. 50
- ^ Stacy, p. 6
- ^ Stacy, p. 8
- ^ Stacy, p. 9
- ^ Stacy, p. 11
- ^ Stacy, p. 7
- ^ Stacy, p. 13
- ^ Stacy, p. 31–32
- ^ Stacy, p. 40
- ^ Stacy, p. 66
- ^ a b Stacy, p. 67
- ^ Stacy, p. 69
- ^ a b Berdahl, Daphne (1999). Where the world ended: re-unification and identity in the German borderland. University of California Press. p. 144. ISBN 0520214773.
- ^ a b Cramer, p. 15
- ^ "Circus escapes from East Germany". The Times. 9 May 1950.
- ^ a b Stokes, Raymond G. (2000). Constructing socialism: technology and change in East Germany 1945–1990. Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 45. ISBN 9780801863912.
- ^ Stacy, p. 71
- ^ a b Stacy, p. 50
- ^ Shears, p. 37
- ^ Harrison, Hope Millard (2003). Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 240 (footnote).
- ^ ""Forbidden Zone" Runs Across Opencast Site". The Manchester Guardian. 9 June 1952.
- ^ Cramer, p. 143.
- ^ Berdahl, p. 67
- ^ a b Maddrell, Paul (2006). Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945–1961. Oxford. p. 54, 56. ISBN 0199267502.
{{cite book}}: Text "Oxford University Press" ignored (help); Text "publisher" ignored (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ "Baltic Coast Made Border Zone". The Times. 21 July 1962.
- ^ a b c d e Rottman, p. 20
- ^ Stacy, p. 181
- ^ a b Stacy, p. 185
- ^ Stacy, p. 189
- ^ a b Mulligan, Hugh A. (28 October 1976). "East German border appearance has changed". The Associated Press. Retrieved 3 August 2009.
- ^ Stacy, p. 176
- ^ a b McAdams, James A. (1985). East Germany and detente: building authority after the wall. Cambridge University Press. p. 148.
- ^ Stacy, p. 177
- ^ Shears, p. 119
- ^ Jarausch, p. 17
- ^ Judt, Matthias (1988). DDR-Geschichte in Dokumenten. Ch. Links Verlag. p. 437. ISBN 9783861531425.
- ^ Koop, Volker (1996). "Den Gegner vernichten" : die Grenzsicherung der DDR. Bonn: Bouvier. ISBN 9783416026338.
- ^ a b Buchholz, p. 59
- ^ "Regional Development along the Former Inner-German Border after Unification", Rupert Kawka, Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Germany. August 2003.
- ^ August, Oliver (1999). Along the Wall and Watchtowers. Harper Collins. p. 28. ISBN 002570432.
{{cite book}}: Check|isbn=value: length (help) - ^ a b c Rottman, pp. 20–21
- ^ Hertle, p. 97
- ^ Lapp, Peter Joachim (1986). Frontdienst im Frieden, die Grenztruppen der DDR: Entwicklung, Struktur, Aufgaben. Bernard & Graefe. p. x. ISBN 9783763753482.
- ^ Reiner Bachmann, Jochen Hoffmann (directors) (1981). Grenzer. Filmstudio der National Volksarmee.
Dieser Staat ist unser Leben, wir stehen mit dem Leben dafür
- ^ "Grenzer". Progress Film-Verleih. Retrieved 6 August 2009.
- ^ "Attention! Demarcation Line!", leaflet issued by the Ministerium für Bundesangelegenheiten, Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge, ca. early 1960s
- ^ Cramer, p. 162
- ^ Berdahl, p. 149
- ^ "Nudes warm up the Cold War". The Age. 18 August 1975.
- ^ "Buff Boom". Los Angeles Times. 7 July 1977.
- ^ Because of the changes in direction of the border, it could also be crossed north to south, south to north or even west to east in some places.
- ^ a b Buchholz, p. 57
- ^ Allinson, Mark (2000). Politics and popular opinion in East Germany, 1945–68. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 125. ISBN 9780719055546.
- ^ a b Rottman, p. 23
- ^ a b c Rottman, p. 29
- ^ a b c d e f Rottman, p. 17
- ^ a b c d Rottman, p. 28
- ^ Rottman, pp. 27-28
- ^ "Der Turm", Grenzturm Kühlungsborn
- ^ a b c Ritter, p. 69.
- ^ a b c d Rottman, p. 25
- ^ a b Schneider, Peter (1992). The German comedy: scenes of life after the wall. I.B.Tauris. pp. 207–212. ISBN 9781850433682.
- ^ a b c d e Display materials, Grenzdenkmal Hötensleben Cite error: The named reference "ReferenceA" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ Rottman, p. 24
- ^ Shears, p. 71
- ^ a b Rottman, pp. 23–24
- ^ Rottman, p. 16
- ^ Rottman, p. 18
- ^ Cramer, p. 188
- ^ Rottman, pp. 18–19
- ^ a b Rottman, p. 21
- ^ Ritter, p. 32
- ^ Rottman, pp. 25–26
- ^ "Geschichte", Ostseegrenzturm Kühlungsborn
- ^ a b Dennis, Mike (2000). The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, 1945–90. Longman. p. 100. ISBN 9780582245624.
- ^ Shears, pp. 49–50
- ^ a b Rottman, p. 42
- ^ Rottman, p. 43
- ^ "Guards the Wall cannot hold". The Age. 21 August 1985. Retrieved 4 August 2009.
- ^ Rottman, p. 44
- ^ "Scale of East German exodus revealed". 7 August 2001. Retrieved 4 August 2009.
- ^ Kellerhoff, Sven Felix; Banse, Dirk (11 August 2007). ""Zögern Sie nicht mit der Schusswaffe!"". Berliner Morgenpost. Retrieved 4 August 2009.
- ^ a b Rottman, p. 48
- ^ a b Rottman, pp. 52–53
- ^ Berdahl, pp. 49–51
- ^ Lockwood, David (2003). "Europe in the Asia-Pacific: the Russian Far East faces its future". Europe and the Asia-Pacific: culture, identity and representations of region. Routledge. p. 90. ISBN 9780415297240.
- ^ Moncourt, André; Smith, J. (2009). The Red Army Faction, a Documentary History: Volume 1: Projectiles for the People. PM Press. p. 22. ISBN 9781604860290.
- ^ Shears, pp. 96–97
- ^ Shears, pp. 90–92
- ^ Shears, pp. 94–95
- ^ Stacy, pp. 263–264
- ^ Shears, p. 100
- ^ Stacy, pp. 261–263
- ^ Shears, p. 101
- ^ Evans, Michael (15 February 1990). "Border watchdog, Thomas Jones, completes 30-year patrol". The Times.
- ^ Stacy, p. 22
- ^ Stacy, pp. 62–63
- ^ Shears, pp. 88, 98–99
- ^ a b Display materials, Gedenkstätte Point Alpha
- ^ Shears, p. 99
- ^ Quoted by Shears, p. 87
- ^ Bailey, p. 61
- ^ MacLeod, Murdo (20 August 2006). "'Little Berlin' marks 40th anniversary of its own Cold War wall". Scotland on Sunday.
- ^ Bailey, p. 48
- ^ a b Gordon, Joseph S. (1988). "East German psychological operations: a 1965 case study". Psychological operations: the Soviet challenge. Westview Press. ISBN 9780813373959.
- ^ a b c Shears, pp. 164–65
- ^ Nelson, Walter Henry (1972). Germany Rearmed. New York City: Simon & Schuster. p. 284.
- ^ Gordon, pp. 94-97
- ^ a b Based on the list in the appendix to §18 of the regulation implementing the Law on the State Border of the German Democratic Republic of 25 March 1982
- ^ Fowle, Farnsworth (8 February 1981). "Dresden's Salvaged Treasures". The New York Times.
- ^ Gleye, p. 135
- ^ Kiefer, Francine S. (11 May 1990). "Tourists Flood Into East Germany". Christian Science Monitor.
- ^ Morris, Jan (1997). Fifty years of Europe: an album. Villard. p. 71. ISBN 9780679416104.
- ^ Shears, p. 142
- ^ Shears, pp. 138–139
- ^ Shears, p. 131–137
- ^ Shears, p. 141
- ^ Shears, p. 18
- ^ Rottman, p. 40
- ^ a b c Display materials, Gedenkstätte Deutsche Teilung Marienborn
- ^ "History hits the wall – Tourists warm to Berlin's Cold War". Sunday Telegraph. 30 May 2004.
- ^ Shears, p. 144
- ^ Display materials, Grenzlandmuseum Eichsfeld
- ^ Hertle, p. 129
- ^ Cowell, Alan (12 September 1996). "Beside the Autobahn, a Cold-War Memory Lane". The New York Times.
- ^ Bailey, p. 31
- ^ Shears, p. 15
- ^ Shears, p. 146
- ^ "The formalities to be carried out by citizens of the GDR wishing to enter the Federal Republic." Grenzmuseum Eichsfeld
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 29
- ^ Bailey, p. 32
- ^ a b McCartney, Robert J. (16 April 1988). "E. Germany Relaxes Curbs on Working Citizens' Visits to West". The Washington Post.
- ^ Childs, David (1989). "The SED faces the challenges of Ostpolitik and Glasnost". East Germany in comparative perspective. Routledge. p. 5. ISBN 9780415004961.
- ^ Glaye, p. 137
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 30
- ^ a b c Dale, p. 87
- ^ Hertle, p. 124
- ^ Dale, pp. 87–88
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 44
- ^ Hertle, pp. 123–124
- ^ Dale, p. 88
- ^ Dale, p. 89
- ^ Hertle, p. 117
- ^ Pohl, Manfred (2000). "Farewell to a Model? German Experiences with Unification and Its Implications for Korean Strategies". In Radtke, Kurt Werner; Feddema, Raymond (eds.). Comprehensive security in Asia: views from Asia and the West on a changing security environment. BRILL. p. 338. ISBN 9789004112025.
- ^ Hertle, p. 118
- ^ Buschschluter, Siegfried (11 October 1981). "Trade in human beings costs Bonn dear". Guardian Weekly.
- ^ Shackley, Theodore; Finney, Richard A (2005). Spymaster: my life in the CIA. Brassey's. pp. 100–101. ISBN 9781574889154.
- ^ a b Jarausch, p. 17
- ^ a b "The number of escapees". Grenzmuseum Eichsfeld
- ^ Ritter, Jürgen; Lapp, Peter Joachim. Die Grenze Ein deutsches Bauwerk. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag. p. 78. ISBN 3861531402.
- ^ GDR Monitor, 1979
- ^ Alan L. Nothnagle, Building the East German myth: historical mythology and youth propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, p. 31. University of Michigan Press, 1990.
- ^ English translation of "Wer die Deutsche Demokratische Republik verläßt, stellt sich auf die Seite der Kriegstreiber" ("He Who Leaves the German Democratic Republic Joins the Warmongers", Notizbuch des Agitators ("Agitator's Notebook"), published by the Socialist Unity Party's Agitation Department, Berlin District, November 1955.
- ^ a b Connolly, Kate (13 August 2003). "'More than 1,000 died' trying to flee East Germany". Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
- ^ Hooper, John (7 August 2001). "East Germany jailed 75,000 escapers". The Guardian. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
- ^ "Victimized East Germans seek redress". Reuters. 11 September 1990.
- ^ "Homemade balloon carries 8 to freedom". The Prescott Courier. 17 September 1979.
- ^ "Climber flees East Germany". Sunday Star-News. 28 August 1987.
- ^ "East German Doctor Swims To Freedom". UPI. 4 August 1971.
- ^ "East German defector seventh since Saturday". Associated Press. 3 September 1987.
- ^ Cramer, pp. 122–123
- ^ "Two Families Flee From East Germany". The Times. 11 September 1964.
- ^ Cramer, p. 184
- ^ "Soviet soldier flees". The Times. 13 July 1984.
- ^ "Escape Into East Germany Not Blocked by Wire, Mines". 7 July 1963.
{{cite news}}: Unknown parameter|source=ignored (help) - ^ "Two Soldiers Go To E. Germany". The Times. 11 July 1959.
- ^ Walmer, Tracy (14 February 1990). "Wall's fall coaxes 2nd deserter back". USA Today.
- ^ "Why Have U.S. Army Men In Europe Defected Behind The Iron Curtain?". St. Petersburg Times. 14 June 1964.
- ^ a b "The Use of Firearms at the Border". Grenzmuseum Eichsfeld
- ^ Hertle, pp. 100–101
- ^ Rottman, p. 56
- ^ K.-H. W. v. Germany. European Court of Human Rights. Application no. 37201/97. Judgment on the Merits (22 March 2001)
- ^ Shears, p. 84
- ^ Eisenhammer, John (10 February 1992). "Dossier on the dark days of Communism". The Independent.
- ^ Shears, p. 84
- ^ "More Than 1,100 Berlin Wall Victims". Deutsche Welle. 9 August 2005. Retrieved 8 August 2009.
- ^ Cramer, p. 82
- ^ "Bild175-P05-00002-0001". Bundesarchiv. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
- ^ "East Germany Apologizes For Fatal Shooting of Italian". 7 August 1976.
{{cite news}}:|access-date=requires|url=(help) - ^ Mielke, Michael (6 May 2002). "Der Fall Gartenschläger". Retrieved 9 August 2009.
- ^ Cramer, p. 38
- ^ Baker, Frederick (2004). "The Berlin Wall". In Ganster, Paul; Lorey, David E. (eds.). Borders and border politics in a globalizing world. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780842051040.
- ^ "Sie gaben ihr Leben für ihr Vaterland". Neues Deutschland. 13–14 August 1989. p. 9.
- ^ Ladd, Brian (1998). The ghosts of Berlin: confronting German history in the urban landscape. University of Chicago Press. p. 25. ISBN 9780226467627.
- ^ Ladd, Brian (2004). The companion guide to Berlin. Boydell & Brewer. p. 107. ISBN 9781900639286.
- ^ Cramer, pp. 112–113
- ^ Todesopfer der DDR. Gedenkstätte Deutsche Teilung Marienborn
- ^ Meyer, Michael (2009). The Year that Changed the World. Scribner. p. 68. ISBN 9781416558453.
- ^ Meyer, pp. 26, 66
- ^ Meyer, p. 32
- ^ Meyer, p. 114
- ^ Meyer, p. 105
- ^ Meyer, p. 90
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 67
- ^ Meyer, p. 122
- ^ a b Childs (2001), p. 68
- ^ Sebasteyen, Victor (2009). Revolution 1989: the Fall of the Soviet Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. pp. 329–331. ISBN 9780297852230.
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 75
- ^ Childs, pp. 82–83
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 85
- ^ a b Hertle, p. 147
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 87
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 88
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 89
- ^ Jacoby, Jeff (8 November 1989). "The Wall came tumbling down". Boston Globe.
- ^ Eliason, Michael (28 January 1990). "A journey along the Iron Curtain today". Associated Press.
- ^ "Sister cities swap citizens across border for a day". Associated Press. 13 November 1989.
- ^ Quoted in August, p. 198
- ^ ""We Were Told to Stop Trespassing at All Costs"". Deutsche Welle. 2 November 2006.
- ^ Adam, Thomas (2005). Germany and the Americas: culture, politics, and history. ABC-CLIO. p. 114. ISBN 9781851096282.
- ^ Fröhling, Wolf Amadeus (2007). Ick ooch: meine 20 Jahre DDR und die Folgen. Dosse. p. 183. ISBN 9781851096282.
- ^ Nothnagle, Alan L. (1999). Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945–1989. University of Michigan Press. p. 17. ISBN 0472109464.
- ^ Nothnagle, pp. 202–203
- ^ Nothnagle, p. 204
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 90
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 100
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 105
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 129
- ^ Childs (2001), p. 140
- ^ Jackson, James O. (12 February 1990). "The Revolution Came From the People". Time.
- ^ a b Koenig, Robert L. (22 April 1990). "Unity replaces fence — German social, economic barriers next to fall". St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
- ^ Rottman, p. 58
- ^ a b Rottman, p. 61
- ^ Freytag, Konrad (1996). "Germany's Security Policy and the Role of Bundeswehr in the Post-Cold War Period"". In Trifunovska,Snezana (ed.). The Transatlantic Alliance on the Eve of the New Millennium. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 230. ISBN 9789041102430.
- ^ The Week in Germany. German Information Center. 1996. p. 13.
- ^ Thorson, Larry (11 November 1995). "Former German border almost free of mines". Austin American-Statesman.
- ^ Ritter, p. 179
- ^ a b Paterson, Tony (17 May 2009). "From Iron Curtain to Green Belt". Independent On Sunday.
- ^ Cramer, p. 9
- ^ Hall, Allan (19 May 2008). "Cold War legacy a haven for nature". The Age.
References
- Baker, Frederick (2004). "The Berlin Wall". In Ganster, Paul; Lorey, David E. (eds.). Borders and border politics in a globalizing world. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780842051040.
- Buchholz, Hanns (1994). "The Inner-German Border". In Grundy-Warr, Carl (ed.). Eurasia: World Boundaries Volume 3. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415088348.
- Childs, David (2001). The fall of the GDR. Pearson Education Ltd. ISBN 0582315689.
- Cramer, Michael (2008). German-German Border Trail. Rodingersdorf: Esterbauer. ISBN 9783850002547.
- Dale, Gareth (2005). Popular protest in East Germany, 1945–1989. Routledge. ISBN 9780714654089.
- Faringdon, Hugh (1986). Confrontation: the Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Books. ISBN 0710206763.
- Gleye, Paul (1991). Behind the wall: an American in East Germany, 1988–89. SIU Press. ISBN 9780809317431.
- Hertle, Hans-Hermann (2007). The Berlin Wall: Monument of the Cold War. Ch. Links Verlag. ISBN 9783861534631.
- Jarausch, Konrad Hugo (1994). The rush to German unity. Oxford University Press US. ISBN 9780195085778.
- Ritter, Jürgen; Lapp, Peter Joachim (2007). Die Grenze: ein deutsches Bauwerk. Ch. Links Verlag. ISBN 9783861534655.
- Rottman, Gordon L. (2008). The Berlin Wall and the Intra-German border 1961–89. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 9781846031939.
- Schweitzer, Carl Christoph (1995). Politics and government in Germany, 1944–1994: basic documents. Berghahn Books. ISBN 9781571818553.
- Shears, David (1970). The Ugly Frontier. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Stacy, William E. (1984). US Army Border Operations in Germany. US Army Military History Office. OCLC 53275935.
- Weber, Jürgen (2004). Germany, 1945–1990: a parallel history. Central European University Press. ISBN 9789639241701.
External links
- Many before-after-pictures of the inner-German border
- Pictures of the former inner-German border
- Links to many sites with GDR border system pictures
- Information on the GDR border system (in German, but with many pictures)
- Zonengrenz-Museum Helmstedt
- Experten Forum DDR grenze (in German and English, with pictures and videos)
- GDR-BRD Border Information (in German, with pictures and videos)
- Allied military trains crossing the zonal border at Marienborn. Includes 1969 sound clip with guard dogs.
- A free book in English about a series of journeys along the remnants of the border in 2003
- List of those killed on the inner German border (In German)
- Field research of the northern section of the former German-German border with photos and maps.
- The Lost Border: Photographs of the Iron Curtain
- "Grenzer". 1981 NVA propaganda film depicting the activities of the East German border guards. (In German)