Trichome

Content deleted Content added
Beginning requested copy-edit; c/e 1st two paras of header; clarify text
more serial commas, and a brief copy-edit. Ending copy-edit.
(124 intermediate revisions by 4 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Use American English|date=October 2012}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2012}}
{{Infobox officeholder
{{Infobox officeholder
|name = Hafez al-Assad
|name = Hafez al-Assad
Line 11: Line 13:
|term_end = 10 June 2000
|term_end = 10 June 2000
|vicepresident = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|vicepresident = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* [[Mahmoud al-Ayyubi]] <small>(1971-1974)</small>
* [[Mahmoud al-Ayyubi]] <small>(19711974)</small>
* [[Rifaat al-Assad]] <small>(1984-1998)</small>
* [[Rifaat al-Assad]] <small>(19841998)</small>
* [[Abdul Halim Khaddam]]
* [[Abdul Halim Khaddam]]
}}
}}
Line 18: Line 20:
|primeminister = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|primeminister = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* Himslef <small>(1971)</small>
* Himslef <small>(1971)</small>
* [[Abdul Rahman Kleifawi]] <small>(1971-1972)</small>
* [[Abdul Rahman Kleifawi]] <small>(1971–1972)</small>
* [[Mahmoud al-Ayyubi]] <small>(1972-1976)</small>
* [[Mahmoud al-Ayyubi]] <small>(19721976)</small>
* [[Abdul Rahman Kleifawi]] <small>(1976-1978)</small>
* [[Abdul Rahman Kleifawi]] <small>(19761978)</small>
* [[Muhammad Ali al-Halabi]] <small>(1978-1980)</small>
* [[Muhammad Ali al-Halabi]] <small>(19781980)</small>
* [[Abdul Rauf al-Kasm]] <small>(1980-1987)</small>
* [[Abdul Rauf al-Kasm]] <small>(19801987)</small>
* [[Mahmoud Zuabi]] <small>(1987-2000)</small>
* [[Mahmoud Zuabi]] <small>(19872000)</small>
* [[Muhammad Mustafa Mero]]
* [[Muhammad Mustafa Mero]]
}}
}}
Line 34: Line 36:
|term_end2 = 3 April 1971
|term_end2 = 3 April 1971
|president2 = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|president2 = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* [[Ahmad al-Khatib]] <small>(1970-1971)</small>
* [[Ahmad al-Khatib]] <small>(19701971)</small>
* Himself
* Himself
}}
}}
Line 53: Line 55:
|successor4 = [[Abdullah al-Ahmar]] <small>(''de facto''; al-Assad is still ''de jure'' Secretary General, even though he is dead.)</small>
|successor4 = [[Abdullah al-Ahmar]] <small>(''de facto''; al-Assad is still ''de jure'' Secretary General, even though he is dead.)</small>
|order5 =
|order5 =
|office5 = [[Minister of Defence of Syria]]
|office5 = [[Ministry of Defense (Syria)|Minister of Defense of Syria]]
|term_start5 = 23 February 1966
|term_start5 = 23 February 1966
|term_end5 = 1972
|term_end5 = 1972
|president5 = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|president5 = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* [[Nureddin al-Atassi]] <small>(1966-1970)</small>
* [[Nureddin al-Atassi]] <small>(19661970)</small>
* [[Ahmad al-Khatib]] <small>(1970-1971)</small>
* [[Ahmad al-Khatib]] <small>(19701971)</small>
* Himself
* Himself
}}
}}
}}
}}
|primeminister5 = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|primeminister5 = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* [[Yusuf Zuaiyin]] <small>(1966-1968)</small>
* [[Yusuf Zuaiyin]] <small>(19661968)</small>
* [[Nureddin al-Atassi]] <small>(1968-1970)</small>
* [[Nureddin al-Atassi]] <small>(19681970)</small>
* Himself <small>(1970-1971)</small>
* Himself <small>(19701971)</small>
* [[Abdul Rahman Kleifawi]]
* [[Abdul Rahman Kleifawi]]
}}
}}
Line 80: Line 82:
|nationality = [[Syrian people|Syrian]]
|nationality = [[Syrian people|Syrian]]
|party = [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Ba'ath Party (Syrian faction)]] <small>(since 1966)
|party = [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Ba'ath Party (Syrian faction)]] <small>(since 1966)
|otherparty = [[Ba'ath Party]] <small>(1947-1966)</small>{{-}}[[Arab Ba'ath Movement]] <small>(1946-1947)</small>
|otherparty = [[Ba'ath Party]] <small>(19471966)</small>{{-}}[[Arab Ba'ath Movement]] <small>(19461947)</small>
|spouse = Aniseh (née Makhluf)
|spouse = Aniseh (née Makhluf)
|relations = [[Jamil al-Assad]] (brother){{-}}[[Rifaat al-Assad]] (brother)
|relations = [[Jamil al-Assad]] (brother){{-}}[[Rifaat al-Assad]] (brother)
|children = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|children = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* [[Bushra al-Assad|Bushra]] <small>(b. 1960)</small>
* [[Bushra al-Assad|Bushra]] <small>(b. 1960)</small>
* [[Bassel al-Assad|Bassel]] <small>(1962-1994)</small>
* [[Bassel al-Assad|Bassel]] <small>(19621994)</small>
* [[Bashar al-Assad|Bashar]] <small>(b. 1965)</small>
* [[Bashar al-Assad|Bashar]] <small>(b. 1965)</small>
* [[Majd al-Assad|Majd]] <small>(1966-2009)</small>
* [[Majd al-Assad|Majd]] <small>(19662009)</small>
* [[Maher al-Assad|Maher]] <small>(b. 1968)</small>
* [[Maher al-Assad|Maher]] <small>(b. 1968)</small>
}}
}}
Line 99: Line 101:
|allegiance = {{flag|Syria}}
|allegiance = {{flag|Syria}}
|branch = [[Syrian Air Force]]
|branch = [[Syrian Air Force]]
|serviceyears = 1950-1972
|serviceyears = 19501972
|rank = [[General]]
|rank = [[General]]
|unit =
|unit =
Line 105: Line 107:
|battles = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
|battles = {{List collapsed|title=''See list''|1={{plain list|
* [[Six Day War]] <small>(1967)</small>
* [[Six Day War]] <small>(1967)</small>
* [[War of Attrition]] <small>(1967-1970)</small>
* [[War of Attrition]] <small>(19671970)</small>
* [[Black September in Jordan|Black September]] <small>(1970-1971)</small>
* [[Black September in Jordan|Black September]] <small>(19701971)</small>
* [[Yom Kippur War]] <small>(1973)</small>
* [[Yom Kippur War]] <small>(1973)</small>
* [[Lebanese Civil War]] <small>(1975-1990)</small>
* [[Lebanese Civil War]] <small>(19751990)</small>
* [[Islamic uprising in Syria]] <small>(1979-1982)</small>
* [[Islamic uprising in Syria]] <small>(19791982)</small>
* [[1982 Lebanon War]] <small>(1982-1983)</small>
* [[1982 Lebanon War]] <small>(19821983)</small>
* [[Gulf War]] <small>(1990-1991)</small>
* [[Gulf War]] <small>(19901991)</small>
}}
}}
}}
}}
|awards =
|awards =
}}
}}
'''Hafez al-Assad''' ({{lang-ar|حافظ الأسد}}, <small>[[Levantine Arabic|Levantine]] pronunciation:</small> {{IPA-ar|ˈħaːfezˤ elˈʔasad|}}; 6 October 1930 – 10 June 2000) was a [[Syrian people|Syrian]] statesman, politician and general who served as [[Prime Minister of Syria]] between 1970 and 1971 and then [[President of Syria|President]] between 1971 and 2000. He also served as [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party]], [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Secretary General of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party]] from 1970 to 2000 and [[Ministry of Defence (Syria)|Minister of Defence]] from 1966 to 1972. Politically, Assad was a [[Ba'athism|Ba'athist]] and adhered to an ideology of [[Arab nationalism]] and [[Arab socialism]]. Under his administration the [[Syria|Syrian Arab Republic]] saw increased stability, with a program of secularization and industrialization designed to modernize and strengthen the country as a regional power.
'''Hafez al-Assad''' ({{lang-ar|حافظ الأسد}}, <small>[[Levantine Arabic|Levantine]] pronunciation:</small> {{IPA-ar|ˈħaːfezˤ elˈʔasad|}}; 6 October 1930 – 10 June 2000) was a [[Syria|Syrian]] statesman, politician and general who served as [[Prime Minister of Syria]] between 1970 and 1971, and [[President of Syria|President]] between 1971 and 2000. He also served as [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party]], [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Secretary General of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party]] from 1970 to 2000, and [[Ministry of Defense (Syria)|Minister of Defense]] from 1966 to 1972. Assad was a [[Ba'athism|Ba'athist]] politician and adhered to the ideologies of [[Arab nationalism]] and [[Arab socialism]]. Under his administration the Syrian Arab Republic experienced increased stability and implemented a program of secularization and industrialization designed to modernize and strengthen the country as a regional power.


Born to a poor [[Alawi]]te family, Assad joined the Syrian wing of the Ba'ath Party in 1946 as a student activist. In 1952 he entered the [[Homs Military Academy]] and graduated three years later as a pilot. Between 1959 and 1961 during Syria's short-lived union with Egypt in the [[United Arab Republic]], Assad was exiled to Egypt, where he and other military officers formed a committee to resurrect the fortunes of the Syrian Ba'ath Party. After the Ba'athists took power in 1963, Assad became commander of the air force. In 1966, after taking part in a coup that overthrew the civilian leadership of the party and sent its founders into exile, he became minister of defence. During Assad’s ministry, Syria lost the [[Golan Heights]] to Israel in the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967, a blow that shaped much of his future political career. Assad then engaged in a protracted power struggle with [[Salah al-Jadid]], chief of staff of the armed forces, Assad's political mentor, and effective leader of Syria until November 1970, when Assad seized control and arrested Jadid and other members of the government. He became prime minister and in 1971 was elected president.
Born to a poor [[Alawi]]te family, Assad joined the Syrian wing of the Ba'ath Party in 1946 as a student activist. In 1952 he entered the [[Homs Military Academy]] and graduated three years later as a pilot. Between 1959 and 1961 during Syria's short-lived [[United Arab Republic|union with Egypt]], he was exiled to Egypt, where he formed a committee to resurrect the fortunes of the Syrian Ba'ath Party. After the Ba'athists took power in 1963, Assad became commander of the air force. In 1966, after taking part in a coup that overthrew the party's civilian leadership, he became Minister of Defense. During Assad’s ministry, Syria lost the [[Golan Heights]] to Israel in the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967, a blow that shaped much of his future political career. He then engaged in a protracted power struggle with [[Salah al-Jadid]], chief of staff of the armed forces and effective leader of Syria. In November 1970, Assad seized control and arrested Jadid and other members of the government. He became prime minister and in 1971 was elected president.


In 1973 Assad changed [[Constitution of Syria|Syria's Constitution]] in order to guarantee equal status for women and enable non-Muslims to become president; the latter change was reverted under pressure from the [[Muslim Brotherhood]]. Assad set about building up the Syrian military with Soviet aid and gaining popular support with public works funded by Arab donors and international lending institutions. Political dissenters were eliminated by arrest, torture, and execution, and when the Muslim Brotherhood mounted a rebellion in [[Hama massacre|Hama]] in 1982, Assad suppressed it, killing between 10,000&ndash;25,000 people. In foreign affairs Assad tried to establish Syria as a leader of the Arab world. A new alliance with Egypt culminated in the [[Yom Kippur War]] against Israel in October 1973, but Egypt's unexpected cessation of hostilities exposed Syria to military defeat. In 1976, with Lebanon racked by the [[Lebanese Civil War|civil war]], Assad dispatched several divisions to that country and secured their permanent presence there as part of a peacekeeping force sponsored by the [[Arab League]]. After Israel's invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982–1985, Assad was able to reassert control of the country, eventually compelling Lebanese Christians to accept constitutional changes granting Muslims equal representation in government. Assad also aided Palestinian and Lebanese resistance groups based in Lebanon and Syria. Assad supported Iran in its [[Iraq-Iran War|war]] against Iraq (1980–1988), and joined the US-led alliance against Iraq in the [[Gulf War]] of 1990–1991. Assad sought to establish peaceful relations with Israel in the mid-1990s, but his repeated call for the return of the Golan Heights stalled the talks. He died of a heart attack, and was succeeded as president by his son, [[Bashar al-Assad]].
In 1973 Assad changed [[Constitution of Syria|Syria's Constitution]] to guarantee equal status for women and enable non-Muslims to become president; the latter change was reverted under pressure from the [[Muslim Brotherhood]]. With aid from the [[Soviet Union]], he built up the Syrian military and gained popular support through public works funded by Arab donors and international lending institutions. Political dissenters were eliminated by arrest, torture, and execution. When the Muslim Brotherhood mounted a rebellion in [[Hama massacre|Hama]] in 1982, Assad suppressed it and killed 10,000&ndash;25,000 people. He tried to establish Syria as a leader of the Arab world. A new alliance with Egypt culminated in the [[Yom Kippur War]] against Israel in October 1973, but Egypt's unexpected cessation of hostilities exposed Syria to military defeat. In 1976, during the [[Lebanese Civil War]], Assad dispatched several divisions to that country and secured their permanent presence as part of a peacekeeping force sponsored by the [[Arab League]]. After Israel's invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982–1985, he reasserted control of that country and compelled Lebanese Christians to accept constitutional changes granting Muslims equal representation in government. He aided Palestinian and Lebanese resistance groups in Lebanon and Syria, supported Iran in its [[Iraq-Iran War|war against Iraq]] (1980–1988), and joined the US-led alliance against Iraq in the [[Gulf War]] of 1990–1991. Assad sought to establish peaceful relations with Israel in the mid-1990s, but his repeated call for the return of the Golan Heights stalled the talks. He constructed a [[cult of personality]] and placed statues and posters bearing images of himself in public places. Assad died of a heart attack on 10 June 2000 and was succeeded as president by his son, [[Bashar al-Assad]].


== Early life and education ==
Assad was a controversial and highly divisive world figure, being lauded as a champion of secularism, women's rights and Syrian nationalism by his supporters, but his critics have accused him of being a dictator who constructed a [[cult of personality]] and whose authoritarian administration oversaw the [[Human rights in Syria|multiple human rights abuses]] both at home and abroad.


=== Family ===
==Early life and education==

===Family===
{{main|Al-Assad family}}
{{main|Al-Assad family}}
Hafez was born on 6 October 1930 in [[Qardaha]], to an [[Alawi]]te family.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=52}} His parents were Na'sa and Ali Sulayman. Hafez was Ali's ninth son and the fourth son from his second marriage.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=127-128}} Sulayman was known for his strength and shooting abilities, so locals gave him a nickname Wahhish (a wild beast).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=3}} Hafez's father, born in 1875, inherited many characteristics of his own father, he was strong, brave, much respected and excellent shot. His father married twice and had eleven children.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=5}} By the 1920s, he became well-respected among the locals, and like many others, he opposed the French occupation initially.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=25}} Nevertheless, Ali Sulayman later cooperated with the French administration and was appointed to an official post. In 1936, he was one of 80 Alawi notables who signed a famous letter that was addressed to the French Prime Minister stating that "Alawi people rejected attachment to Syria and wished to stay under French protection."{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=20}} For his accomplishments, he was called al-Assad (a lion) by the locals.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=25}} He made his nickname a surname in 1927.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}}
Hafez was born on 6 October 1930 in [[Qardaha]] to an [[Alawi]]te family.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=52}} His parents were Na'sa and Ali Sulayman. Hafez was Ali's ninth son and the fourth son from his second marriage.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=127-128}} Sulayman married twice, had eleven children,{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=5}} and was known for his strength and shooting abilities, so locals nicknamed him Wahhish (a wild beast).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=3}} By the 1920s, he became well-respected among the locals, and like many others he opposed the French occupation initially.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=25}} Nevertheless, Ali Sulayman later cooperated with the French administration and was appointed to an official post. In 1936, he was one of 80 Alawi notables who signed a letter addressed to the French Prime Minister stating that "Alawi people rejected attachment to Syria and wished to stay under French protection."{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=20}} For his accomplishments, he was called al-Assad (a lion) by the locals.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=25}} He made his nickname a surname in 1927.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}}

===Education===
Alawites at first opposed the united Syrian state, as they thought they would be in danger as a religious minority. Hafez's father shared this opinion. As the French left Syria, many Syrians became suspicious of Alawites for their alignment with France.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=28}} At the time, Hafez left his Alawite village and started education in a Sunni-dominant{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=52}} [[Latakia]] when he was nine.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} He was the first member of the Alawite community to attend a high school.{{sfn|Jammal|2007|p=128}} In Latakia, Assad faced the anti-Alawite prejudice of the Sunnis for the first time. However, he was an excellent student, winning a few prizes when he was around fourteen.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=28}} In Latakia, Assad lived in a poor, predominantly Alawite part of the town. In order to fit in, he approached the political parties that welcomed Alawites. These parties, that also supported secularism, were the [[Syrian Communist Party]], the [[Syrian Social Nationalist Party]] and the [[Arab Ba'ath Movement|Ba'ath Party]]; Assad joined the last one in 1946,{{sfn|Jammal|2007|p=128}} while some of his friends were also members of the Nationalist Party.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=28-29}}


===Education and early political career===
Assad was an asset to the party, organizing Ba'ath students' cells and carrying its message to the poor sections of Latakia and Alawite villages. As a result, he was opposed by the [[Muslim Brotherhood]], which was allied to wealthy conservative Muslim families. Both rich and poor sent their children to the same high school. Assad was joined by the anti-establishment poor Sunni Muslim youth from the Ba'ath Party in his confrontations with the children of the rich Brotherhood members. He made many Sunni friends, who would later became his political allies.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} While he was still a teenager, Hafez became invaluable to the Ba'ath Party.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=31}} He was an organizer and recruiter, the head of his school's student affair committee between 1949 and 1951, and later President of the Union of Syrian Students.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} During his political activity in school, he met many men that would serve him while he was a president.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=31}}
Alawites at first opposed the united Syrian state as they thought that their status as a religious minority would put them in danger. Hafez's father shared this opinion. As the French left Syria, many Syrians became suspicious of Alawites for their alignment with France.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=28}} At the time, Hafez left his Alawite village and started education in a Sunni-dominant{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=52}} [[Latakia]] when he was nine.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} He was the first member of the Alawite community to attend a high school.{{sfn|Jammal|2007|p=128}} In Latakia, Assad faced the anti-Alawite prejudice of the Sunnis. However, he was an excellent student, winning a few prizes when he was around fourteen.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=28}} Assad lived in a poor, predominantly Alawite part of Latakia. In order to fit in, he approached the political parties that welcomed Alawites. These parties, that also supported secularism, were the [[Syrian Communist Party]], the [[Syrian Social Nationalist Party]], and the [[Arab Ba'ath Movement|Ba'ath Party]]; Assad joined the last one in 1946,{{sfn|Jammal|2007|p=128}} while some of his friends were also members of the Nationalist Party.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=28-29}}The Ba'ath Party, also called the Renaissance Party, was a [[Pan-Arabism|Pan-Arabic]] [[Socialism|socialist]] party.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=29-31}}


Assad was an asset to the party, organizing Ba'ath students' cells and carrying its message to the poor sections of Latakia and Alawite villages. He was opposed by the [[Muslim Brotherhood]], which was allied to wealthy conservative Muslim families. The high school catered for the children of both rich and poor families. Assad was joined by the poor, anti-establishment Sunni Muslim youth from the Ba'ath Party in his confrontations with the children of the rich Brotherhood members. He made many Sunni friends, some of whom later became his political allies.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} While he was still a teenager, Hafez became invaluable to the Ba'ath Party.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=31}} He was an organizer and recruiter, the head of his school's student affair committee between 1949 and 1951, and later President of the Union of Syrian Students.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} During his political activity in school, he met many men that would serve him while he was president.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=31}}
The Ba'ath Party, also called the Renaissance Party, was a [[Pan-Arabism|Pan-Arabic]] [[Socialism|socialist]] party. In 1947 the [[United Nations]] agreed to decree a large portion of Palestinians in the Jewish state. Leaders of the Ba'ath Party were incensed, as this was opposed to their idea about Pan-Arabism. In 1948, Syria and other Arab countries invaded [[Israel]], in a war known as the [[1948 Arab-Israeli War|Arab-Israeli War]]. The Arab countries lost that war, leaving Syria with a lot of Palestinian refugees. In 1949, Syria witnessed a very unstable political situation. The army officer [[Husni al-Za'im]] came to power in March, but was overthrown in August by [[Sami al-Hinnawi]]. In turn, al-Hinnawi was overthrown and arrested in December and replaced by another army officer [[Adib Shishakli]], who ruled Syria until 1954. During the Shishakli's rule, the Ba'ath Party was forced to operate underground. The Ba'ath Party succeeded to regroup, however, often by establishing coalitions with peasants, soldiers and students.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=29-31}}


==Air Force career==
==Air Force career==
[[File:Hafezalassad.jpg|thumb|left|Hafez al-Assad (above) standing on the wing of a [[Fiat G.46]]-4B, with fellow cadets at the Syrian AF Academy outside [[Aleppo]], 1951/52]]
[[File:Hafezalassad.jpg|thumb|left|Hafez al-Assad (above) standing on the wing of a [[Fiat G.46]]-4B, with fellow cadets at the Syrian AF Academy outside [[Aleppo]], 1951/52]]
After his graduation from high school, Hafez wanted to be a medical doctor, but his father was unable to pay for his study at the Jesuit University of St. Joseph in [[Beirut]], so he decided to join the military.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} In 1950, like many other Alawites, he decided to join the [[Syrian Armed Forces]].{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=31}} At first, he entered the Military Academy in Homs, which offered free food, lodging and a stipend that suited him.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} Assad wanted to fly, and was the first out of fifteen cadets to enter the flying school in Aleppo in 1950.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129}} Assad eventually graduated in 1955, after which he was commissioned as a [[lieutenant]] in the [[Syrian Air Force]].{{sfn|Tucker|Roberts|2008|p=168}} Assad won the best-aviator trophy upon his graduation as he was a talented pilot{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129}} After he graduated, Assad was assigned to the [[Mezze]] air base near Damascus.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=49}} While he was a lieutenant in his early 20s, he married Aniseh Makhlouf, a distant relative of a powerful family.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=34}}
After his graduation from high school, Assad wanted to be a medical doctor but his father could not pay for his study at the Jesuit University of St. Joseph in [[Beirut]].{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} Instead, in 1950 he decided to join the [[Syrian Armed Forces]].{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=31}} Assad entered the Military Academy in Homs, which offered free food, lodging and a stipend that suited him.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=128}} He wanted to fly, and entered the flying school in Aleppo in 1950.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129}} Assad graduated in 1955, after which he was commissioned as a [[lieutenant]] in the [[Syrian Air Force]].{{sfn|Tucker|Roberts|2008|p=168}} Upon his graduation from the flying school, he won a trophy for the best aviator{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129}} and shortly afterwards was assigned to the [[Mezze]] air base near Damascus.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=49}} While he was a lieutenant in his early 20s, he married Aniseh Makhlouf, a distant relative of a powerful family.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=34}}


In 1954, the military split in the revolt against Shishakli. [[Hashim al-Atassi]], head of the National Bloc, who was briefly the president after Hinnawi's coup, returned as president, and Syria was again under the civil rule. After Assad's graduation in 1955, Atassi's hold on the country was increasingly shaky. At the 1955 election, Atassi was replaced by [[Shukri al-Quwatli]], the former president from the pre-independence days. Also at the time, the Ba'ath Party started to get close to the Communist Party; not because of shared ideology, but shared opposition towards the west.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=32}} While at the Academy, he also met [[Mustafa Tlass]], his future Minister of Defence.{{sfn|Leverett|2005|p=231}} When in 1956 Nasser took over control of the [[Suez Canal]], Hafez flew in an air defence mission over Syria, which feared retaliation from the British.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=33}} In 1955, Assad was sent to Egypt for a further six months training. He was among the Syrian pilots who were sent to fly to Cairo to show Syria's commitment to Egypt, as they were threatened at the time by Israel and members of the Bagdad Pact, including Iraq and Turkey. The next year, after he finished a course in Egypt, he returned to a small air base near Damascus. In that year, during the [[Suez Crisis]], Assad flew a reconnaissance mission over northern and eastern Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=50-51}} In 1957 Assad became squadron commander and was sent for training to the Soviet Union to fly [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17|MiG-17]].{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}} He spent ten months in the Soviet Union, during which he fathered a daughter who died as an infant while he was abroad.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=34}}
In 1954, the military split in a revolt against [[Adib Shishakli]]. [[Hashim al-Atassi]], head of the National Bloc and briefly the president after [[Sami al-Hinnawi]]'s coup, returned as president; Syria was again under the civilian rule. After 1955, Atassi's hold on the country was increasingly shaky. At the 1955 election, Atassi was replaced by [[Shukri al-Quwatli]], who had been president before Syria's independence from France. At the time, the Ba'ath Party started to get close to the Communist Party; not because of shared ideology, but shared opposition towards the west.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=32}} While at the Academy, Assad met [[Mustafa Tlass]], his future Minister of Defense.{{sfn|Leverett|2005|p=231}} When in 1956 [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] took control of the [[Suez Canal]], Syria feared retaliation from the United Kingdom and Hafez flew in an air defense mission.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=33}} In 1955, Assad was sent to Egypt for a further six months training. He was among the Syrian pilots who were sent to fly to Cairo to show Syria's commitment to Egypt, which was threatened by Israel and members of the [[Central Treaty Organization|Baghdad Pact]], which included Iraq and Turkey. After he finished a course in Egypt the following year, Assad returned to a small air base near Damascus. In that year, during the [[Suez Crisis]], Assad flew a reconnaissance mission over northern and eastern Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=50-51}} In 1957, Assad became squadron commander and was sent the the Soviet Union for training to fly the[[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17|MiG-17]].{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}} He spent ten months in the Soviet Union, during which he fathered a daughter who died as an infant while he was abroad.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=34}}


In 1958, Syria and [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] led Egypt formed the [[United Arab Republic]] (UAR), separating themselves from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, that were aligned to Great Britain. This pact led to the rejection of Communist influence in favor of the Egyptian control over Syria. All Syrian political parties, including Assad's Ba'ath Party, were dissolved. Senior officers, especially those who supported the Communists, were dismissed from the Syrian Armed Forces. Assad however remained in the army and rose quickly through the ranks to fill in the vacuum.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=32-34}} Captain Assad was transferred to Egypt. Assad continued his military education in Egypt, studying together with his Egyptian colleague [[Hosni Mubarak]], the future president of Egypt.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}
In 1958, Syria and Egypt formed the [[United Arab Republic]] (UAR), separating themselves from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, which were aligned to the United Kingdom. This pact led to the rejection of Communist influence in favor of Egyptian control over Syria. All Syrian political parties, including the Ba'ath Party, were dissolved. Senior officers, especially those who supported the Communists, were dismissed from the Syrian Armed Forces. Assad however remained in the army and rose quickly through its ranks.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=32-34}} After attaining the rank of captain, Assad was transferred to Egypt where he continued his military education, studying together with his Egyptian colleague [[Hosni Mubarak]], the future president of Egypt.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}


==Rise to power==
==Rise to power==
{{see also|1966 Syrian coup d'état}}
{{see also|1966 Syrian coup d'état}}
[[File:Assad1.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad in 1970]]
[[File:Assad1.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad in 1970]]
Assad wasn't content with a professional military career. He regarded it as an avenue for political ascent. After the UAR was created, [[Michel Aflaq]], leader of the Ba'ath Party was forced by Nasser to dissolved the Ba'ath Party, which he did.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=98}} During the existence of the UAR the Ba'ath Party suffered a serious crisis.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=65}} Several members of the Ba'ath Party, mostly young, blamed Aflaq for the bad situation within the party. In order to resurrect the [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|Syrian Regional Branch]] of the Ba'ath Party, [[Muhammad Umran]], [[Salah Jadid]] and Assad, amongst others, established the Military Committee.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=60-61}} In years 1957–58 Assad acquired a dominant position. Assad did not despair because of his transfer to Egypt. Moreover, hard-working, skilful and highly ambitious Assad became, along with senior [[Alawite]] and [[Druze]] officers, one of the leaders of the Military Committee, which was established in Egypt with aim of rescuing the UAR from dissolution. However, after Syria left the UAR in September 1961, Assad, like other Ba'athist officers, was eased out from the military by the new regime in [[Damascus]], and was given a minor clerical position in the Ministry of Transport.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}
Assad was not content with a professional military career and regarded it as an avenue into politics. After the UAR was created, [[Michel Aflaq]], leader of the Ba'ath Party, was forced by Nasser to dissolved the Ba'ath Party, which he did.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=98}} During the existence of the UAR the Ba'ath Party suffered a serious crisis,{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=65}} for which several of its members—mostly young—blamed Aflaq. In order to resurrect the [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|Syrian Regional Branch]] of the Ba'ath Party, [[Muhammad Umran]], [[Salah Jadid]] and Assad, among others, established the Military Committee.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=60-61}} In the period 1957–58 Assad acquired a dominant position in the party and did not despair because of his transfer to Egypt. He was hard-working, skillful and highly ambitious, and became one of the leaders of the Military Committee, which was established in Egypt with aim of rescuing the UAR from dissolution. However, after Syria left the UAR in September 1961, Assad and other Ba'athist officers were removed from the military by the new regime in Damascus, and Assad given a minor clerical position in the Ministry of Transport.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53}}


Assad was involved in the 1962 military coup, but played only a minor role. After the coup failed, he was jailed for a time in Lebanon, after which he was brought back to Syria.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=38}} In the same year, Aflaq convened the Fifth Congress of the Ba'ath Party where he was reelected as the National Command's Secretary General and ordered the reestablishment of the Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba'ath Party. At the Congress, the Military Committee through Umran established contacts with Aflaq and the Ba'athist leadership. The Military Committee asked for permission to seize power through forceful means; Aflaq consented to the conspiracy.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=75}} After the success of the [[February 1963 Iraqi coup d'état|Iraqi coup d'état]], led by the Ba'ath Party's [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region|Iraqi Regional Branch]], the Military Committee hastly convened to launch a coup against al-Kudsi.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=76-78}} Assad himself was involved in the planning of the [[8th of March Revolution|Ba'athist military coup]].{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=38}} In March 1963, when the plan was executed, Assad played a major role in the coup.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53-54}} The coup was planned for the 7 March, but was postponed for the next day, which Assad had announced to the other units.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=76}} During the coup Assad led a small group to capture the [[Dumayr]] air base, 40 kilometers north-east of Damascus. His group was the only one to see resistance. Some of the planes in the air base were ordered to bomb the conspirators, and because of it, Assad hastened to reach the air base before the dawn. Problems occurred when it took longer than planned to get the 70th Armoured Brigade to surrender, and because of it, Assad managed to arrive at broad daylight. Assad threatened the base commander that he would shell them if they wouldn't surrender, the base commander responded by initiating negotiations with Assad and eventually surrendered. Assad himself claimed that the base was able to defend it's self from his forces.{{sfn|Selae|1990|p=77}} After the coup was over, Assad was promoted to major and subsequently to lieutenant-colonel, and by the end of 1963, he was put in charge of the Syrian Air Force. By the end of 1964 he was named commander of the Syrian Air Force with a rank of major general.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53-54}} Even though still a leader of the Ba'ath Party, the Military Committee was seizing power from Aflaq the civilian wing of the party.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=88}}
Assad played a minor role in the failed 1962 military coup, for which he was jailed in Lebanon and was later repatriated.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=38}} In the same year, Aflaq convened the Fifth Congress of the Ba'ath Party, where he was reelected as the National Command's Secretary General and ordered the re-establishment of the party's Syrian Regional Branch. At the Congress, the Military Committee through Umran established contacts with Aflaq and the Ba'athist leadership. The Military Committee asked for permission to seize power through forceful means; Aflaq consented to the conspiracy.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=75}} After the success of the [[February 1963 Iraqi coup d'état|Iraqi coup d'état]], led by the Ba'ath Party's [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region|Iraqi Regional Branch]], the Military Committee hastily convened to launch a [[8th of March Revolution|Ba'athist military coup]] in March 1963 against President [[Nazim al-Kudsi]],{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=76-78}}which Assad helped to plan and played a major role.{{sfn|Zahler|2009|p=38}}{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53-54}} The coup was planned for the 7 March, but was postponed until the next day, which Assad had announced to the other units.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=76}} During the coup Assad led a small group to capture the [[Dumayr]] air base, {{convert|40|km}} northeast of Damascus. His group was the only one to see resistance. Some of the airplanes at the base were ordered to bomb the conspirators, and because of this, Assad hastened to reach the base before dawn. It took longer than planned to get the 70th Armored Brigade to surrender, because of which Assad arrived in broad daylight. He threatened the base commander that he would shell them if they did not surrender; the base commander initiated negotiations with Assad and eventually surrendered. Assad claimed that the base was able to defend itsself from his forces.{{sfn|Selae|1990|p=77}} After the coup was over, Assad was promoted to major and subsequently to lieutenant-colonel, and by the end of 1963 he was put in charge of the Syrian Air Force. By the end of 1964 he was named commander of the Syrian Air Force with a rank of major general.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=53-54}} Even though still a leader of the Ba'ath Party, the Military Committee was seizing power from the civilian wing of the party under Aflaq.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=88}}


Assad turned the Air Force into his power base by lavishing special privileges on its officers, appointing his confidants to senior and sensitive positions, and establishing an efficient intelligence network. Thus the Air Force Intelligence, under command of [[Muhammad al-Khuli]], became independent of Syria's other intelligence organizations and was given assignments beyond the Air Force arena. Apparently, Assad prepared himself at the time to take an active role in the power struggles that lay ahead. Between 1963 and 1970, Assad demonstrated a unique combination of traits, ambition and single-mindedness, patience, and caution, coolness and manipulativeness, in order to reach the supreme position in the country. In the first stage of the power struggle, Assad remained the junior partner in the leading Alawite Triumvirate of the Military Committee, along with generals Umran and Jadid. However, when Umran, the senior member of the Military Committee, changed his allegiance to Aflaq, [[Salah al-Din al-Bitar]], [[Munif al-Razzaz]] and the civilian leadership in 1965, the power struggle which had lasted since taking power, the remaining members of the Military Committee launched the [[1966 Syrian coup d'état]] and overthrew the civilian Ba'athist leadership.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54}} The coup led to a permanent schism within the Ba'ath movement, the birth of [[neo-Ba'athism]] and the establishment of two centers for the international Ba'athist movement (one Iraqi dominated, another Syrian dominated).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=102}}
As head of the Air Force, Assad gave special privileges to its officers, appointed his confidants to senior and sensitive positions, and established an efficient intelligence network. Thus the Air Force Intelligence, under command of [[Muhammad al-Khuli]], became independent of Syria's other intelligence organizations and was given assignments beyond the Air Force. Assad prepared himself to take an active role in the power struggles that lay ahead. Between 1963 and 1970, he demonstrated ambition, single-mindedness, patience, caution, coolness and manipulativeness. In the first stage of the power struggle, Assad remained the junior partner in the leading Alawite Triumvirate of the Military Committee, along with generals Umran and Jadid. However, when Umran, the senior member of the Military Committee, changed his allegiance to Aflaq, [[Salah al-Din al-Bitar]], [[Munif al-Razzaz]] and the civilian leadership in 1965, the power struggle which had lasted since taking power, the remaining members of the Military Committee launched the [[1966 Syrian coup d'état]] and overthrew the civilian Ba'athist leadership.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54}} This coup led to a permanent schism within the Ba'ath movement, the advent of [[neo-Ba'athism]] and the establishment of two centers for the international Ba'athist movement—one Iraqi dominated, another Syrian dominated.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=102}}


After the coup, Assad was named Minister of Defence, and was the second most influential person in the neo-Ba'athist regime. While holding this ministry, Assad prepared for ousting Jadid. He turned the military into his power base and employed brutal force and political manipulation as well as ideological and strategic arguments to undermine Jadid's position and gain supremacy.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54}} In 1970 Syria supported Palestinian guerrila in war against Jordan known as the [[Black September in Jordan|Black September]], and Jadid sent an armored force to aid the Palestinians.{{sfn|Carter|Dunston|Thomas|2008|p=30}} Assad opposed Syria's intervention, and refused to send the Air Force in support, which allowed the [[Royal Jordanian Air Force]] to route the Syrian armor unopposed and turned the invasion into a disaster.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|pp=339–340}} Paradoxically, Syria's defeat in the [[War of Attrition]] between 1967 and 1970 against Israel and fiasco against Jordan in the Black September, were both skilfully utilized by Assad to discredit Jadid and extend his own control over the Armed Forces and the Ba'ath Party. In addition, in two successive military coups in February 1969 and in [[1970 Syrian Corrective Revolution|November 1970]], Assad evicted and arrested Jadid and his senior followers in the government, and assumed unchallenged control over Syria.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54}} After taking power, Assad expanded his control over the military and expanded the network of the security organizations; by this he wanted to gain support from both Sunni and non-Sunni Syrians.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54-55}} Assad succeeded to become a popular leader deriving his authority from the people. His wish for power, however, was also motivated by his nationalist views; Assad believed in creation of the [[Greater Syria]] by creating a political-military alliance with Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinians.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=52-55}}
After the coup, Assad was appointed Minister of Defense, and became the second most influential person in the neo-Ba'athist regime. While holding this ministry, Assad prepared for ousting Salah Jadid, the country's ''de facto'' leader. Assad turned the military into his power base and employed brutal force, political manipulation, and ideological and strategic arguments to undermine Jadid's position and gain supremacy.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54}} In 1970, Syria supported Palestinian guerrillas in their war against Jordan, known as the [[Black September in Jordan|Black September]], and Jadid sent an armored force to aid the Palestinians.{{sfn|Carter|Dunston|Thomas|2008|p=30}} Assad opposed Syria's intervention and refused to send the Air Force in support, which allowed the [[Royal Jordanian Air Force]] to rout the Syrian forces unopposed and turned the invasion into a disaster.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|pp=339–340}} Assad used Syria's defeat in the [[War of Attrition]] against Israel between 1967 and 1970 and the Black September affair to discredit Jadid and extend his own control over the Armed Forces and the Ba'ath Party. In two military coups in February 1969 and [[1970 Syrian Corrective Revolution|November 1970]], Assad evicted and arrested Jadid and his senior followers in the government, and assumed unchallenged control over Syria.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54}} Assad expanded his control over the military and expanded the network of the security organizations in order to gain support from both Sunni and non-Sunni Syrians.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=54-55}} Assad successfully became a popular leader deriving his authority from the people. His wish for power was also motivated by his nationalist views; Assad believed in the creation of [[Greater Syria]] by creating a political and military alliance with Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=52-55}}


==Presidency==
==Presidency==
Line 160: Line 158:
===Gaining support===
===Gaining support===
{{Ba'athism sidebar}}
{{Ba'athism sidebar}}
In 1971, while Prime Minister, Assad embarked a "corrective movement" at the Eleventh National Congress of the Ba'ath Party. There was to be a general revision of national policy, which also included the introduction of measures, including religion, to consolidate his rule. His Ba'athist predecessors had restricted control of Islam in public life and government.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129-130}} Because of the Constitution which only allowed Sunnis to became presidents,{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}} Assad, unlike his predecessor Jadid, represented himself as a pious Muslim. In order to get the ''[[ulama]]'', the educated Muslim class, on his side, he prayed in Sunni mosques, even though he was an Alawite. Among the measures he took were the raising in rank of some 2,000 religious functionaries, the appointment of an ''[[alim]]'' as minister of religious functionaries and construction of mosques. He even appointed little known Sunni Muslim teacher, [[Ahmad al-Khatib]], as Head of State in order to satisfy the Sunni majority.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129-130}} Assad also appointed Sunnis to senior positions in the government, the military and the party, moreover all of his prime ministers, defence ministers and foreign ministers, as well as majority of his cabinet, were Sunnis. In the early 1970s, he was even verified as an authentic Muslim by the Sunni Mufti of Damascus. He also made the ''[[Hajj]]'', the pilgrimage to [[Mecca]]. In his speeches, he often used Muslim terms like "''[[jihad]]''" (a holy war) and "''[[shahada]]''" (martyrdom), both terms referred to fighting Israel.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}}
In 1971, while Prime Minister, Assad embarked upon a "corrective movement" at the Eleventh National Congress of the Ba'ath Party. There was to be a general revision of national policy, which also included the introduction of measures to consolidate his rule. His Ba'athist predecessors had restricted control of Islam in public life and government.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129-130}} Because the Constitution allowed only Sunnis to became president,{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}} Assad, unlike Jadid, presented himself as a pious Muslim. In order to gain support from the ''[[ulama]]''—the educated Muslim class— he prayed in Sunni mosques, even though he was an Alawite. Among the measures he introduced were the raising in rank of some 2,000 religious functionaries and the appointment of an ''[[alim]]'' as minister of religious functionaries and construction of mosques. He appointed a little-known Sunni Muslim teacher, [[Ahmad al-Khatib]], as Head of State in order to satisfy the Sunni majority.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=129-130}} Assad also appointed Sunnis to senior positions in the government, the military and the party. All of Assad's prime ministers, defense ministers and foreign ministers and a majority of his cabinet were Sunnis. In the early 1970s, he was verified as an authentic Muslim by the Sunni Mufti of Damascus and made the ''Hajj''—the pilgrimage to [[Mecca]]. In his speeches, he often used Muslim terms like ''jihad'' (a holy war) and ''shahada'' (martyrdom) when referring to fighting Israel.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}}


After gaining enough power Assad needed to appear as leader of the Ba'ath Party, so he ordered the arrests and discharges of the incumbent party leaders, replacing them by his own supporters in the Ba'ath Regional Command. They promptly elected him as secretary-general of the party's Syrian branch, thus cementing his status as the country's ''de facto'' leader. It also appointed a new People's Assembly, which in 1971 nominated him for the presidency as the only candidate. On 22 February 1971, Assad resigned from the Air Force.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=55}} Assad was subsequently endorsed as president with 99.6% of the vote{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}} at the referendum held on 12 March 1971. He also returned the old Islamic Presidential Oath of Office.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=55}} While continuing to use the Ba'ath Party, its ideology, and its expanding apparatus as instruments of his rule and policies, Assad established for the first time in Syria's modern history a powerful centralized presidential system with absolute authority.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}}
After gaining enough power, Assad needed to become leader of the Ba'ath Party, so he ordered the arrests and discharge of the incumbent party leaders, replacing them by his own supporters in the Ba'ath Regional Command. They promptly elected him as secretary-general of the party's Syrian branch, confirming his status as the country's ''de facto'' leader. The Regional Command also appointed a new People's Assembly, which in 1971 nominated him for the presidency as the only candidate. On 22 February 1971, Assad resigned from the Air Force{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=55}}and was subsequently endorsed as president with 99.6% of the vote{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}} at the referendum held on 12 March 1971. He also returned the old Islamic Presidential Oath of Office.{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=55}} While continuing to use the Ba'ath Party, its ideology and its expanding apparatus as instruments of his rule and policies, Assad established a powerful, centralized presidential system with absolute authority for the first time in Syria's modern history.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=55}}


Assad tried to put a democratic face on his regime. To that end, the People's Assembly and his cabinet consisted of several nationalist and socialist parties under the umbrella of the [[National Progressive Front]], which was led by the Ba'ath Party. Half of his cabinet were representatives of peasants and workers, and a number of popular organizations of peasants, workers, women, students and the like were established in order to participate in the decision making process. As he gained support from the peasantry, workers and youth, and also the military and the Alawite community, Assad wanted to destroy his remaining opposition. He tried to represent himself as a leader-reformer, a state-builder as well as nation-builder by developing and modernizing the country's socio-economic infrastructure, while supplying the population with political stability and economic opportunities as well as ideological consensus. As he wanted to create ideological consensus and national unity, Assad advocated a dynamic regional policy while opposing [[Zionism]] and imperialism. In order to gain legitimacy for his regime and to meet his nationalist objectives, Assad planned to carry out this policy, in external and internal politics. Moreover, he saw it as a struggle for the well-being of his people, notably the unprivileged section.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56}}
Assad wanted his regime to appear democratic. The People's Assembly and his cabinet consisted of several nationalist and socialist parties under the umbrella of the [[National Progressive Front]], which was led by the Ba'ath Party. Half of his cabinet were representatives of peasants and workers, and a number of popular organizations of peasants, workers, women and students were established in order to participate in the decision-making process. As he gained support from the peasantry, workers, the youth, the military and the Alawite community, Assad wanted to destroy his remaining opposition. He tried to present himself as a leader-reformer, a state-builder and nation-builder by developing and modernizing the country's socio-economic infrastructure, achieving political stability, economic opportunities and ideological consensus. As he wanted to create ideological consensus and national unity, Assad advocated a dynamic regional policy while opposing [[Zionism]] and imperialism.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56}}


On 31 January 1973, Assad implemented the new Constitution which led to a national crisis. Unlike previous constitutions, this one did not require that the president of Syria must be a Muslim, leading to fierce demonstrations in [[Hama]], [[Homs]] and Aleppo organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and the ''ulama''. They labeled Assad as the "enemy of Allah" and called for a ''jihad'' against his rule. [[Robert D. Kaplan]] has compared Assad's coming to power to "an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia—an unprecedented development shocking to the Sunni majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."<ref name="Kaplan">{{cite web|url=http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199302/kaplan|title=Syria: Identity Crisis|last=Kaplan|first=Robert|date=1993-02|work=The Atlantic}}</ref> Assad responded by arresting about 40 Sunni officers who were accused of plotting. Nevertheless, Assad returned the requirement to the Constitution to please the Sunnis, but he stated that he "rejects every uncultured interpretation of Islam that lays bare an odious narrow-mindedness and loathsome bigotry".{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=55}}In 1974, to satisfy this constitutional requirement, [[Moussa Sader|Musa Sadr]], a leader of the [[Twelvers]] of [[Lebanon]] and founder of the [[Amal Movement]] who had unsuccessfully tried to unite Lebanese Alawis and Shias under the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council,<ref name="mideastmonitor.org">Riad Yazbeck. "[http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0808/0808_2.htm#_ftn1 Return of the Pink Panthers?]" ''Mideast Monitor''. Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2008.</ref> issued a [[fatwa]] stating that Alawis were a community of Twelver Shia Muslims.<ref name="KaplanSadr">{{cite web |url=http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199302/kaplan |title=Syria: Identity Crisis |last=Kaplan |first=Robert |date=1993-02 |work=The Atlantic |quote=Today, those Muslims called Alawīs are brothers of those Shi'ites called Mutawallis by the malicious.}}</ref><ref name="Glasse">''The New Encyclopedia of Islam'' by Cyril Glasse, Altamira, 2001, p.36–7</ref>
Nevertheless, there were no real changes in the regime's basic character. For his entire tenure, Assad ruled under the terms of a state of emergency dating to 1963.<ref>[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Syria.pdf Syria country profile], p. 15-17. [[Library of Congress]] [[Federal Research Division]] (April 2005). ''This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the [[public domain]].''</ref> Under the provisions of the emergency law, the press was limited to three Ba'ath-controlled newspapers and dissidents were often tried in security courts that operated outside the regular judicial system. [[Human Rights Watch]] estimated that no fewer than 17,000 people had [[forced disappearance|"disappeared"]] without even the formalities of a trial.<ref name="hrw.org">[http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/07/16/wasted-decade ''Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power''], [[Human Rights Watch]], 2010 Report</ref> Every seven years, Assad was nominated as the sole candidate for president by the People's Council, and confirmed in office by a referendum. He was reelected four times, each time garnering over 99 percent of the vote—including three times in which he received unanimous support (according to official figures).<ref>Nohlen, D, Grotz, F & Hartmann, C (2001) ''Elections in Asia: A data handbook, Volume I'', p221 ISBN 019924958</ref>

For his entire tenure as Syria's president, Assad ruled under the terms of a state of emergency dating from 1963.<ref>[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Syria.pdf Syria country profile], p. 15-17. [[Library of Congress]] [[Federal Research Division]] (April 2005). ''This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the [[public domain]].''</ref> Under the provisions of the emergency law, the press was limited to three Ba'ath-controlled newspapers and political dissidents were often tried in security courts that operated outside the regular judicial system. [[Human Rights Watch]] estimated that a minimum of 17,000 people had [[forced disappearance|disappeared]] without the formalities of a trial.<ref name="hrw.org">[http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/07/16/wasted-decade ''Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power''], [[Human Rights Watch]], 2010 Report</ref> Every seven years, Assad was nominated as the sole candidate for president by the People's Council, and confirmed in office by a referendum. He was re-elected four times, each time gaining over 99 percent of the vote—including three times in which he received unanimous support, according to official figures.<ref>Nohlen, D, Grotz, F & Hartmann, C (2001) ''Elections in Asia: A data handbook, Volume I'', p221 ISBN 019924958</ref>


===Federation of Arab Republics===
===Federation of Arab Republics===
Line 172: Line 172:
====Alliance with Egypt====
====Alliance with Egypt====
[[File:Sadat Qaddafi Assad 1971.jpg|thumb|left|Assad (sitting on the right side) signing the Federation of Arab Republics in Benghazi, Libya, on 18 April 1971 with President Anwar al-Sadat (sitting left) of Egypt and Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya (sitting in the centre)]]
[[File:Sadat Qaddafi Assad 1971.jpg|thumb|left|Assad (sitting on the right side) signing the Federation of Arab Republics in Benghazi, Libya, on 18 April 1971 with President Anwar al-Sadat (sitting left) of Egypt and Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya (sitting in the centre)]]
However, Assad's domestic policy encountered serious difficulties and setbacks, and produced new problems and ill feelings particularly among the Sunni urban classes; the orthodox section of these classes also continued to oppose Assad's regime for being a military sectarian dictatorship. As it happened, the continued Muslim opposition to his regime as well as the shortcomings of his socio-economic policies further enforced Assad's initial tendency to give prime attention to Syria's regional affairs, namely intra-Arab and anti-Israeli policies. This tendency did not stem only for Assad's expectations to score quick and spectacular gains in his foreign policies at a time when the crucial socio-economic issues of Syria required long-term and painstaking efforts without promise of immediate positive results. Furthermore, in addition to his strong ambition to turn Syria into a regional power and himself become a pan-Arab leader, Assad calculated that working for Arab unity and stepping up the struggle against Israel were likely to strengthen his legitimacy and leadership among the various sections of the Syrian population.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56-57}}


Assad's domestic policy encountered serious difficulties and setbacks, and produced new problems and ill feelings, particularly among the Sunni urban classes; the orthodox section of these classes continued to oppose Assad's regime for being a sectarian military dictatorship. The continued Muslim opposition to his regime and the shortcomings of his socio-economic policies forced Assad's to focus primarily on Syria's regional affairs, namely intra-Arab and anti-Israeli policies. This tendency did not stem only from Assad's expectations to score quick and spectacular gains in his foreign policies at a time when the socio-economic issues of Syria required long-term and painstaking efforts without promise of immediate positive results. In addition to his ambition to turn Syria into a regional power and to himself become a pan-Arab leader, Assad calculated that working for Arab unity and stepping up the struggle against Israel were likely to strengthen his legitimacy and leadership among the various sections of the Syrian population.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56-57}}
Assad's first foreign policy actions after he came to power were to join the newly established Federation of Arab Republics along with Egypt, Libya and later Sudan, and to sign a military pact with Egypt. Assad gave a high priority to quick building of a strong military, while preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the [[Golan Heights]] from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}

[[File:Assad Tlass war 1973.jpg|thumb|Assad and Defense Minister Mustapha Tlass, during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, at the Golan front]]
Assad's first foreign policy actions were to join the newly-established [[Federation of Arab Republics]] along with Egypt, Libya and later Sudan, and to sign a military pact with Egypt. Assad gave a high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the Golan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}
On 31 January 1973, Assad implemented the new Constitution which led to a crisis in the country. Unlike any other previous constitution, this one did not had an article affirming that the president of Syria must be a Muslim. The fierce demonstrations broke out in [[Hama]], [[Homs]] and Aleppo. They were organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and the ''ulama''. They labeled Assad as the "enemy of Allah", even calling for a ''jihad'' (a holy war) against his rule. Assad responded with repression, arresting some 40 Sunni officers who were accused for plotting. Nevertheless, Assad added the concerned article into the Constitution to please the Sunnis, but he also stated that he "rejects every uncultured interpretation of Islam that lays bare an odious narrow-mindedness and loathsome bigotry".{{sfn|Alianak|2007|p=55}}


[[File:Assad Tlass war 1973.jpg|thumb|right|Assad and Defense Minister Mustapha Tlass, during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, at the Golan front]]
Once Assad had prepared his army, he was ready to join [[Anwar al-Sadat]]'s Egypt in the [[Yom Kippur War]] in October 1973. The Syrian military was badly defeated in the war, but while Sadat signed unilateral agreements with Israel, Assad emerged from the war as a national hero in Syria as well as parts of the Arab world. This was due not only to his bold decision to go to war against Israel, but Syria's subsequently carrying out single-handedly a war of attrition against the Israeli Defence Forces in spring 1974. Assad's skill as a cool, proud, tough, and shrewd negotiator in the post war period enabled him to gain not only the town of [[Kuneitra]] but also respect and admiration of many Arabs in Syria and elsewhere. Many of his followers now regarded Assad as the new pan-Arab leader, and a worthy successor of Gamal Nasser.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}
Once Assad had prepared his army, he was ready to join [[Anwar al-Sadat]]'s Egypt in the [[Yom Kippur War]] in October 1973. Syria was defeated, but while Sadat signed unilateral agreements with Israel, Assad emerged from the war as a national hero in Syria an other parts of the Arab world. This was due to his decision to go to war against Israel and Syria's subsequent war of attrition against the [[Israeli Defense Forces]] in early 1974. Assad's skill as a cool, proud, tough, and shrewd negotiator in the post war period enabled him to gain the town of [[Kuneitra]] and the respect and admiration of many Arabs. Many of his followers now regarded Assad as the new pan-Arab leader, and a worthy successor of Gamal Nasser.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}


====Dissolution with Egypt====
====Dissolution with Egypt====
While promoting his personality cult as a historical leader in the model of Nasser and [[Saladin|Salah ad-Din]], Assad had indeed regarded his supreme twofold goal to be Arab unity and an uncompromising struggle against Israel. The latter goal, with its military, political, economic, and cultural ramifications, did not only stem for Assad's need for legitimacy as an Alawite ruler of Syria who wished to present himself as a genuine Arab and Muslim leader. Assad had apparently been convinced that Israel presented a severe threat to the integrity of the Arab nation from Nile to Euphrates, and that it was, therefore, his historic mission to defend Arabdom. He regarded the confrontation with Israel as a zero-sum struggle, and as a good strategist who understood power politics, he had sought to counterbalance Israeli military might with an all-Arab political-military alliance. However, since Egypt under Sadat's leadership defected from this alliance following the 1973 war, Assad endeavored during the middle late 1970s to establish an alternative all-Arab alliance with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the [[Palestinian Liberation Organization]] (PLO). However, facing grave difficulties to reach an understanding with Ba'athist Iraq, as he didn't want to play a secondary role in an Iraqi-Syrian union, Assad returned to his country's historic goal, to create under his leadership a Greater Syria union or alliance with Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO. As it happened, during the second half of the 1970s, Assad managed to significantly advance, political, military, and economic cooperation with Jordan; to extend his control over large parts of Lebanon while intervening in the [[Lebanese Civil War]], and for a while, also to sustain his strategic alliance with the PLO.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=58}}
While promoting himself as a historical leader in the style of Nasser and [[Saladin|Salah ad-Din]], Assad regarded his main goals to be Arab unity and an uncompromising struggle against Israel. The latter goal stemmed partly from Assad's need for legitimacy as an Alawite ruler of Syria who wished to present himself as a genuine Arab and Muslim leader. He had become convinced that Israel presented a severe threat to the integrity of the Arab nation from the Nile to the Euphrates, and that it was his historic mission to defend Arabdom. He regarded the confrontation with Israel as a zero-sum struggle, and as a strategist who understood power politics, he had sought to counterbalance Israeli military might with an all-Arab political-military alliance. However, after Sadat's Egypt left the alliance after the 1973 war, Assad during the middle late 1970s to establish an alternative all-Arab alliance with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the [[Palestinian Liberation Organization]] (PLO). However, he faced difficulties in reaching an understanding with Ba'athist Iraq, as he did not want to play a secondary role in an Iraqi-Syrian union. Assad returned to his goal to create a Greater Syria union or alliance with Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO. During the period 1975&nbsp;–&nbsp;1980, Assad significantly advanced political, military, and economic cooperation with Jordan, extended his control over large parts of Lebanon, and intervened in the [[Lebanese Civil War]], and sustained his strategic alliance with the PLO.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=58}}
[[File:NixonAssad.jpg|thumb|Assad greets President Nixon on his arrival at Damascus airport in 1974]]
Parallel to his regional accomplishments, Assad also had significant gains in his relations with the superpowers. In 1974, he embarrassed the Soviet Union by negotiating with the United States regarding the military disengagement on the Golan Heights, and in 1976 he ignored Soviet pressure and requests to refrain from invading Lebanon and subsequently to refrain from attacking the PLO and the Lebanese radical forces. Simultaneously, Assad renewed and markedly improved his relations with the United States, and made both presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Jimmy Carter]] his great admirers.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=58}}


Assad also made significant gains in his relations with the superpowers. In 1974, he embarrassed the Soviet Union by negotiating with the United States regarding the military disengagement in the Golan Heights, and in 1976 he ignored Soviet pressure and requests to refrain from invading Lebanon and later to refrain from attacking the PLO and the Lebanese radical forces. Simultaneously, Assad renewed and markedly improved his relations with the United States and made presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Jimmy Carter]] his great admirers.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=58}}
However, neither Assad's international and regional achievements nor his domestic gains lasted long, and soon showed sign of collapse, partly owing to his miscalculation and partly because of changing circumstances. The major source of his initial successes, his regional politics, turned out to be main causes of his severe setbacks. Primarily, Assad's direct intervention in Lebanon proved to be a grave miscalculation; within a year or two it turned from an important asset to a grave liability, both regionally and domestically. Thus Assad's maneuvers among the two main rival factions, playing one against other, served to alienate both. The PLO, experiencing Assad's blows in 1976, distanced itself from him and consolidated its autonomous infrastructure in southern Lebanon, paradoxically with Israel's indirect assistance, as Israel firmly objected to the deployment of Syrian troops south of the Sidon-Jazzin "red line".{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=58-59}}


[[File:NixonAssad.jpg|thumb|left|Assad greets President Nixon on his arrival at Damascus airport in 1974]]
===After dissolution of the FAR===
However, neither Assad's international and regional achievements nor his domestic gains lasted long, and he soon showed sign of collapse because of his miscalculation and changing circumstances. His regional politics, which had earned him early political success, now became the main cause of his severe setbacks. Assad's direct intervention in Lebanon was a grave miscalculation, and within two years it turned from being an important asset to a grave liability, both regionally and domestically. Assad's maneuvers among the two main rival factions, playing one against other, alienated both. The PLO, experiencing Assad's blows in 1976, distanced itself from him and consolidated its autonomous infrastructure in southern Lebanon, paradoxically with Israel's indirect assistance, since Israel firmly objected to the deployment of Syrian troops south of the Sidon-Jazzin "red line".{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=58-59}}


===After dissolution of the FAR===
====Isolation====
[[File:Assad in rage November 1977.jpg|left|thumb|Assad enraged after Anwar Sadat asked him to visit Israel, 1977]]
The Christian [[Maronites]], fearing Syrian domination, in 1978 started a guerrila warfare against Syrian troops in Beirut and northern Lebanon. Again, Israel's moral support and material aids contributed to foster the Maronites' autonomy and their resistance to Assad's ''de facto'' occupation of Lebanon. Furthermore, while Syria drenched its Lebanese quagmire, a newly formed [[Likud]] government in Israel, founded in 1977, not only developed political and military relations with the Maronite Lebanese Forces, but also took a further important step, which contributed to undermining Assad's regional position. Israel welcomed Sadat's initiative in November 1977 and signed the [[Camp David Accords]] with Egypt and the United States in 1978, to be followed by the [[Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty]] in 1979.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}}


[[File:Assad in rage November 1977.jpg|right|thumb|Assad enraged after Anwar Sadat asked him to visit Israel, 1977]]
Apart from a deep psychological shock, Assad's regional strategic posture also suffered serious blows as Egypt, the most significant Arab country, departed from the all-Arab confrontation against Israel, in effect exposing Syria to a growing Israeli threat. Indeed, apart from a short-lived rapprochement with the PLO, Assad became increasingly isolated in the region. His brief unity talks with Iraqi leaders collapsed in mid 1979; and with Iraq's 1980 involvement in the [[Iraq-Iran War]], this second major Arab state also effectively withdrew from the conflict against Israel.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}}
In 1978, the Christian [[Maronites]], fearing Syrian domination, started a guerrilla war against Syrian troops in Beirut and northern Lebanon. Israel's moral support and material aid contributed to the Maronites' autonomy and their resistance to Assad's ''de facto'' occupation of Lebanon. A newly formed [[Likud]] government in Israel developed political and military relations with the Maronite Lebanese Forces and contributed to the undermining of Assad's regional position. Israel welcomed Sadat's initiative in November 1977 and signed the [[Camp David Accords]] with Egypt and the United States in 1978, which was followed by the 1979 [[Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty]].{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}}


Simultaneously, in 1979, under the impact of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty, and in view of Syria's regional predicament, Jordanian King [[Hussein of Jordan|Husein ibn Talal]] pulled away from his association with Assad in favor of a closer relationship with Iraq. Finally, Assad's regional strategic position was further damaged as the Carter administration in the United States was geared to abandon its new Syrian-oriented policy in favor of the Egypt-Israeli peace process. In this critical situation, with his political skills exhausted, Assad still demonstrated his stamina, obstinacy, and single-mindedness.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}}
Assad's regional strategic posture suffered serious blows as Egypt's withdrawal from the all-Arab confrontation against Israel exposed Syria to a growing Israeli threat. Apart from a short-lived rapprochement with the PLO, Assad became increasingly isolated in the region. His brief unity talks with Iraqi leaders collapsed in mid 1979; and with Iraq's 1980 involvement in the [[Iraq-Iran War]], Iraq also effectively withdrew from the conflict against Israel.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}} Also in 1979, under the impact of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty, and in view of Syria's regional predicament, King [[Hussein of Jordan]] withdrew from his association with Assad in favor of a closer relationship with Iraq. Assad's regional strategic position was further damaged when the US Carter administration abandoned its new Syrian-oriented policy in favor of the Egypt-Israeli peace process.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}}


====Strategic Balance doctrine====
====Strategic Balance doctrine====
In 1980, with the first friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union, Assad continued to develop his new doctrine of Strategic Balance, which he had initiated the previous year. Aiming primarily at confronting Israel single-handedly, this doctrine not only engendered fresh intra-Arab policies, it was also directed toward reconsolidating Assad's domestic front, which, like his regional posture, had suffered setbacks since 1977.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}}
In 1980, Assad signed Syria's Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.<ref name="Country Studies/68"> {{cite web |url = http://countrystudies.us/syria/68.htm |title = Relations with the Soviet Union |author = Thomas Collelo, ed.|work = Syria: A Country Study. | location = Washington | publisher = GPO for the Library of Congress |date = 1987 |accessdate = 08 October, 2012}}</ref> He continued to develop his new doctrine of Strategic Balance, which he had initiated the previous year. Aiming primarily at confronting Israel single-handedly, this doctrine engendered fresh intra-Arab policies and was directed toward consolidating Assad's domestic front, which had suffered setbacks since 1977.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59}} The regime faced further threats from a resurgence of the Islamic opposition. Assad's earlier support of the Christian Maronites and his military actions against the Muslim radicals in Lebanon provoked a new and unprecedented phase of Muslim resistance in the form of well-organized and effective urban guerrilla warfare against government, military, and Ba'athist officials and institutions. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Islamic ''jihad'' became almost an open rebellion as many Alawite soldiers, officers and senior officials were killed, and government and military centers were bombed by the Muslim ''[[mujahideen]]''.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}}


Facing a serious threat to his regime and possibly to his life, Assad for the first time lost his self-confidence and reacted with fury and desperation. His health also started to deteriorate during this period. Under his personal orders a campaign of repression was launched against the Muslim Brotherhood.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}} Assad escaped an attempted assassination in a grenade attack in 1980. In response, troops led by his brother Rifaat took revenge by killing 250 inmates at [[Tadmor Prison]] in [[Palmyra]].<ref name=NYTObit>MacFarquhar, Neil. [http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/11/world/hafez-al-assad-who-turned-syria-into-a-power-in-the-middle-east-dies-at-69.html Hafez al-Assad, Who Turned Syria Into a Power in the Middle East, Dies at 69]. [[New York Times]], 2000-06-11.</ref> In February 1982, the rebellious city of Hama was [[Hama massacre|bombed by Assad's troops]], killing up to 10,000 people.{{sfn|Chaliand|Blin|2007|p=230}}{{sfn|Schlumberger|2007|p=105}}{{sfn|Tanter|1999|p=13}} It was later described as "the single deadliest act by any Arab government against people in the modern Middle East."{{sfn|Wright|2008|p=243-244}}{{sfn|Harris|1997|p=166-167}} Over the next few years, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood followers were arrested and tortured, and many of them were killed or disappeared. Assad realized that his previous efforts to bring about a national unity in Syria and to gain legitimacy from the Sunni urban population had totally failed. He was confronted with resistance from the Muslim Brotherhood and thousands of their followers. Large sections of the urban intelligentsia, professionals, intellectuals and former Ba'ath Party members, also regarded his regime as illegitimate.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}} Later, Assad used the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to justify his heavy-handed rule.<ref name=NYTObit/>
Still more detrimental and threatening was the resurgence and expansion of the Islamic opposition to Assad's regime. Indeed, Assad's initial support of the Christian Maronites and his military actions against the Muslim radicals in Lebanon provoked for the first time a new and unprecedented phase of Muslim resistance to Assad. It took the form of well-organized and effective urban guerrilla warfare against government, military, and Ba'athist officials and institutions. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Islamic ''jihad'' became almost an open rebellion as many Alawite soldiers and officers as well as senior officials were killed, and government and military centers were bombed by the Muslim ''[[mujahideen]]''.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}}


Assad became increasingly reliant on the further cultivation of his close constituencies as a support base and a new political community consisting of large sections of peasants and workers, salaried middle-class and public employees—both Sunnis and non-Sunnis. These groups, mostly organized in the Ba'ath Party, mass syndicates, and trade unions, like most Alawites and Christians, greatly benefited from Assad's policies, and either depended on him or were ideologically identified with his regime.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}} Many young Syrians also had a strong allegiance to Assad, since they had been educated or indoctrinated in the notions of the Ba'ath Party as formulated by Assad. These sections of the population rendered legitimacy to Assad's regime, and were periodically mobilized by Assad to actively support his policies and curb his domestic enemies. Nonetheless, Assad's main support base remained the Alawite community, the combat units of the Syrian Armed Forces and the wide network of security and intelligence organizations.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=61}}
Facing a serious menace to his regime and perhaps even to his life, for the first time, Assad lost his coolness and self-confidence, and reacted with fury and desperation; reportedly, his health also started to deteriorate during this period. Under his personal orders a ferocious campaign of repression and counterterror was launched against the Muslim Brotherhood.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}} The campaign of terror started in 1980, when Assad escaped a grenade attack. In response, troops led by his brother Rifaat took revenge by killing 250 inmates at [[Tadmor Prison]] in [[Palmyra]].<ref name=NYTObit>MacFarquhar, Neil. [http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/11/world/hafez-al-assad-who-turned-syria-into-a-power-in-the-middle-east-dies-at-69.html Hafez al-Assad, Who Turned Syria Into a Power in the Middle East, Dies at 69]. [[New York Times]], 2000-06-11.</ref> In February 1982, the rebellious city of [[Hama]] was [[Hama massacre|bombed by Assad's troops]], killing up to 10,000 people,{{sfn|Chaliand|Blin|2007|p=230}}{{sfn|Schlumberger|2007|p=105}}{{sfn|Tanter|1999|p=13}} including women and children. It was later described as "the single deadliest act by any Arab government against people in the modern Middle East."{{sfn|Wright|2008|p=243-244}}{{sfn|Harris|1997|p=166-167}} Over the next few years, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood followers were arrested and tortured, and many of them were killed or disappeared. At that juncture, Assad finally realized that his previous great efforts to bring about a national unity in Syria, namely to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Sunni urban population, had totally failed. He was confronted now not only with resistance of the Muslim Brotherhood and their many thousands of followers. Large sections of the urban intelligentsia, professionals and intellectuals, as well as former Ba'ath Party members, also regarded his regime as an illegitimate Alawite sectarian military system.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}} Later, Assad used the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to justify his heavy-handed rule.<ref name=NYTObit/>


Members of the Alawite community and non-Alawites loyal to Assad virtually controlled the security, intelligence and military apparatuses. They manned or commanded about a dozen security and intelligence networks and most armoured divisions, commandos and other combat units of the Syrian Armed Forces. Assad had turned some of his intelligence networks into apparatuses for terrorism against targets in the Middle East and in Europe. Assad used terrorism and intimidation to extend his control over Lebanon. In 1977, his agents assassinated [[Kamal Jumblatt]], the Druze leftist leader, and in 1982 they killed [[Bachir Gemayel]], the newly elected Maronite president, both of whom had resisted Assad's attempts to dominate Lebanon. Using similar tactics, Assad brought about the abolition of the 1983 Lebanon-Israel agreement, and through guerrilla warfare carried out by proxy in 1985, Assad indirectly caused the Israeli Defense Forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Terrorism against Palestinians and Jordanian targets in the mid-1980s contributed to thwart the rapprochement between King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO and the slowing down of Jordanian-Israeli political cooperation in the [[West Bank]].{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=61}}
Consequently, Assad became increasingly reliant on the further cultivation of his close constituencies as a support base and a new political community. These consisted of large sections of peasants and workers, salaried middle-class and public employees, both Sunnis and non-Sunnis alike. Mostly organized in the Ba'ath Party, mass syndicates, and trade unions, these sections, like most Alawite minority and Christians, greatly benefited from Assad's policies, and thus depended on him or were ideologically identified with his regime.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=60}} Another large section of the population that had a strong allegiance to Assad were many of the young Syrians, who for a generation or so were educated or indoctrinated in the notions of the Ba'ath Party as formulated by Assad. These sections of the population not only rendered legitimacy to Assad's regime, but from the time to time were been mobilized by Assad to actively support his policies and curb his domestic enemies. Nonetheless, the hard core of Assad's support base remained the Alawite community, combined with the combat units of the Syrian Armed Forces as well as the wide network of security and intelligence organizations.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=61}}


In November 1983, Assad—who was a [[Diabetes|diabetic]]—suffered a serious heart attack, which was complicated by [[phlebitis]].<ref name="CountryStudies/57"> {{cite web |url = http://countrystudies.us/syria/57.htm |title = 1982 – 1987 Political Developments |author = Thomas Collelo, ed.|work = Syria: A Country Study. | location = Washington | publisher = GPO for the Library of Congress |date = 1987 |accessdate = 08 October, 2012}}</ref> He withdrew from public life and a battle for succession took place between Assad's brother Rifaat and the army generals. Assad's recovery and return brought an end to the discord and he took advantage of the situation to undermine his brother's position, eventually sending him into exile. Assad's return to supreme power was confirmed at the eight party congress in January 1985.{{sfn|Seddon|2004|p=75}}
Indeed, members of the Alawite community, as well as non-Alawites loyal to Assad virtually controlled the huge security, intelligence, and military apparatuses of Assad's regime. They manned or commanded about a dozen security and intelligence networks as well as most armoured divisions, commandos, and other combat units of the Syrian Armed Forces. In addition to directing a state-run repression system against the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Assad had turned some of his intelligence networks into special apparatuses for terrorism against targets in the Middle East and in Europe. For example, Assad used terrorism and intimidation, in addition to other means, to extend his control over Lebanon: in 1977, his agents assassinated [[Kamal Jumblatt]], the Druze leftist leader, and in 1982 they killed [[Bachir Gemayel]], the newly elected Maronite president, both of whom had struggled against Assad's attempts to dominate Lebanon. By similar tactics, Assad managed to bring the abolition of the 1983 Lebanon-Israel agreement, and through guerrilla warfare carried out by proxy in 1985, Assad indirectly caused the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces from southern Lebanon. Terrorism against Palestinians and Jordanian targets contributed in the mid-1980s to thwart the rapprochement between Jordanian King Hussein and the PLO, as well as to slowing down Jordanian-Israeli political cooperation in the [[West Bank]].{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=61}}


Israel was the main target of Assad's terrorist and guerrilla operations in both Lebanon and Europe. Attempts to bomb an El-Al airliner in London in April 1986 and in Madrid in June 1986 were part of an attrition campaign that Assad had been directing against Israel to damage its economy, morale, and social fabric and weaken its military capacity. This campaign of attrition was an auxiliary tactic in Assad's policy of strategic balance with Israel developed by Assad in the late 1970s, when Syria was largely isolated in the region and exposed to a potential Israeli threat. With the help of the Soviet Union, Assad built a large military equipped with modern tanks, airplanes and long-range ground-to-ground missiles capable of launching chemical warheads into most Israeli cities.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=61-62}}
In November 1983, after a serious heart attack kept Assad out of public life, a virtual "war of succession" took place between his brother Rifaat and the army generals. Assad's return from illness brought an end to the discord and he took advantage of the situation to undermine the position of his brother, eventually sending him into exile. His return to supreme power was confirmed at the eight party congress in January 1985.{{sfn|Seddon|2004|p=75}}


Although Assad was still far from achieving a strategic balance with Israel, his regime reached military parity in quantitative terms. This enabled him to deter Israel from attacking Syria and in the event of war, to cause heavy losses to Israel. It also gave him an option to retake the Golan Heights by a surprise attack. Assad's enormous military power also enabled him to sustain some of his major political gains in the region and at home. However, he was not content with his military buildup, and continued to also employ his skills as a first-rate strategist and manipulator in order to advance his prime regional policy to gain support from all Arabs for his assumed role as a leader of the Arab struggle against Israel, while further isolating Egypt and counterbalancing the growing power of Iraq, Syria's major Arab rivals in the region.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=62}}
Israel was the major target of Assad's terrorist and guerrilla operations, not only in Lebanon, but also in Europe. The attempt to bomb an El-Ar airliner in London in April 1986 and the attack on an El-Al jet in Madrid in June 1986 are two examples of his policy. These actions were apparently part of an attrition campaign that Assad had been directing against Israel aimed at damaging its economy, morale, and social fabric, as well as weakening its military capacity. However, this campaign of attrition had merely been an auxiliary tactic in Assad's major strategy of strategic balance with Israel. This doctrine of strategic balance or military parity was developed by Assad in the late 1970s, when Syria was largely isolated in the region and exposed to a potential Israeli threat. Assad was then determined to build a powerful military force, in addition to a sound economy and a cohesive national community, in order to single-handedly confront Israel, while exercising his influence over the neighbouring Arab countries. The 1982 war with Israel in Lebanon only enhanced Assad's efforts to greatly increase and improve his military. Indeed, with the massive help of the Soviet Union, Assad succeeded in building a huge and modernized military equipped with modern tanks, airplanes, and long-range ground-to-ground missiles capable of launching chemical warheads into most Israeli centres.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=61-62}}

Thus, although he was still far from achieving military superiority over, or a strategic balance with, Israel, Assad nevertheless reached a military parity with the Jewish state in quantitative terms. This military capacity, a major achievement for Assad, enabled him to deter Israel from attacking Syria as well as to cause heavy losses to Israel in case of war. While rendering him an option to regain the Golan Heights, or part of it, by a surprise attack, Assad's enormous military power also enabled him to sustain some of his major political gains in the region and at home. However, Assad was not content with his military buildup, and continued to also employ his unique skills as a first-rate strategist and master manipulator in order to advance his prime regional policies, namely to mobilize all-Arab support for his assumed role as a leader of the Arab struggle against Israel, while further isolating Egypt and counterbalancing the growing power of Iraq, Syria's major Arab rivals in the region.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=62}}


====1990s====
====1990s====
Althrough Syria had good relations with the Soviet Union, Assad began to turn somewhat more towards the West in late 1980s, having seen the benefits that had accrued to Iraq during its war with Iran. He agreed to join the United States-led coalition against Iraq in the [[Gulf War]] in 1991. He continued to regard Israel as major regional enemy, however, at the end of 1991 Middle East peace conference insisted on an uncompromising line on "land for peace", demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The September 1993 Israeli accord with the PLO, which put an end to the ''[[First Intifada|intifada]]'' (resistance) in the Occupied Territories without giving the Palestinians any substantial gains, represented a set-back for Assad, as did the increasingly friendly relationship between Israel and Jordan.{{sfn|Seddon|2004|p=76}}
Although Syria had good relations with the Soviet Union, Assad began to turn towards the West in late 1980s, having seen how Iraq had benefited during its war with Iran. He agreed to join the United States-led coalition against Iraq in the [[Gulf War]] in 1991. He continued to regard Israel as major regional enemy. At the end of the 1991 Middle East peace conference, Assad insisted on a "land for peace" deal, demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Assad regarded the September 1993 Israeli accord with the PLO—which ended the ''[[First Intifada|first intifada]]'' (resistance) in the Occupied Territories without giving the Palestinians any substantial gains—and the increasingly friendly relationship between Israel and Jordan as set-backs. {{sfn|Seddon|2004|p=76}}


==Foreign policy==
==Foreign policy==
[[File:Hafez Assad.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=2:15|Footage of Hafez al-Assad overseeing training of the Syrian army with his brother Rifaat and meeting political leaders such as [[Leonid Brezhnev]], [[Yassir Arafat]], [[King Abdullah]] and [[King Hussein]]]]
[[File:Hafez Assad.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=2:15|left|Footage of Hafez al-Assad overseeing training of the Syrian army with his brother Rifaat and meeting political leaders such as [[Leonid Brezhnev]], [[Yassir Arafat]], [[King Abdullah]] and [[King Hussein]]]]


===Major powers===
===Major powers===
Line 224: Line 220:
====European Union countries====
====European Union countries====
{{See also|Syria–European Union relations|France–Syria relations}}
{{See also|Syria–European Union relations|France–Syria relations}}
Syria increased importance of the relations with the countries of the [[European Union]], both economically and politically. The EU was Syria's source of financial aid and foreign trade and politically its relations served a counterforce to the United States.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=732}} Assad's Syria also tried to give greater influence to the EU in its region. However, opposition of Israel and the United States prevented EU's influence on the region.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=732-733}} Syrias ministers visited number of the EU countries either because of the peace process or other issues, primarely of economic nature. Representatives of Netherlands, France, Portugal and Germany visited Syria. Countries of the European Union were an important source of Syrian trade, for example in 1992 36.8% of Syria's imports were from the EU and 47.9% exports were in the EU.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}
Under Assad's regime, Syria's relations with the countries of the [[European Union]] increased in importance, both economically and politically. Much of Syria's financial aid and foreign trade came from the EU, for example in 1992, 36.8% of Syria's imports and 47.9% of its exports were traded with the EU.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}} Syria's political relations with the EU served as a counterbalance to the United States.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=732}} Assad's Syria also tried to increase the influence of the EU in the Middle East. However, opposition from Israel and the United States prevented the EU's influence in the region.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=732-733}} Syrias ministers visited a number of EU countries either because of the peace process or for economic reasons. Representatives of Netherlands, France, Portugal, and Germany visited Syria.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}


During the Lebanese Civil War, Syria's relations with France were rather tense, which eventually improved, nevertheless France was stil critical of Syria's and demanded the reduction of its presence in Lebanon. Later however, the issue was solve with France recognizing Syrian central role in the region as well as Lebanon. In February 1992 French Foreign Minister [[Roland Dumas]] visited Damascus in order to discuss the Lebanese question and the peace process. In 1992 Syria's relations with Germany improved. Previously the relations were cold. The improvement occurred when Syria involved in securing the release of two German hostages in Lebanon which ended the affair of Western hostages in that country. This action of Syria improved its image in world as well as Germany. Chanchellor [[Helmut Kohl]] thanked Assad for his effort. German Foreign Minister [[Hans-Dietrich Genscher]] visited Syria in September 1992 to discuss the improvement of relations between the countries.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}
During the Lebanese Civil War, Syria's relations with France were tense, but eventually improved. France was still critical of Syria and demanded the reduction of its presence in Lebanon. The issue was resolved when France recognized Syria's central role in the region. In February 1992, French Foreign Minister [[Roland Dumas]] visited Damascus to discuss the Lebanese question and the peace process. In 1992, Syria's relations with Germany, previously cold, improved when Syria was involved in securing the release of two German hostages in Lebanon, which also improved its international image. Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] thanked Assad for his effort. German Foreign Minister [[Hans-Dietrich Genscher]] visited Syria in September 1992 to discuss the improvement of relations between the countries.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}


In late 1990s, Syrian relationship with EU countries continued to improve slowly. Syrian relations with the EU countries were of economic significane and moreover Syria benefited from it by bolstering its international status. Good relations with the EU countries enabled Syria the maneuverability regarding Israel.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=561}}
In late 1990s, Syria's relations with EU countries, which were economically significant, continued to slowly improve and allowed the coutry to gain some maneuverability regarding Israel. The country's international status was also bolstered.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=561}}


====Soviet Union and Russia====
====Soviet Union and Russia====


=====Soviet Union=====
=====Soviet Union=====
[[File:Assad-Brezhnev 1981.jpg|thumb|Assad and [[Leonid Brezhnev]] in Moscow in 1981]]
[[File:Assad-Brezhnev 1981.jpg|thumb|right|Assad and [[Leonid Brezhnev]] in Moscow in 1981]]
In the 1980s Syria established a military-related cooperation with the Soviet Union. Soviet sophisticiated arms as well as military advisors helped the development of the Syrian Army which raised the tension between Israel and Syria. In November 1983 a Soviet delegation arrived in Damascus to discuss the opening of the [[Russian naval facility in Tartus|Soviet naval base]] in Syrian city of [[Tartus]]. Nevertheless, Syria and the Soviet Union had few issues in their relationship; Syria's involvement in the Gulf War, while Syria supported Iran, the Soviet Union was on Iraq's side; when the rebellion against Yasser Arafat broke out in al-Fatah in 1983, Syria supported rebels while Soivets supported Arafat. In order to fix problem between the countries, in 1983 Syrian Foreign Minister [[Abdul Halim Khaddam]] visited Moscow. Soviet Foreign Minister [[Andrey Gromyko]] argued that Syria and the Soviet Union must resolve their differences concerning the Palestinian movement as stoping the internal conflict would allow the "anti-Imperialist struggle."{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=700-701}}
In the 1980s, Assad's regime established a military cooperation with the Soviet Union. Sophisticiated Soviet arms and military advisers helped the development of the Syrian Army, which raised the tension between Israel and Syria. In November 1983, a Soviet delegation arrived in Damascus to discuss the opening of a [[Russian naval facility in Tartus|Soviet naval base]] in the Syrian city of [[Tartus]]. The countries' relationship encountered problems: Syria had supported Iran during the Gulf War, while the Soviet Union supported Iraq, and when the rebellion against Yasser Arafat broke out in al-Fatah in 1983, Syria supported the rebels while the Soviet Union supported Arafat. In 1983 the Syrian Foreign Minister [[Abdul Halim Khaddam]] visited Moscow. Soviet Foreign Minister [[Andrey Gromyko]] argued that Syria and the Soviet Union must resolve their differences concerning the Palestinian movement as stopping the internal conflict would allow the "anti-Imperialist struggle."{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=700-701}}


During the diplomatic crisis between the United States and Syria which escalated in minor clashes, Syrian counted on Soviet help if the clashes would grow to a war. Soviet ambassador in Damascus, [[Vladimir Yukhin]], expressed his country's appreciation "for the firm Syrian position in the face of Imperialism and Zionism." This Soviet attitude didn't satisfied Syria completely. Assad's government even considered entering the [[Warsaw Pact]] to gain Soviet support and to match United States and Israel. Syria and the Soviet Union had also signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in October 1980. This treaty was focused on general features, mainly cultural, technical, military, economic and transport relations. This treaty also incuded joint action in case that any of the countries is under aggression and forbade both Syria and the Soviet Union to join any alliance that is against one of the signatiories. Syrian effort to improve the strategic relations with the Soviet Union ment that Syria was not completely satisfied with the current Treaty. Even before the Treaty was signed the Soviet Union backed the Arab countries, both in the [[Six-Day War]] of 1967 and the [[Yom Kippur War]] of 1973. During the [[1982 Lebanon War]], the Soviet Union kept a policy of low profile. The Soviets did not send arms nor did they exert pressure to end the conflict. The Syrian Armed Forces and the PLO were militarily defeated. This also led to damage of the Soviet prestige in the region. Such Soviet attitude occurred under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation so it is understandebla why Syria wanted to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union, especially in the face of an aggressive policy of the United States in Lebanon designed to harm Syria's position there.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=701-702}}
During the diplomatic crisis between the United States and Syria, which escalated into minor clashes, Syrian counted on Soviet help if war should break out. [[Vladimir Yukhin]], the Soviet ambassador in Damascus, expressed his country's appreciation "for the firm Syrian position in the face of Imperialism and Zionism." The Soviet attitude did not satisfied Syria completely. Assad's government considered entering the [[Warsaw Pact]] to gain Soviet support and to match the United States and Israel. Syria and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in October 1980, which was focused on cultural, technical, military, economic, and transport relations. This treaty included joint action in case any of the countries were attacked and forbade both Syria and the Soviet Union from joining any alliance that was against one of the signatories. Syria's efforts to improve the strategic relations with the Soviet Union meant that Syria was not completely satisfied with the current Treaty. Even before the Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had backed the Arab countries in the [[Six-Day War]] of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. During the [[1982 Lebanon War]], the Soviet Union kept a policy of low profile. The Soviets did not send arms or exert pressure to end the conflict. This damaged the prestige of the Soviet in the Middle East.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=701-702}}


The Syrian need for strengthening its ties with the Soviet Union was part of the Assad's policy of strategic balance with Israel. Increased Soviet military support coupled with more Soviet political backing occurred in Damascus as vital ingredients in Syria's determined effort to match Israeli power. The Soviets, however, had a problem with Syria in 1983 due to a power struggle started by Rif'at al-Assad. In that time Hafez al-Assad was ill and unable to govern the country. The Soviets supported Hafez al-Assad's Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass and were concerned about Rif'at's bid for power. When the Soviet leader [[Yuri Andropov]] died Assad didn't attended his funeral, but the Syrian official commentary stated that Andropov supported the Soviet-Syrian friendship and that both countries stressed aspirations for strengthening their ties in various fields.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=702}}
The strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union, and the increased Soviet military support and political backing were part of the Assad's policy of strategic balance with Israel. In 1983, during the power struggle between Assad's forces and his brother, Rif'at al-Assad, the Soviets supported Hafez al-Assad's Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass and were concerned about Rif'at's bid for power. When the Soviet leader [[Yuri Andropov]] died, Assad did not attended his funeral, but the Syrian official commentary stated that Andropov supported the Soviet-Syrian friendship and that both countries stressed their aspirations for strengthening their ties.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=702}}


Syria's relations with the Soviet Union had been a coreston of the Syrian foreign policy for years. Soviet Union was Syria's political, military and economic prop which enabled Syria a sense of security in the face of external threats, mainly Israel. However, after 1987 the Soviet Union was unable to support Syria. The reason for that were the internal changes and political crisis in the Soviet Union. At the same time this made an impact on the relationship between the states and eventually Syria reduced its support for the Soviet Union as a superpower. Change of the Soviet Middle East policy led to Syrian change of its relations with Israel which resulted in allowing mass emigration of Jews to Israel and demand Syria change its attitude on the conflict with Israel. Alexander Zotov, the Soviet Ambassador, said in November 1989 that Syria's change of foreign policy is necessary, stating that Syria should cease aspiring for a strategic balance with Israel and settle for "reasonable defensive sufficiency," and that the Soviet-Syrian arms trade would be changed as well. The arms sales have been reduced and another reason for that was the growing debt of Syria to the Soviet Union. This led Syria to find new weapon suppliers, China and North Korea.{{sfn|Zisser|1992|p=656}}
After 1987, because of internal changes and a political crisis, the Soviet Union was unable to support Syria. This impacted the relationship between the states and Syria reduced its support for the Soviet Union. Changes to the Soviet Middle East policy led to Syria changing its relations with Israel, which resulted in the mass emigration of Jews to Israel and a demand that Syria change its attitude on the conflict with Israel. Alexander Zotov, the Soviet Ambassador, said in November 1989 that Syria's change of foreign policy was necessary, that Syria should cease aspiring for a strategic balance with Israel and settle for "reasonable defensive sufficiency", and that the Soviet-Syrian arms trade would also be changed. The growing Syrian debt to the Soviet Union led to a reduction of the arms trade between the countries and Syria turned to China and North Korea for its weapons supplies.{{sfn|Zisser|1992|p=656}}


[[File:Blog -Hafez Al-Assad Gorbatchev.jpg|thumb|Assad and Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1987]]
[[File:Blog -Hafez Al-Assad Gorbatchev.jpg|thumb|left|Assad and Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1987]]
Nevertheless, Syria continued to mentain normal relations with the Soviets. Between 27 and 29 April 1987 Assad was in visit to the Soviet Union along with the Defence Minister Tlass and Vice President Khaddam. During a visit, Assad stressed out that Jewish emigration to Israel is not only an embarrassment to Syria but it serves strengthening Israel as well. Radio Damascus denied the claims that the Soviet Union and Syria were distancing and stated that the Assad's visit had renewed the momentum in the relations between the Soviet Union and Syria consolidating their common veiw of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syrian Daily, ''Tishrin'' stated that after this visit, the relation between the Soviet Union and Syria would be expanded. Few weeks after he returned from Moscow, Assad, in his speech to the National Federation of Syrian Students, said that the Soviet Union remained a firm friend of Syria and the Arabs and no slacking in their relations occurred. Assad stated that even though [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] and his government are preoccupied with the internal affairs, they haven't ignored external issues, especially those related to their friends.{{sfn|Zisser|1992|p=657}} Syria mentained its close economic ties with the Soviet Union. In 1990 44.3% of exports were traded in the Soviet Union. However, just befor the collapse of the Soviet Union the economic, military and political ties between the countries changed. As contrast to their previous visits, in 1991 Syrian Foreign Minister al-Sharaa visited the Soviet Union only once in April. Sovet Foreign Ministers [[Alexander Bessmertnykh]] and [[Boris Pankin]] also visited Syria in May and October. However, those visits were connected only with the American initiative to promote peace process, accentuating the decline in the status of the Soviet Union in the region.{{sfn|Zisser|1993|p=673-674}}
Between 27 and 29 April 1987, Assad, along with the Defense Minister Tlass and Vice President Khaddam, visited the Soviet Union. Assad stressed that Jewish emigration to Israel was an embarrassment to Syria and served to strengthen Israel. Radio Damascus denied claims that the Soviet Union and Syria were becoming distant and stated that the Assad's visit had renewed the momentum in the relations between the countries, consolidating their common view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Syrian daily newspaper, ''Tishrin'', stated that after this visit, the relation between the Soviet Union and Syria would be expanded. A few weeks after he returned from Moscow, Assad, in a speech to the National Federation of Syrian Students, said that the Soviet Union remained a firm friend of Syria and the Arabs, and that even though [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] and his government were preoccupied with internal affairs, they had not ignored external issues, especially those related to their friends.{{sfn|Zisser|1992|p=657}} In 1990, 44.3% of Syrian exports were traded in the Soviet Union. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the countries changed. In April 1991, the Syrian Foreign Minister al-Sharaa visited the Soviet Union, the only visit that year. Soviet Foreign Ministers [[Alexander Bessmertnykh]] and [[Boris Pankin]] visited Syria in May and October, but those visits were in connection with the American Middle East peace initiative, accentuating the decline in the status of the Soviet Union in the region.{{sfn|Zisser|1993|p=673-674}}


=====Russia=====
=====Russia=====
{{See also|Russia–Syria relations}}
{{See also|Russia–Syria relations}}
Collapse of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991 marked the end of the Syrian main source of political and military support for more than two decades. In 1992 the [[Commonwealth of Independent States]] (CIS) and Russia were dependent from the United States and their made closer ties with Israel which ment that Syria was unable to count on their support. Nevertheless, CIS countries were views as limited market and limited source for arms. The absence of high-level contracts between Russia and Syria unabled future development of the relations between the countries. Russians agreed to sell the arms under previous contracts signed between the Soviet Union and Syria and they demanded Syrian payment of the $10 billion - $12 billion worth debt. Syria refused to do so claiming that Russia is not a successor state of the Soviet Union. However Syria later agreed to pay part of the debt by exporting citrus fruit worthing $800 million.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}
The collapse of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991 marked the end of the main source of Syria's political and military support for more than two decades. In 1992 the [[Commonwealth of Independent States]] (CIS) and Russia were dependent upon the United States and made closer ties with Israel, which meant that Syria was unable to count on their support. Nevertheless, CIS countries were views as limited market and limited source for arms. The absence of high-level contracts between Russia and Syria enabled future development of the relations between the countries. Russia agreed to sell Syria arms under previous contracts with the Soviet Union and they demanded payment of Syria's US$10&nbsp;–&nbsp;12 billion debt. Syria refused to do so, claiming that Russia was not a successor state of the Soviet Union, but later agreed to pay part of the debt by exporting citrus fruit worth $800 million.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}


Like other Arab countries, Syria worked on good relations with Muslim countries that were part of the Soviet Union. Syrian Foreign Minister [[Farouk al-Sharaa]] visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. However, good relations with those state were only limited. Syra, nevertheless, established good relationship with another former Soviet state, Armenia. Reason for that was because Syria had large [[Armenians in Syria|Armenian community]] living in Syria.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}
Like other Arab countries, Syria worked to develop good relations with Muslim former Soviet countries. Syrian Foreign Minister [[Farouk al-Sharaa]] visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan with limited results, but Syria established good relations with [[Armenia]] because Syria had large [[Armenians in Syria|Armenian community]].{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=733}}


On 6 July 1999 Assad visited Moscow. The visit was originally planned for April but Israeli Prime Minister [[Ariel Sharon]] was visiting Moscow at the same time so Assad's visit was postponed. His visit ended with finalizing arms deal worthing $2 billion. After the visit both sides stated that they will strengthen their trade ties. Assad commented the Russian growing importance stating that he welcomes Russian strengthening and hope that their role would be more clearly and more openly expressed. United States warned Russia not to trade arms to Syria, but Russia stated that it would not yield to American thereats at halting cooperation with Syria.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=561}}
On 6 July 1999, Assad visited Moscow. The visit was originally planned for April but Israeli Prime Minister [[Ariel Sharon]] was visiting Moscow at the same time so Assad's visit was postponed. Assad finalized an arms deal worth $2 billion, and after the visit both sides stated that they would strengthen their trade ties. Assad commented upon Russia's growing importance, stating that he welcomed Russia's strengthening and hoped that their role would be more clearly and openly expressed. The United States warned Russia not to trade arms to Syria, but Russia stated that it would not yield to American threats.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=561}}


====United States====
==== United States ====
{{See also|Syria–United States relations}}
{{See also|Syria–United States relations}}
[[File:Jimmy Carter and Hafiz al-Asad during a meeting between U.S. and Syrian officials - NARA - 174645.tif|thumb|Hafez Assad meeting Jimmy Carter 9 May 1977]]
[[File:Jimmy Carter and Hafiz al-Asad during a meeting between US and Syrian officials - NARA - 174645.tif|thumb|right|Hafez Assad meeting Jimmy Carter 9 May 1977]]
In 1980s a major issue in the relations between the United States and Syria was the situation in Lebanon. In October 1983 the headquarters of the American and French troops of the [[Multinational Force in Lebanon]] (MNF), was completely demolished in an suicide attack. Around 200 Americans was killed. Syrian ambassador in the USA disclaimed any kind of Syria's involvement in the attack, however, USA thought differently so Congress passed an emergency bill cancelling economic aid previously approved for Syria. It was later reported that Syrian support for the attack was however massive. Around 800 Shia fanatics were reportedly trained in Syria and Assad's cousin [[Adnan al-Assad]] personally supervised the preparations for the attack. Syria decided to resist American and French if attacked. At the time Assad's health was bad. Syria's Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass said that Syria would launche suicide attacks on the American Sixth Fleet. In December 1983, when American planes pounded Syrian positions in Biqa' valley, Syrian air-defence system fought back. Two American planes were destroyed and one pilot was taken prisoner of war. Just before the attack, Israeli Prime Minister visited Washington so Syria linked the American attack with the visit.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=703}}


In 1980s, the situation in Lebanon became a major problem between Assad's regime and the United States. In October 1983, the headquarters of the American and French troops of the [[Multinational Force in Lebanon]] (MNF), was demolished in an suicide attack. Around 200 Americans was killed. Syria's ambassador in the US disclaimed any Syria's involvement but the thought differently so Congress passed an emergency bill canceling economic aid previously approved for Syria. It was later reported that Syria had provided support for the attack. Around 800 Shia extremists had been trained in Syria and Assad's cousin [[Adnan al-Assad]] had supervised the preparations for the attack. Syria decided to resist American and French if attacked. Syria's Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass said that Syria would launch suicide attacks on the American Sixth Fleet. In December 1983, when American planes pounded Syrian positions in Biqa' valley, the Syrian air-defense system fought back. Two American airplanes were destroyed and one pilot was taken prisoner of war. Just before the attack, Israel's Prime Minister had visited Washington; Syria linked the American attack with the visit.{{sfn|Olmert|1988|p=703}}
In 1990s Syria continued to mentain its good relations with the United States. Nevertheless, unsolved issues between the countries prevented their friendly relationship. One of the issues between the states was allowing Syrian Jews to emigrate, which was allowed in April 1992. The step was welcomed by the [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]] Administration.{{sfn|Zisser|p=729-730}} Syria also showed their commitment to the peace process requesting for US' more active part. However, relations between Syria and the United States were still characterised by mutual distrust and differences of opinion on key issues.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=730}}


In the 1990s, Syria maintained good relations with the United States, but several problems prevented them establishing a friendly relationship. In April 1992, Syria allowed Jews to emigrate to Israel, which was welcomed by the [[George H. W. Bush|Bush]] administration.{{sfn|Zisser|p=729-730}} Syria also showed its commitment to the peace process and requested US to take a more active part. However, relations between the countries were still characterized by mutual distrust and differences of opinion on key issues.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=730}}
One of the issues in the relationship between the two countries was the accusation that Syria is patronising terrorist organisations. Despite Syria's efforts to portray itself as having dissociated itself from these groups, Syria wasn't removed from the list of countries sponsoring terrorist organisations that appeared in annual US Department report on "Patterns of Global Terrorism." The United States believed that Syria continued to help the terrirosts. In 1991 Syria was one of the suspects for the explosion of the Pan Am plane over [[Lockerbie]] in Scotland. Even though the US diprived Syria of responsibility, the US media continued to portray Syria as a suspect. Syria itself denied the involvement and protested because they weren't removed from the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" list. Syria, nevertheless, continued to patronage number of organisations that were operating against Israel, including [[Hezbollah]], the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=730}}

The US accused Syria of patronizing terrorist organizations. Despite Syria's efforts to portray itself as having dissociated itself from these groups, it was not removed from the list of countries sponsoring terrorist organizations that appeared in annual US Department report on "Patterns of Global Terrorism". In 1991, Syria was suspected of involvement in the destruction of [[Pan Am Flight 103]] over [[Lockerbie]] in Scotland. The US government absolved Syria of responsibility but the US media continued to portray Syria as a suspect. Syria denied any involvement and protested its inclusion on the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" list. Assad's government continued to patronage organizations that operated against Israel, including [[Hezbollah]], the [[Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine]] (PFLP), and the [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command]] (PFLP-GC).{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=730}}


===Region===
===Region===


====Egypt====
====Egypt====
Relations between Egypt in Syria were renewed in December 1989. In 1990s Syria had good relations with Egypt. Those relations were of high importance to it. President of Egypt Mubarak and Assad were in good relations also. In relations between Egypt in Syria, Syria tried to make Egypt its advocate infront of the United States and Israel, while Egypt tried to convince Syria to go forward with the peace process. Syria also tried to mediate between Egypt and Iran. Those efforts were mainly undertaken by Syrian Foreign Minister al-Sharaa. However, this mediation proved to be futile as there was no reconciliation nor the normalization in relationship between Egypt in Iran. Nevertheless, relations between Egypt in Syria weren't so good at military or economic level. Those relations were mainly of political nature.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=734}}
Relations between Egypt in Syria were renewed in December 1989. In the1990s, the countries enjoyed good relations with each other, as did their respective presidents, Hosni Mubarak and Assad. Syria tried to make Egypt its advocate to the United States and Israel, while Egypt tried to convince Syria to continue with the peace process. Syria also tried in vain to mediate between Egypt and Iran, a process mainly undertaken by Syrian Foreign Minister al-Sharaa. Relations between Egypt in Syria were not as good on a military or economic level.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=734}}In 1999 relations between the countries became strained because of differences over the peace process. Assad and Mubarak met only once that year; during the past decade they had met every few months. Syria opposed Egypt's proposal to convene a summit of Arabic countries negotiating with Israel, as Syria was unwilling to be pressured into a dialog with Yaser Arafat. Later, Syria accused Egypt of seeking to promote negotiations with the Palestinians at Syrian expense.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=562}}

In 1999 relations between Egypt and Syria strained because of the differences over the peace process. Representatives from both countries alluded to this tension on various occasions. During the year, Assad and Egypt's president met only in January 1999 in contrast to their previous practice of meeting every few months in past decade. Syria opposed Egyptian proposal to convene Arab summit of the countries negotiationg with Israel, as Syria was unwilling to place itself in a position where they would be preassured into a dialogue with Yaser Arafat. Later, Syria accused Egypt for seeking to promote negotiations in the Palestinian track at Syrian expense.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=562}}


====Iran====
====Iran====
The [[Iranian Revolution|Islamic revolution in Iran]] in February 1979 was seen by Assad as an opportunity to further implement his policies. The new regime of [[Ruhollah Khomeini]] in Iran promptly abolished Iran's pro-Western link with Egypt, potentially threatened Iraq, and turned Israel from a latent ally into a declared enemy of Iran. Assad thus established this unusual alliance with Iran, whose political and social principles, except those concerning Israel and the United States, were dramatically opposed to the Ba'athist doctrines of his regime as well as of Iraqi government. Furthermore, Assad consistently extended military and diplomatic assistance to Iran in its long and bloody war with Iraq, aiming at achieving his major goals - securing legitimacy and support for his rule in Syria and his policies in Lebanon; using the Iranian potential threat to manipulate Arab states of the [[Persian Gulf]] into continuing their financial and diplomatic support for Syria; weakening and possibly toppling the regime in Baghdad; and subsequently employing Iraq and Iran for "strategic depth" and as allies in Syria's confrontation with Israel, thus emerging as leader of the all-Arab struggle against Israel. To be sure, Assad repeated that the war between Iraq and Iran never should have occurred since it was waged against a potential ally of the Arabs, and caused the diversion of the Arabs' attention, resources, and efforts from their real enemy, Israel. In other words, according to Assad, most Arab countries had been wrongly led to support Iraq in an unnecessary war against Iran, rather than support Syria in its vital national-historical struggle against Israel.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=62-63}}
Assad regarded the [[Iranian Revolution|Islamic revolution in Iran]] in February 1979 as an opportunity to further implement his policies. The new regime of [[Ruhollah Khomeini]] in Iran promptly abolished Iran's pro-Western link with Egypt, which potentially threatened Iraq and turned Israel from a possible ally into a declared enemy. Assad established an alliance with Iran, whose political and social principles—except those concerning Israel and the United States—were dramatically opposed to Ba'athist doctrines. Assad consistently extended military and diplomatic assistance to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in order to secure legitimacy and support for his rule in Syria and his policies in Lebanon. He used the potential threat from Iran to manipulate Arab states in the [[Persian Gulf]] into continuing their financial and diplomatic support for Syria, weakening and possibly toppling the Iraqi regime, and subsequently employing Iraq and Iran for "strategic depth" and as allies in Syria's confrontation with Israel, thus emerging as leader of the all-Arab struggle against Israel. Assad repeated that the Iran-Iraq war should not have occurred since it was waged against a potential ally of the Arabs and diverted the Arabs' attention, resources, and efforts from their real enemy, Israel. According to Assad, most Arab countries had been wrongly led to support Iraq in an unnecessary war against Iran, rather than support Syria in its vital national-historical struggle against Israel.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=62-63}}


However, except for securing Arab financial support and verbal commitments, and obtaining large quantities of free and discounted Iranian oil, Assad failed to achieve the main goals of his Gulf strategy. Moreover, this strategy served to further worsen Syria's regional position. Thus, Assad failed to further isolate Egypt because of its peace with Israel, to weaken or topple the Iraqi leadership because of their war with Iran, or to himself emerge as leader of an all-Arab coalition vis-à-vis Israel. The growing Iranian threat to Iraq, which Assad indirectlly fuelled, contributed to bringing Egypt back to the Arab fold and made many Arabs acquiesce with Egypt's peace treaty with Israel; it also served to develop a new alliance between Egypt and Iraq, the two major Arab states, while further isolating Syria in the Arab world; and finally, it helped to consolidate the Iraqi regime and create amongst its leaders an intense feeling of hatred and revenge towards Assad.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=63}}
However, except for securing Arab financial support and verbal commitments, and obtaining large quantities of free and discounted Iranian oil, Assad failed to achieve the goals of his Gulf strategy; instead it further worsened Syria's regional position. The growing Iranian threat to Iraq, which Assad indirectly fueled, brought Egypt back to the Arab cause and many Arabs agreed with Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. A new alliance developed between Egypt and Iraq, Syria became further isolated, and the Iraqi regime—whose leaders developed feelings of hatred and revenge towards Assad—consolidated itself.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=63}} Syria's relationship with Iran during the Gulf war was under pressure. Iran's threats to take Iraqi territory caused Syria to not object the loss of Arab territory. In early 1986, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa said that Iran had confirmed that Iraqi territory would not be taken and al-Sharaa called Iran's refusal to end the war "crazy". Soon afterwards, Iran occupied the Iraqi Faw peninsula, damaging Syria's credibility. Another blow was Iran's offensive on [[Basra]] in late 1986 and early 1987. Between May and June 1986, Jordan and Saudi Arabia mediated between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties. Mediation was arranged due to Iran's threats to cut off oil supplies to Syria, as Syria was unable to pay Iran. Assad said that he was also interested in a dialog with Iraq. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries tried to persuade Assad to reach an agreement with Iraq and reopen its pipeline to the Mediterranean, which traverses Syria.{{sfn|Olmert|1988|p=616}}


====Iraq====
====Iraq====
[[File:Hussein Assad Bouteflika Khaddam.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad (centre) with Iraqi President [[Saddam Hussein]] (left), Algerian Foreign Minister [[Abdelaziz Bouteflika]] (right), and Syrian Vice-President [[Abd al-Halim Khaddam]] (far right, half-covered) in 1979]]
[[File:Hussein Assad Bouteflika Khaddam.jpg|thumb|left|Hafez al-Assad (centre) with Iraqi President [[Saddam Hussein]] (left), Algerian Foreign Minister [[Abdelaziz Bouteflika]] (right), and Syrian Vice-President [[Abd al-Halim Khaddam]] (far right, half-covered) in 1979]]
{{See also|Iraq–Syria relations}}
{{See also|Iraq–Syria relations}}
Even though Iraq was ruled by another [[Ba'ath Party (Baghdad)|branch of the Ba'ath Party]], Assad's relations with [[Saddam Hussein]] were extremely strained. One of the main reason for Syria-Iraq tense relations was Saddam's refusal to ally with Syria against Israel, which Assad was unable to forgove to the President of Iraq. When the Iran-Iraq War broke out in 1980 Syria took the part of Iran against Iraq. Iran also succeeded to find an ally, the Kurds in Iraq. The Kurds assisted Iran's offensive at the northern Iraq. [[Massoud Barzani]], a Kurdish leader, hoped that Khomeini would give the territory to the Kurds, but Khomeini at the end decided to incorporate it in the [[Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq]]. Barzani wasn't satisfied with the decision so he aligned with Assad's Syria, while Assad was also already patronizing [[Jalal Talabani]].{{sfn|Pelletière|2007|p=70}} Talabani resided in Syria since the 1970s and Assad believed he could benefit from his ties with Syria. Talabani himself stated that he wouldn't forget the support given to him by Assad.{{sfn|Barkey|Lasensky|Marr|Hamilton|2011|p=27}} This was one of Assad's efforts to expand Syria's zone of influence to Iraq. By receiving Barzani, Assad gained the Kurds on his side, thus decreasing Iran's chances to expand the influence over Iraq. Nevertheless, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Kurds were still in close relations with Iran.{{sfn|Pelletière|2007|p=70}}
Even though Iraq was ruled by another [[Ba'ath Party (Baghdad)|branch of the Ba'ath Party]], Assad's relations with [[Saddam Hussein]] were extremely strained, mainly because of Saddam's refusal to ally with Syria against Israel, which Assad was unable to forgive. Assad had supported Iran in the war, and Iran found another ally in the Kurds in Iraq, who assisted Iran's offensive at the northern Iraq.


[[Massoud Barzani]], a Kurdish leader, hoped that Khomeini would give the territory to the Kurds, but Khomeini decided to incorporate it into the [[Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq]]. Barzani was not satisfied so he aligned with Assad's Syria, while Assad was also patronizing [[Jalal Talabani]].{{sfn|Pelletière|2007|p=70}} Talabani had lived in Syria since the 1970s and Assad believed he could benefit from his ties with Syria. Talabani stated that he would not forget the support given to him by Assad.{{sfn|Barkey|Lasensky|Marr|Hamilton|2011|p=27}} This was one of Assad's efforts to expand Syria's zone of influence to Iraq. By receiving Barzani, Assad gained the support of Kurds, thus decreasing Iran's chances to expand its influence over Iraq. However, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Kurds were still in close relations with Iran.{{sfn|Pelletière|2007|p=70}}
Assad also participated in the coalition formed to force Iraq from Kuwait in the [[Gulf War]] in 1991, however, the Syria-Iraq relations started to improve in 1997 and 1998{{sfn|Post|George|2004|p=231}} when Israel started to develop a strategic partnership with Turkey.{{sfn|Tucker|Roberts|2008|p=169}}

Assad also participated in the coalition formed to force Iraq from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War; however Syria-Iraq relations started to improve in 1997 and 1998{{sfn|Post|George|2004|p=231}} when Israel started to develop a strategic partnership with Turkey.{{sfn|Tucker|Roberts|2008|p=169}}


====Israel====
====Israel====
{{See also|Israel–Syria relations}}
{{See also|Israel–Syria relations}}

To a large extent, Al-Assad's foreign policy was shaped by Syria's attitude toward [[Israel]]. During his presidency, Syria played a major role in the [[Arab-Israeli War of 1973|1973 Arab-Israeli war]]. The war is presented by the Syrian government as a victory, although by the end of the war the Israeli army had invaded large areas of Syria, and taken up positions 40&nbsp;km from Damascus. However, through later negotiations Syria regained some territory that had been occupied in 1967 in the peace negotiations headed by [[Henry Kissinger]]. The Syrian government refused to recognize the State of Israel and referred to it as the "Zionist Entity." Only in the mid-1990s did Hafez moderate his country's policy towards Israel, as he realized the loss of Soviet support meant a different balance of power in the [[Middle East]]. Pressed by the [[United States]], he engaged in negotiations on the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights, but these talks failed. Al-Assad believed that what constituted Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, were an integral part of "Southern Syria."<ref>[http://www.danielpipes.org/174/palestine-for-the-syrians Palestine for the Syrians? :: Daniel Pipes<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref>[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64972/fouad-ajami/the-ways-of-syria?page=2 The Ways of Syria | Foreign Affairs<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref> Syria also took part in the [[1982 Lebanon War]].
Assad's foreign policy was largely shaped by Syria's attitude toward Israel. During his presidency, Syria played a major role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which was presented by the Assad's government as a victory, although by the end of the war the Israeli army had invaded large areas of Syria and taken up positions {{convert|40|km}} from Damascus. Syria later regained some territory that had been occupied in 1967 in the peace negotiations headed by [[Henry Kissinger]]. The Syrian government refused to recognize the State of Israel and referred to it as the "Zionist Entity." In the mid-1990s, Assad moderated his country's policy towards Israel as the loss of Soviet support altered the balance of power in the Middle East. Under pressure from the United States, Assad engaged in negotiations on the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights, but these talks failed. Assad believed that what constituted Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza were an integral part of southern Syria.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.danielpipes.org/174/palestine-for-the-syrians |title = Palestine for the Syrians? |author = Daniel Pipes}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64972/fouad-ajami/the-ways-of-syria?page=2 |title = The Ways of Syria Foreign Affairs |author = Fouad Ajami |date = May/June 2009 |accessdate = 10 October 2012}}</ref>


====Jordan====
====Jordan====
{{See also|Jordan–Syria relations}}
{{See also|Jordan–Syria relations}}
Assad had cold relations with Jordan. Syria under Assad had long history of attempts to destabilize King Hussein's regime and a regular onslought official insults emanating from Damascus towards [[Amman]].{{sfn|Schenker|2003|p=11}} Both countries supported the opposition forces in order to destabileze each other's countries. In 1979 when the Islamic uprising started in Syria, Jordan supported the Muslim Brotherhood.{{sfn|Milton-Edwards|2009|p=101}} Assad accused King Hussein for supporting them,{{sfn|Korany|Dessounki|2010|p=272}} and after he crushed the Islamists, Assad sent Syrian troops on the border with Jordan. In December 1980 some Arab newspapers reported that Syrian jets attacked Muslim Brotherhood's bases located in Jordan. Saudi Arabia mediated in order to calm the two countries. A significant factor for Syria's hostility towards Jordan was its good relationship with Syria's rival Iraq.{{sfn|Milton-Edwards|2009|p=101-102}} During the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s, Syria and Jordan supported different sides.{{sfn|Schenker|2003|p=11}} Not even the treath of war with Syria did prevented King Hussein to support Iraq; however, the rest of the [[Arab States of the Persian Gulf]] did the same.{{sfn|Milton-Edwards|2009|p=102}} In October 1998 Syria's Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass stated that "there is no such country as Jordan. Jordan was merely south Syria".{{sfn|Schenker|2003|p=11}} Nevertheless, when King Hussein died in February 1999, Assad attended his funeral, after which relations between Syria and Jordan started to improve. Hussein's successor, [[Abdullah II of Jordan|King Abdullah]] visited Syria in April 1999 which was rated as a "turning point" in the relationship between two countries.{{sfn|Korany|Dessounki|2010|p=272}}
Assad had cold relations with Jordan. Syria under Assad had long history of attempts to destabilize King Hussein's regime and a regular onslaught of official insults emanated from Damascus towards [[Amman]].{{sfn|Schenker|2003|p=11}} Both countries supported the other's opposition forces in order to destabileze each other's countries. In 1979's Islamic uprising in Syria, Jordan supported the Muslim Brotherhood.{{sfn|Milton-Edwards|2009|p=101}} Assad accused King Hussein of supporting them,{{sfn|Korany|Dessounki|2010|p=272}}defeated the Islamists and sent Syrian troops to the Jordanian border. In December 1980, some Arab newspapers reported that Syrian jets attacked Muslim Brotherhood bases in Jordan. Saudi Arabia mediated in order to calm the two countries. Syria's hostility towards Jordan was partly fueled by Jordan's good relationship with Iraq.{{sfn|Milton-Edwards|2009|p=101-102}} During the Iraq-Iran War, Syria and Jordan supported different sides.{{sfn|Schenker|2003|p=11}} Not even the threat of war with Syria prevented King Hussein from supporting Iraq; however the rest of the [[Arab States of the Persian Gulf]] did the same.{{sfn|Milton-Edwards|2009|p=102}} In October 1998, Syria's Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass stated that "there is no such country as Jordan. Jordan was merely south Syria".{{sfn|Schenker|2003|p=11}} However, when King Hussein died in February 1999, Assad attended his funeral, after which relations between Syria and Jordan started to improve. Hussein's successor, [[Abdullah II of Jordan|King Abdullah]] visited Syria in April 1999, which was described as a "turning point" in the relationship between two countries.{{sfn|Korany|Dessounki|2010|p=272}}


====Lebanon====
====Lebanon====
{{See also|Lebanon–Syria relations|Syrian presence in Lebanon}}
{{See also|Lebanon–Syria relations|Syrian presence in Lebanon}}
Syria deployed troops to [[Lebanon]] in 1976, officially in response to a request from the Lebanese government for Syrian military intervention during the [[Lebanese Civil War]]. It is alleged that the Syrian presence in Lebanon began earlier with its involvement in [[as-Saiqa]], a Palestinian militia composed primarily of Syrians. The [[Arab League]] agreed to send a peacekeeping force mostly composed of Syrian troops. The initial goal was to save the Lebanese government from being overrun by the Left and the Palestinian militancy. Critics allege that this turned into an occupation by 1982, which is not disputed within the Lebanese community. The Syrian presence ended in 2005, due to UN resolution 1559, after the [[Rafiq Hariri]] assassination and the March 14 protests.
Syria deployed troops to Lebanon in 1976 during the Lebanese Civil War as part of the [[Arab Deterrent Force]]. Military intervention h0ad been requested by the [[President of Lebanon|Lebanese President]] [[Suleiman Frangieh]], as Lebanese Christian fears had been greatly exacerbated by the [[Damour massacre]]. Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian [[Rejectionist Front]] and began supporting the Maronite-dominated government.<ref>Charles D. Smith, ''Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict'', p. 354.</ref> The Syrian presence ended in 2005, due to UN resolution 1559, after the [[Rafiq Hariri]] assassination and the March 14 protests.{{citation needed|date=October 2012}}


====Libya====
====Libya====
[[File:Gaddafi-Boumedienne-Assad-1977-Tripolis.jpg|thumb|Libyan leader al-Gaddafi, Algerian president Boumedienne and Syrian President Assad at the Front summit in Tripoli, December 1977]]
[[File:Gaddafi-Boumedienne-Assad-1977-Tripolis.jpg|thumb|right|Libyan leader al-Gaddafi, Algerian president Boumedienne and Syrian President Assad at the Front summit in Tripoli, December 1977]]
Throughout 1970 Gaddafi and Egypt's President Sadat were involved in the negotiations about the union between Egypt and Libya. Assad, at the time Lieutenant General, expanded the negotiations on Syria{{sfn|Metz|2004|p=71}} in September 1970 when in Libya in order to revive the "Steadfastness Front", established by the radical Arab countries.{{sfn|Otman|Karlberg|2007|p=35}} In April 1971 the three leaders announced the [[Federation of Arab Republics]] between the three countries.{{sfn|Metz|2004|p=71}} When the [[Yom Kippur War]] started in 1973, Libya opposed its direction and criticized Egypt and Syria for restricted objectives. Libya was also unhappy with being sidelined. Nevertheless, Libya supported the war and had stationed troops in Egypt before the war began. When the Arab countries lost the war and ceasfire negotiations started, [[Muammar Gaddafi]] was infuriated. After the war Gaddafi criticized Sadat and Assad for not consulting him before the war.{{sfn|Otman|Karlberg|2007|p=37}} Egypt's marginalization of Libya and acceptance of the Camp David accords led Libya to accept more hostile stance with Israel. Eventually, Libya started to mentain good relations with Syria who also opposed Egypt after the Camp David accords.{{sfn|Otman|Karlberg|2007|p=35}}


Throughout 1970, Libya's leader [[Muammar Gaddafi]] and Egypt's President Sadat were involved in the negotiations about the union between Egypt and Libya. Assad—at the time Lieutenant General—expanded the negotiations on Syria{{sfn|Metz|2004|p=71}} in September 1970 when in Libya in order to revive the [[Steadfastness and Confrontation Front]] established by the radical Arab countries.{{sfn|Otman|Karlberg|2007|p=35}} In April 1971, the three leaders announced the Federation of Arab Republics between Libya, Syria, and Egypt..{{sfn|Metz|2004|p=71}} When the Yom Kippur War started in 1973, Libya opposed its direction and criticized Egypt and Syria for restricted objectives. Libya was also unhappy with being sidelined. Nevertheless, Libya supported the war and had stationed troops in Egypt before it began. When the Arab countries lost the war and ceasfire negotiations started, Gaddafi was infuriated. After the war Gaddafi criticized Sadat and Assad for not consulting him before the war.{{sfn|Otman|Karlberg|2007|p=37}} Egypt's marginalization of Libya and acceptance of the Camp David accords led Libya to adopt a more hostile stance against Israel. Eventually, Libya improved its relations with Syria, which also opposed Egypt after the Camp David accords.{{sfn|Otman|Karlberg|2007|p=35}}
Gaddafi tried to expand the Arab unity on his west. In 1974 he proposed a union to Tunisia, but the proposal was immediately repudiated by the Tunisian President [[Habib Bourguiba]] and after several incidents between Tunisia and Libya, the countries brake the diplomatic relations. After he failed to form a union with Tunisa and Egypt, Gaddafi again turned to Assad. In September 1980 Assad agreed to enter another union with Libya. This union occurred when both countries were diplomaticily isolated. As part of the agreement, Libya paid the Syrian debt of US$ 1 billion owned to the Soviet Union for weapons. Ironically, this union with Syria confounded Gaddafi's pan-Arab ambitions. In the same month when the union was formed, the war between Iraq and Iran broke out and Syria and Libya were the only Arab states to support Iran.{{sfn|Metz|2004|p=74}}


Gaddafi tried to expand the Arab unity to states to the west of Libya. After he failed in 1974 to form a union with Tunisia and Egypt, Gaddafi again turned to Assad. In September 1980, Assad agreed to enter another union with Libya, which occurred when both countries were diplomatically isolated. As part of the agreement, Libya paid the Syrian debt of US$ 1 billion owned to the Soviet Union for weapons. The union confounded Gaddafi's pan-Arab ambitions. In the same month the union was formed, the Iran-Iraq War broke out and Syria and Libya were the only Arab states to support Iran.{{sfn|Metz|2004|p=74}}
In 1992, during the crisis between Libya and the West after the West accused Libya for involvement in terrorist operations, despite long years of friendship between Assad and Gaddafi, Syria refrained from any substantive support for Libya, its support was only verbal. In order to get more support from Syria, Gaddafi sent a delegation in Damascus in January headed by Colonel Mustafa al-Kharubi. In March, while Assad was visiting Egypt, he met with Libyan representative to the [[Arab League]]. Later in the same month, Abu Zayd 'Umar Durd, secretary of the Libyan General People's Committees, also visited Damascus. However, Syria was unable to do anything more but to denounce the UN's Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Libya, condamning it as unjustified provocation, especially in view of what Syria depicted as a double standard applied by the international community toward Libya, ond the other hand, and Israel, on the other. Once the sanctions were in force on 15 April, Syria announced that it will violate the embargo and will mentain areal contacts with Libya, however, American pressure and Syria's technical inability to send flights to Libya caused them to reverse the decision.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=738}}


In 1992, during the crisis between Libya and the West, despite long years of friendship between Assad and Gaddafi, Syria refrained from any substantive support for Libya, its support was only verbal. In order to get more support from Syria, Gaddafi sent a delegation to Damascus in January 1992, headed by Colonel Mustafa al-Kharubi. In March, while Assad was visiting Egypt, he met with a Libyan representative to the [[Arab League]]. Later in the same month, Abu Zayd 'Umar Durd, secretary of the Libyan General People's Committees, also visited Damascus. However, Syria could do no more than to denounce the UN's Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Libya, condemning it as unjustified provocation in view of what Syria considered to be a double standard applied by the international community toward Libya and Israel. Once the sanctions were in force on 15 April, Syria announced that it would violate the embargo and maintain air contacts with Libya. However, American pressure and Syria's technical inability to send flights to Libya caused them to reverse the decision.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=738}}
====Palestinians====
{{POV-section|date=June 2012}}
The hostile attitude to Israel meant vocal support for the [[Palestinians]], but that did not translate into friendly relations with their organizations. In the 1970s, Al-Assad conducted military operations against Palestinian camps in Lebanon, including involvement in the [[Tel al-Zaatar massacre]], which drew strong criticism for his regime in the Arab world. Hafez al-Assad was always wary of independent Palestinian organizations, as he aimed to bring the Palestinian issue under Syrian control in order to use it as a political tool. He soon developed an implacable animosity towards [[Yasser Arafat]]'s [[Palestinian Liberation Organization|PLO]], against which Syria fought bloody battles in Lebanon. As Arafat moved the PLO in a more moderate direction, seeking compromise with Israel, al-Assad feared regional isolation, and he resented the PLO underground's operations in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. Arafat was depicted by Syria as a rogue madman and an American marionette, and after accusing him of supporting the [[Hama massacre|Hama revolt]], al-Assad backed the 1983 [[Said al-Muragha|Abu Musa]] rebellion inside Arafat's [[Fatah]]-movement. A number of unsuccessful Syrian attempts to kill Arafat were also made.{{citation needed|date=June 2012}}


====Turkey====
====Turkey====
{{See also|Syria–Turkey relations}}
{{See also|Syria–Turkey relations}}
The relations between Turkey and Syria during Assad's rule were tense. Even though the problem of the [[Hatay Province]] existed in the early 1970s, bigger issues to the Syria's relations with Turkey was a water supply and Syria's support to the [[Kurdistan Workers' Party]] and the [[Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia]] (ASALA). Another problem to their bilateral relations was a fact that Turkey was a part of [[NATO]], while Syria was allied to the Soviet Union, nevertheless, the [[Cold War]] was a guarantor to the ''status quo''. After end of the Cold War, the issue of Hatay Province came to the surface.{{sfn|Rabo|Utas|2006|p=92-93}} Hatay Province was handed over to Turkey by France, which was, at the time, a mandatory power in Syria.{{sfn|Radu|2003|p=178}}
During Assad's presidency, Syria's relations with Turkey were tense. The problem of [[Hatay Province]] had existed since early 1970s. A more important issue between the countries was water supply and Syria's support to the [[Kurdistan Workers' Party]] (PKK) and the [[Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia]] (ASALA). Turkey was a member of [[NATO]], while Syria was allied to the Soviet Union; the [[Cold War]] was a guarantor to the ''status quo''. After the Cold War ended, the issue of Hatay Province came to prominence.{{sfn|Rabo|Utas|2006|p=92-93}} Hatay Province was handed over to Turkey by France, which was, at the time, the colonial power in Syria.{{sfn|Radu|2003|p=178}}


Assad offered help to the [[Kurdistan Workers' Party]] (PKK). Assad not only sheltered, trained and equipped Lebanon's PKK, he also enabled the organization to receive training in Beka'a' Vally in Lebanon. [[Abdullah Öcalan]], one of the founders of the PKK, openly used his villa in Damascus as a base for operations. Turkey threatened to cut of all water supplies to Syria.{{sfn|Phillips|2009|p=129-130}} However, whenever Turkish Prime Minister or President sent a formal letter to the Syrian leadership requesting to stop its support to the PKK, Assad would ignore them. Turkey at the time wasn't able to attack Syria due to low military capacity near the Syrian border and advise of the European [[NATO]]-members to stay away from getting involved in the Middle East conflicts in order to avoid escalation of the conflict and involvement of the [[Warsaw Pact]] states, as Syria had good relations with the Soviet Union. However, after the end of the [[Cold War]], Turkish military concentration on the Syrian border increased.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}} Later, during the summer 1998, Turkey threatened with military action because of Syrian aid to Öcalan,{{sfn|Radu|2003|p=152}} and in October they gave Syria an ultimatum.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}} Assad was aware of the possible consequences of Syria's continuing support to the PKK. Not only was Turkey powerful militarily, but also Syria didn't had suppurt of the Soviet Union any more. The Russian Federation wasn't willing to help neither was capable to take strong meassures against Turkey.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}} Facing a real threat of military confronation with Turkey, Syria signed the [[Adana Memorandum]] in October 1998. This agreement designeted the PKK as a terrorist organization and required Syria to evict the PKK from its territory.{{sfn|Phillips|2009|p=129-130}} After the PKK was dissolved in Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations have developed considerably in the political domain. However, major issues, such as waters of the [[Euphrates]] and [[Tigris]] rivers and the [[Hatay Province]] issue, remained unssolved.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}}
Assad offered help to the PKK, sheltered, trained, and equipped Lebanon's PKK and enabled the latter organization to receive training in the [[Beqaa Valley|Beka'a' Valley]] in Lebanon. [[Abdullah Öcalan]], one of the founders of the PKK, openly used his villa in Damascus as a base for operations. Turkey threatened to cut off all water supplies to Syria.{{sfn|Phillips|2009|p=129-130}} However, when the Turkish Prime Minister or President sent a formal letter to the Syrian leadership requesting it to stop supporting the PKK, Assad ignored them. At that time, Turkey could not attack Syria due to its low military capacity near the Syrian border, and advised the European NATO members to avoid becoming involved in Middle East conflicts in order to avoid escalating the West's conflict with the Warsaw Pact states, since Syria had good relations with the Soviet Union. However, after the end of the Cold War, Turkish military concentration on the Syrian border increased.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}} In mid-1998, Turkey threatened Syria with military action because of Syrian aid to Öcalan,{{sfn|Radu|2003|p=152}} and in October they gave Syria an ultimatum.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}} Assad was aware of the possible consequences of Syria's continuing support to the PKK.Turkey powerful militarily, but Syria had lost the support of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was not willing to help; neither was it capable of taking strong measures against Turkey.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}} Facing a real threat of military confrontation with Turkey, Syria signed the [[Adana Memorandum]] in October 1998, which designated the PKK as a terrorist organization and required Syria to evict it from its territory.{{sfn|Phillips|2009|p=129-130}} After the PKK was dissolved in Syria, Turkish-Syrian political relations have developed considerably, but issues such as water supplies from the [[Euphrates]] and [[Tigris]] rivers and Hatay Province remained unsolved.{{sfn|Kibaroğlu|Kibaroğlu|Halman|2009|p=73}}


==Economy==
==Economy==
[[File:Tabaqah assad.jpg|thumb|Tabqa Dam built in 1974 (center of image)]]
[[File:Tabaqah assad.jpg|thumb|left|Tabqa Dam built in 1974 (center of image)]]
Assad labeled his domestic reforms as a corrective movement, making great efforts and achieving substantial results, particularly during the first six-seven years of his rule, in various economic and social fields. Assad made a great effort to modernize the agricultural and the industrial sector of the Syrian economy. One of the most successful of Assad's achievements was the completion of the [[Tabqa Dam]] on the Euphrates River in 1974. Tabqa Dam is one of the biggest dams in the world, with a huge water reservoir named Lake Assad. Lake Assad greatly increased the irrigation of arable lands, provided electric power to many regions of the country, and fostered industrial as well as technical development in Syria. Parallel to his efforts to advance agriculture and develop modern industry, the conditions of many peasants and workers were noticeably improved in matters of financial income and social security as well as health and educational services. The urban middle classes, merchants, artisans, shopkeepers, and the like, which had been hurt by the Jadid regime's policy were given new economic opportuinites by Assad.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56}}
Assad called his domestic reforms as a corrective movement, and achieved substantial results. Assad tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors. One of Assad's main achievements was the completion of the [[Tabqa Dam]] on the Euphrates River in 1974. It is one of the biggest dams in the world, and its reservoir was called [[Lake Assad]]. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased financial incomes, social security, and improved health and education services. The urban middle classes, who had been hurt by the Jadid regime's policy, obtained new economic opportunities.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56}}


By 1977, it become clear that Assad's state-building and nation-building reforms, despite certain achievements, had largely failed to reach their goals. Here again, the causes for these failures were partly related to Assad's miscalculations or mistakes, and partly to factors that he was unable to control or change within a short period of time. Thus, the chronic socio-economic difficulties of Syria mostly persisted, while new ones were created. The major problems were mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption in the government bureaucracy as well as in the public and private economic sectors; illiteracy and low-level education, particularly in rural areas, and an increasing brain drain of professionals; and a growing trade deficit and inflation, high cost of living, and shortages in consumer goods and the like. Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 with the resulting financial burden contributed not only to worsen economic problems, but it also fostered the spread of corruption and black-marketering to high levels. The emerging new class of enterpreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers, among which was Assad's brother [[Rifaat al-Assad|Rifaat]], in smuggling contraband goods from Lebanon, thus affecting government revenues and spreading bribery among senior governmental officials.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59-60}}
By 1977, it become apparent that despite some successes, Assad's political reforms had largely failed. this was partly due to Assad's miscalculations or mistakes, and partly to factors he could not control or change quickly. Chronic socio-economic difficulties remained and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education, particularly in rural areas, the increasing emigration of professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among the problems Syria faced. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems and encouraged corruption and the black market. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers— including Assad's brother [[Rifaat al-Assad|Rifaat]]—in the smuggling of contraband goods from Lebanon, which affected government revenues and spread corruption among senior governmental officials.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=59-60}}


In the early 1980s Syria entered economic difficulties - food shortages and illegal economy. In mid 1984 food crisis was so high that it the press was full of complaiments. Assad's government searched for a fundamental solution. They argued that food shortages can be avioided with application of careful and sophisticated economic planning. In August, however, food crisis shortages continued despite the government's measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron and construction equipment. The resuls were soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketereering. Smuggling of goods from Lebanon was a constant occurrence since Syria's invasion of this country in 1976. Assad's government made a great effort to combat the smuggling, but saw difficulties due to the involvement of Assad's brother Rif'at in the illegal business. In July 1984 Syria formed a special anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon-Syria boundaries. The maesuress were effective. The Defence Deatachment commanded by Rif'at al-Assad were a leading role in smuggling business importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. Government's anti-smuggling squads seized an amount of $3.8 million worth of goods only in the first week.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=683-684}}
In the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened and by mid-1984 the food crisis was so serious that the press was full of complaints. Assad's government sought solution and argued that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. In August the food crisis continued despite the government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment, which resulted in soaring prices, long queues, and rampant black marketereering. Smuggling of goods from Lebanon was a common occurrence. Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, but encountered problems due to the involvement of Assad's brother Rif'at in the illegal business. In July 1984, the regime formed an anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon-Syria borders, which proved effective. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rif'at al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, and imported $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squads seized $3.8 million worth of goods in its first week.{{sfn|Olmerl|1986|p=683-684}}


[[File:1000 SYP obverse.jpg|thumb|Assad's portrait on 1000 Syrian Pound banknote]]
[[File:1000 SYP obverse.jpg|thumb||right|Assad's portrait on 1000 Syrian Pound banknote]]
In the early 1990s, Syrian economy continued to grow. Syrian exports were increased, the balance of trade continued to improve and inflation remained moderate 15%-18%. Along with the investment, Syrian economy was also increased in its activity. In May 1991 Assad's government made a decision to liberalize Syrian economy which proved to be beneficial as it stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most of the foreign investors were Arab states of the Persian Gulf, as the Western countries still had issues with Syria, both political and economic. In the early 1990s, Syrian economy saw growth between 5%-7%. The oil export also increased. The economic liberalization was a major factor for Syrian economic growth. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and the development projects. However, Assad's government refused to privatize state-owned companies as part of the Ba'ath Party socialist ideology.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=728-729}}
In the early 1990s, Syrian economy grew between 5%-7%, exports increased, the balance of trade improved and inflation remained moderate at 15%&nbsp;–&nbsp;18%, and oil exports increased. In May 1991, Assad's government liberalized the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most of the foreign investors were Arab states of the Persian Gulf, as Western countries still had political and economic issues with Syria. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects. However, because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government refused to privatize state-owned companies.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|p=728-729}}


In the mid 1990s Syria entered an economic crisis due to a recession and sharp drop in the economic growth copmared to the early years of the decade. In the late 1990s the economic growth of Syria was around 1.5%, which was insufficient as the population growth was between 3% and 3.5%. This made the GDP per capita negative. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis occurred along with the recession in world markets and major blow to its economy was drop in the price of oil in 1998. Nevertheless, the rise of the price of oil in 1999 eased Syrian economic bind to some extent. Another difficulty to the Syrian economy was a drought that occurred in 1999. It was one of the wors droughts in the century. It caused a drop of 25%-30% in crop yields as compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures that included loans and compensation to farmers and distribution of fodder free charge in order to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and did not make any real difference.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=598-599}}
In the mid 1990s, Syria entered another economic crisis due to a recession. In the late 1990s, Syria's economic growth was around 1.5%, which was insufficient as the population growth was between 3% and 3.5%, causing the GDP per capita to be negative. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis occurred at a time of recession in world markets. A drop in the price of oil in 1998 caused a major blow to Syria's economy, but when the oil price rose in 1999, the Syrian economy experienced a partial recovery. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused further economic woes. It caused a drop of 25%-30% in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures that included loans and compensation to farmers and distribution of fodder free charge in order to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=598-599}}


Syrian economy had problem with the population growth. Assad's government tried to decrease to population growth, but only with a marginal success. One of the signs of the economic stagnation was Syrian lack of progress in talks with the European Union on the signing of an association agreement. The major reason for this problem was the difficulty facing Syria to meet EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. [[Marc Pierini]], head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if Syrian economy was not modernized it could not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Nevertheless, Assad's government made 20% paychek increase for the civil servants on the anniversary day of the "Correction Revolution" which brought Assad to power. The foreign press criticized Syrian reluctance for refusing to liberalize its economy. Assad's government refused to modernize the bank system that included allowing the private banks as well as refusing to open an stock exchange.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=599}}
Assad's government tried to decrease to population growth, which caused economic problems, but this was only marginal successful. One sign of the economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on the signing of an association agreement. The maic cause of this failure was the difficulty of Syria meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. [[Marc Pierini]], head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernized it could not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Nevertheless, Assad's government gave civil servants a 20% pay increase on the anniversary of the "Correction Revolution" which brought Assad to power. The foreign press criticized Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy. Assad's government refused to modernize the bank system, allow private banks, and open a stock exchange.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=599}}


==Personality cult==
==Personality cult==
[[File:Assad Aleppo Syria 2001.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad's statue in [[Aleppo]]]]
[[File:Assad Aleppo Syria 2001.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad's statue in [[Aleppo]]]]
As one of his strategies to maintain power, Hafez developed a state-sponsored [[cult of personality]]. As Assad had ambition to become a pan-Arab leader, he often represented himself as a successor of Gamal Abdul Nasser. To be sure, since his ascendancy in November 1970, which symbolically occurred a few weeks after Nasser's death, Assad had alluded in various ways to the fact that he regarded himself as Nasser's successor. He modeled his presidential system after Nasser's and hailed Nasser for his pan-Arabic leadership, while displaying Nasser's photos alongside his own posters in public places.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}
Assad developed a state-sponsored [[cult of personality]] in order to maintain power. Because he wanted to become an Arab leader, he often represented himself as a successor to Egypt's Gamal Nasser, having risen to power in November 1970, a few weeks after Nasser's death. He modeled his presidential system on Nasser's, hailed Nasser for his pan-Arabic leadership, and in public he displayed photographs of Nasser alongside posters of himself.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}


Nonetheless, a greater hero and a supreme model for Assad was [[Saladin|Salah ad-Din]], the legendary Muslim Kurdish leader who in the 12th century succeeded in unifying the Muslim East, defeating the Crusaders in 1187 at Hittin and subsequently conquering Jerusalem. Assad demonstrated his admiration for Salah ad-Din and his heritage by having in his office a large painting depicting Salah ad-Din's tomb in Damascus and issuing a currency bill with Salah ad-Din's figure. In his speeches and conversations, Assad frequently hailed Salah ad-Din's successes and his victory over the crusaders while equating Israel with the [[Kingdom of Jerusalem]], the Crusaders' state.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57-58}}
Assad also demonstrated his admiration for Salah ad-Din, a Muslim Kurdish leader who in the 12th century unified the Muslim East and defeating the Crusaders in 1187 and subsequently conquered Jerusalem. Assad displayed a large painting of Salah ad-Din's tomb in Damascus in his office and issued a currency bill featuring Salah ad-Din. In his speeches and conversations, Assad frequently hailed Salah ad-Din's successes and his victory over the Crusaders while equating Israel with the [[Kingdom of Jerusalem]], the Crusaders' state.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57-58}}


Portraits of him, often depicting him engaging in heroic activities, were placed in every public space. He named numerous places and institutions in Syria after himself and other members of his family. At school, children were taught to sing songs of adulation about Hafez al-Assad. Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our eternal leader, Hafez al-Assad". In some cases, he portrayed himself with apparently divine properties. Sculptures and portraits depicted him alongside the prophet Mohammad, while following his mother's death, the government produced portraits of her surrounded by a halo. Syrian officials were made to refer to him as the 'Sanctified one' (al-Muqaddas).{{sfn|Pipes|1995|p=15-16}} This strategy of creating a cult of personality was pursued further by Hafez's son Bashar al-Assad.{{sfn|Zisser|2006|p=50}}
Portraits of Assad, often depicting him engaging in heroic activities, were placed in public spaces. He named numerous places and institutions after himself and members of his family. In schools, children were taught to sing songs of adulation about Hafez al-Assad. Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our eternal leader, Hafez al-Assad". Assad was sometimes portrayed with apparently divine properties. Sculptures and portraits depicted him alongside the prophet Mohammad, and after his mother's death, the government produced portraits of her surrounded by a halo. Syrian officials were made to refer to him as 'the sanctified one' (al-Muqaddas).{{sfn|Pipes|1995|p=15-16}} This strategy was also pursued by Assad's son, Bashar al-Assad.{{sfn|Zisser|2006|p=50}}


==Death==
==Death==
By the late 1990s Assad increasingly suffered from ill health.{{sfn|Seddon|2004|p=76}} American diplomats that met him stated that Assad was difficult to remain focused during their meeting and he projected weariness and fatigue. It was also speculated that Assad was capable of functioning no more than two hours a day. However, his spokesperson refrained to respond those speculations. Moreover Assad's official routine in 1999 did not have any significant change from that of the previous decade. Assad continued to have meetings and traveled abroad few times, of which most notable was his visit to Moscow in July. Nevertheless Assad's government was accustomed to work without his direct intervention or involvement in day-to-day affairs.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=552-553}} On 10 June 2000 Assad died due to a heart attack he suffered while speaking on the telephone with Lebanese prime minister [[Salim al-Hoss]].{{sfn|Ball|2010|p=110}} His funeral was held three days later, on 13 June.{{sfn|Freedman|2002|p=105}} Hafez al-Assad is buried together with his son [[Bassel al-Assad|Bassel]] in a [[mausoleum]] in his hometown of Qardaha.
By the late 1990s, Assad increasingly suffered from ill health.{{sfn|Seddon|2004|p=76}} American diplomats said that that Assad found it difficult to remain focused and projected weariness during their meetings. It was speculated that Assad was incapable of functioning for more than two hours a day. However, his spokesperson did not respond to these speculations, and Assad's official routine in 1999 had no significant change from that of the previous decade. Assad continued to have meetings and traveled abroad occasionally; most notably he visited Moscow in July 1999. Assad's government was accustomed to working without his direct involvement in day-to-day affairs.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=552-553}} On 10 June 2000 Assad died from a heart attack he suffered while speaking on the telephone with Lebanese prime minister [[Salim al-Hoss]].{{sfn|Ball|2010|p=110}} His funeral was held three days later.{{sfn|Freedman|2002|p=105}} Hafez al-Assad is buried with his son [[Bassel al-Assad|Bassel]] in a [[mausoleum]] in his hometown of Qardaha.


==References==
==References==
Line 356: Line 351:
* {{Cite book|title=Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy |last=Milton-Edwards |first=Beverley |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2009 |isbn=9780415457170 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy |last=Milton-Edwards |first=Beverley |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2009 |isbn=9780415457170 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning |last1=Otman |first1=Waniss |last2=Karlberg |first2=Erling |publisher=Springer |year=2007 |isbn=9783540464600 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning |last1=Otman |first1=Waniss |last2=Karlberg |first2=Erling |publisher=Springer |year=2007 |isbn=9783540464600 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Middle East Contemporary Survey |volume=8 |last=Olmerl |first=Yosef |editor1-last=Shaked |editor1-first=Haim |editor2-last=Dishon |editor2-first=Daniel |publisher=The Moshe Dayan Center |year=1986 |isbn=9789652240064 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Middle East Contemporary Survey |volume=8 |last=Olmert |first=Yosef |editor1-last=Shaked |editor1-first=Haim |editor2-last=Dishon |editor2-first=Daniel |publisher=The Moshe Dayan Center |year=1986 |isbn=9789652240064 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Losing Iraq: Insurgency and Politics |last=Pelletière |first=Stephen C. |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |year=2007 |isbn=9780275992132 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Losing Iraq: Insurgency and Politics |last=Pelletière |first=Stephen C. |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |year=2007 |isbn=9780275992132 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Syria Beyond the Peace Process |last=Pipes |first=Daniel |publisher=The Washington Institute for Near East Policy |year=1995 |isbn=9780944029640 |ref=harv}}
* {{Cite book|title=Syria Beyond the Peace Process |last=Pipes |first=Daniel |publisher=The Washington Institute for Near East Policy |year=1995 |isbn=9780944029640 |ref=harv}}

Revision as of 05:44, 12 October 2012

Hafez al-Assad
حافظ الأسد
File:Hafez al-Assad 1993.jpg
Hafez al-Assad in 1993
President of Syria
In office
12 March 1971 – 10 June 2000
Prime Minister
See list
Vice President
See list
Preceded byAhmad al-Khatib
Succeeded byAbdul Halim Khaddam (acting)
Prime Minister of Syria
In office
21 November 1970 – 3 April 1971
President
See list
Preceded byNureddin al-Atassi
Succeeded byAbdul Rahman Kleifawi
Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
In office
November 1970 – 10 June 2000
Preceded byNureddin al-Atassi
Succeeded byBashar al-Assad
Secretary General of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party
Assumed office
November 1970
Preceded byNureddin al-Atassi
Succeeded byAbdullah al-Ahmar (de facto; al-Assad is still de jure Secretary General, even though he is dead.)
Minister of Defense of Syria
In office
23 February 1966 – 1972
President
See list
Prime Minister
See list
Preceded byMuhammad Umran
Succeeded byMustafa Tlass
Personal details
Born
Hafez ibn 'Ali ibn Sulayman al-Assad

(1930-10-06)6 October 1930
Qardaha, Alawite State, Syria
Died10 June 2000(2000-06-10) (aged 69)
Damascus, Syria
Resting placeQardaha, Syria
Political partyBa'ath Party (Syrian faction) (since 1966)
Other political
affiliations
Ba'ath Party (1947 – 1966)
Arab Ba'ath Movement (1946 – 1947)
SpouseAniseh (née Makhluf)
RelationsJamil al-Assad (brother)
Rifaat al-Assad (brother)
Children
See list
Alma materHoms Military Academy
OccupationStatesman, politician
ProfessionSoldier
Military service
Allegiance Syria
Branch/serviceSyrian Air Force
Years of service1950 – 1972
RankGeneral
CommandsSyrian Air Force
Syrian Armed Forces
Battles/wars
See list

Hafez al-Assad (Arabic: حافظ الأسد, Levantine pronunciation: [ˈħaːfezˤ elˈʔasad]; 6 October 1930 – 10 June 2000) was a Syrian statesman, politician and general who served as Prime Minister of Syria between 1970 and 1971, and President between 1971 and 2000. He also served as Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Secretary General of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party from 1970 to 2000, and Minister of Defense from 1966 to 1972. Assad was a Ba'athist politician and adhered to the ideologies of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. Under his administration the Syrian Arab Republic experienced increased stability and implemented a program of secularization and industrialization designed to modernize and strengthen the country as a regional power.

Born to a poor Alawite family, Assad joined the Syrian wing of the Ba'ath Party in 1946 as a student activist. In 1952 he entered the Homs Military Academy and graduated three years later as a pilot. Between 1959 and 1961 during Syria's short-lived union with Egypt, he was exiled to Egypt, where he formed a committee to resurrect the fortunes of the Syrian Ba'ath Party. After the Ba'athists took power in 1963, Assad became commander of the air force. In 1966, after taking part in a coup that overthrew the party's civilian leadership, he became Minister of Defense. During Assad’s ministry, Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967, a blow that shaped much of his future political career. He then engaged in a protracted power struggle with Salah al-Jadid, chief of staff of the armed forces and effective leader of Syria. In November 1970, Assad seized control and arrested Jadid and other members of the government. He became prime minister and in 1971 was elected president.

In 1973 Assad changed Syria's Constitution to guarantee equal status for women and enable non-Muslims to become president; the latter change was reverted under pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood. With aid from the Soviet Union, he built up the Syrian military and gained popular support through public works funded by Arab donors and international lending institutions. Political dissenters were eliminated by arrest, torture, and execution. When the Muslim Brotherhood mounted a rebellion in Hama in 1982, Assad suppressed it and killed 10,000–25,000 people. He tried to establish Syria as a leader of the Arab world. A new alliance with Egypt culminated in the Yom Kippur War against Israel in October 1973, but Egypt's unexpected cessation of hostilities exposed Syria to military defeat. In 1976, during the Lebanese Civil War, Assad dispatched several divisions to that country and secured their permanent presence as part of a peacekeeping force sponsored by the Arab League. After Israel's invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982–1985, he reasserted control of that country and compelled Lebanese Christians to accept constitutional changes granting Muslims equal representation in government. He aided Palestinian and Lebanese resistance groups in Lebanon and Syria, supported Iran in its war against Iraq (1980–1988), and joined the US-led alliance against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990–1991. Assad sought to establish peaceful relations with Israel in the mid-1990s, but his repeated call for the return of the Golan Heights stalled the talks. He constructed a cult of personality and placed statues and posters bearing images of himself in public places. Assad died of a heart attack on 10 June 2000 and was succeeded as president by his son, Bashar al-Assad.

Early life and education

Family

Hafez was born on 6 October 1930 in Qardaha to an Alawite family.[2] His parents were Na'sa and Ali Sulayman. Hafez was Ali's ninth son and the fourth son from his second marriage.[3] Sulayman married twice, had eleven children,[4] and was known for his strength and shooting abilities, so locals nicknamed him Wahhish (a wild beast).[5] By the 1920s, he became well-respected among the locals, and like many others he opposed the French occupation initially.[6] Nevertheless, Ali Sulayman later cooperated with the French administration and was appointed to an official post. In 1936, he was one of 80 Alawi notables who signed a letter addressed to the French Prime Minister stating that "Alawi people rejected attachment to Syria and wished to stay under French protection."[7] For his accomplishments, he was called al-Assad (a lion) by the locals.[6] He made his nickname a surname in 1927.[8]

Education and early political career

Alawites at first opposed the united Syrian state as they thought that their status as a religious minority would put them in danger. Hafez's father shared this opinion. As the French left Syria, many Syrians became suspicious of Alawites for their alignment with France.[9] At the time, Hafez left his Alawite village and started education in a Sunni-dominant[2] Latakia when he was nine.[8] He was the first member of the Alawite community to attend a high school.[10] In Latakia, Assad faced the anti-Alawite prejudice of the Sunnis. However, he was an excellent student, winning a few prizes when he was around fourteen.[9] Assad lived in a poor, predominantly Alawite part of Latakia. In order to fit in, he approached the political parties that welcomed Alawites. These parties, that also supported secularism, were the Syrian Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Ba'ath Party; Assad joined the last one in 1946,[10] while some of his friends were also members of the Nationalist Party.[11]The Ba'ath Party, also called the Renaissance Party, was a Pan-Arabic socialist party.[12]

Assad was an asset to the party, organizing Ba'ath students' cells and carrying its message to the poor sections of Latakia and Alawite villages. He was opposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was allied to wealthy conservative Muslim families. The high school catered for the children of both rich and poor families. Assad was joined by the poor, anti-establishment Sunni Muslim youth from the Ba'ath Party in his confrontations with the children of the rich Brotherhood members. He made many Sunni friends, some of whom later became his political allies.[8] While he was still a teenager, Hafez became invaluable to the Ba'ath Party.[13] He was an organizer and recruiter, the head of his school's student affair committee between 1949 and 1951, and later President of the Union of Syrian Students.[8] During his political activity in school, he met many men that would serve him while he was president.[13]

Air Force career

Hafez al-Assad (above) standing on the wing of a Fiat G.46-4B, with fellow cadets at the Syrian AF Academy outside Aleppo, 1951/52

After his graduation from high school, Assad wanted to be a medical doctor but his father could not pay for his study at the Jesuit University of St. Joseph in Beirut.[8] Instead, in 1950 he decided to join the Syrian Armed Forces.[13] Assad entered the Military Academy in Homs, which offered free food, lodging and a stipend that suited him.[8] He wanted to fly, and entered the flying school in Aleppo in 1950.[14][15] Assad graduated in 1955, after which he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Syrian Air Force.[16] Upon his graduation from the flying school, he won a trophy for the best aviator[14][15] and shortly afterwards was assigned to the Mezze air base near Damascus.[17] While he was a lieutenant in his early 20s, he married Aniseh Makhlouf, a distant relative of a powerful family.[18]

In 1954, the military split in a revolt against Adib Shishakli. Hashim al-Atassi, head of the National Bloc and briefly the president after Sami al-Hinnawi's coup, returned as president; Syria was again under the civilian rule. After 1955, Atassi's hold on the country was increasingly shaky. At the 1955 election, Atassi was replaced by Shukri al-Quwatli, who had been president before Syria's independence from France. At the time, the Ba'ath Party started to get close to the Communist Party; not because of shared ideology, but shared opposition towards the west.[19] While at the Academy, Assad met Mustafa Tlass, his future Minister of Defense.[20] When in 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser took control of the Suez Canal, Syria feared retaliation from the United Kingdom and Hafez flew in an air defense mission.[21] In 1955, Assad was sent to Egypt for a further six months training. He was among the Syrian pilots who were sent to fly to Cairo to show Syria's commitment to Egypt, which was threatened by Israel and members of the Baghdad Pact, which included Iraq and Turkey. After he finished a course in Egypt the following year, Assad returned to a small air base near Damascus. In that year, during the Suez Crisis, Assad flew a reconnaissance mission over northern and eastern Syria.[22] In 1957, Assad became squadron commander and was sent the the Soviet Union for training to fly theMiG-17.[14] He spent ten months in the Soviet Union, during which he fathered a daughter who died as an infant while he was abroad.[18]

In 1958, Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), separating themselves from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, which were aligned to the United Kingdom. This pact led to the rejection of Communist influence in favor of Egyptian control over Syria. All Syrian political parties, including the Ba'ath Party, were dissolved. Senior officers, especially those who supported the Communists, were dismissed from the Syrian Armed Forces. Assad however remained in the army and rose quickly through its ranks.[23] After attaining the rank of captain, Assad was transferred to Egypt where he continued his military education, studying together with his Egyptian colleague Hosni Mubarak, the future president of Egypt.[14]

Rise to power

Hafez al-Assad in 1970

Assad was not content with a professional military career and regarded it as an avenue into politics. After the UAR was created, Michel Aflaq, leader of the Ba'ath Party, was forced by Nasser to dissolved the Ba'ath Party, which he did.[24] During the existence of the UAR the Ba'ath Party suffered a serious crisis,[25] for which several of its members—mostly young—blamed Aflaq. In order to resurrect the Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba'ath Party, Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid and Assad, among others, established the Military Committee.[26] In the period 1957–58 Assad acquired a dominant position in the party and did not despair because of his transfer to Egypt. He was hard-working, skillful and highly ambitious, and became one of the leaders of the Military Committee, which was established in Egypt with aim of rescuing the UAR from dissolution. However, after Syria left the UAR in September 1961, Assad and other Ba'athist officers were removed from the military by the new regime in Damascus, and Assad given a minor clerical position in the Ministry of Transport.[14]

Assad played a minor role in the failed 1962 military coup, for which he was jailed in Lebanon and was later repatriated.[27] In the same year, Aflaq convened the Fifth Congress of the Ba'ath Party, where he was reelected as the National Command's Secretary General and ordered the re-establishment of the party's Syrian Regional Branch. At the Congress, the Military Committee through Umran established contacts with Aflaq and the Ba'athist leadership. The Military Committee asked for permission to seize power through forceful means; Aflaq consented to the conspiracy.[28] After the success of the Iraqi coup d'état, led by the Ba'ath Party's Iraqi Regional Branch, the Military Committee hastily convened to launch a Ba'athist military coup in March 1963 against President Nazim al-Kudsi,[29]which Assad helped to plan and played a major role.[27][30] The coup was planned for the 7 March, but was postponed until the next day, which Assad had announced to the other units.[31] During the coup Assad led a small group to capture the Dumayr air base, 40 kilometres (25 mi) northeast of Damascus. His group was the only one to see resistance. Some of the airplanes at the base were ordered to bomb the conspirators, and because of this, Assad hastened to reach the base before dawn. It took longer than planned to get the 70th Armored Brigade to surrender, because of which Assad arrived in broad daylight. He threatened the base commander that he would shell them if they did not surrender; the base commander initiated negotiations with Assad and eventually surrendered. Assad claimed that the base was able to defend itsself from his forces.[32] After the coup was over, Assad was promoted to major and subsequently to lieutenant-colonel, and by the end of 1963 he was put in charge of the Syrian Air Force. By the end of 1964 he was named commander of the Syrian Air Force with a rank of major general.[30] Even though still a leader of the Ba'ath Party, the Military Committee was seizing power from the civilian wing of the party under Aflaq.[33]

As head of the Air Force, Assad gave special privileges to its officers, appointed his confidants to senior and sensitive positions, and established an efficient intelligence network. Thus the Air Force Intelligence, under command of Muhammad al-Khuli, became independent of Syria's other intelligence organizations and was given assignments beyond the Air Force. Assad prepared himself to take an active role in the power struggles that lay ahead. Between 1963 and 1970, he demonstrated ambition, single-mindedness, patience, caution, coolness and manipulativeness. In the first stage of the power struggle, Assad remained the junior partner in the leading Alawite Triumvirate of the Military Committee, along with generals Umran and Jadid. However, when Umran, the senior member of the Military Committee, changed his allegiance to Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Munif al-Razzaz and the civilian leadership in 1965, the power struggle which had lasted since taking power, the remaining members of the Military Committee launched the 1966 Syrian coup d'état and overthrew the civilian Ba'athist leadership.[34] This coup led to a permanent schism within the Ba'ath movement, the advent of neo-Ba'athism and the establishment of two centers for the international Ba'athist movement—one Iraqi dominated, another Syrian dominated.[35]

After the coup, Assad was appointed Minister of Defense, and became the second most influential person in the neo-Ba'athist regime. While holding this ministry, Assad prepared for ousting Salah Jadid, the country's de facto leader. Assad turned the military into his power base and employed brutal force, political manipulation, and ideological and strategic arguments to undermine Jadid's position and gain supremacy.[34] In 1970, Syria supported Palestinian guerrillas in their war against Jordan, known as the Black September, and Jadid sent an armored force to aid the Palestinians.[36] Assad opposed Syria's intervention and refused to send the Air Force in support, which allowed the Royal Jordanian Air Force to rout the Syrian forces unopposed and turned the invasion into a disaster.[37] Assad used Syria's defeat in the War of Attrition against Israel between 1967 and 1970 and the Black September affair to discredit Jadid and extend his own control over the Armed Forces and the Ba'ath Party. In two military coups in February 1969 and November 1970, Assad evicted and arrested Jadid and his senior followers in the government, and assumed unchallenged control over Syria.[34] Assad expanded his control over the military and expanded the network of the security organizations in order to gain support from both Sunni and non-Sunni Syrians.[38] Assad successfully became a popular leader deriving his authority from the people. His wish for power was also motivated by his nationalist views; Assad believed in the creation of Greater Syria by creating a political and military alliance with Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians.[39]

Presidency

Gaining support

In 1971, while Prime Minister, Assad embarked upon a "corrective movement" at the Eleventh National Congress of the Ba'ath Party. There was to be a general revision of national policy, which also included the introduction of measures to consolidate his rule. His Ba'athist predecessors had restricted control of Islam in public life and government.[40] Because the Constitution allowed only Sunnis to became president,[41] Assad, unlike Jadid, presented himself as a pious Muslim. In order to gain support from the ulama—the educated Muslim class— he prayed in Sunni mosques, even though he was an Alawite. Among the measures he introduced were the raising in rank of some 2,000 religious functionaries and the appointment of an alim as minister of religious functionaries and construction of mosques. He appointed a little-known Sunni Muslim teacher, Ahmad al-Khatib, as Head of State in order to satisfy the Sunni majority.[40] Assad also appointed Sunnis to senior positions in the government, the military and the party. All of Assad's prime ministers, defense ministers and foreign ministers and a majority of his cabinet were Sunnis. In the early 1970s, he was verified as an authentic Muslim by the Sunni Mufti of Damascus and made the Hajj—the pilgrimage to Mecca. In his speeches, he often used Muslim terms like jihad (a holy war) and shahada (martyrdom) when referring to fighting Israel.[41]

After gaining enough power, Assad needed to become leader of the Ba'ath Party, so he ordered the arrests and discharge of the incumbent party leaders, replacing them by his own supporters in the Ba'ath Regional Command. They promptly elected him as secretary-general of the party's Syrian branch, confirming his status as the country's de facto leader. The Regional Command also appointed a new People's Assembly, which in 1971 nominated him for the presidency as the only candidate. On 22 February 1971, Assad resigned from the Air Force[42]and was subsequently endorsed as president with 99.6% of the vote[41] at the referendum held on 12 March 1971. He also returned the old Islamic Presidential Oath of Office.[42] While continuing to use the Ba'ath Party, its ideology and its expanding apparatus as instruments of his rule and policies, Assad established a powerful, centralized presidential system with absolute authority for the first time in Syria's modern history.[41]

Assad wanted his regime to appear democratic. The People's Assembly and his cabinet consisted of several nationalist and socialist parties under the umbrella of the National Progressive Front, which was led by the Ba'ath Party. Half of his cabinet were representatives of peasants and workers, and a number of popular organizations of peasants, workers, women and students were established in order to participate in the decision-making process. As he gained support from the peasantry, workers, the youth, the military and the Alawite community, Assad wanted to destroy his remaining opposition. He tried to present himself as a leader-reformer, a state-builder and nation-builder by developing and modernizing the country's socio-economic infrastructure, achieving political stability, economic opportunities and ideological consensus. As he wanted to create ideological consensus and national unity, Assad advocated a dynamic regional policy while opposing Zionism and imperialism.[43]

On 31 January 1973, Assad implemented the new Constitution which led to a national crisis. Unlike previous constitutions, this one did not require that the president of Syria must be a Muslim, leading to fierce demonstrations in Hama, Homs and Aleppo organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and the ulama. They labeled Assad as the "enemy of Allah" and called for a jihad against his rule. Robert D. Kaplan has compared Assad's coming to power to "an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia—an unprecedented development shocking to the Sunni majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."[44] Assad responded by arresting about 40 Sunni officers who were accused of plotting. Nevertheless, Assad returned the requirement to the Constitution to please the Sunnis, but he stated that he "rejects every uncultured interpretation of Islam that lays bare an odious narrow-mindedness and loathsome bigotry".[42]In 1974, to satisfy this constitutional requirement, Musa Sadr, a leader of the Twelvers of Lebanon and founder of the Amal Movement who had unsuccessfully tried to unite Lebanese Alawis and Shias under the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council,[45] issued a fatwa stating that Alawis were a community of Twelver Shia Muslims.[46][47]

For his entire tenure as Syria's president, Assad ruled under the terms of a state of emergency dating from 1963.[48] Under the provisions of the emergency law, the press was limited to three Ba'ath-controlled newspapers and political dissidents were often tried in security courts that operated outside the regular judicial system. Human Rights Watch estimated that a minimum of 17,000 people had disappeared without the formalities of a trial.[49] Every seven years, Assad was nominated as the sole candidate for president by the People's Council, and confirmed in office by a referendum. He was re-elected four times, each time gaining over 99 percent of the vote—including three times in which he received unanimous support, according to official figures.[50]

Federation of Arab Republics

Alliance with Egypt

Assad (sitting on the right side) signing the Federation of Arab Republics in Benghazi, Libya, on 18 April 1971 with President Anwar al-Sadat (sitting left) of Egypt and Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya (sitting in the centre)

Assad's domestic policy encountered serious difficulties and setbacks, and produced new problems and ill feelings, particularly among the Sunni urban classes; the orthodox section of these classes continued to oppose Assad's regime for being a sectarian military dictatorship. The continued Muslim opposition to his regime and the shortcomings of his socio-economic policies forced Assad's to focus primarily on Syria's regional affairs, namely intra-Arab and anti-Israeli policies. This tendency did not stem only from Assad's expectations to score quick and spectacular gains in his foreign policies at a time when the socio-economic issues of Syria required long-term and painstaking efforts without promise of immediate positive results. In addition to his ambition to turn Syria into a regional power and to himself become a pan-Arab leader, Assad calculated that working for Arab unity and stepping up the struggle against Israel were likely to strengthen his legitimacy and leadership among the various sections of the Syrian population.[51]

Assad's first foreign policy actions were to join the newly-established Federation of Arab Republics along with Egypt, Libya and later Sudan, and to sign a military pact with Egypt. Assad gave a high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the Golan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union.[52]

Assad and Defense Minister Mustapha Tlass, during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, at the Golan front

Once Assad had prepared his army, he was ready to join Anwar al-Sadat's Egypt in the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Syria was defeated, but while Sadat signed unilateral agreements with Israel, Assad emerged from the war as a national hero in Syria an other parts of the Arab world. This was due to his decision to go to war against Israel and Syria's subsequent war of attrition against the Israeli Defense Forces in early 1974. Assad's skill as a cool, proud, tough, and shrewd negotiator in the post war period enabled him to gain the town of Kuneitra and the respect and admiration of many Arabs. Many of his followers now regarded Assad as the new pan-Arab leader, and a worthy successor of Gamal Nasser.[52]

Dissolution with Egypt

While promoting himself as a historical leader in the style of Nasser and Salah ad-Din, Assad regarded his main goals to be Arab unity and an uncompromising struggle against Israel. The latter goal stemmed partly from Assad's need for legitimacy as an Alawite ruler of Syria who wished to present himself as a genuine Arab and Muslim leader. He had become convinced that Israel presented a severe threat to the integrity of the Arab nation from the Nile to the Euphrates, and that it was his historic mission to defend Arabdom. He regarded the confrontation with Israel as a zero-sum struggle, and as a strategist who understood power politics, he had sought to counterbalance Israeli military might with an all-Arab political-military alliance. However, after Sadat's Egypt left the alliance after the 1973 war, Assad during the middle late 1970s to establish an alternative all-Arab alliance with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). However, he faced difficulties in reaching an understanding with Ba'athist Iraq, as he did not want to play a secondary role in an Iraqi-Syrian union. Assad returned to his goal to create a Greater Syria union or alliance with Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO. During the period 1975 – 1980, Assad significantly advanced political, military, and economic cooperation with Jordan, extended his control over large parts of Lebanon, and intervened in the Lebanese Civil War, and sustained his strategic alliance with the PLO.[53]

Assad also made significant gains in his relations with the superpowers. In 1974, he embarrassed the Soviet Union by negotiating with the United States regarding the military disengagement in the Golan Heights, and in 1976 he ignored Soviet pressure and requests to refrain from invading Lebanon and later to refrain from attacking the PLO and the Lebanese radical forces. Simultaneously, Assad renewed and markedly improved his relations with the United States and made presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter his great admirers.[53]

Assad greets President Nixon on his arrival at Damascus airport in 1974

However, neither Assad's international and regional achievements nor his domestic gains lasted long, and he soon showed sign of collapse because of his miscalculation and changing circumstances. His regional politics, which had earned him early political success, now became the main cause of his severe setbacks. Assad's direct intervention in Lebanon was a grave miscalculation, and within two years it turned from being an important asset to a grave liability, both regionally and domestically. Assad's maneuvers among the two main rival factions, playing one against other, alienated both. The PLO, experiencing Assad's blows in 1976, distanced itself from him and consolidated its autonomous infrastructure in southern Lebanon, paradoxically with Israel's indirect assistance, since Israel firmly objected to the deployment of Syrian troops south of the Sidon-Jazzin "red line".[54]

After dissolution of the FAR

Assad enraged after Anwar Sadat asked him to visit Israel, 1977

In 1978, the Christian Maronites, fearing Syrian domination, started a guerrilla war against Syrian troops in Beirut and northern Lebanon. Israel's moral support and material aid contributed to the Maronites' autonomy and their resistance to Assad's de facto occupation of Lebanon. A newly formed Likud government in Israel developed political and military relations with the Maronite Lebanese Forces and contributed to the undermining of Assad's regional position. Israel welcomed Sadat's initiative in November 1977 and signed the Camp David Accords with Egypt and the United States in 1978, which was followed by the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.[55]

Assad's regional strategic posture suffered serious blows as Egypt's withdrawal from the all-Arab confrontation against Israel exposed Syria to a growing Israeli threat. Apart from a short-lived rapprochement with the PLO, Assad became increasingly isolated in the region. His brief unity talks with Iraqi leaders collapsed in mid 1979; and with Iraq's 1980 involvement in the Iraq-Iran War, Iraq also effectively withdrew from the conflict against Israel.[55] Also in 1979, under the impact of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty, and in view of Syria's regional predicament, King Hussein of Jordan withdrew from his association with Assad in favor of a closer relationship with Iraq. Assad's regional strategic position was further damaged when the US Carter administration abandoned its new Syrian-oriented policy in favor of the Egypt-Israeli peace process.[55]

Strategic Balance doctrine

In 1980, Assad signed Syria's Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.[56] He continued to develop his new doctrine of Strategic Balance, which he had initiated the previous year. Aiming primarily at confronting Israel single-handedly, this doctrine engendered fresh intra-Arab policies and was directed toward consolidating Assad's domestic front, which had suffered setbacks since 1977.[55] The regime faced further threats from a resurgence of the Islamic opposition. Assad's earlier support of the Christian Maronites and his military actions against the Muslim radicals in Lebanon provoked a new and unprecedented phase of Muslim resistance in the form of well-organized and effective urban guerrilla warfare against government, military, and Ba'athist officials and institutions. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Islamic jihad became almost an open rebellion as many Alawite soldiers, officers and senior officials were killed, and government and military centers were bombed by the Muslim mujahideen.[57]

Facing a serious threat to his regime and possibly to his life, Assad for the first time lost his self-confidence and reacted with fury and desperation. His health also started to deteriorate during this period. Under his personal orders a campaign of repression was launched against the Muslim Brotherhood.[57] Assad escaped an attempted assassination in a grenade attack in 1980. In response, troops led by his brother Rifaat took revenge by killing 250 inmates at Tadmor Prison in Palmyra.[58] In February 1982, the rebellious city of Hama was bombed by Assad's troops, killing up to 10,000 people.[59][60][61] It was later described as "the single deadliest act by any Arab government against people in the modern Middle East."[62][63] Over the next few years, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood followers were arrested and tortured, and many of them were killed or disappeared. Assad realized that his previous efforts to bring about a national unity in Syria and to gain legitimacy from the Sunni urban population had totally failed. He was confronted with resistance from the Muslim Brotherhood and thousands of their followers. Large sections of the urban intelligentsia, professionals, intellectuals and former Ba'ath Party members, also regarded his regime as illegitimate.[57] Later, Assad used the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to justify his heavy-handed rule.[58]

Assad became increasingly reliant on the further cultivation of his close constituencies as a support base and a new political community consisting of large sections of peasants and workers, salaried middle-class and public employees—both Sunnis and non-Sunnis. These groups, mostly organized in the Ba'ath Party, mass syndicates, and trade unions, like most Alawites and Christians, greatly benefited from Assad's policies, and either depended on him or were ideologically identified with his regime.[57] Many young Syrians also had a strong allegiance to Assad, since they had been educated or indoctrinated in the notions of the Ba'ath Party as formulated by Assad. These sections of the population rendered legitimacy to Assad's regime, and were periodically mobilized by Assad to actively support his policies and curb his domestic enemies. Nonetheless, Assad's main support base remained the Alawite community, the combat units of the Syrian Armed Forces and the wide network of security and intelligence organizations.[64]

Members of the Alawite community and non-Alawites loyal to Assad virtually controlled the security, intelligence and military apparatuses. They manned or commanded about a dozen security and intelligence networks and most armoured divisions, commandos and other combat units of the Syrian Armed Forces. Assad had turned some of his intelligence networks into apparatuses for terrorism against targets in the Middle East and in Europe. Assad used terrorism and intimidation to extend his control over Lebanon. In 1977, his agents assassinated Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leftist leader, and in 1982 they killed Bachir Gemayel, the newly elected Maronite president, both of whom had resisted Assad's attempts to dominate Lebanon. Using similar tactics, Assad brought about the abolition of the 1983 Lebanon-Israel agreement, and through guerrilla warfare carried out by proxy in 1985, Assad indirectly caused the Israeli Defense Forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Terrorism against Palestinians and Jordanian targets in the mid-1980s contributed to thwart the rapprochement between King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO and the slowing down of Jordanian-Israeli political cooperation in the West Bank.[64]

In November 1983, Assad—who was a diabetic—suffered a serious heart attack, which was complicated by phlebitis.[65] He withdrew from public life and a battle for succession took place between Assad's brother Rifaat and the army generals. Assad's recovery and return brought an end to the discord and he took advantage of the situation to undermine his brother's position, eventually sending him into exile. Assad's return to supreme power was confirmed at the eight party congress in January 1985.[1]

Israel was the main target of Assad's terrorist and guerrilla operations in both Lebanon and Europe. Attempts to bomb an El-Al airliner in London in April 1986 and in Madrid in June 1986 were part of an attrition campaign that Assad had been directing against Israel to damage its economy, morale, and social fabric and weaken its military capacity. This campaign of attrition was an auxiliary tactic in Assad's policy of strategic balance with Israel developed by Assad in the late 1970s, when Syria was largely isolated in the region and exposed to a potential Israeli threat. With the help of the Soviet Union, Assad built a large military equipped with modern tanks, airplanes and long-range ground-to-ground missiles capable of launching chemical warheads into most Israeli cities.[66]

Although Assad was still far from achieving a strategic balance with Israel, his regime reached military parity in quantitative terms. This enabled him to deter Israel from attacking Syria and in the event of war, to cause heavy losses to Israel. It also gave him an option to retake the Golan Heights by a surprise attack. Assad's enormous military power also enabled him to sustain some of his major political gains in the region and at home. However, he was not content with his military buildup, and continued to also employ his skills as a first-rate strategist and manipulator in order to advance his prime regional policy to gain support from all Arabs for his assumed role as a leader of the Arab struggle against Israel, while further isolating Egypt and counterbalancing the growing power of Iraq, Syria's major Arab rivals in the region.[67]

1990s

Although Syria had good relations with the Soviet Union, Assad began to turn towards the West in late 1980s, having seen how Iraq had benefited during its war with Iran. He agreed to join the United States-led coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991. He continued to regard Israel as major regional enemy. At the end of the 1991 Middle East peace conference, Assad insisted on a "land for peace" deal, demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Assad regarded the September 1993 Israeli accord with the PLO—which ended the first intifada (resistance) in the Occupied Territories without giving the Palestinians any substantial gains—and the increasingly friendly relationship between Israel and Jordan as set-backs. [68]

Foreign policy

Footage of Hafez al-Assad overseeing training of the Syrian army with his brother Rifaat and meeting political leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev, Yassir Arafat, King Abdullah and King Hussein

Major powers

European Union countries

Under Assad's regime, Syria's relations with the countries of the European Union increased in importance, both economically and politically. Much of Syria's financial aid and foreign trade came from the EU, for example in 1992, 36.8% of Syria's imports and 47.9% of its exports were traded with the EU.[69] Syria's political relations with the EU served as a counterbalance to the United States.[70] Assad's Syria also tried to increase the influence of the EU in the Middle East. However, opposition from Israel and the United States prevented the EU's influence in the region.[71] Syrias ministers visited a number of EU countries either because of the peace process or for economic reasons. Representatives of Netherlands, France, Portugal, and Germany visited Syria.[69]

During the Lebanese Civil War, Syria's relations with France were tense, but eventually improved. France was still critical of Syria and demanded the reduction of its presence in Lebanon. The issue was resolved when France recognized Syria's central role in the region. In February 1992, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas visited Damascus to discuss the Lebanese question and the peace process. In 1992, Syria's relations with Germany, previously cold, improved when Syria was involved in securing the release of two German hostages in Lebanon, which also improved its international image. Chancellor Helmut Kohl thanked Assad for his effort. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visited Syria in September 1992 to discuss the improvement of relations between the countries.[69]

In late 1990s, Syria's relations with EU countries, which were economically significant, continued to slowly improve and allowed the coutry to gain some maneuverability regarding Israel. The country's international status was also bolstered.[72]

Soviet Union and Russia

Soviet Union
File:Assad-Brezhnev 1981.jpg
Assad and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in 1981

In the 1980s, Assad's regime established a military cooperation with the Soviet Union. Sophisticiated Soviet arms and military advisers helped the development of the Syrian Army, which raised the tension between Israel and Syria. In November 1983, a Soviet delegation arrived in Damascus to discuss the opening of a Soviet naval base in the Syrian city of Tartus. The countries' relationship encountered problems: Syria had supported Iran during the Gulf War, while the Soviet Union supported Iraq, and when the rebellion against Yasser Arafat broke out in al-Fatah in 1983, Syria supported the rebels while the Soviet Union supported Arafat. In 1983 the Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam visited Moscow. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko argued that Syria and the Soviet Union must resolve their differences concerning the Palestinian movement as stopping the internal conflict would allow the "anti-Imperialist struggle."[73]

During the diplomatic crisis between the United States and Syria, which escalated into minor clashes, Syrian counted on Soviet help if war should break out. Vladimir Yukhin, the Soviet ambassador in Damascus, expressed his country's appreciation "for the firm Syrian position in the face of Imperialism and Zionism." The Soviet attitude did not satisfied Syria completely. Assad's government considered entering the Warsaw Pact to gain Soviet support and to match the United States and Israel. Syria and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in October 1980, which was focused on cultural, technical, military, economic, and transport relations. This treaty included joint action in case any of the countries were attacked and forbade both Syria and the Soviet Union from joining any alliance that was against one of the signatories. Syria's efforts to improve the strategic relations with the Soviet Union meant that Syria was not completely satisfied with the current Treaty. Even before the Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had backed the Arab countries in the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. During the 1982 Lebanon War, the Soviet Union kept a policy of low profile. The Soviets did not send arms or exert pressure to end the conflict. This damaged the prestige of the Soviet in the Middle East.[74]

The strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union, and the increased Soviet military support and political backing were part of the Assad's policy of strategic balance with Israel. In 1983, during the power struggle between Assad's forces and his brother, Rif'at al-Assad, the Soviets supported Hafez al-Assad's Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass and were concerned about Rif'at's bid for power. When the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov died, Assad did not attended his funeral, but the Syrian official commentary stated that Andropov supported the Soviet-Syrian friendship and that both countries stressed their aspirations for strengthening their ties.[75]

After 1987, because of internal changes and a political crisis, the Soviet Union was unable to support Syria. This impacted the relationship between the states and Syria reduced its support for the Soviet Union. Changes to the Soviet Middle East policy led to Syria changing its relations with Israel, which resulted in the mass emigration of Jews to Israel and a demand that Syria change its attitude on the conflict with Israel. Alexander Zotov, the Soviet Ambassador, said in November 1989 that Syria's change of foreign policy was necessary, that Syria should cease aspiring for a strategic balance with Israel and settle for "reasonable defensive sufficiency", and that the Soviet-Syrian arms trade would also be changed. The growing Syrian debt to the Soviet Union led to a reduction of the arms trade between the countries and Syria turned to China and North Korea for its weapons supplies.[76]

File:Blog -Hafez Al-Assad Gorbatchev.jpg
Assad and Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1987

Between 27 and 29 April 1987, Assad, along with the Defense Minister Tlass and Vice President Khaddam, visited the Soviet Union. Assad stressed that Jewish emigration to Israel was an embarrassment to Syria and served to strengthen Israel. Radio Damascus denied claims that the Soviet Union and Syria were becoming distant and stated that the Assad's visit had renewed the momentum in the relations between the countries, consolidating their common view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Syrian daily newspaper, Tishrin, stated that after this visit, the relation between the Soviet Union and Syria would be expanded. A few weeks after he returned from Moscow, Assad, in a speech to the National Federation of Syrian Students, said that the Soviet Union remained a firm friend of Syria and the Arabs, and that even though Mikhail Gorbachev and his government were preoccupied with internal affairs, they had not ignored external issues, especially those related to their friends.[77] In 1990, 44.3% of Syrian exports were traded in the Soviet Union. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the countries changed. In April 1991, the Syrian Foreign Minister al-Sharaa visited the Soviet Union, the only visit that year. Soviet Foreign Ministers Alexander Bessmertnykh and Boris Pankin visited Syria in May and October, but those visits were in connection with the American Middle East peace initiative, accentuating the decline in the status of the Soviet Union in the region.[78]

Russia

The collapse of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991 marked the end of the main source of Syria's political and military support for more than two decades. In 1992 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia were dependent upon the United States and made closer ties with Israel, which meant that Syria was unable to count on their support. Nevertheless, CIS countries were views as limited market and limited source for arms. The absence of high-level contracts between Russia and Syria enabled future development of the relations between the countries. Russia agreed to sell Syria arms under previous contracts with the Soviet Union and they demanded payment of Syria's US$10 – 12 billion debt. Syria refused to do so, claiming that Russia was not a successor state of the Soviet Union, but later agreed to pay part of the debt by exporting citrus fruit worth $800 million.[69]

Like other Arab countries, Syria worked to develop good relations with Muslim former Soviet countries. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan with limited results, but Syria established good relations with Armenia because Syria had large Armenian community.[69]

On 6 July 1999, Assad visited Moscow. The visit was originally planned for April but Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was visiting Moscow at the same time so Assad's visit was postponed. Assad finalized an arms deal worth $2 billion, and after the visit both sides stated that they would strengthen their trade ties. Assad commented upon Russia's growing importance, stating that he welcomed Russia's strengthening and hoped that their role would be more clearly and openly expressed. The United States warned Russia not to trade arms to Syria, but Russia stated that it would not yield to American threats.[72]

United States

File:Jimmy Carter and Hafiz al-Asad during a meeting between US and Syrian officials - NARA - 174645.tif
Hafez Assad meeting Jimmy Carter 9 May 1977

In 1980s, the situation in Lebanon became a major problem between Assad's regime and the United States. In October 1983, the headquarters of the American and French troops of the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF), was demolished in an suicide attack. Around 200 Americans was killed. Syria's ambassador in the US disclaimed any Syria's involvement but the thought differently so Congress passed an emergency bill canceling economic aid previously approved for Syria. It was later reported that Syria had provided support for the attack. Around 800 Shia extremists had been trained in Syria and Assad's cousin Adnan al-Assad had supervised the preparations for the attack. Syria decided to resist American and French if attacked. Syria's Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass said that Syria would launch suicide attacks on the American Sixth Fleet. In December 1983, when American planes pounded Syrian positions in Biqa' valley, the Syrian air-defense system fought back. Two American airplanes were destroyed and one pilot was taken prisoner of war. Just before the attack, Israel's Prime Minister had visited Washington; Syria linked the American attack with the visit.[79]

In the 1990s, Syria maintained good relations with the United States, but several problems prevented them establishing a friendly relationship. In April 1992, Syria allowed Jews to emigrate to Israel, which was welcomed by the Bush administration.[80] Syria also showed its commitment to the peace process and requested US to take a more active part. However, relations between the countries were still characterized by mutual distrust and differences of opinion on key issues.[81]

The US accused Syria of patronizing terrorist organizations. Despite Syria's efforts to portray itself as having dissociated itself from these groups, it was not removed from the list of countries sponsoring terrorist organizations that appeared in annual US Department report on "Patterns of Global Terrorism". In 1991, Syria was suspected of involvement in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland. The US government absolved Syria of responsibility but the US media continued to portray Syria as a suspect. Syria denied any involvement and protested its inclusion on the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" list. Assad's government continued to patronage organizations that operated against Israel, including Hezbollah, the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).[81]

Region

Egypt

Relations between Egypt in Syria were renewed in December 1989. In the1990s, the countries enjoyed good relations with each other, as did their respective presidents, Hosni Mubarak and Assad. Syria tried to make Egypt its advocate to the United States and Israel, while Egypt tried to convince Syria to continue with the peace process. Syria also tried in vain to mediate between Egypt and Iran, a process mainly undertaken by Syrian Foreign Minister al-Sharaa. Relations between Egypt in Syria were not as good on a military or economic level.[82]In 1999 relations between the countries became strained because of differences over the peace process. Assad and Mubarak met only once that year; during the past decade they had met every few months. Syria opposed Egypt's proposal to convene a summit of Arabic countries negotiating with Israel, as Syria was unwilling to be pressured into a dialog with Yaser Arafat. Later, Syria accused Egypt of seeking to promote negotiations with the Palestinians at Syrian expense.[83]

Iran

Assad regarded the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979 as an opportunity to further implement his policies. The new regime of Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran promptly abolished Iran's pro-Western link with Egypt, which potentially threatened Iraq and turned Israel from a possible ally into a declared enemy. Assad established an alliance with Iran, whose political and social principles—except those concerning Israel and the United States—were dramatically opposed to Ba'athist doctrines. Assad consistently extended military and diplomatic assistance to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in order to secure legitimacy and support for his rule in Syria and his policies in Lebanon. He used the potential threat from Iran to manipulate Arab states in the Persian Gulf into continuing their financial and diplomatic support for Syria, weakening and possibly toppling the Iraqi regime, and subsequently employing Iraq and Iran for "strategic depth" and as allies in Syria's confrontation with Israel, thus emerging as leader of the all-Arab struggle against Israel. Assad repeated that the Iran-Iraq war should not have occurred since it was waged against a potential ally of the Arabs and diverted the Arabs' attention, resources, and efforts from their real enemy, Israel. According to Assad, most Arab countries had been wrongly led to support Iraq in an unnecessary war against Iran, rather than support Syria in its vital national-historical struggle against Israel.[84]

However, except for securing Arab financial support and verbal commitments, and obtaining large quantities of free and discounted Iranian oil, Assad failed to achieve the goals of his Gulf strategy; instead it further worsened Syria's regional position. The growing Iranian threat to Iraq, which Assad indirectly fueled, brought Egypt back to the Arab cause and many Arabs agreed with Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. A new alliance developed between Egypt and Iraq, Syria became further isolated, and the Iraqi regime—whose leaders developed feelings of hatred and revenge towards Assad—consolidated itself.[85] Syria's relationship with Iran during the Gulf war was under pressure. Iran's threats to take Iraqi territory caused Syria to not object the loss of Arab territory. In early 1986, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa said that Iran had confirmed that Iraqi territory would not be taken and al-Sharaa called Iran's refusal to end the war "crazy". Soon afterwards, Iran occupied the Iraqi Faw peninsula, damaging Syria's credibility. Another blow was Iran's offensive on Basra in late 1986 and early 1987. Between May and June 1986, Jordan and Saudi Arabia mediated between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties. Mediation was arranged due to Iran's threats to cut off oil supplies to Syria, as Syria was unable to pay Iran. Assad said that he was also interested in a dialog with Iraq. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries tried to persuade Assad to reach an agreement with Iraq and reopen its pipeline to the Mediterranean, which traverses Syria.[86]

Iraq

Hafez al-Assad (centre) with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (left), Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika (right), and Syrian Vice-President Abd al-Halim Khaddam (far right, half-covered) in 1979

Even though Iraq was ruled by another branch of the Ba'ath Party, Assad's relations with Saddam Hussein were extremely strained, mainly because of Saddam's refusal to ally with Syria against Israel, which Assad was unable to forgive. Assad had supported Iran in the war, and Iran found another ally in the Kurds in Iraq, who assisted Iran's offensive at the northern Iraq.

Massoud Barzani, a Kurdish leader, hoped that Khomeini would give the territory to the Kurds, but Khomeini decided to incorporate it into the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Barzani was not satisfied so he aligned with Assad's Syria, while Assad was also patronizing Jalal Talabani.[87] Talabani had lived in Syria since the 1970s and Assad believed he could benefit from his ties with Syria. Talabani stated that he would not forget the support given to him by Assad.[88] This was one of Assad's efforts to expand Syria's zone of influence to Iraq. By receiving Barzani, Assad gained the support of Kurds, thus decreasing Iran's chances to expand its influence over Iraq. However, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Kurds were still in close relations with Iran.[87]

Assad also participated in the coalition formed to force Iraq from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War; however Syria-Iraq relations started to improve in 1997 and 1998[89] when Israel started to develop a strategic partnership with Turkey.[90]

Israel

Assad's foreign policy was largely shaped by Syria's attitude toward Israel. During his presidency, Syria played a major role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which was presented by the Assad's government as a victory, although by the end of the war the Israeli army had invaded large areas of Syria and taken up positions 40 kilometres (25 mi) from Damascus. Syria later regained some territory that had been occupied in 1967 in the peace negotiations headed by Henry Kissinger. The Syrian government refused to recognize the State of Israel and referred to it as the "Zionist Entity." In the mid-1990s, Assad moderated his country's policy towards Israel as the loss of Soviet support altered the balance of power in the Middle East. Under pressure from the United States, Assad engaged in negotiations on the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights, but these talks failed. Assad believed that what constituted Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza were an integral part of southern Syria.[91][92]

Jordan

Assad had cold relations with Jordan. Syria under Assad had long history of attempts to destabilize King Hussein's regime and a regular onslaught of official insults emanated from Damascus towards Amman.[93] Both countries supported the other's opposition forces in order to destabileze each other's countries. In 1979's Islamic uprising in Syria, Jordan supported the Muslim Brotherhood.[94] Assad accused King Hussein of supporting them,[95]defeated the Islamists and sent Syrian troops to the Jordanian border. In December 1980, some Arab newspapers reported that Syrian jets attacked Muslim Brotherhood bases in Jordan. Saudi Arabia mediated in order to calm the two countries. Syria's hostility towards Jordan was partly fueled by Jordan's good relationship with Iraq.[96] During the Iraq-Iran War, Syria and Jordan supported different sides.[93] Not even the threat of war with Syria prevented King Hussein from supporting Iraq; however the rest of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf did the same.[97] In October 1998, Syria's Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass stated that "there is no such country as Jordan. Jordan was merely south Syria".[93] However, when King Hussein died in February 1999, Assad attended his funeral, after which relations between Syria and Jordan started to improve. Hussein's successor, King Abdullah visited Syria in April 1999, which was described as a "turning point" in the relationship between two countries.[95]

Lebanon

Syria deployed troops to Lebanon in 1976 during the Lebanese Civil War as part of the Arab Deterrent Force. Military intervention h0ad been requested by the Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh, as Lebanese Christian fears had been greatly exacerbated by the Damour massacre. Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian Rejectionist Front and began supporting the Maronite-dominated government.[98] The Syrian presence ended in 2005, due to UN resolution 1559, after the Rafiq Hariri assassination and the March 14 protests.[citation needed]

Libya

Libyan leader al-Gaddafi, Algerian president Boumedienne and Syrian President Assad at the Front summit in Tripoli, December 1977

Throughout 1970, Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt's President Sadat were involved in the negotiations about the union between Egypt and Libya. Assad—at the time Lieutenant General—expanded the negotiations on Syria[99] in September 1970 when in Libya in order to revive the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front established by the radical Arab countries.[100] In April 1971, the three leaders announced the Federation of Arab Republics between Libya, Syria, and Egypt..[99] When the Yom Kippur War started in 1973, Libya opposed its direction and criticized Egypt and Syria for restricted objectives. Libya was also unhappy with being sidelined. Nevertheless, Libya supported the war and had stationed troops in Egypt before it began. When the Arab countries lost the war and ceasfire negotiations started, Gaddafi was infuriated. After the war Gaddafi criticized Sadat and Assad for not consulting him before the war.[101] Egypt's marginalization of Libya and acceptance of the Camp David accords led Libya to adopt a more hostile stance against Israel. Eventually, Libya improved its relations with Syria, which also opposed Egypt after the Camp David accords.[100]

Gaddafi tried to expand the Arab unity to states to the west of Libya. After he failed in 1974 to form a union with Tunisia and Egypt, Gaddafi again turned to Assad. In September 1980, Assad agreed to enter another union with Libya, which occurred when both countries were diplomatically isolated. As part of the agreement, Libya paid the Syrian debt of US$ 1 billion owned to the Soviet Union for weapons. The union confounded Gaddafi's pan-Arab ambitions. In the same month the union was formed, the Iran-Iraq War broke out and Syria and Libya were the only Arab states to support Iran.[102]

In 1992, during the crisis between Libya and the West, despite long years of friendship between Assad and Gaddafi, Syria refrained from any substantive support for Libya, its support was only verbal. In order to get more support from Syria, Gaddafi sent a delegation to Damascus in January 1992, headed by Colonel Mustafa al-Kharubi. In March, while Assad was visiting Egypt, he met with a Libyan representative to the Arab League. Later in the same month, Abu Zayd 'Umar Durd, secretary of the Libyan General People's Committees, also visited Damascus. However, Syria could do no more than to denounce the UN's Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Libya, condemning it as unjustified provocation in view of what Syria considered to be a double standard applied by the international community toward Libya and Israel. Once the sanctions were in force on 15 April, Syria announced that it would violate the embargo and maintain air contacts with Libya. However, American pressure and Syria's technical inability to send flights to Libya caused them to reverse the decision.[103]

Turkey

During Assad's presidency, Syria's relations with Turkey were tense. The problem of Hatay Province had existed since early 1970s. A more important issue between the countries was water supply and Syria's support to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Turkey was a member of NATO, while Syria was allied to the Soviet Union; the Cold War was a guarantor to the status quo. After the Cold War ended, the issue of Hatay Province came to prominence.[104] Hatay Province was handed over to Turkey by France, which was, at the time, the colonial power in Syria.[105]

Assad offered help to the PKK, sheltered, trained, and equipped Lebanon's PKK and enabled the latter organization to receive training in the Beka'a' Valley in Lebanon. Abdullah Öcalan, one of the founders of the PKK, openly used his villa in Damascus as a base for operations. Turkey threatened to cut off all water supplies to Syria.[106] However, when the Turkish Prime Minister or President sent a formal letter to the Syrian leadership requesting it to stop supporting the PKK, Assad ignored them. At that time, Turkey could not attack Syria due to its low military capacity near the Syrian border, and advised the European NATO members to avoid becoming involved in Middle East conflicts in order to avoid escalating the West's conflict with the Warsaw Pact states, since Syria had good relations with the Soviet Union. However, after the end of the Cold War, Turkish military concentration on the Syrian border increased.[107] In mid-1998, Turkey threatened Syria with military action because of Syrian aid to Öcalan,[108] and in October they gave Syria an ultimatum.[107] Assad was aware of the possible consequences of Syria's continuing support to the PKK.Turkey powerful militarily, but Syria had lost the support of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was not willing to help; neither was it capable of taking strong measures against Turkey.[107] Facing a real threat of military confrontation with Turkey, Syria signed the Adana Memorandum in October 1998, which designated the PKK as a terrorist organization and required Syria to evict it from its territory.[106] After the PKK was dissolved in Syria, Turkish-Syrian political relations have developed considerably, but issues such as water supplies from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and Hatay Province remained unsolved.[107]

Economy

Tabqa Dam built in 1974 (center of image)

Assad called his domestic reforms as a corrective movement, and achieved substantial results. Assad tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors. One of Assad's main achievements was the completion of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974. It is one of the biggest dams in the world, and its reservoir was called Lake Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased financial incomes, social security, and improved health and education services. The urban middle classes, who had been hurt by the Jadid regime's policy, obtained new economic opportunities.[43]

By 1977, it become apparent that despite some successes, Assad's political reforms had largely failed. this was partly due to Assad's miscalculations or mistakes, and partly to factors he could not control or change quickly. Chronic socio-economic difficulties remained and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education, particularly in rural areas, the increasing emigration of professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among the problems Syria faced. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems and encouraged corruption and the black market. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers— including Assad's brother Rifaat—in the smuggling of contraband goods from Lebanon, which affected government revenues and spread corruption among senior governmental officials.[109]

In the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened and by mid-1984 the food crisis was so serious that the press was full of complaints. Assad's government sought solution and argued that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. In August the food crisis continued despite the government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment, which resulted in soaring prices, long queues, and rampant black marketereering. Smuggling of goods from Lebanon was a common occurrence. Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, but encountered problems due to the involvement of Assad's brother Rif'at in the illegal business. In July 1984, the regime formed an anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon-Syria borders, which proved effective. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rif'at al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, and imported $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squads seized $3.8 million worth of goods in its first week.[110]

File:1000 SYP obverse.jpg
Assad's portrait on 1000 Syrian Pound banknote

In the early 1990s, Syrian economy grew between 5%-7%, exports increased, the balance of trade improved and inflation remained moderate at 15% – 18%, and oil exports increased. In May 1991, Assad's government liberalized the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most of the foreign investors were Arab states of the Persian Gulf, as Western countries still had political and economic issues with Syria. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects. However, because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government refused to privatize state-owned companies.[111]

In the mid 1990s, Syria entered another economic crisis due to a recession. In the late 1990s, Syria's economic growth was around 1.5%, which was insufficient as the population growth was between 3% and 3.5%, causing the GDP per capita to be negative. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis occurred at a time of recession in world markets. A drop in the price of oil in 1998 caused a major blow to Syria's economy, but when the oil price rose in 1999, the Syrian economy experienced a partial recovery. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused further economic woes. It caused a drop of 25%-30% in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures that included loans and compensation to farmers and distribution of fodder free charge in order to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy.[112]

Assad's government tried to decrease to population growth, which caused economic problems, but this was only marginal successful. One sign of the economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on the signing of an association agreement. The maic cause of this failure was the difficulty of Syria meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. Marc Pierini, head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernized it could not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Nevertheless, Assad's government gave civil servants a 20% pay increase on the anniversary of the "Correction Revolution" which brought Assad to power. The foreign press criticized Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy. Assad's government refused to modernize the bank system, allow private banks, and open a stock exchange.[113]

Personality cult

Hafez al-Assad's statue in Aleppo

Assad developed a state-sponsored cult of personality in order to maintain power. Because he wanted to become an Arab leader, he often represented himself as a successor to Egypt's Gamal Nasser, having risen to power in November 1970, a few weeks after Nasser's death. He modeled his presidential system on Nasser's, hailed Nasser for his pan-Arabic leadership, and in public he displayed photographs of Nasser alongside posters of himself.[52]

Assad also demonstrated his admiration for Salah ad-Din, a Muslim Kurdish leader who in the 12th century unified the Muslim East and defeating the Crusaders in 1187 and subsequently conquered Jerusalem. Assad displayed a large painting of Salah ad-Din's tomb in Damascus in his office and issued a currency bill featuring Salah ad-Din. In his speeches and conversations, Assad frequently hailed Salah ad-Din's successes and his victory over the Crusaders while equating Israel with the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Crusaders' state.[114]

Portraits of Assad, often depicting him engaging in heroic activities, were placed in public spaces. He named numerous places and institutions after himself and members of his family. In schools, children were taught to sing songs of adulation about Hafez al-Assad. Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our eternal leader, Hafez al-Assad". Assad was sometimes portrayed with apparently divine properties. Sculptures and portraits depicted him alongside the prophet Mohammad, and after his mother's death, the government produced portraits of her surrounded by a halo. Syrian officials were made to refer to him as 'the sanctified one' (al-Muqaddas).[115] This strategy was also pursued by Assad's son, Bashar al-Assad.[116]

Death

By the late 1990s, Assad increasingly suffered from ill health.[68] American diplomats said that that Assad found it difficult to remain focused and projected weariness during their meetings. It was speculated that Assad was incapable of functioning for more than two hours a day. However, his spokesperson did not respond to these speculations, and Assad's official routine in 1999 had no significant change from that of the previous decade. Assad continued to have meetings and traveled abroad occasionally; most notably he visited Moscow in July 1999. Assad's government was accustomed to working without his direct involvement in day-to-day affairs.[117] On 10 June 2000 Assad died from a heart attack he suffered while speaking on the telephone with Lebanese prime minister Salim al-Hoss.[118] His funeral was held three days later.[119] Hafez al-Assad is buried with his son Bassel in a mausoleum in his hometown of Qardaha.

References

Citations
  1. ^ a b Seddon 2004, p. 75.
  2. ^ a b Reich 1990, p. 52.
  3. ^ Alianak 2007, p. 127-128.
  4. ^ Seale 1990, p. 5.
  5. ^ Seale 1990, p. 3.
  6. ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 25.
  7. ^ Seale 1990, p. 20.
  8. ^ a b c d e f Alianak 2007, p. 128.
  9. ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 28.
  10. ^ a b Jammal 2007, p. 128.
  11. ^ Zahler 2009, p. 28-29.
  12. ^ Zahler 2009, p. 29-31.
  13. ^ a b c Zahler 2009, p. 31.
  14. ^ a b c d e Reich 1990, p. 53.
  15. ^ a b Alianak 2007, p. 129.
  16. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2008, p. 168.
  17. ^ Seale 1990, p. 49.
  18. ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 34.
  19. ^ Zahler 2009, p. 32.
  20. ^ Leverett 2005, p. 231.
  21. ^ Zahler 2009, p. 33.
  22. ^ Seale 1990, p. 50-51.
  23. ^ Zahler 2009, p. 32-34.
  24. ^ Seale 1990, p. 98.
  25. ^ Seale 1990, p. 65.
  26. ^ Seale 1990, p. 60-61.
  27. ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 38.
  28. ^ Seale 1990, p. 75.
  29. ^ Seale 1990, p. 76-78.
  30. ^ a b Reich 1990, p. 53-54.
  31. ^ Seale 1990, p. 76.
  32. ^ Selae 1990, p. 77.
  33. ^ Seale 1990, p. 88.
  34. ^ a b c Reich 1990, p. 54.
  35. ^ Seale 1990, p. 102.
  36. ^ Carter, Dunston & Thomas 2008, p. 30.
  37. ^ Pollack 2002, pp. 339–340.
  38. ^ Reich 1990, p. 54-55.
  39. ^ Reich 1990, p. 52-55.
  40. ^ a b Alianak 2007, p. 129-130.
  41. ^ a b c d Reich 1990, p. 55.
  42. ^ a b c Alianak 2007, p. 55.
  43. ^ a b Reich 1990, p. 56.
  44. ^ Kaplan, Robert (1993-02). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  45. ^ Riad Yazbeck. "Return of the Pink Panthers?" Mideast Monitor. Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2008.
  46. ^ Kaplan, Robert (1993-02). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic. Today, those Muslims called Alawīs are brothers of those Shi'ites called Mutawallis by the malicious. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  47. ^ The New Encyclopedia of Islam by Cyril Glasse, Altamira, 2001, p.36–7
  48. ^ Syria country profile, p. 15-17. Library of Congress Federal Research Division (April 2005). This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  49. ^ Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power, Human Rights Watch, 2010 Report
  50. ^ Nohlen, D, Grotz, F & Hartmann, C (2001) Elections in Asia: A data handbook, Volume I, p221 ISBN 019924958
  51. ^ Reich 1990, p. 56-57.
  52. ^ a b c Reich 1990, p. 57.
  53. ^ a b Reich 1990, p. 58.
  54. ^ Reich 1990, p. 58-59.
  55. ^ a b c d Reich 1990, p. 59.
  56. ^ Thomas Collelo, ed. (1987). "Relations with the Soviet Union". Syria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Retrieved 08 October, 2012. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help); Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  57. ^ a b c d Reich 1990, p. 60.
  58. ^ a b MacFarquhar, Neil. Hafez al-Assad, Who Turned Syria Into a Power in the Middle East, Dies at 69. New York Times, 2000-06-11.
  59. ^ Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 230.
  60. ^ Schlumberger 2007, p. 105.
  61. ^ Tanter 1999, p. 13.
  62. ^ Wright 2008, p. 243-244.
  63. ^ Harris 1997, p. 166-167.
  64. ^ a b Reich 1990, p. 61.
  65. ^ Thomas Collelo, ed. (1987). "1982 – 1987 Political Developments". Syria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Retrieved 08 October, 2012. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help); Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  66. ^ Reich 1990, p. 61-62.
  67. ^ Reich 1990, p. 62.
  68. ^ a b Seddon 2004, p. 76.
  69. ^ a b c d e Zisser 1995, p. 733.
  70. ^ Zisser 1995, p. 732.
  71. ^ Zisser 1995, p. 732-733.
  72. ^ a b Zisser 2002, p. 561.
  73. ^ Olmerl 1986, p. 700-701.
  74. ^ Olmerl 1986, p. 701-702.
  75. ^ Olmerl 1986, p. 702.
  76. ^ Zisser 1992, p. 656.
  77. ^ Zisser 1992, p. 657.
  78. ^ Zisser 1993, p. 673-674.
  79. ^ Olmert 1988, p. 703.
  80. ^ Zisser, p. 729-730.
  81. ^ a b Zisser 1995, p. 730.
  82. ^ Zisser 1995, p. 734.
  83. ^ Zisser 2002, p. 562.
  84. ^ Reich 1990, p. 62-63.
  85. ^ Reich 1990, p. 63.
  86. ^ Olmert 1988, p. 616.
  87. ^ a b Pelletière 2007, p. 70.
  88. ^ Barkey et al. 2011, p. 27.
  89. ^ Post & George 2004, p. 231.
  90. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2008, p. 169.
  91. ^ Daniel Pipes. "Palestine for the Syrians?".
  92. ^ Fouad Ajami (May/June 2009). "The Ways of Syria – Foreign Affairs". Retrieved 10 October 2012. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  93. ^ a b c Schenker 2003, p. 11.
  94. ^ Milton-Edwards 2009, p. 101.
  95. ^ a b Korany & Dessounki 2010, p. 272.
  96. ^ Milton-Edwards 2009, p. 101-102.
  97. ^ Milton-Edwards 2009, p. 102.
  98. ^ Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict, p. 354.
  99. ^ a b Metz 2004, p. 71.
  100. ^ a b Otman & Karlberg 2007, p. 35.
  101. ^ Otman & Karlberg 2007, p. 37.
  102. ^ Metz 2004, p. 74.
  103. ^ Zisser 1995, p. 738.
  104. ^ Rabo & Utas 2006, p. 92-93.
  105. ^ Radu 2003, p. 178.
  106. ^ a b Phillips 2009, p. 129-130.
  107. ^ a b c d Kibaroğlu, Kibaroğlu & Halman 2009, p. 73.
  108. ^ Radu 2003, p. 152.
  109. ^ Reich 1990, p. 59-60.
  110. ^ Olmerl 1986, p. 683-684.
  111. ^ Zisser 1995, p. 728-729.
  112. ^ Zisser 2002, p. 598-599.
  113. ^ Zisser 2002, p. 599.
  114. ^ Reich 1990, p. 57-58.
  115. ^ Pipes 1995, p. 15-16.
  116. ^ Zisser 2006, p. 50.
  117. ^ Zisser 2002, p. 552-553.
  118. ^ Ball 2010, p. 110.
  119. ^ Freedman 2002, p. 105.
Bibliography
  • Alianak, Sonia (2007). Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium. Peter Lang. ISBN 9780820469249. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Ball, Howard (2010). Genocide: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9781598844887. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Barkey, Henri J.; Lasensky, Scott; Marr, Phebe; Hamilton, Lee H. (2011). Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power. US Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 9781601270771. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Carter, Terry; Dunston, Lara; Thomas, Amelia (2008). Syria and Lebanon. Lonely Planet. ISBN 9781741046090. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Chaliand, Gérard; Blin, Arnaud (2007). The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda. University of California Press. ISBN 9780520247093. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Freedman, Robert O. (2002). The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century. University Press of Florida. ISBN 9780813031101. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Harris, William W. (1997). Faces of Lebanon: sects, wars, and global extensions. Markus Wiener Publishers. ISBN 9781558761162. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Kibaroğlu, Mustafa; Kibaroğlu, Ayșegül; Halman, Talât S. (2009). Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook. Peter Lang. ISBN 9780313345609. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Korany, Bahgat; Dessouki, Ali E. H. (2010). The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization. American University in Cairo Press. ISBN 9789774163609. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Keddie, Nikki R. R. (2012). Women in the Middle East: Past and Present. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691128634. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Leverett, Flynt L. (2005). Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial By Fire. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815752042. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Metz, Helen C. (2004). Libya. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 9781419130120. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2009). Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780415457170. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Otman, Waniss; Karlberg, Erling (2007). The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning. Springer. ISBN 9783540464600. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Olmert, Yosef (1986). Shaked, Haim; Dishon, Daniel (eds.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 8. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 9789652240064. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Pelletière, Stephen C. (2007). Losing Iraq: Insurgency and Politics. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275992132. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Pipes, Daniel (1995). Syria Beyond the Peace Process. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. ISBN 9780944029640. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Phillips, David L. (2009). From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition. ransaction Publishers. ISBN 9781412807951. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Pollack, Kenneth (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-3733-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Post, Jerrold M.; George, Alexander (2004). Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior. Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801441691. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Radu, Michael (2003). Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 9780765801661. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Reich, Bernard (1990). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780313262135. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Schenker, David K. (2003). Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations. Lexington Books. ISBN 9780739106495. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Schlumberger, Oliver (2007). Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes. Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804757768. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Seale, Patrick (1990). Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East. University of California Press. ISBN 9780520069763. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Seddon, David (2004). A Political and Economic Dictionary of the Middle East. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781857432121. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Shore, Nawar (2008). The Arab-American Handbook: A Guide to the Arab, Arab-American & Muslim Worlds. Cune Press. ISBN 9781885942142. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Tanter, Raymond (1999). Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780312217860. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Tucker, Spencer C.; Roberts, Priscilla M. (2008). The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9781851098422. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Wright, Robin B. (2009). Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East. Penguin Press. ISBN 9780143114895. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Zahler, Kathy A. (2009). The Assads' Syria. Twenty-First Century Books. ISBN 9780822590958. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Zisser, Eyal (1993). Ayalon, Ami (ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 15. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 9780813318691. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Zisser, Eyal (1995). Ayalon, Ami (ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 16. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 9780813321332. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Zisser, Eyal (2002). Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 23. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 9789652240491. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Zisser, Eyal (2006). Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 9781845111533. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

External links

Political offices
Preceded by Minister of Defense of Syria
1966–1972
Succeeded by
Preceded by Prime Minister of Syria
1970–1971
Succeeded by
Preceded by President of Syria
1971–2000
Succeeded by
Party political offices
Preceded by Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
1970–2000
Succeeded by

Template:Cold War figures

Template:Persondata

Leave a Reply