Page 1

Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Henrik Jedig Jørgensen

Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch

Never Gonna

Give You Up?

Experiences with ending conscription in

France, the Netherlands, Latvia and

Slovakia

February 2009

Page 2 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Dansk Institut for Militære Studier er en uafhængig

forskningsinstitution, hvis formål er at kortlægge,

analysere og debattere de valg, som dansk forsvar står

overfor i en globaliseret verden.

Denne rapport er baseret på forfatterens egen forskning,

og dens konklusioner er således udelukkende udtryk for

forfatterens egne holdninger.

Copyright © Dansk Institut for Militære Studier og

forfatteren, 2009.

Rapporten kan hentes på www.difms.dk

Abstract

This report surveys the experiences gained in

France, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Slovakia

in connection with discontinuing conscription.

These experiences are then used to estimate

what the consequences of discontinuing

conscription in Denmark would be.

There was awareness in France, the

Netherlands, Latvia, and Slovakia that their

national defence forces would be significantly

reduced when they discontinued conscription,

but the decisions were seen as necessary in

order to realise their strategic visions of

heightening their ability to take part in

international operations.

It was realised in all four countries that

recruitment and testing are even more

important for professional forces than for

forces based on conscription and they were all

obliged to increase expenditure in this area.

After the discontinuation of conscription in

these countries it has generally been possible

to recruit and organise an exclusively

professional military that has provided forces

suitable to be sent out on international

operations. This has led to increases in

defence expenditure, but the greatest increase

in expenditure stems from committing troops

to international operations – not from

increased payroll and recruitment costs.

Furthermore, experience has shown that it is

easier to recruit women to professional armed

forces.

Because professional forces can perform a

greater number of and more complex tasks

than conscripted forces, it is even more

important for politicians to progressively and

clearly define the role of the armed forces and

to ensure there is balance between ways and

means.

Page 3 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Recommendations

This report does not conclude whether

conscription

in

Denmark

should

be

discontinued, modified, or maintained. The

recommendations therefore fall into three

categories depending on whether or not

conscription is maintained in Denmark.

Recommendations that do not depend on

whether conscription is discontinued or

maintained in Denmark:

Prepare a national security strategy.

Maintain

"Armed

Forces'

Day”

(the

examination of potential conscripts) – and let

it include both sexes.

Recruitment to and retaining personnel in the

armed forces should to a greater degree be

seen as two sides of the same coin.

Age composition in the armed forces should

be adapted to the tasks that are to be

performed.

The "Dutch hospital model" should be tried out

in Denmark – and be enlarged with functions

other than a surgeon's team.

There should be a "Veterans' Day" in Denmark.

The Danish armed forces should be allowed to

make an active, visible contribution to youth

activities with a military strain such as scouts'

camps and sports arrangements.

Recommendations

if

conscription

is

discontinued in Denmark:

Do not abolish conscription – simply put it on

standby.

Make a greater effort to strengthen

recruitment – this should include a bigger

organisation and more money.

Establish clear purposes and goals for the

armed forces – create balance between ways

and means.

Make the decision at a time when competition

for manpower is declining.

Create flexible contracts that offer young

people the opportunity to try out life in the

armed forces before they bind themselves for

a longer period of time and also make it

possible for the armed forces to evaluate

them.

Pay close attention to the relationship

between the civilian population and the armed

forces.

Establish cost-benefit balances for terms of

service and design a motivation structure in

accordance with these.

Recommendations

if

conscription

is

maintained in Denmark:

Transfer conscription to the Home Guard.

Extend "Armed Forces' Day" to include both

sexes.

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Content

Abstract

2

Recommendations

3

01 Introduction

5

02 Method

15

03 Conscription in context

18

04 Background

23

05 Decision

30

06 Implementation

33

07 Evaluation

40

08 Summary and general

observations

50

09 Conclusion and perspectives 55

10 Recommendations

63

11 Appendix

67

12 Sources

72

13 Notes

74

Page 5 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

01 Introduction

Conscription is a subject of debate – with the public, academics, and

politicians. This became clear during the preparations of the Danish

Defence Agreement for 2005-2009, and over the years, conscription

has been a subject of interest to both politicians and the press.1

Views in the political world range from the Social Democrats' wish to

discontinue conscription to the Danish People's Party's wish that it

should be expanded.2

In a debate characterised by such strong views, it would probably

come as a surprise to most people in Denmark to learn that we know

very little about what happens when a country discontinues

conscription. No systematic collection and comparison of experience

from countries that have abolished or suspended conscription has as

yet been carried out in Denmark. Furthermore, isolated statistical

information is often used to support various arguments without

reference to a broader context. There is therefore good reason to look

more closely at the experience from other countries.

But what can we in Denmark actually learn from countries that have

discontinued conscription?

Over and above purely practical experience – such as how to

demobilise conscripts and build up professional forces in a balanced

manner at the same time, and how to avoid a drastic decline in

combat readiness and problems on the labour market – there have

been political considerations in all of the countries that have

discontinued conscription about what should and could be done with

the national armed forces and about the social significance of

conscription. And, unlike the countries that have maintained

conscription, it is possible to learn from their experience – with

regard to the direct and derived consequences of discontinuing

conscription and the ability to make authoritative statements about

the expected and unexpected effects of this.

This report shows what the discontinuation of military conscription

has meant for France, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Slovakia in four

selected areas that are discussed in greater detail below.

The four assumptions examined in the report are as follows:

1. For the armed forces, conscription constitutes the most

economical and efficient recruitment base to the professional

forces. This means that conscription is cheaper than purely

professional armed forces.

2. Conscription is necessary for the armed forces to be able to

perform their tasks in connection with national defence and

to commit troops to international operations.

3. Conscription is necessary in order to create horizontal

legitimacy in the state – both by making the armed forces

transparent and by integrating various groups and classes of

the population.

4. Conscription maintains the public's view of duty to society

and develops conscripts' sense of responsibility.

With the point of departure in these four assumptions, the report

contains an investigation of the considerations, background, and

objectives the decision to discontinue conscription were based on

and the extent to which the objectives were attained. The report

focuses on the expected and unexpected effects that arose in the

process – and on which measures were taken in the countries in

question to ensure that the objectives were attained. The purpose of

investigating the experience gained in the four countries is therefore

to put Danish conscription into perspective.

The structure of the report is as follows: the introduction and

presentation of conscription in general, and the specific conditions

connected with conscription in Denmark, are followed by the section

on method. There is then a review of the context conscription was

part of in the four countries in order to create a basis for assessing

the consequences of its discontinuation. Next follows a review of the

considerations and background for the decision in the countries.

Then there are three sections on the decision itself, its

implementation, and an evaluation of the effect of discontinuation,

and finally the conclusion of the report and the perspectives for

Danish conscription.

What is conscription?

Conscription existed in various forms in many societies in antiquity

and is familiar from ancient Athens, for instance, where civil rights

depended on the ability and will to serve as an oarsman or soldier

until a very advanced age.3

The introduction of modern conscription is normally ascribed to

France where, in 1772, Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote that national

defence could only be ensured in a state where "it was the duty of all

citizens to serve as soldiers".4 In 1789 The French National Assembly

declared that "every citizen must be a soldier and every soldier must

be a citizen or we will never have a constitution". Article 12 of the

French Constitution from the same year states that "Security for

people's and citizens' rights demands public military forces" and

article 13: "Common contributions are essential to maintain public

forces".5 The point of departure for conscription therefore was that it

constituted a symbiosis between state and citizen in which the

citizen placed himself at the disposal of the state's military

apparatus in return for the state guaranteeing security and

democracy for the citizen.

Conscription as a citizen's duty to contribute to the protection of his

country or city state, and – in extremis – to die for it, has therefore

historically existed hand in hand with other forms of recruitment – in

the form of mercenaries, for instance.6

On the other hand,

conscription in its modern form within the national state also

replaced (transformed, some would say) the compulsory levying of

troops for warfare in earlier times.

The central functions of conscription – the citizen's duty to society

and the privileges implied by the fulfilment of this duty and society's

duty to its citizens – are appropriately summarised by Samuel E.

Finer, in citing the old Swedish maxim:

Page 6 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

One man, one rifle, one vote!7

Down through the ages, however, conscription has been used for

many other purposes than to mobilise military forces for the defence

of the state – to mix groups of the population, for instance, and

thereby create a common national identity − and there has been a

general tendency towards a change in conscription in NATO and

OECD countries. Since 1995, 11 out of 32 countries have discontinued

or suspended conscription – of which eight have done so since 2002.8

Conscription in Denmark

The Danish Constitution states that:

Every man capable of bearing arms shall be obliged with his person to

contribute to the defence of the fatherland in accordance with the detailed

provisions prescribed by law. 9

These more detailed provisions are laid down in the Danish National

Service Act, which states that "every Danish man shall be subject to

conscription", and that conscription comprises "service in the armed

forces, service in the civil emergency preparedness forces, relief work

in developing countries, or civilian work in accordance with the

special legislation on this" (conscientious objectors). 10

The Danish

conscription model has been changed on an ongoing basis in order to

adapt to changes in the international system and developments in

the pattern of threat in the direction of asymmetric and transnational

threats to security. The Bruun Report, which analysed development

tendencies in security policy of significance for Danish defence for

the Danish Defence Agreement of 1994 has it that:

… the conventional threat against Danish territory has disappeared for the

foreseeable future, for which reason there is no longer a need for the national

defence set up to counteract it. At the same time, technological developments

mean that if a conventional threat should arise against Denmark again in the

very long term, it would probably be necessary to organise national defence in

a completely different way to that we were familiar with during the Cold War…11

And further:

Viewed overall, developments in security policy demand that the Danish armed

forces should increase capacity in two central areas:

•

Total defence, including the ability to counter acts of terrorism and

their effects

•

Internationally deployable capacities.12

Specifically with regard to conscription:

However, it must be assumed that there will continue to be a need for

manpower for the armed forces' contribution to total defence. Consideration

could therefore be given to allowing a possible continuation of conscription to

the national defence forces to be central to this and also to make it possible to

recruit professional soldiers from the ranks of conscripts.13

The evaluations and conclusions in the Bruun Report were later used

as a framework for the Danish Defence Agreement of 2004, which

concludes on page three that conscription in Denmark should be

adapted to national defence.14 The changes led to a general reduction

in the duration of conscription to four months, which was to be

evaluated at the end of 2006.15

This evaluation, which was carried out by the Chief of Defence

Denmark in the first quarter of 2007, states on page three that:

Whereas the former training of conscripts was addressed to the mobilisation-

based war strength, the present training of conscripts aims at a focused,

relevant total defence content that provides the armed forces with a flexible,

Page 7 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

well-trained capacity to incorporate into the framework of total defence. Over

and above this, conscript training must be a motivating course of training that

addresses the recruitment of personnel for continued training in the operative

structure and for subsequent training in connection with international

missions.16

Where recruitment is concerned, the evaluation report states that:

… there has been success in recruiting more than the 20% outlined that was set

up as a goal to cover the structural need. It should be remarked, however, that

a large number of conscripts only make up their minds during basic training.17

And that:

… in the long term, the right number of people with the right qualifications

could be recruited from among conscripts, but it is not possible to cover the

need for a number of technical specialists solely among conscripts. This is

exacerbated by the fact that it is no longer possible to call up conscripts on the

basis of their civil training/competencies...

In other words, the armed forces no longer train conscripts to a level

at which they could be used directly in the national defence forces or

undergo a mission-specific course of training and be sent out in

connection with international operations. Instead they undergo a

course of training that aims at getting conscripts to support total

defence and creates the basis for recruitment to professional

appointments in the armed forces.

In practice, the Danish Defence Recruitment Board18

calls up all 18-

year-old Danish men to "Armed Forces' Day". This takes the form of

providing information on education and job opportunities in the

armed forces and the Emergency Management Agency. Potential

conscripts must present themselves to a draft board which, on the

basis of a number of tests and a medical evaluation, sorts

participants in accordance with their suitability to do military

service. Women also receive an invitation to take part in "Armed

Forces' Day" but, unlike the men who are obliged to take part, their

participation is voluntary.

Those deemed suitable draw a number while attending the draft. The

height of this number determines whether the person in question is

conscripted, as the politically established number of conscripts

minus the number of volunteers is decisive for where the limit to the

number exempting the person from military service will be placed. A

low number means that it is highly probable that the person in

question will be called up, while a high number means it is less

probable. After a person has drawn a number, it is possible for him to

volunteer for military service. Those who do so have several

advantages in connection with deciding where and when they will be

called up. Since 2005, between 61 and 77 percent of those liable for

military service have taken advantage of this scheme. It must be

assumed that some of these "volunteers" choose to volunteer first

and foremost to gain the accompanying advantages, and therefore

they are often referred to as "technical volunteers", so the real share

of volunteers must be assumed to be lower that shown in figure 1.

Compulsory military service thus includes only men, whereas

women can sign contracts to serve what is known as "voluntary

military service". Figure 1 shows from left to right the number of

young people from a particular year (both men and women) first,

then the number of people who have attended the draft, then the

number of those suitable for conscription, followed by the number of

"volunteers" who have agreed to be conscripted, and then the

number of people called up. Column 7 shows the percentage of those

called up in relation to the entire number of people from a particular

year (both men and women), and finally, columns eight and nine

Page 8 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

show the number of women under contract and the number of

conscientious objectors respectively.

Figure 1

Conscription in Denmark: number of young people from a particular

year and their involvement in the draft and compulsory military

service (own design).

Year

Number

of 18-

year-

olds in

current

year.19

Number

of men

at the

draft. 20

Number

of

suitable

people

at the

draft. 21

Of whom,

volunteers

agreeing to

be con-

scripted.22

Number

called

up.23

Those

called up

as a % of

people

from a

particular

year.

Women

under

military

service

contracts.

24

Conscien-

tious

objectors.

2005 59,419

28,954

15,060

3,877

6,298

10.6

209

537

2006 60,082

31,933

15,404

4,375

5,673

9.3

219

349

2007 62,838

33,120

17,933

5,553

6,125

9.7

452

263

2008 65,339

17,127 25

8,207 26

unknown

approx.

6,300

9.6

480

unknown

Conscripts are paid a taxable amount of DKK 7,307.14 a month (as of

April 2008). After deductions for holiday leave, they receive DKK

7,063.57 a month. To this must be added a tax-free amount for meals

of DKK 168.00 a day (as of April 2008), which amounts to

approximately DKK 5,040 a month.27

That means that a conscript costs the armed forces DKK 12,347.14 a

month in wages and services – and in total, the 2,150 conscript man-

years cost more than DKK 318 million a year. In addition, there is the

training structure and the cost of its operation – plus training costs

proper in the form of such things as books, ammunition and fuel. It

has not been possible to obtain an overall figure for the cost of

conscription for the national defence forces – and this figure would

under any circumstances only provide a partial answer to the social

costs of conscription. This is discussed in greater detail in section 1.3.

It is also part of the picture of conscription in Denmark that a large

percentage of the professional cadre in the armed forces is involved

in training conscripts. It goes without saying that some of these

personnel are bound to tasks in Denmark while others are frequently

sent out on international operations. One of the more positive side

effects of conscription is that many of the officers and non-

commissioned officers in the armed forces learn valuable lessons

regarding management and how to treat manpower through their

engagement in training conscripts. It is therefore difficult – even for

professionals – to differentiate between the core service that is the

foundation of conscription and the positive and negative side effects

it brings about.

The Danish conscription model is therefore an adaptation of a

general conscription model that has developed since the French

Revolution.

In order to investigate the consequences of discontinuing

conscription, we must therefore look more closely at its general

characteristics. In our introductory reading in connection with writing

this report we encountered a number of assumptions of which the

following four themes proved to be recurrent:

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Conscription, economy and recruitment

As conscripts have normally been far less well paid than

professionals and as they have not received payment for being

members of the reserve, they have – on paper at least – constituted

an inexpensive and effective replacement for professional forces.

Furthermore, mobilisation mechanisms have made it possible to

acquire a relatively big reserve force in the event of war.28

Additionally, in most countries, conscription has constituted the

foundation for recruitment to the professional armed forces because

the most common path to a professional career for enlisted

specialists and non-commissioned officers began with national

service. There is therefore an assumption that conscription is an

inexpensive way of acquiring military forces and that discontinuing

conscription would lead to extra expenditure on wages and

recruitment to the professional forces.29

The costs of conscription as opposed to professional forces can be

calculated in many ways and there are good arguments for looking at

conscription from an overall socio-economic perspective. What are

the consequences for the economy, for instance, if the state devotes

more than 2,000 man-years to conscription while the production of

export items or services has to be suspended?30

The military organisation is part of the surrounding society also

when it comes to basic socio-economic contexts. In this connection,

the manpower that is part of the military organisation can naturally

not be part of the civilian labour market at the same time. The more

this labour market is based on highly-trained and specialised

manpower, the greater the influence on society will be when this

manpower is withdrawn for military service.

The costs of conscription are also greatly influenced by the way the

rest of the armed forces are organised and which tasks conscription

is to fulfil in connection with the rest of the armed forces. Henning

Sørensen provides an excellent demonstration of the way in which

the costs of conscription in respectively Denmark, Norway and

Sweden are closely connected with widely differing ambitions

regarding what use should be made of it. He specifically concludes

that conscription in Denmark was primarily intended to function as a

recruitment mechanism for the armed forces' international

operations as early as the years up to 2004, whereas conscription in

Sweden and Norway was primarily intended to be used for the

democratic control of the armed forces and the acquisition of

national defence forces. According to Henning Sørensen, this

difference implies a completely different ratio between the number of

conscripts and the number of professionals – and a higher level of

costs for conscription in Denmark.31

Conscription, international operations and national defence

New demands arose on the armed forces with the end of the Cold

War: the already ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs made new

technological demands on the capability of the armed forces and

their understanding of combat and thereby on soldiers' competencies

and their joint training32. The need for training at all levels in the

armed forces was thereby on the increase at the same time as

priorities switched from national defence to international operations.

This made it relevant to look more closely at the best and least

expensive ways of acquiring the type of armed forces prescribed by

the new situation in connection with security policy. An Advanced

Page 10 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Research Workshop, held by NATO in 2003 in Bratislava, showed the

difficulties of measuring the efficiency of conscription.33 For example,

Kenneth S. Brower carried out a comparative analysis of the military

capabilities of Israel, Syria and the USA in which he demonstrated

the relative advantages of conscript-based armed forces as opposed

to professional forces.34 At the same time, Bertel Heurlin's analysis in

his contribution, "Revolution in Danish Military Affairs", showed that

the Danish armed forces' preparedness for readjustment was

hampered by the equipment inherited and by a personnel situation

that was bound up with Cold War scenarios that focused on national

defence and that change was necessary in connection with

organisation and equipment. 35

As Bertel Heurlin showed, the increasing number of Danish forces

engaged in international operations after the end of the Cold War

brought about a new view of the significance of the quality of the

armed forces' equipment and weaponry. It became clear that the

equipment that had been good enough for national defence under

domestic skies was inadequate for the new role the armed forces

were suddenly required to play in demanding environments far away

from Denmark. The new tasks thus brought about a need for more

training, extensive investments in equipment, and more soldiers

sent on international operations.36

In Denmark, it was decided in

2003 to reduce the duration of conscription and the number of

people called up.37

As a result, conscription was maintained as a

recruitment base, but in principle lost part of its ability to mobilise a

manpower-intensive national defence. This released resources for

such things as investments in equipment for the professional cadre

who would perform the international tasks.

The assumption is thus that recruitment to the armed forces can best

be covered by maintaining conscription as a recruitment base and

that a shorter conscription period would make it possible to achieve

savings that could finance the additional costs of the new tasks.

However, the consequences are that conscripts will no longer be

trained up to a level where they can be used in combat. Neither will it

be (and has never been) possible to send them out on international

operations. But as opposed to previously, when the duration of

conscription and the goals of training were intended to send home

soldiers trained for combat; in 2008 they receive such an abridged

version of basic military training that they are no longer capable of

going straight from life as conscripts to a goal-oriented, mission-

oriented course of training. On the contrary, they must first complete

their basic military training, which requires about six to eight

months of additional training.

Conscription, transparency and social cohesion

When the talk around the kitchen table turns to conscription, there

are almost always experts present in the form of former conscripts –

which bears witness to the culture-bearing and identity-creating

elements of conscription.

Consequently, conscription has had the effect of bringing young men

from society as a whole together in a military-based working

partnership. Due to the time limit on conscription the force of

conscripts is constantly being replaced, which has ensured that the

armed forces have renewed their youngest personnel with a wide

range of personnel from all levels of society on an ongoing basis.

This has led to the general assumption that conscription ensures

that the composition of the armed forces reflects that of the society

around it. As a derived consequence of this, it also leads to the

assumption that conscription ensures that the armed forces are

transparent with regard to the public. This makes it possible to

Page 11 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

ensure that they do not become alienated from the public and

provides a guarantee that the armed forces are under democratic

control.38 There are also researchers, however, who believe there is a

risk that this sporadic recruitment could rather split both society and

the armed forces. This risk arises because the duty to become

engaged in the state's military machinery is extremely unequally

distributed. The problem is exacerbated when only a small part of the

population does military service, when the sorting mechanisms for

conscription function on the basis of gender, intelligence, physical

capacity and drawing lots, and when calculating young people may

be lucky enough to avoid conscription.39

Furthermore, conscription has helped (in a purpose-oriented manner

in some countries) to create cohesion within the state. In his article

"Værnepligt og Nationalstat" (Conscription and the Nation State), Uffe

Østergaard describes how conscription has been used purposefully in

Italy to create cohesion in a fragmented society.40

By mixing groups

of the population from various parts of the country and exposing

them to external pressure in the form of missing their homes,

families and jobs and subjecting them to military discipline, side

benefits have arisen in the form of an emerging spirit of solidarity

across traditional local anchoring. This spirit of solidarity – thrust

upon them by the state – thereby served the purposes of the state by

constituting a central element in military identity – based on a joint

effort to defend the country.41

An example of this is the tradition in

intelligence and reconnaissance units of allowing recruits to go

under the name of their towns or villages. When, for practical

reasons, a recruit is called "Videbæk", he thereby also becomes a

symbolic representative of his town – and together the military unit

represents Denmark as a whole.

In addition, garrisoning troops played a role as soldiers were often

obliged to do their military service at such a distance from their

homes that they were unable to return to them during their periods

of leave and therefore ended up by becoming integrated into the local

communities where the garrisons were located. Not a few of the

family trees from modern times thus have their roots in a romance

between a conscript and a local woman in a garrison town, and

conscription has thereby contributed to the creation of physical

integration between groups of the population. Conscription is

thereby regarded – along with state churches and state schools – as

having been an important element in what is called the construction

of the national community, namely the idea of the nation as a special

community comprising people of the same nationality.42

Conscription thereby also includes a domestic policy dimension –

some would claim that this dimension is still a function (that it

continues to contribute to the self-knowledge of the Danish nation

and the Danish people). Others may feel that the domestic policy

dimension is a remnant from the time the state had or could have

the power of life and death over their citizens. These issues are

basically political because they concern values. They concern how

the nation (or the people) and the state in the country of Denmark

have stood and must stand in relation to each other. Who owes who

what and how much? It also concerns how Danish citizens define

citizenship – and how politicians define it.43

There are naturally

differences between the various countries and some countries have

more stable models for citizenship, state and national conditions and

conscription than others. But these models are not constant: they

vary with the external needs of the state to secure its existence and

interests, and with the internal view of what the state should be to its

citizens and vice versa.

The degree to which all this is applicable to Denmark has been much

discussed. In 1996, Pertti Joenniemi from the Danish Institute for

Page 12 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

International Studies (DIIS) published a comprehensive study of the

changes in conscription in Europe and concluded, among other

things, that conscription could only be said to contribute to a special

form of Danishness to a minor extent because it is seen as

something forced on citizens by the state while the Home Guard, for

instance, connects the nation with the state to a far greater extent

because this is a question of a voluntary arrangement.44

While the

real connection between voluntariness and Danishness can certainly

be discussed, it is worth noting that the majority of conscripts – as

shown in figure 1 – are also volunteers, even though some of them

must be designated technical volunteers.

However, the assumption still exists that, due to the effects above,

conscription helps to create transparency and cohesion in society or,

in other words: conscription promotes the state's horizontal

legitimacy, and without conscription social cohesion and democratic

control of the military would be weakened and the armed forces

would become alienated from the population.

Conscription, justice and rights

Conscription was originally reserved for the male part of the

population suitable for combat. This in itself brought about an

imbalance as both women and men who were not suitable for combat

could avoid the burden constituted by conscription. The system could

therefore best be defended in states and at times when the defence

of the state's interests required the mobilisation of the state's entire

resources. But at other times, when the state's existence or vital

interests were not threatened, or where large numbers of young

people from a particular year and economic considerations meant

that the state had no need to mobilise the entire male population

suitable for combat, the need for compulsory military service was

more debatable. A general obligation was therefore introduced in

some states that included the entire population, while other states –

as is the case in Denmark – introduced a kind of lottery in which the

male part of the population suitable for combat were selected at

random. Whether or not compulsory military service was fair has

been a major subject of discussion in many countries. In Denmark,

the concept "ordinary conscription" is therefore not very precise.

When only about one-tenth of young people from a particular year

actually do national service, "extraordinary conscription" would

actually be more appropriate45. Part of the argumentation for

maintaining conscription, however, is also connected with the classic

assumption that duties and rights should go hand in hand.46

Some

people therefore believe that the absence of traditional conscription

could lead to a general collapse in the understanding of civic duty.47 In

everyday language, people can nod in recognition of arguments

regarding the educative role of conscription with regard to "difficult"

or pampered youngsters – arguments often accompanied by

statements such as: "Learning some discipline will do them good!"

or: "It is good for young people to learn to take responsibility". It is

less clear, on the other hand, why this educative function should be

handled by the armed forces rather than by schools and day-care

institutions where the youngsters might learn to take responsibility

as auxiliary teachers or assistant educators.

The following four assumptions, derived from the issues discussed

above, are examined in this report:

1. For the armed forces, conscription constitutes the most

economical and efficient recruitment base to the

professional forces. This means that conscription is

cheaper than purely professional armed forces.

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Page 14 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

2. Conscription is necessary for the armed forces to be able

to perform their tasks in connection with national

defence and to commit troops to international

operations.

3. Conscription is necessary in order to create horizontal

legitimacy in the state – both by making the armed forces

transparent and by integrating various groups and

classes of the population.

4. Conscription maintains the public's view of duty to

society and develops conscripts' sense of responsibility.

The report investigates whether, in the specific cases of countries

that have had a long-standing tradition for conscription, but have

discontinued it, there are actually examples of the assumptions

regarding conscription outlined above. Based on the conclusions of

the study, opportunities and problem areas connected with

reorganising or discontinuing conscription in Denmark are pointed

out in the report.

But conscription involves more than just recruitment and money –

even though they are both technical and administrative subjects that

the state must prioritise. On the contrary, as mentioned above, the

Danish debate hitherto has concerned questions of principle. How

much do we owe our country? Can a nation exist without the

individual contributing to the broader community in this extreme

manner?48

There are no clear technical answers to questions of this

type. They are to a great extent political by nature and must be

answered by politicians, but there are technical views to add to the

debate on the relationship, or the balance, between deference to the

national (administrative, military-technical) and political (value-

based) issues.

However, it is important not to underestimate the importance of the

political issues because, in the final analysis, they constitute the

framework for how conscription can be reformed.

As conscription is a central aspect of a special political narrative on national

and military identity, it is difficult to reform and rethink conscription and the

role it plays.49

Anna Leander and Pertti Joenniemi hereby point out that the basic

understanding of conscription in a political context defines whether

conscription can be reformed in a given country to any great degree

or whether, on the contrary, it will either remain static or disappear

completely. Denmark and Sweden are examples of the first, Latvia

and France of the second.50

Page 15 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

02 Method

An attempt is made in the report to illustrate the experience gained

in the four countries in connection with discontinuing conscription in

selected areas. These areas can be described in summary as follows:

1. Conscription, economy and recruitment.

2. Conscription, international operations and national

defence.

3. Conscription, transparency and social cohesion.

4. Conscription, justice and rights.

In order to create the best conditions for evaluating the

consequences of discontinuing conscription, we decided to

investigate two countries that have recently discontinued

conscription, and two countries that have had more experience of the

consequences of changing to purely professional armed forces. This

means that two of the countries are relatively close to the process of

change in terms of time and this made it possible to interview

personnel who had experience of planning, implementing and

following up the reform. On the other hand, the two other countries

have had the opportunity to evaluate the more long-term

consequences of the change – and to carry out mitigating measures

in those cases where professionalisation led to unexpected

difficulties, or where expected difficulties proved more problematic

than anticipated. There is therefore sharper focus on the short-term

consequences in two of the countries and on the long-term

consequences in the other two.

The two countries where conscription was discontinued most

recently are Latvia (where the decision was made in 2005, with the

last conscripts being demobilised in 2007) and Slovakia (where the

decision was made in 2002, with the last conscripts being

demobilised at the end of 2005). There are similarities between these

countries and Denmark in two central areas: they are both members

of NATO, and there were prolonged discussions as to how reorganise

their armed forces from focusing on national defence to the

capability to enter forcefully into international operations in the

most appropriate and economical manner. These countries also

resemble Denmark because of their sizes and populations. However,

they are also both former East bloc countries51

and have therefore

had experience in the form of a different organisational, educational

and equipment-related inheritance than Denmark. The need to

reform the military system was therefore pressing and extensive in

both countries and the process of change must therefore be expected

to have been more complex than for countries that exclusively wish

to change their armed forces from conscript-based to professional.

Page 16 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

The two countries with longer experience of discontinuing

conscription are France (where the decision was made in 1996 and

the last conscripts demobilised at the end of 2001) and the

Netherlands (where the decision was made in 1993 and the last

conscripts demobilised at the end of 1996). Both countries are also

members of NATO, and both were extremely preoccupied with

transforming their military capacities so they could generate more

forces for international operations. Both countries are also "old"

NATO members and have therefore been included in the alliance's

strategies and have thereby been able to adapt their military

capabilities to fulfil their obligations within the alliance on an

ongoing basis. The need for reform was therefore less extensive – but

not necessarily less pressing – than was the case with Latvia and

Slovakia.

The study was carried out with the point of departure in qualitative

interviews with officers and civil servants who were pointed out as

"experts" by Ministry of Defence staff or the General Staff in the

respective countries. Before these interviews were held, interview

guides (see appendix 1 below) were sent to the relevant people and

authorities selected so that disputed points could be looked into and

clarified in advance to the greatest possible extent. All of the

interviews were carried out on a non-attribution basis to promote

openness and honesty.52

They were also held in the respondents'

native countries and as close as possible to their own surroundings

to make it possible for them to consult reference works, databases,

colleagues and find additional documentation if points of dispute

arose.

Our investigations in Latvia and Slovakia were carried out

respectively in Riga from 25 to 26 April 2008 and in Bratislava from

28 to 29 April 2008. In both cases, we had the opportunity to meet

officers of the rank of colonel from the respective countries' Ministry

of Defence and General Staff, the people who had been the project

managers responsible for planning, organising, performing and

controlling the reform programmes and other relevant people were

called in from recruitment departments, finance administration

departments, and personnel administration. We were also given

documentation and data in the form of PowerPoint presentations

and, in Bratislava, also hard copies of relevant Acts.

It could justifiably be asked why we did not choose to investigate

countries with a tradition of conscription that is more similar to the

Danish system. But there are quite simply no other countries where a

decision was made to combine extremely brief conscript training

with the focus on training conscripts to either join a total defence

force or be recruited to the professional part of the armed forces. In

other words, the Danish model is unique.

But our considerations regarding the choice of countries to

investigate did include the stipulation that the countries selected

should have organised their conscription systems in a way that

resembled the Danish system as much as possible. France differs

most in this connection as there was compulsory national service

there for everybody, not only men suitable for combat. Both France

and the Netherlands are former colonial powers with a tradition of

maintaining military contingents outside their national borders, but

as conscripts have had very limited opportunity to serve in these

contingents, and only in accordance with their own wishes, this

circumstance was considered as irrelevant to the study.53

Our investigations in France and the Netherlands were carried out in

Paris and The Hague from respectively 20-21 May 2008 and 10-11

June 2008. At the meeting in Paris we had the opportunity to meet a

colonel from personnel administration who was involved in the

organisation of and following up on the French reform programme,

as well as a representative from the recruitment authorities and a

researcher from the defence policy think-tank "Centre d`études en

sciences sociale de la défense". We also received exhaustive

documentation from the French Ministry of Defence in connection

with the specific questions in our interview guide, and several

publications on the French deliberations on and experience with the

discontinuation of conscription. In the Netherlands, we were able to

interview a civil servant from the Dutch Ministry of Defence who was

involved in the practical organisation of the reform programme and

the subsequent follow-up. As it is quite some time since conscription

was discontinued in the Netherlands, convening a panel of experts

proved to be a challenge, but the person with the relevant resources

(who works for the Dutch Ministry of Defence personnel staff at

present) was extremely well-informed and well prepared.

It could be argued that the countries selected cannot be compared

with Denmark on the face of things and that the results of the study

cannot therefore be transferred to Danish conditions. While it is

correct that the countries differ from Denmark in many ways,

conscription is a general model with national variations, as

mentioned in the last chapter, and it is also striking that there have

been the same deliberations in all of them. Furthermore, the other

Nordic countries have decided to maintain conscription for the

present, so the countries Denmark usually compares itself with have

no experience whatsoever of discontinuing conscription. In addition,

a comparison of the Nordic countries would be meaningless because,

as shown by Henning Sørensen, they have different aims for

conscription.54

The report focuses on military conscription. Several countries have

had conscription to other public institutions such as the police force,

border guards, or gendarmerie, just as there is conscription to the

Emergency Management Agency in Denmark. The report does not

touch upon these areas – even though it should be noted that

conscription in these areas did lapse in all cases with the

discontinuation of military conscription. All figures, evaluations, and

effects mentioned in the report have therefore been purged of data

regarding conscription outside of the armed forces.

It must be remarked that conscription to the Emergency

Management Agency constitutes a central element in the civil

emergency preparedness forces. Most recently, the Working Party on

the Dimensioning of Danish Emergency Preparedness55

stated in its

report that conscription is a central precondition for national civil

preparedness56.

During our interviews, we received a number of financial statements

in which currency was given either in Euro, Slovak Koruna or Latvian

Lats.57 All of these currency units were converted to Danish Kroner in

the report in accordance with the exchange rates current on 17

September 2008. This in itself leads to considerable uncertainty

because the figures stated represent many years of currency

fluctuation, but it is important to note that economic developments

in the four countries have differed widely.

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Page 18 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

03 Conscription in context

The duration of conscription

Of the four countries selected, only France had a form of compulsory

military service that included both men and women. The number of

women in the armed forces, however, was limited, and in practice most

women served in other branches of the compulsory system, "Service

Nationale". In Slovakia and the Netherlands, women were not allowed

to do national service, and in Latvia, where it was possible for women

to do national service in accordance with their wishes, it was an

extremely rare occurrence – due, among other things, to rigorous

physical requirements.

All of the countries had a selection system or a draft where potential

conscripts underwent a medical examination and a psychological test.

Conscription age in Latvia and Slovakia began during the year young

men turned 19. In France and the Netherlands it was during the year

they turned 18 at the earliest. There were systems in all of the countries

to defer conscription due to participation in courses of education,

family matters, or for other reasons. Additionally, there were systems

in all four countries to handle people who did not wish to do military

service on the grounds of conscience, and there were sanctions in all of

the countries for people who failed to turn up at a draft board that

included various types of imprisonment.

The extent of conscription was reduced after the end of the Cold War in

all four countries. This was done by reducing the duration of

conscription and, in some cases, by reducing the number of people

called up.

Military service lasted for 12 months in France up to 1992 and was

changed to ten months in 1992. A committee set up by the French

president issued a white paper in 1994 in which a further reduction of

conscription to four months was debated. This proposal was rejected

later on the grounds that it would not be possible to achieve an

adequate level of military training in such a short space of time.

The statutory duration of conscription in the Netherlands was 24

months, but in reality the duration was briefer. For privates and

sergeants, its actual duration was 14 months, while it was respectively

16 and 17 months for officers, depending on which function they

performed. Conscripts were transferred to the reserve for the remaining

months. During the transitional period from conscription to

professionalism, there were a number of adjustments to the duration of

conscription, including a reduction from 14 to 12 or 9 months

(depending on function) and pay raises to the same level as that for

professionals. The number of people called up was reduced during the

same period – and those who were called up could refuse to do military

service freely and without consequences.

Up to 1997, the duration of conscription in Latvia was six months for

young men with a university education and 18 months for the majority

of those without such an education. This was changed after 1997 so that

everybody had to serve twelve months irrespective of their level of

education. A reduction of conscription to three month was discussed in

parliament, but the proposal was rejected because the basic costs of

conscription would remain the same – and because it was felt that three

months' conscription would not produce serviceable soldiers.

The duration of conscription in Slovakia gave considerable deference to

providers and, up to 2000, they were only obliged to do five months'

military service. After 2000, this was further reduced to three months.

Military service for those who were not providers was gradually

reduced from 24 months in 1989 to 18 months during the period from

March 1990 to June 1993, to twelve months from June 1993 to December

2000, nine months from January 2001 to December 2003, and to six

months from January 2004 until conscription was finally discontinued

in 2006.

Registration and selection

There was national registration, call-up, and mustering of conscripts in

all four countries. Mustering was carried out at recruitment centres

where physical, psychological, and intelligence tests were performed,

after which the final decision was made regarding who was suitable for

military service and who had to be rejected.

There were draft boards in France for all young people from a particular

year with approximately 50% of those found suitable being accepted for

compulsory military service after an evaluation to determine where

they could most suitably be placed and in accordance with their own

wishes. During their period of service, conscripts could be selected and

trained to act as non-commissioned officers and they could be

appointed sergeants or second lieutenants, but it was not possible to

continue a military career in connection with doing military service.

Those who wished to embark on a career in the armed forces had to

sign a separate contract after completing their term of service or apply

for enrolment at an officers' academy if they wanted to pursue an

officer's career.

In the Netherlands, those with a higher education were obliged to

attend a draft at special centres attached to officers' schools and this

made it possible to recruit suitable conscripts for reserve officer

training directly from a draft. The remainder of the young people from a

particular year went to an ordinary draft board. After the draft board,

the most suitable were selected for military service – and the rest were

not selected or actually rejected. This led to the paradox that conscripts

were often overqualified in relation to the functions they would be

required to perform. After the end of the Cold War, the number of

conscripts in the Netherlands was reduced to include about 60% of the

suitable young people from a particular year.

The number of conscripts in Latvia fell dramatically at the beginning of

the new millennium due to the fact that, up to 2003 when this

arrangement lapsed, about half of them were used to perform functions

as policemen, border guards, bodyguards and customs inspectors, etc.,

under the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice

respectively.

In Slovakia, there was conscription to the armed forces, service under

the Ministry of Transport (railway troops), and the Ministry of the

Interior (border guards) until 1995. After 1995, when these

arrangements lapsed, only about one-third of the male population from

a particular year was recruited to the armed forces. In both of these

countries it was possible for conscripts to be appointed corporals or

sergeants during the term of their service, but there were no

Page 19 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Page 20 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Unemployment percentages for the case countries and Denmark, 1995-2006

Denmark

France

Latvia

The Netherlands

Slovakia

0

5

10

15

20

25

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Year

Pe

rc

en

ta

g

e

of un

e

m

ploym

e

nt

conscripted officers. If conscripts wished to be enrolled in the officers'

academy in continuation of their training, they had to take a special

entrance examination and after examination a training course that

included full basic military training. There were therefore very few

officers who had been through a classic course of training as conscripts.

In addition to the systems for deferring conscription, there were limits

to the latest age at which men could be conscripted in all four countries.

The limit in France was 29 years (unless the reason for the deferment

was failure to appear before the draft board or a prison sentence – in

which case it was 34 years). It was possible to apply for deferment for

up to five years in the Netherlands, due to participation in a course of

education, for instance. It was then possible to apply for prolonged

deferment for a year at a time, but this required documentation for

continued progress in the course of education. In practice, people were

not called up if they had been granted deferment until they were 25. In

Latvia and Slovakia, military service had to be completed before people

reached the age of 30, but it was extremely easy to be granted

exemption on medical, familial, or other grounds in both countries.

General social developments

The decision to discontinue conscription in the Netherlands, Latvia and

Slovakia was made at a time when these countries were experiencing

high growth rates and increasing employment rates, at the same time

as low birth rates began to have an impact. In France, however, the

birth rate was fairly stable while employment was declining slightly.

Figure 2

Source: Eurostat

Page 21 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Development in GDP in fixed prices for the case countries and Denmark, 1995-2006 (Index 1995=100)

Denmark

France

Latvia

The Netherlands

Slovakia

80,0

100,0

120,0

140,0

160,0

180,0

200,0

220,0

240,0

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Year

Index

Figure 3

Source: Eurostat

Conscripts and international operations

The way in which it was decided to use conscription in the four

countries led to major limitations on the ability to perform

international operations. In Latvia, Slovakia and France there was no

statutory authority whatsoever to commit conscripts to international

operations. Conscripts in France, however, could choose to take part in

national postings outside the French borders. As there was also a

tradition for mixing conscripts with professionals in military units in

both France and Slovakia, it was extremely difficult to send out military

units collectively. Instead, it was necessary to piece together troops by

using professionals from several units or send individuals and very

small contingents of professionals.

On the other hand, in the Netherlands there was both statutory

authority for and a long-standing tradition of sending volunteer

conscripts to international operations. However, the Dutch conscripts

could at all times refuse, even when they were in a mission area, after

which they could stop serving with immediate effect and return to the

Netherlands to complete their military service. This led to problems in

the Balkans where personnel levels in periods fell to unacceptable

levels.

In the nature of the case, all of the countries had arranged their armed

forces in accordance with a comprehensive system of national defence.

It was possible in France, for instance, to mobilise a total force of

almost three million men to defend the nation, but it was still difficult

to muster 15,000 men to take part in the Gulf War in 1991. Few

resources were earmarked to maintain reservists ready for combat. The

policy in the Netherlands was only to re-enlist former conscripts in the

event of acute, threatening situations in connection with security

policy, natural catastrophes, or war. It was therefore extremely rare for

a former conscript to be re-enlisted. Plans and a structure were

prepared in Latvia to carry out re-enlistment – but they were never used

in practice, nor were reservists in general re-enlisted in Slovakia.

Page 22 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Development in active military personnel in the armed forces in the case countries and Denmark,

2001-2007 (Index 2001=100)

Denmark

France

The Netherlands

Latvia

Slovakia

60

80

100

120

2001

2003

2005

2007

År

In

d

e

x

Active forces as a percentage of total population 2007

0,00

0,10

0,20

0,30

0,40

0,50

0,60

0,70

Denmark

France*

The Netherlands

Latvia

Slovakia

Figure 4

Source: The military Balance

Figure 5

* The figures for France also include paramilitary forces as they can

also be stationed abroad. If they are deducted, the French level of

strength falls to to 0.43%.

Source: The Military Balance

Page 23 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

04 Background

A common point of departure for the four countries in this report is that

the change from conscription to professional armed forces coincided

with a general wish to carry out a military reform.

The underlying motives for this wish were many and various – but

there are four common (and mutually connected) traits for the four

countries. First, the ambition in all of them was to strengthen the

ability of the military to take part in international operations without

appreciably increasing military appropriations. Second, there was

general recognition of the fact that technological developments in

warfare and the consequent increase of training requirements for the

modern soldier could not be fulfilled within the term of traditional

conscription. Third, there was a common understanding that the direct

military threat of an attack was reduced– and there was therefore more

time to respond to an early warning and less need to maintain a large

national defence force. Fourth, there was the view that conscription was

unfair because it either only put pressure on a small percentage of

males from a particular year (Slovakia, Latvia and the Netherlands), or

because it had become so easy for the most calculating youngsters to

avoid military service that it was really no longer just (France).

Specifically where Latvia and Slovakia were concerned, where the

decision to suspend conscription was made in respectively 2003 and

2002, to the end of respectively 2006 and 2010, the need for reform

was emphatically underlined by the goal-oriented efforts made in these

countries to achieve NATO membership.58 The Membership Action Plans

in the two countries, which were implemented after the NATO summit

in Prague in 2002, thus required the countries, among other things, to

adapt technologically and organisationally to NATO's standards and to

enhance their capability to perform international operations, so they

were obliged to implement a process of military reform under any

circumstances.

In the Netherlands and France, where conscription was suspended at

the end of 1996 and 2001 respectively, there was also a general need for

a military reform. In this connection, the people interviewed stated that

although their countries were already fully involved in NATO

cooperation, the new types of conflict that NATO became engaged in

after the end of the Cold War made greater demands on the ability of

the military to deploy forces. These new types of conflict – together with

the fact that equipment was now being used for purposes other than

exercises – increased wear on equipment and brought about the need

for completely different equipment. This put pressure on the economy

to an extent that made new initiatives necessary.

France

In France, up to 2001, there was a civic duty, "Service Nationale", which

in principle included all citizens. It obliged those suitable for combat to

serve in the armed forces while the remainder could perform their civic

duty in other areas of society. The point of departure, however, was a

need to mobilise forces for the nation's military. For France, the Gulf

War in 1991 was an eye-opener as it proved to be the case that although

France has almost three million reservists and about 500,000 troops in

the standing army, it was only with great difficulty that France

mustered a force of about 15,000 to take part in Operation Desert

Storm. This was due, among other things, to the fact that conscripts

were generally speaking mixed with professionals in the French units

after their basic training – and as, according to the French Constitution,

conscripts could not be sent to military operations outside France, only

a limited force was available.

Later experience in the Balkans also played its part. The tasks there

prompted the French people to view soldiers' role as protectors who did

good deeds in the world under the authority of international

organisations, which led to more support for international operations.

Furthermore, over the years the French people had seen conscription as

an element that unified the nation. In step with the general increase of

competence in society, which meant that a steadily increasing number

of young people were taking courses of higher education. This function,

however, had been taken over by the education system to a

considerable extent. At the same time, there was a growing feeling that

it had gradually become so easy for the most calculating youngsters to

avoid military service, that there was no longer any justice regarding

those who were conscripted. The function of conscription as an element

that unified the nation and attached it to the state was thereby

weakened. The role formerly played by the armed forces was now to a

greater degree handled by various institutes of education.

After the end of the Cold War there was also a certain amount of

frustration in France regarding how to finance what was seen as an

increasing need to commit troops to international operations at a time

when many people had hoped to gain a new peace dividend. Economic

motives were therefore also in play – and as conscription on the new

security policy agenda was increasingly seen as a financial burden for

the state that made no effective contribution to the ability of the

military to perform its new tasks, it was an obvious step to channel

funds to the part of the military that actually could perform the new

tasks.

Viewed overall, there had thus been a change in the views of the French

from regarding the military as a combination of a necessary bastion to

the east and a patriotic, national-unification project, to a greater

priority on the ability to perform international military operations to

safeguard the interests of France – also within the framework of

international authority. It was the general view that the military's new

tasks justified an increase in expenditure.

The new view of the threat and of the role of the military as a unifying

social element, combined with the wish to reduce or freeze military

expenditure, led to a reduction in the duration of conscription from

twelve to ten months during the 1990s, but reducing the duration of

conscription failed to release sufficient funds to enable the military to

fulfil its objectives. In 1994, a commission set up by President Mitterand

issued a white paper in which a further reduction in the duration of

conscription was recommended – to four months this time.59 During the

subsequent debate the conclusion was reached, as mentioned in

section 3.1., that it would not be possible to reach a sufficiently high

level of training in four months to justify the maintenance of military

Page 24 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

service. The white paper thereby had considerable influence on the

decision to discontinue conscription.

There was only limited opposition to the suspension of conscription in

France. The greatest opposition came from the military itself. The

people interviewed consider that the brunt of the opposition came from

that section of personnel who were involved in training conscripts and

who were afraid of losing their jobs. The discontinuation of conscription

coincided with a general recession in France. Furthermore, it was

uncertain whether it would really be possible to maintain a suitable

level of capability to commit troops to international operations. Finally,

there was a general fear of change in the French military.

The Netherlands

Conscription became increasingly unpopular in the Netherlands after

the end of the Cold War. Among other things, this was connected with

the feeling that conscription was unjust because the system only drew

on a small percentage of the young people from each particular year –

and a percentage that generally comprised the most sought-after

manpower into the bargain. At the draft board, the male part of the

population from a particular year was subjected to physical and

psychological tests – and the most suitable were conscripted for

military service. On the basis of these tests and the level of education

of the young people, an administrative body distributed them to the

units of the armed forces where it was judged they would be most

useful. However, it was possible for the young people themselves to

influence the result. Those with a higher education could go to the draft

board at the officers' school and could be taken for training as officers

of the reserve. This method meant that many young people were placed

in functions they were overqualified for – electronics engineers, for

instance, who served in tank squadrons immediately after completing

their course of education. Thereby, a valuable education became

outdated during military service, which was paradoxical since society

was undergoing a period of growth and there was a need for highly-

skilled manpower. In addition, young people saw military service as a

deterioration of their opportunities when, by comparing themselves

with their contemporaries, they could see that some could avoid the

discipline and limitations of conscription and at the same time be

employed at better pay.

Declining birth rates and deteriorating physical fitness in young people

meant that decreasing number of young men could be conscripted, and

cut-backs in defence budgets prompted the armed forces to call up

fewer of them in order to save money. This led increasingly to the

feeling that the system was unjust because it discriminated against

people who took a course of education and kept themselves in shape.

In addition, the absence of a direct military threat against the

Netherlands' sovereignty after the Cold War led to more political

pressure for a reduction in the defence budget. For the Dutch armed

forces, the reduction in the security threat meant that the military had

to to redefine its role in order to justify its size and existence. The

solution was to participate more actively in international operations at

the same time as the armed forces would guarantee national defence

and take action if natural catastrophes should hit the Netherlands.

The sharper focus on the ability to commit troops to international

operations led to new deliberations on the organisation of the military.

Up to 1992, the Netherlands had only a limited number of permanent

specialists at manual and middle-management level and in the officers'

corps. Most conscripts thus served in conscripted units which were

often commanded at divisional and company level by conscripted non-

commissioned officers and officers. At battalion level and above,

professional soldiers and conscripts were mixed, which meant that if

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troops were sent on international operations, the conscripts would

either have to be sent with the unit in question or replaced by

professionals. This made it impossible to deploy homogeneous units

that had built up an esprit de corps through joint training and a

common understanding of the procedures in the unit and its unique

individual strengths and weaknesses.60

However, it was possible for volunteer conscripts in the Netherlands to

be sent out on peace-keeping or peace-making missions abroad. Dutch

conscripts were deployed in Lebanon, the Dutch Antilles, and Surinam,

for instance. While conscription was in force, the Dutch armed forces

never had any difficulty in recruiting conscripts for international

operations.

The voluntary system, however, had the great disadvantage that

conscripts could break off their engagement while posted abroad at any

time, after which they were sent back to the Netherlands. In some

cases, this meant that the fighting ability of units in the mission areas

fell to an unacceptably low level, which was a stumbling block

particularly in the deployments in the Balkans, Lebanon, and

Cambodia. This was one of the reasons why the professional soldiers in

the armed forces supported professionalisation.

There were arguments in military circles both for and against

professionalisation. Soldiers who had previously been posted abroad

regarded the eight months' basic training conscripts received as

inadequate if they were to take part in international operations and

were, on the basis of this, keen advocates of professionalising the

armed forces. On the other hand, there were permanent personnel in

the armed forces that had never been posted abroad or, for that matter,

had ever served anywhere but at the base they had been attached to

since the commencement of their employment. For this group,

professionalising the armed forces represented a threat to their

familiar working lives as it could result in being posted abroad, among

other things.

Overall, less young men from a particular year, less suitable applicants

from each year, less conscripts recruited, briefer terms of conscription,

less money for the armed forces, and new assignments (INTOPS), that

required longer training, meant that the Dutch parliament set up a

commission in 1991 to investigate whether conscription should be

maintained.61

The commission concluded that conscription should be

maintained, with the principal argument being that this ensured the

connection between the armed forces and the civil sector. Parliament

took note of this conclusion and a plan was prepared to enable the

armed forces to maintain contact with society. The plan was never

implemented, however, as parliament did not regard it as very probable

that professionalising the armed forces would lead to their isolation or

alienation from their surroundings. This conclusion appears to be

correct.

Latvia

For Latvia, gaining NATO membership was a cornerstone of the

country's security policy strategy after achieving independence in 1991

and after the end of the Cold War. This goal made a general

rearrangement of the armed forces necessary and meant sharpening

the focus on organisation, procedures and acquiring modern equipment

so that they could contribute to NATO cooperation. It also made it

necessary to adjust the focus from national defence to international

operations and, according to the Latvian Constitution, conscripts could

not be used in this connection.

The debate on discontinuing conscription began in October and

November 2002 with the new government's "Membership Action Plan",

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the first official document to mention the need to transform the armed

forces. At the request of the Minister of Defence, the Ministry of

Defence authored the part of the document which concerned

professionalising the armed forces. The proposal received the support

of the Prime Minister and the military from the beginning.

The proposal was also well received by the public as the general

attitude to conscription was that the system was unjust because, in

spite of its compulsory nature, very few men from a particular year

were actually called up. In 2006, for example, 7,200 men were

registered as potential conscripts, but only 4,700 of them were found

suitable and only 1,070 were actually conscripted. This was due, among

other things, to the fact that it was relatively easy to defer military

service or avoid it entirely as the law governing conscription opened up

a number of legitimate reasons for dispensation. It was particularly

men from major cities who applied for deferment.

Slovakia

After achieving independence and after the division of Czechoslovakia

into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in 1993, the Slovak

armed forces were subject to almost constant reform programmes up to

2001. However, most of these programmes were described as "paper

tigers" that never really had any significance and actually rather

reduced the quality of the armed forces.

The far-reaching transformation of the political system and the

orientation of Slovakia in the direction of Western Europe and the USA

rather than the Soviet Union called for reforms in the legal foundation

of the state and administration and the executive bodies where

procedures and the basis of administration were aligned with Eastern

European traditions. The Slovak armed forces were therefore far too top

heavy and lacked a professional middle-management structure. There

was thus an opportunity for a marriage of convenience between

symbolic and practical action in which the aim would be to do away

with the procedures and structures connected with the old political

system. The principal reason for the decision can therefore be found in

the fact that the political system was fundamentally changed – with

consequent changes in the entire structure of society.

As NATO membership was also a central element in Slovak security

policy, similarly to Latvia, the country was obliged to adapt its armed

forces to meet NATO standards. The vision of professionalising the

military came from the political sphere. The idea was presented by the

Minister of Defence on the basis of a general acceptance in parliament

that conscription would not help to heighten the quality of the armed

forces sufficiently to fulfil the ambition for NATO membership, among

other things.

However, this made it necessary to increase the number of troops from

the armed forces that could take part in military operations outside

Slovakia's borders as Slovak conscripts could not be committed to

INTOPS under any circumstances. This required soldiers to sign

contracts and undergo a full course of training, including unit training

and mission-oriented training. Conscripts were called up and given

basic training in training units and then distributed to units of the

armed forces where they were mixed with professional soldiers.

If they wanted to be sent out on international operations, they had to

sign a contract for the duration of the mission. One disadvantage of this

was that they were often sent out together with an unfamiliar unit that

they for obvious reasons had not trained together with during

conscription. Furthermore, signing contracts for the duration of

missions meant that they were sent home immediately after the

mission if they did not sign a new contract – and the period of useful

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service was therefore far too short when it was only possible to send

out soldiers once for each completed course of training. After some

time, the contracts were changed to a three-year period so that it was

possible to send out soldiers several times without it being necessary

to repeat basic training. But even these contracts failed to provide

optimum practical value in relation to international operations.

The decision to discontinue conscription was extremely popular with

the public, especially among those who were eligible to be called up.

There was a widespread feeling that conscription was unjust and that it

was lopsided. The perceived injustice was put into perspective by the

fact that wages were increasing in the civilian sector at the beginning of

the 1990s and the financial position of conscripts was much less

favourable. Conscripts received board and lodging, free uniforms and

free travel in connection with leave. Over and above this, they received

a small amount in pocket money which corresponded to about one-

quarter of a poorly-paid industrial worker's wages. But there were

special payments for conscripts who were providers.

Furthermore, there were many systems to defer conscription or avoid it

completely. The people interviewed stated that it was actually easy to

avoid conscription – by feigning illness at a draft board, for instance.

Those who refused to do military service on grounds of conscience were

transferred to conscientious objectors' service, broadly speaking on the

same terms as those in Denmark. The duration of service as a

conscientious objector was consistently longer than military service –

ordinary military service in 2004 was six months, while it was nine

months for conscientious objectors.

There was much discussion about maintaining conscription but

organising it in a different way in Slovakia prior to the decision to

professionalise the military– for example by further reducing its

duration. Experience had already been gained of reducing the duration

of conscription from twelve to nine months at the end of 2000, and as

part of the reorganisation it was reduced again from nine to six months

at the end of 2003. But the previous experience and a comparison of

the transition from nine to six months made it clear that the cost of

nine months' conscription was only marginally higher than the cost of

six months' conscription, which meant that soldiers could be far better

trained at a modest additional cost.62

A reduction of conscription to three months was discussed, but not

accepted because the basic cost of conscription would still be the same.

Furthermore, it was considered, as mentioned in section 3.1., that three

months' conscription would not produce serviceable soldiers.

The conscription system was also considered extremely inefficient.

Conscripts often performed manual functions such as cooking or

cleaning - that had nothing to do with military training. This was

particularly in evidence during the last year of conscription and was

partly a result of the fact that it was not considered possible to train

conscripts effectively in only six months. It thereby became a question

of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conscripts did, however, have guard duty at

garrisons and also took part in other real military functions after their

initial training, but irrespective of the duration and form of military

service, according to the constitution conscripts could still not take part

in international operations.

One argument in the public debate on military service helping to train

young people to feel a sense of responsibility could be rejected on the

grounds that parents had had 19 years to do this. How then, could the

military be expected to do it in six months if parents had been unable

to in 19 years?

The decision to suspend conscription engendered some critical

objections due to the fear that it would also discontinue the

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mobilisation reserve, which would lay the country open to a new

Russian invasion. Some people had not recognised the possibility of

achieving security through an alliance or a collective security system,

nevertheless the mood of the population was overwhelmingly positive.

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05 Decision

One feature common to all four countries was that conscription was not

abolished – it was merely suspended. According to the countries'

constitutions it is therefore still possible to reintroduce conscription,

even though legislation in all of them makes various demands on the

terms of this. According to the people interviewed, choosing to suspend

rather than abolish conscription was connected with the fact that there

had been debates regarding the consequences of this for the ability to

mobilise reservists for national defence. In these debates, opponents of

discontinuing conscription maintained that it was a tried and tested,

well-functioning system that should not be completely abandoned

because it ensured volume in national defence. However, the people

interviewed argued that it will no longer be possible to reintroduce

conscription – unless there is a complete transformation of the entire

economy. This is due, among other things, to the fact that facilities,

outfits, equipment and weapons will no longer be stored and

maintained and that the military has not retained the expertise to call

up and train such a large personnel force. Furthermore, mobilising a

major personnel force would have serious consequences for the

national economy because of the direct influence it would have on the

private and public sectors alike, both of which are now prepared to take

all of the young people from a particular year in their entirety.

France

Suspending conscription was a political decision and, in practice, would

only require a new political decision to reactivate, in a crisis, for

instance. Both the president and parliament can introduce bills to this

effect, but in the final analysis, the president's decision determines the

outcome as the president has the right of veto in such matters with

regard to parliament.

The public was more responsive to the argument that military service

was a civic duty that created a bond between the individual citizen and

the state. The decision was therefore made to maintain a system to

emphasise the aspect of civic duty and specifically the duty to take part

in defending the country with regard to all citizens. It was in this spirit

that the decision was made, concurrently with the suspension of

conscription, to establish a "Citizens' Day", an introduction for all

citizens to their duties in relation to defending the country. In this

connection, they also receive information on the tasks of the armed

forces and career opportunities in the military. All men born after 1978

and all women born after 1982 must attend this day at some stage

between their 16th and 18th birthday. It is interesting that gender

equality has been maintained after the suspension of conscription in

France where civic duty is concerned. There has been considerable

political debate regarding the duration of this new "civic duty". When

conscription was suspended, the government at the time introduced a

bill to the effect that it should last a whole week, but it was never

adopted and the new government cut the week down to what is now

known as "Citizens' day".

In the present security policy situation, the people interviewed felt that

it would be practically impossible to reintroduce conscription in the

form it previously had. But because conscription has only been

suspended in France, they also believed that citizens would still feel an

obligation to the armed forces.

As an illustration of the theoretical costs of reintroducing conscription,

the people interviewed mentioned that in recent years the armed forces

had calculated the cost of prolonging "Citizens' Day" to a seminar

lasting several days. The cost of accommodation and board for almost

500,000 young people from a particular year would be so great that it

is impossible to gain support for it because the barracks structure and

support functions previously used in connection with conscription have

been shut down and sold.

The Netherlands

There was no real debate in parliament as such regarding whether

conscription should be replaced by professional armed forces.

Conscription was still an increasing source of irritation to voters, who

regarded the system as unjust. A politician's career could therefore be

brief if he or she defended maintaining conscription during a year in

which one of the major themes of the election was conscription.

There was a debate in parliament, however, regarding whether it would

be possible to re-establish the armed forces and defend the borders of

the Netherlands in cases of an attack on the country's sovereignty if

conscription were discontinued. As the armed forces could guarantee

that the sovereignty of the Netherlands would not come under threat,

parliament decided to suspend conscription. But conscription can be re-

established in principle without amending the constitution if the

security of the Netherlands should be threatened. This would require

parliament to adopt a bill on its reintroduction by a simple majority.

However, such a vote can only be held at the moment the Netherlands

is confronted with an international threat to its security.

As the conscription system has only been suspended, all young men

still receive a letter from the authorities on their 17th birthday in which

they are called up for military service. This letter, however, is the sole

remainder of conscription still maintained. The young men therefore

need not attend a draft board or perform any other type of symbolic

action regarding duty.

That the Dutch parliament decided to suspend rather than discontinue

conscription is very much due to the fact that its complete

discontinuation would require an amendment of the Dutch

Constitution, as would reintroducing it. Additionally, politicians wished

to ensure that it would be possible to reintroduce the system if there

were an external threat to Dutch sovereignty.

Latvia

It was suggested in "The National Defence Concept" from 2003 that the

focus of the armed forces should be realigned from national defence to

international operations and from conscription to professionalisation.63

There was full support for this idea in parliament and therefore no

major political debate as to whether conscription should be replaced by

professional armed forces. A working party was set up in 2003 under

the Ministry of Defence for the purpose of preparing this change. The

working party presented its transition report to the government in

2003. The conclusions in the report were based on interviews in

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European countries that had previously discontinued conscription, and

one of them was that the shorter the transition period was, the better. A

transition period of three years was therefore suggested in the report.

Parliament adopted the transition plan in March 2005 and established

the commencement date as 1 January 2007.

As Latvia's independence in itself led to a pressing need to revise the

country's legislation – and as the conscription system was based on

legislation enacted during the Cold War – it was necessary to revise the

laws governing conscription in order to be able to suspend it. There was

not the time to do this during the transition period, however, so the

Latvian Parliament therefore initially passed a law discontinuing

conscription. Conscription thus remained established by the

constitution during the transition period, but the practical instructions

on the organisation of the mobilisation system were not covered by it

and the Latvian Minister of Defence is in the process of drawing up a

new law/new concept for mobilisation. The new mobilisation system

will in all probability be similar to the French system where the number

of young people from the current year is called up to be registered by a

"draft board" and the armed forces can still present their training

courses.

Slovakia

Parliament implemented its "Membership Action Plan" in 2002 in

collaboration with NATO. The plan was turned into a detailed

programme for restructuring the Slovak armed forces by the General

Staff.64

The programme was implemented with the double purpose of

implementing a professional structure and break with the Soviet

inheritance. The goal of the reform was to build up a small, but fully

professional military with a better quality personnel force and better

training.

Conscription was thus not discontinued in Slovakia either – it was

simply suspended just as in the three other countries. The people

interviewed stated that historical apprehension over the threat from

Russia was a contributory reason why the decision was made to

maintain the possibility of drafting conscripts. They recommended that

countries that consider abolishing conscription should settle for a

suspension rather than a total end to conscription.

As there is no Home Guard or any other kind of National Guard in

Slovakia, the decision was made to establish an "active volunteer

reserve" comprising demobilised professionals in order to ensure that

the state had reservists at its disposal. In time, this force will replace

the former reservists. No reaction time has been established for

reservists and no preparedness as such is maintained. However, there

is a "centre for mobilisation planning" in the General Staff. The centre is

responsible for reintroducing conscription if it should be necessary. All

necessary data are stored in the national register if the need arises to

call up conscripts again. Reactivating conscription would require a

parliamentary decision.

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06 Implementation

A gradual reorganisation from conscription to professional armed

forces was chosen in all of the countries studied and, during the

transition periods, a decreasing number of conscripts were called up,

while the recruitment and training of professionals was increased. The

transition periods were of different lengths, with three years (in Latvia)

as the shortest and six years (in the Netherlands) as the longest. The

people interviewed generally stated that the transition periods –

between three and six years – were of suitable length. In Latvia,

however, it was difficult to amend existing legislation and provisions

within the time allotted and the people interviewed therefore

recommended a longer transition period.

Where implementation was concerned, there was a reduction of

personnel in the armed forces in all countries which meant, among

other things, that the training structure could be pared down and the

number of garrisons reduced, and the general organisation of the

military could be changed. But this had the side effect of making

reintroduction of conscription practically impossible, as it would be too

expensive to recover the necessary structure once it had been sold.

It was necessary to set aside more money for recruitment in all

countries, even though the methods of calculating this differ widely,

and special recruiting offices also had to be established.

Furthermore, steps were taken in all countries to make a greater effort

to create transparency in the armed forces, for instance by holding

central "open-house" arrangements. This effort to make the armed

forces more visible to the civil population was regarded as an important

facet of the recruitment process.

France

After the political suspension of conscription, made law in October

1997, conscription was maintained for a transitional period that lasted

until 2001. During this period the number of conscripts was reduced

dramatically each year, whereas it was a little more than 50% of the

young people from a particular year before the decision was made.65

During the transitional period, France benefited from the fact that it did

not suffer from the same decline in birth rates as the other countries

studied. On the other hand, it was noted, as in the other countries, that

young men's physical condition (in the form of strength and stamina)

was declining. This tendency has continued after the suspension of

conscription.

The composition and structure of the armed forces were changed

concurrently with the move to professionalisation. Among other things,

the number of military regions was reduced from nine to five.66

Professional units were built up and facilities to handle the new

professional structure were developed. The total personnel strength of

the armed forces was reduced from approximately 573,000 men to

approximately 436,000 men from 1996 to 2002, but the costs related to

personnel did not fall during this period, instead they increased from

approximately DKK 85 billion to approximately DKK 100 billion. This

development was partly due to general price movements in society, but

also to wage levels being raised in relation to those in the civil sector.

During this period, a number of problems in recruitment were

experienced in France and, as a reaction to this a recruitment centre

was established at the end of the transitional phase in an attempt to

encourage more young people to join the armed forces. The recruitment

centre makes use of such means as advertising campaigns,

participation in job fairs, and "open-house arrangements".

Furthermore, "Citizens' Day" was implemented, which basically has the

same content as and was a source of inspiration for "Armed Forces'

Day" in Denmark. All young people must take part in the arrangement

between their 16th and 18th birthdays.

The Netherlands

First and foremost, the professionalisation of the armed forces and the

suspension of conscription led to dramatic reductions in the number of

units. For example, before conscription was suspended, the Dutch army

could muster a force of two and a half divisions67 , whereas today, it has

only three brigades. At the same time, there was a reduction in all

services in the number of bases, aircraft, tanks, etc. Total military

personnel were reduced from approximately 128,000 to approximately

50,000 soldiers.

The reduction in the number of units meant, among other things, that

the existing units now have better supplies and equipment, which

increase their capability to take part in international operations. It has

also been realised in the armed forces that international operations

today are not short-term missions of a year's duration, but on the

contrary, are longer-term efforts often far away from the Netherlands

which, where missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are concerned, has

meant tremendous wear on the equipment used in the mission areas.

Members of the armed forces have also been obliged to acknowledge

that a problem has arisen in connection with deployments, training for

missions, and, that it is difficult to muster the manpower to take part in

international exercises while preparing for – and taking part in –

international operations.

When conscription was suspended in the Netherlands, it became

necessary to establish a completely new recruitment and selection

system as conscription had previously been the source of the

professional soldiers the armed forces needed. The recruitment budget

was therefore low before conscription was suspended. There are no

useable figures for the number of people recruited today as recruitment

is not regarded as an independent budget item in the Netherlands, but

as an activity designed to maintain balance in the overall personnel

structure of the armed forces in relation to the number of people who

leave. Since 2001, approximately DKK 373 million has been spent

annually on this project in the Netherlands.

As part of professionalisation, recruiting offices were established in all

major Dutch cities where young people seeking employment in the

armed forces must undergo a series of physical and psychological tests

before they can sign a professional contract. Unlike the case of Latvia,

physical and mental requirements have not been reduced in the

Netherlands.

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A "Veterans' Day" has been introduced in the Netherlands in order to

maintain contact between the public and the military. On this day,

tribute is paid to soldiers from missions in the Balkans, Iraq,

Afghanistan, etc. The initiative has been given a positive reception by

the public and veterans are highly respected. The arrangement is

supported by the royal house and receives extensive coverage in the

Dutch media.

Latvia

The introduction of professional armed forces was facilitated by the fact

that the number of conscripts called up since 2003 has been reduced at

the same time as the number of professional soldiers has been

increased. Furthermore, the terms of contracts for professional soldiers

have been extended from three to five years.

It was originally stipulated in connection with the decision to

professionalise the armed forces that the process should be completed

by the end of 2010. This time horizon was later stepped up by

politicians to 2006, when parliament adopted the motion that the last

conscripts would be called up in 2005. This meant that the last

conscripts left the Latvian armed forces in 2006.

It rapidly became clear that initial expenditure would be necessary in

connection with changing to a professional military. The people

interviewed pointed out that professional armed forces were less

expensive in the long run – and certainly more cost-effective.

Expenditure on the armed forces is lower because, among other things,

well-trained professional soldiers look after their equipment better and

make fewer mistakes than conscripts. However, the greatest savings

comes from doing away with much of the training structure. In addition,

professionalisation made it possible to develop new, more advanced

technologies that save resources.68

There was a public debate during the implementation phase regarding

the discontinuation of conscription in which it was claimed that the

armed forces were viewed as an institution that moulded the character

of young people and improved their physical ability. In other words, the

armed forces were seen as an institution for social upbringing. Another

argument that gave rise to concern was that the discontinuation of

conscription could result in the armed forces losing contact with civil

society. This concern was obviated in part when the Ministry of Defence

increased financial support for the youth corps "Jaunsardzes", which is

a type of scouts' organisation based on a Russian model.69

One of the

purposes of the organisation is to support healthy interests in young

people and keep them away from crime. The organisation has 7,300

members, which makes it bigger than the army. Over and above this,

the youth corps has a socially supportive function as its members

receive training in such fields as tourism and history and learn basic

skills in first aid, among other things, as well as certain aspects of

military training. Teachers come from the National Guard or are

professional soldiers. The members of the corps are divided into three

age groups: 12-14 years, 15-16 years, and 17-18 years. Members of the

latter group are offered rifle practice. Participation in the various

activities arranged by the organisation is voluntary. There is no formal

connection between the youth corps and recruiting professional

soldiers, but approximately 10% of the members of the organisation are

recruited.

There was considerable concern in the military in connection with

implementation that being posted abroad would be a far more common

feature in the professional forces. As the armed forces are keen to

promote consideration for the family, a rotation system was introduced,

which meant that after a professional soldier has been posted abroad,

he returns to Latvia for a certain period of time, normally a year, before

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the next deployment. The soldiers "relax" during this period and

prepare for the next mission in mission training. There is no upper limit

to the number of times a soldier can be posted abroad. It should also be

mentioned that international operations are viewed in a positive light

by civilians, who generally support Latvia's international engagement.

A large number of young people volunteered for the armed forces

during the last year of conscription. This was probably due to the fact

that this was their last chance to try out life in the military and thereby

find out what it had to offer. Conscription hereby functioned as a one-

year trial period that did not have the same consequences as entering

into a five-year professional contract. In spite of the apparent

popularity of the armed forces, however, few conscripts actually signed

contracts because they regarded the five-year binding period as too

long. Among the conscripts in the latter years of conscription, 25-30%

said that they would have signed a contract if it had been for three

years instead of five.

Slovakia

The Slovak armed forces engaged a US consultant company in

connection with the implementation of the professionalisation plan,

which prepared an in-depth analysis of the entire Slovak personnel

structure.70

There was also contact with the British and French

ministries of defence and great benefit was derived from NATO's

Partnership for Peace Programme and its various advisory functions.

Most of the advice, however, was obtained from the consultant

company. One of the critical shortcomings was that until

professionalisation, Slovakia had not had a professional nopn-

commissioned –officers (NCO) structure. NCO funtions were carried out

by conscripts or professional officers. The officer structure was

therefore also overwhelming and the entire organisation far too top

heavy. This was therefore not a question of an isolated conscription

reform – but on the contrary, a complete reorganisation of the Slovak

armed forces.

Implementing professional armed forces was planned to be carried out

over a period of six years. As conscripts were called up four times a

year in Slovakia, a decision was made to reduce the number of people

called up from time to time so that the number of conscripts would

gradually fall.

The plan was to have fully professional armed forces by the end of

2006. In fact, professionalisation went faster than planned and, as

early as 1 January 2006, the armed forces comprised 100% professional

soldiers. The number of people called up therefore fell gradually from

16,235 in 2001, to 7,201 in 2003, to 2,472 in 2005.

While discontinuing conscription went more rapidly than expected,

recruiting professional soldiers did not go quite so fast. The goal of

recruiting 15,360 private soldiers and non-commissioned officers by 1

January 2005 was not reached and only 11,188 people were recruited.

Among the reasons stated for the difficulty in recruiting professionals

was the effect of a low number of men from a particular year in

Slovakia, the fact that there was record growth in the country during

this period (large-scale car factories were opened), and finally that it

was necessary for the Slovak armed forces to create a recruitment

culture. Demographics had not been taken into account before the

decision was made to suspend conscription – and the people

responsible were therefore surprised at the difficulty involved.

Concurrently with professionalisation, legislation regarding the

personnel benefits soldiers had previously been eligible for was

changed. The benefits – including health care and education, for

instance – were now withdrawn and this, in combination with the

Page 36 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

considerable reduction in career opportunities and increased

competition on the labour market for the brightest, prompted many of

the best officers to retire at the time the reform was implemented,

making it more difficult to carry out a successful reform.

The process led to a complete transformation of the armed forces with

major changes at all levels. Total personnel were thus reduced from

46,662 in 2001 to 31,251 in 2005. There were also great changes in the

composition of the armed forces. There were 7,265 officers in 2001

while this figure had been reduced to 4,152 by 2005, which was again

reduced to 3,326 officers in 2006. There were also considerable changes

in the rank structure of the officer corps. At the beginning of the reform,

only 64% of all officers occupied posts commensurate with their rank –

the remainder were in positions with less responsibility than their rank

warranted. The head of one of the country's music corps, for instance,

was a general. The changes were handled through a combination of

natural wastage, offers of early retirement, and offers of voluntarily

demotion by one or two ranks. Job and function descriptions were

drawn up for all positions in order to ensure cohesion between ranks

and jobs. A completely new bureaucratic structure was established in

connection with selection and appointment and the connection between

rank, job, training, and retirement age in general created a new and

more efficient administrative culture.

The structural changes made it a natural step to close garrisons. In

Slovakia, the decision was chiefly to close the smaller of these so that

the forces are now concentrated in bigger units around training

grounds. The opportunity was also used to close a number of garrisons

that were inappropriately located in urban surroundings. This led to

some savings, but they have not been calculated in detail. Closing

garrisons led to a major political showdown on the location of the

remaining installations, but it was not connected solely with the

suspension of conscription, it was also due to the fact that there was a

great reduction in personnel structure at the same time.

Similarly to the case of Latvia, the decision to suspend conscription led

to a record number of young men volunteering during the last years of

conscription. There was no need at any time for a national conscription

lottery similar to that in Denmark as there was a sufficient number of

suitable potential conscripts from all years – and all of those suitable

had to do military service.

The military was ordered to hold attention-creating arrangements in

order to ensure that the armed forces remained visible and transparent

to the population at large and appeared as an exciting and attractive

workplace. All units therefore have the production goal of carrying out

local exhibitions and shows and contributing to national exhibitions

and arrangements to which the military is invited.

Furthermore, the armed forces carry out a central campaign that

addresses young people – in the form of "youth camps". These camps

are a type of team competition in which young people compete against

each other in open-air disciplines with a military character. In addition,

various high-profile institutions are encouraged to take part (e.g. the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs against the Ministry of Defence) to draw

attention to the camps. The camps, insurance, etc., are paid for by the

armed forces – and participants are divided into teams by age (14-15

years, 16-17 years and 18-19 years). The camps were held in 2006 and

2007 were also held during the summer of 2008. The winners can try

their hand at a military profession for 24 hours "with all the trimmings"

and fly in a helicopter or try shooting with live ammunition.

In spite of these measures, the difficulty of recruiting professional

soldiers became evident immediately after conscription was suspended

– this notwithstanding the fact that a recruiting office had been

established in Slovakia as early as 2001. This office is subdivided into

Page 37 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

various units and includes a personnel structure office with

responsibility for calculating the need for intake to all courses of

training in the Slovak armed forces and to create cohesion in the rank

structure on an ongoing basis. Annual recruitment production targets

are established at the recruiting office. In general, output of all kinds

must correspond to analogous input – and it has proved to be

increasingly difficult to attain these goals. This is not least due to

economic growth in Slovakia which has led, among other things, to

major auto industry factories opening (among them, Volkswagen). The

armed forces are unable to compete on wages, but are otherwise

considered as an employment opportunity offering good job security.71

There is also a marketing centre under the recruiting office that

handles all advertising measures and initial contracts. Among the

central advertising activities, personal contact, advertising in printed

and electronic media and on the Internet are emphasised. Among other

things, the centre's web site contains an activity calendar that shows

which recruiting activities, shows and other arrangements are to be

held so that people with an interest can keep up to date.

The difficulties of recruitment are illustrated by the fact that it was only

necessary to perform 0.31 activities per recruit in 2002, while 3.6

activities were necessary in 2007. (A recruiting activity in this example

could be an exhibition and a recruiting visit to a village or an upper

secondary school).

Approximately DKK 3.7 million is spent on recruiting annually. The

means are distributed with about DKK 370,000 that can be used by the

personnel office, while the remainder is connected with the Ministry of

Defence with the right to draw on this amount at the personnel office.

This pays for the costs of advertising in the printed and electronic

media and on the Internet. Attention-creating activities on the part of

the military units are not included in this amount.

Calculations by the General Staff show that it costs DKK 2.5 million to

recruit 700 suitable applicants to the armed forces – corresponding to

approximately DKK 3,700 per recruit. Last year, 14,000 people had to be

contacted directly to attain the goal of 765 recruits. When

professionalisation was introduced, it was sufficient to contact 6,000

people to recruit 2,000. The people interviewed stated that there is a

close connection between visibility and recruitment. It is easier to

recruit people in the areas where an effort is made at garrisons and

where garrisons are very prominent.

The Slovak recruitment budget has not been changed in step with the

increasing difficulty of recruiting people. Currently, the latest surveys

show that three percent of suitable people from a particular year want

to be professionals, while nine percent "consider it".

The task of building up a military reserve was given to a Mobilisation

Planning Centre which is supposed to create an "active reserve" of

volunteers and suitable demobilised professional soldiers. The plan is

to perform the first exercise with the reserve in 2009. There are still

about 800,000 reserves in Slovakia – of whom about 15,000 are former

professional soldiers. The aim is to replace this force with a smaller

reserve of 20-60-year-old volunteers comprising former professional

soldiers under contract with the armed forces who will make

themselves available for further training for up to 15 days a year for

privates and 30 days a year for specialists and non-commissioned

officers. The reserves are paid during their training if the company they

work for does not provide compensation for loss of income. Contracts

have a duration of three years at a time and the responsibility for

appointing those who are qualified, so that contracts are not entered

into with unsuitable people, lies with the General Staff personnel office.

Another aim is to use the active reserve to recruit people for the

professional forces.

Page 38 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Page 39 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Recruiting difficulties have prompted the armed forces to consider

increasing retirement age and to reduce enrolment requirements.

Retirement age today depends on the rank attained, but for people with

a retirement age of 55, consideration is being given to increasing this to

60 years.

It should be noted that the need to strengthen the middle-management

structure has led to a situation in which non-commissioned officers

cannot become officers and highly qualified non-commissioned officers

earn more money than younger officers.

Wage levels for the armed forces were frozen by the national defence

agreement that applies during the entire period up to 2010. The level is

politically established in such a way that the relationship between the

youngest man's wages and Defence Chief's salary is 1:5.26.72

It might

have been a good idea to adjust wage levels during the term of the

agreement, but this is not possible on budgetary and parliamentary

grounds.

One urgent wish in connection with the reform was to change the

career structure of the military. A "Personnel Centre" with

responsibility for selecting and promoting personnel to specialist

functions or the next highest rank was established for this purpose.

This applies to all personnel up to and including the rank of lieutenant

colonel. Selecting and promoting personnel was previously the

responsibility of a local leader, but as it was misused through nepotism,

corruption and cultivating other private interests, it was abolished with

the reform, which led to many angry reactions on the part of local

leaders.

Finally, the responsibility for carrying out initial tests of all applicants,

and thereby constituting a significant element of recruitment, lies with

the "Psychological and Sociological Centre". Candidates for service

abroad on the staff and in INTOPS are also screened at the centre.

Page 40 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

07 Evaluation

It is noted in all of the countries that capacity and ability to perform

international operations has improved and that the main purpose of

changing from conscripted to professional armed forces has thereby

been fulfilled.

The generally declining physical standard among young people, known

respectively in Latvia and the Netherlands as the "computer

generation" and the "beer generation", was noted in all of the countries

studied. This has been of particular importance as the number of

applicants has decreased because it meant either rejecting a larger

percentage of them or lowering enrolment requirements and increasing

the duration of training to get recruits into a physical condition in

which they could perform military service effectively.

It was also noted in the four countries studied that there were more

female applicants, and the number of female soldiers has also

increased since the suspension of conscription. This may be because all

of the countries involved have made attempts to broaden the

recruitment base which, among other things, led to a change in the

nature of job campaigns that now target female applicants.

Another reason could be, as stated in all countries, that measurements

and evaluations unanimously seem to indicate that the social prestige

of the armed forces has increased after the suspension of conscription.

(This does not necessarily mean, however, that soldiers have become

more popular in the business community, for instance. In fact, the

people who were asked in France said that there were no advantages to

be gained from including military service in CVs).

Another common feature is that all four countries experienced

opposition from groups of professionals in the armed. The people

interviewed stated that this was partly due to a fear of change – and,

quite specifically, to concern that restructuring would lead to personnel

being posted abroad on international missions, whereas they had

hitherto lived stationary lives at the same garrison throughout their

careers.

Another central point is that while recruitment is important, retaining

people is at least equally important. This is because it is cheaper to

retain and "reuse" soldiers than to recruit and train new. Personnel

staff in both France and the Netherlands estimated that the optimum

employment perspective for private soldiers is eight years in the

system.

It was also noted in all four countries that demographic and socio-

economic conditions are very important for recruiting and retaining

personnel. Competition for suitable manpower is therefore strongly

influenced by the number of young people who are available from each

Development in costs per soldier in France, the Netherlands and Denmark, 1988-2000 (fixed prices, 2005 USD)

France

The Netherlands

Denmark

100000

110000

120000

130000

140000

150000

160000

170000

1988

1992

1996

2000

Year

particular year, at the same time as the state of the financial market

influences the demand for manpower on the part of the business

community. The worst possible situation (for the armed forces and the

business community alike) occurs when few young people from a

particular year are in great demand with a business community that is

experiencing growth.

Finally, it appears that the new professional forces are not less

expensive than the conscription system, which is not only due to the

organisation of the armed forces in itself. The defence budgets in Latvia

and Slovakia were increased on an ongoing basis throughout

restructuring, but in both countries this was to an equal degree an

aspect of the goal of living up to NATO's objectives that member states

should spend two percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on the

military. (And the two countries have not only increased the share of

GDP spent on defence – GDP has also increased, so in actual figures,

this is a question of a considerable increase). Where the Netherlands

and France are concerned, military expenditure has also increased after

the suspension of conscription. It was stated in all four countries that

the costs of acquiring equipment and the wear on this in connection

with international operations and the major costs connected with

transport and logistics for these operations play an important role.

Figure 6.

Source: SIPRI and Military Balance

The increasing cost levels are illustrated in figure 6 and the figure

shows the development in defence expenditure per soldier in France,

the Netherlands and Denmark during the period 1988 to 2000 (i.e.

during the period when conscription was suspended in the Netherlands

(from 1993 to 1996) and France (from 1996 to 2000)). There is a

remarkable displacement between the countries in relation to resource

consumption per soldier, so that from being the country that devoted

most resources per unit, Denmark became the country that devoted

least, whereas this was the opposite for the Netherlands. It is

particularly interesting that the increase in Dutch resource

2005

USD

Page 41 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

De elopment in costs per soldier in Latvia, Slovakia and Denmark, (fixed prices, 2005 USD)

v

Slovakia

Latvia

Denmark

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

200000

2000

2004

2007

Year

consumption per soldier coincided with the introduction of the

professional army in 1992. During this period it was possible to reduce

resource consumption per unit in Denmark so that Danish resource

consumption is slightly more than 25% lower than that of the

Netherlands. It is also remarkable that the level of costs in France also

increased with the introduction of a professional army. However, as

this increase can also be seen both in the Netherlands and France, it

cannot be explained solely by the suspension of conscription.

Figure 7.

Source: SIPRI and Military Balance

Figure 7 illustrates the same development in Slovakia, Latvia and

Denmark during the period 2000-2007 – i.e. the period during which

the two first countries suspended conscription. The same interesting

increase in costs in the two countries can be seen during the period in

which they introduced a professional army. By way of comparison, the

development in Denmark led to a fall in total costs. It is remarkable in

this connection that costs in both Slovakia and Latvia have increased

continuously and sharply (by approximately 450% in Latvia and 280%

in Slovakia) in a relatively short period of time. The increase in the two

countries is thus considerably higher and more uniform than is the less

clear picture for France and the Netherlands. This indicates that the

increase in costs cannot exclusively be ascribed to the change to a

professional army. The transition to NATO membership and a general

need to improve military equipment can therefore be seen as

contributory factors to the defence costs per soldier in the two

countries.

In summary, military costs have increased in all four countries since

conscription was suspended. The higher costs in all four countries are

due to a combination of initial costs for organisational changes and

costs that can be ascribed to a higher level of activity – plus the fact

that wage levels in the armed forces had to be adapted to developments

in the rest of society.

2005

USD

Page 42 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

France

The overall impression is that recruitment to the French armed forces

in general was not a problem while conscription was in force, nor was

there even an organisation involved in recruitment during that time. It

can therefore be assumed that conscription was adequate to advertise

the armed forces so that no special measures were necessary.

Initially, there were many costs connected with the restructuring

process. Among other things, it was necessary to invest a considerable

amount in a recruiting centre.73

Payroll costs in the armed forces also

rose appreciably, but on the other hand it was possible to save on

structural costs – by closing barracks and other facilities, etc. As

previously mentioned, there was a minor problem with recruitment

during the transitional phase up to professionalisation, something that

was unusual in the French armed forces.

The people interviewed were not of the impression that there had been

any noticeable recruitment problems after the transitional phase and

the establishment of structures to handle the change in the recruitment

procedure. On average, the armed forces must recruit about 30,000

young men each year and there are many types of employment on

offer. The system is extremely flexible, especially for the NCO group

who sign one-year contracts. They can enter into these contracts four

times, after which they are obliged to change to a different employment

category. The officer system is separate from the NCO system, but it is

possible for sergeants to be trained as officers and advance to the rank

of captain at most. The people interviewed acknowledged that this was

an expensive solution and that it functioned as a kind of conscription in

practice, but the system has been maintained in order to get young

people interested in trying out life in the armed forces and giving time

for them to be evaluated before they sign longer-term contracts.

Furthermore, measures have been implemented in an attempt to retain

the group of privates. A model has been set up in which the armed

forces pay individual soldiers a bonus after a number of years' service

with the aim of encouraging them to continue serving for the desired

average of eight years. Today, the first bonus is paid after five years.

The general recession on the French labour market may provide part of

the explanation to the French success with recruitment. As there is a

relatively high rate of unemployment among young people in France,

many of them join the military, which is actually the second-largest

employer in the country.

The people interviewed felt that the flexible terms offered by the

military also played a role on a labour market that does not otherwise

have a reputation for flexibility. Over and above flexibility, the armed

forces can naturally also offer stable employment for those who choose

longer-term contracts and there are also several advantageous offers

for personnel, such as inexpensive flats – an offer that a large number

of young people value highly. On the other hand, the people

interviewed were of the opinion that having experience from the armed

forces was not an advantage, which is often the case in Denmark, for

instance, when seeking employment in the civilian sector.

There has been a clear tendency in connection with restructuring for

the military to employ many more civilians to perform the

administrative tasks that were previously performed by the armed

forces' own personnel.

The sporadic opposition to discontinuing conscription seen in the

armed forces before discontinuation has generally been overcome.

There is a pragmatic acceptance that it is structurally almost

impossible to reintroduce conscription today in the same form it had

previously as, among other things, the physical framework for such a

step is no longer available.

Page 43 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

On the other hand, the violence in the suburbs of Paris in 2005

breathed new life into the discussion in civilian society and among

politicians on the reintroduction of conscription as an educative

element to discipline young, uncontrollable forces. The people

interviewed, however, did not believe that reintroducing conscription

would find support among the public or gain a majority in parliament.

They emphasised that the change of attitude in the public from viewing

the armed forces as a patriotic project to viewing it now as a practical

tool that the state can use for humanitarian purposes is so well

established that they cannot imagine a return to conscription in its old

form.

Where "Citizens' Day" is concerned, the public auditors in France

recently raised the question as to what benefit was actually derived

from the money spent on this day each year. They felt that there was

too little return on the arrangement if it were merely regarded as an

advertisement for the armed forces, and that DKK 5.2 billion a year was

too high a price to pay for maintaining a "direct mailing list" to young

people who might be interested in a military career.74

The Netherlands

In spite of major personnel and structural reductions, expenditure on

the armed forces has risen by approximately 17-20% compared with the

level before conscription was suspended. The individual soldier today is

more expensive than formerly. This is first and foremost due to the fact

that the costs of active participation in international operations have

been higher than expected and that this has led to extensive purchases

of new equipment. Professionalising the armed forces also led to higher

costs to maintain the size of the personnel force.

The wage level for a professional soldier is broadly speaking unchanged

as a professional soldier's initial pay is still higher than for a private

sector employee with a similar level of education. Experience in the

Netherlands has also shown that pay is not the most important means

of recruiting and retaining people in the armed forces. On the contrary,

variables such as career opportunities, long-term deployment, and the

question regarding whether a soldier can combine his/her work with the

role of parent, play a decisive role for the individual soldier.

Furthermore, the experience gained in the armed forces since the

suspension of conscription indicates that the new professional soldiers

must be treated, instructed and trained in a completely different way

compared to the period when there was conscription in the

Netherlands. This is not least due to the fact that those liable to be

conscripted – who were, as mentioned, selected from among the young

elite – were more enterprising and had better intellectual qualifications

because of their high level of education. Today – when the people

recruited are not among the most proficient – procedures must be

practised far more thoroughly and repeated more frequently in order to

ensure satisfactory learning.

As the physical and intellectual minimum requirements on applicants

have been retained, the qualifications of the recruits (even though they

are lower today than during conscription) have generally been

satisfactory. It has not been possible, however, to recruit the necessary

intake of about 5,000 people a year at the recruiting offices. The Dutch

armed forces are therefore at present down to about 80% of their

approved personnel force. It is particularly difficult to attract specialists

such as mechanics and people with a technical background. The Dutch

military has therefore implemented a new initiative designed to attract

older, better-educated people (over 30 years of age). Furthermore, there

has been a lack of doctors in the Dutch armed forces for some time as

conscripts previously constituted the majority of medical staff. There

are professional doctors in the armed forces today and there are at

Page 44 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

present no problems in recruiting doctors, but this could become a

problem in the future because 85% of newly qualified doctors in the

Netherlands are women, who are traditionally not prepared to work full

time, which is a requirement in the armed forces.

To ensure sufficient medical capacity, the Dutch armed forces have paid

for an extra operation team at ten Dutch hospitals in return for the

hospitals in question placing a voluntary operation team at the

disposal of the armed forces that can be deployed for six months to a

mission area together with the soldiers. The operation team is thereby

chosen at the hospital and not by the military. The project has been a

great success as many doctors want to have experience of combat

surgery. Experience they cannot obtain in many other places than in

mission areas. The success of this project has meant that a decision

was made in the armed forces to extend the idea to other groups of

specialists such as mechanics and other technicians.

The Dutch Minister of Defence formulated a vision to the effect that

30% of military personnel should be women as it was felt that this

would improve the dynamism of the armed forces. The armed forces

have therefore implemented a "gender project" that purposefully aims

to recruit women and to retain the women who are already in the

armed forces. Several new initiatives have been implemented in which

there is more consideration for pregnant women, for instance. However,

it has been emphasised that the Dutch military will not give female

officers special treatment to make it easier for them to pursue a career.

At present, about 7% of armed forces personnel are women, which is an

increase compared to the time before conscription was suspended.

Women can serve in all units with the exception of the Dutch Marine

Corps and in submarines.

A major problem for the armed forces today is that the physical

condition of young people has deteriorated in relation to previously.

Approximately half of them are unable to live up to the physical

requirements in tests and about one-third of these are categorised as

permanently unsuitable. These figures are in glaring contrast to

formerly when about 70% were fit for service. The Dutch armed forces

have not chosen to lower the physical and mental requirements on

young people applying for enlistment in the hope of increasing

recruitment, as is the case in Latvia, for instance. Young people who

cannot live up to the physical requirements are advised to train for two

or three months and then come back and take the tests again.

The biggest problem for the Dutch armed forces is to retain personnel

and this has led to the introduction of very flexible contracts of two,

four, and six years. The goal is to retain short-term personnel in the

armed forces for eight years, which is expected to provide a satisfactory

balance between investing in training and useful service, and a bonus

system has been introduced with a bonus that increases in step with

seniority. Furthermore, the armed forces pay for courses of education

for personnel so that they are well prepared to return to a civilian

career. The goal is for all military personnel to leave the military with a

higher level of education than they had when they entered.

Additionally, the armed forces offer personnel a number of social

privileges such as health insurance. Among other things, these

measures have meant that the armed forces have ranked as the

Netherlands' third best workplace for the past two years, according to

an annual nationwide survey, and they have never ranked lower than

number five. This in itself constitutes an invaluable advertisement for

the armed forces in Dutch society.

It is now regarded as an established fact that re-establishing

conscription is no longer possible and it would be meaningless to

attempt to mobilise demobilised conscripts. This is due, among other

things, to the fact that the armed forces no longer have the quantity of

Page 45 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

equipment (boots, uniforms, etc.), that re-establishment would require,

and that the value of the military training given in the mid 1990s must

be seen as having been extremely limited. The initial cost of acquiring

weapons, uniforms, equipment and stores would be enormous and

there would be a discussion regarding which particular year the first

people should be re-conscripted from.

In spite of the challenges that a potential reintroduction of conscription

would present, there are forces in Dutch society that demand the re-

establishment of the conscription system. These groups are concerned

about the difficulties of achieving a satisfactory level of training for

professional soldiers. A university graduate, for instance, would seek

employment in the private sector rather than the armed forces. The

biggest party in the Netherlands, the Christian Democrats, finances a

think-tank that sometimes puts out feelers with ideas for a new form of

conscription that would also involve women.

Latvia

The decision to suspend conscription was given a positive reception in

Latvian society. When the decision was made, about 80% of the

population supported it and this figure is unchanged after the reform

has been completed. There was also great satisfaction in military

circles regarding the course of the reform and, after the completion of

professionalisation, the prestige of the armed forces has risen so that it

now ranks number four among the country's most prestigious

professions. The people interviewed felt that this is first and foremost

because the armed forces now appear to be better trained, because

wages have been raised, and better equipment acquired.

All political parties supported the decision to suspend conscription. The

transformation was therefore seen as a great success in political circles

and there has been no discussion regarding the value of suspension.

The introduction of modern, high-tech equipment in the armed forces

has meant that training for individual soldiers has been intensified,

which is one of the reasons why the costs of training are five or six

times as high as they were before conscription was suspended75. Due to

this – and in order to live up to NATO requirements – the government

has increased the defence budget annually since 2003, which at

present means that 1.79% of GDP is spent on the armed forces (the

increase should also be seen in the light of the fact that GDP has

increased significantly).

The reforms were also viewed in a positive light in the armed forces.

But it will still take some time to change the mind-set in the officers'

corps as the tone used among professional soldiers is essentially

different to the tone between professionals and conscripts. In coming

years, an attempt will therefore be made to change officers'

management style from elementary command to cooperation and

involvement.

Originally, the plans in Latvia were to concentrate on incentives in the

form of facilities such as sports and recreation centres and officers'

clubs, etc., as it was believed that the establishment of such centres

would lead to greater satisfaction with the workplace so that personnel

could be retained by the armed forces. However, these plans had to be

shelved as the cost of realising them proved to be much too high.

The experience in Latvia has also been that it is very important that

there is a prospect of career opportunities for the individual soldier, so

it is important to show potential soldiers all of the options for

development the armed forces can offer in connection with recruitment.

There were very good years for recruitment in 2005 and 2006. In 2005,

285 conscripts signed professional contracts and this was bettered the

year after when 628 people signed contracts, of whom 230 were

Page 46 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

conscripts who wanted to serve as professionals after their military

service. After the suspension of conscription, however, it has become

more difficult to recruit people to the armed forces which has meant,

among other things, that 5-6% of the available positions have not been

filled.

Another reason why recruitment has become more difficult is the

demographic and economic variables. Due to fewer young people being

born in a particular year (which is already having an effect now), in the

years to come there will be even fewer young people to recruit. As there

has also been a high rate of growth in the Latvian economy it has been

difficult for the armed forces to attract young people. Private sector

wages in big cities are higher than those the armed forces can offer. The

expectation is that it will be easier for the armed force to recruit people

during times when the Latvian economy is growing more slowly or is in

recession.

Figures from the recruitment offices show that it costs about DKK 1,185

in direct advertising to recruit a soldier to the armed forces. The annual

advertising budget for the Latvian armed forces is DKK 754,000. The

radio and the Internet have proved to be the most effective media in

connection with recruitment. In 2007, the recruiting offices reached

70% of the planned recruitment goal and it is expected that the figures

for this year will increase because of a decline in economic growth. The

armed forces can offer potential soldiers a fixed, stable income that lies

slightly above the average wage in the country and is not influenced by

market fluctuations. The central recruiting arguments thereby appear

to be stability in connection with wages and employment conditions.

The training and education system has been changed in order to recruit

and retain more soldiers as the young people from a particular year

today are in poorer physical shape than previously. The physical

demands made on soldiers on recruitment to the military have been

lowered. The focus of the first three months has now been goal-oriented

to improve soldiers' physical condition. The educational requirements

have also been lowered as conscripts were required to have had an

upper secondary school education before the suspension of

conscription if they wished to become professional soldiers. Today, nine

to ten years' schooling are sufficient even though soldiers are required

to pass an upper secondary school examination during the course of a

five-year contract.76

Soldiers without an upper secondary school

education can only serve in infantry units and not in specialised

technical or intelligence functions. Finally, the age limit has been

lowered from 19 to 18 years so it is now possible to go straight into the

armed forces from the school system. People with previous military

training (e.g. former conscripts or members of the Youth Corps) can

avoid the first three months of basic training.

The modification of the criteria above has meant that there has been a

minor fall in the quality of the people applying for a professional

contract in the armed forces. However, the quality of the applicants to

the officers' academy is at the same level as previously.

The average age of soldiers is the same as previously. Army officers

have an average age of 33-35 years and this is 25-26 years for privates.

The armed forces comprise 18% women. This figure has not changed

significantly, but there has been a minor increase. Most women work in

administrative functions.

At present, there are no advantages in the armed forces for soldiers

with families. But this will be an area of special interest in the future if

the military wishes to retain its soldiers and renew their contracts. The

hope for the future is that, by offering soldiers special advantages, it

will be easier for the armed forces to recruit and retain personnel.

Financial support has already been provided by the Ministry of Defence

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in the form of building kindergartens and schools, etc., close to military

bases that can be used by soldiers' families.

With the benefit of hindsight, a three-year transitional period was too

short. A longer transition period is necessary to create the necessary

platform for communication and organisation between the various

working parties involved in such extensive reforms. There were

examples of laws and provisions establishing the terms for the armed

forces (including terms of employment and demobilisation) that were

not updated in time.

Slovakia

All in all the ability to conduct international operations has improved

as the quality of the soldiers sent out has increased. In general, the

training level of the Slovak forces has been dramatically increased, and

it is estimated that the country is now capable of fulfilling its

international obligations. Slovakia thus expects to take on greater

responsibility in e.g. Afghanistan in the future. It has not been difficult

to recruit troops for international operations in spite of the fact that it

is possible for everybody to cancel their contracts at short notice and

without appreciable consequences. This also goes for personnel who

are on the verge of being posted abroad.

Military expenditure has increased. When the decision was made in

2001, conscription cost DKK 13.2 million. A projection to 2010 price

levels based on developments in the national economy showed that

costs could be expected to rise to approximately DKK 65 million. This

included training and billeting, etc. The total cost of 3,000 professionals

is hereby higher than the cost of 12,500 conscripts would have been

due, among other things, to the fact that the professionals are actually

used on international operations and therefore have a higher level of

activity.

Professionalisation has led to the appointment of appreciably more

women in the military. The share of women is now about eight to nine

%. Before professionalisation it was about two %. At the time, it was

necessary for a soldier to go through the entire conscription period

before he could become permanently employed, whereas it is now

possible to do so immediately. The recruitment of more women was

explained through our interviews by the fact that many women (an

estimated 70%) apply in order to gain social advantages such as job

security. Others really want a military career, while others again want

to serve in administrative positions. Another explanation could be that

factory work in Slovakia has become a high-wage area and therefore

attracts more men. Many of the women who are recruited come from

families with a military tradition. Women generally have the same

rights as men – but mothers and motherhood enjoy special protection

under the constitution − women are entitled to 28 weeks' maternal

leave (beginning a month before giving birth). Women sent out on

international operations are pregnancy tested before their deployment

in international missions. They cannot be deployed if they prove to be

pregnant. However, women can be employed in staff positions in the

NATO structure even though they may be pregnant.

After professionalisation, there was a strong desire that homogeneous

units that had been trained together could be sent out on international

operations. This was impossible in the old structure in which conscripts

constituted part of the units, but could not be posted abroad.77

This has now become a reality and is described as a great success.

With regard to the reflection of the civilian sector in the professional

armed forces, it has proved to be difficult to ensure the representation

of minorities in these. Slovak data protection legislation prevents the

registration of the population on the basis of ethnic, religious, or other

grouping – but there are many minority issues to take into account. The

people interviewed estimated that there is generally a fair balance in

the armed forces, but that the numbers of Hungarians and Roma in the

armed forces are not representative to that of their share of the

population. The people interviewed said that it is important, but

impossible at present due to data protection legislation, to certify that

the military force reflects the composition of the population.

Another important element is that professionalisation has created

more distance between officers, non-commissioned officers, and

privates. The people interviewed described this as a positive element

that, over and above more effective leadership, allowed all groups to

have professional pride. It has also proved a good choice to establish a

professional, well-functioning cadre of non-commissioned officers –

this has been an important element and remains a priority issue.

Support for the armed forces has increased notably since the

suspension of conscription. The people interviewed said that the

number of citizens who took a positive view of the military in 2007 had

increased to 72%. Before the decision to suspend conscription this was

less than 50%. The increased support is also connected with the fact

that people are no longer forced to do military service. Furthermore,

discipline has been significantly improved in the armed forces. Soldiers

have a more professional appearance and, at the same time, a smaller

force of well-trained soldiers means that there are sufficient resources

for proper equipment and better and more modern weapons. The

military therefore emanates greater professionalism, which again has a

positive effect on the public. In general, the people interviewed felt that

there was more prestige in being a soldier after the suspension of

conscription.

The Ministry of Defence is preparing a job satisfaction survey among

professional soldiers. Among other things, the survey will result in

proposals for social bonus schemes – such as access to first place on

public waiting lists, for instance.

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08 Summary and general

observations

This section is a summary of the observations regarding the four

assumptions examined in the report:

Assumption 1:

Conscription, economy and recruitment.

It is quite possible to recruit the necessary number of professional

soldiers if conscription is discontinued – but market fluctuations, the

number of young people from a particular year, and terms of

employment are decisive factors.

All countries had difficulties in recruiting specialists such as mechanics

– but the same applies to countries where conscription has not been

discontinued (e.g. Denmark). The ability to find recruits for the classic

military functions varies from country to country – and the people

interviewed generally stated that the number of young people from a

particular year and conditions in the business community (and hereby

job opportunities and wages outside the military) are decisive elements

in the ability to recruit people. Another major factor is that soldiers'

prestige has generally increased among the public after the suspension

of conscription. Terms of employment also proved to play a central role.

Experience has shown that the wording of contracts is important.

Contracts must provide the military with the opportunity to assess

potential soldiers before they sign contracts and retain them under

terms of employment that give the best possible result from the money

spent on training them. This should be supplemented with thorough

tests. In addition, terms of employment must be experienced as

flexible. This makes it necessary to thoroughly analyse the needs of the

armed forces and the wishes of the target group and to design contracts

in accordance with these. Experience also shows that it is not an

advantage to retain all personnel in lifelong positions. In the

Netherlands, for instance, it has been found cost-effective to retain

manual level personnel for eight years.

It costs a great deal of money to reorganise a country's military from

conscript-based to professional forces, but most of the costs are

connected with the fact that reorganisation increases the opportunity

for active participation in international operations – and thereby also

the need to prepare for them. And this is more expensive than training

soldiers in national defence.

In all four countries military expenditure had increased since the

suspension of conscription. This development is due to three mutually

independent circumstances: First, there have been higher payroll costs;

second, recruitment and selection have become more expensive; and

third, there have been costs that can be specifically ascribed to a

change in the tasks performed by the military (from national defence to

international operations).

The higher payroll costs are due to the fact that professional soldiers

are generally paid more than conscripts, and therefore vary exclusively

according to the number of soldiers and their wage levels, something

that was predictable because this development was bound to follow the

general wage development outside the military. Overall military

strength had been considerably reduced in all four countries as part of

the reorganisation, but it has generally also been necessary to raise the

wages of professional soldiers in order to be able to maintain the

desired personnel force (this does not apply to the Netherlands,

however).

The higher costs of recruitment and selection are partly due to higher

campaign costs, and partly to a greater need to test applicants.

Recruitment costs can to a certain extent be counterbalanced by

structural savings caused by reduced costs of maintaining barracks and

the training structure when conscription is discontinued. However,

recruitment costs vary (similarly to payroll costs) with the development

of the national economy and demographic developments, which

together determine the competition for manpower.

The third parameter, the higher costs involved in using the armed

forces, depends on several factors: First, it depends on whether the

increased international capability is used for anything at all, and then

where soldiers are used, how they are used, and for which purposes

play a major role. Broadly speaking, the change from conscription to

professional armed forces could be compared to a family that

exchanges its family car for a four-wheel drive vehicle because they

intend to take a holiday in the mountains. The classic family car can be

used for all of the day-to-day purposes and fuel economy and service

costs are known – but it is not so suitable for (and could not negotiate)

the mountains. Changing to a four-wheel drive vehicle involves initial

costs – but once it has been bought and is parked in the garage, it costs

about the same to keep it there. The real difference becomes evident

when it is driven – because the four-wheel drive vehicle is more

expensive where fuel and service are concerned – but on the other

hand, it can stand up to a trip in the mountains that would be

problematic for the family car. The family must therefore decide

whether to buy a four-wheel drive vehicle that will probably be parked

in the garage most of the time because they cannot afford to fill it up

and maintain it. Statements from the four countries indicate that they

have either increased their participation in international operations or

expect to do so – and the unanimous verdict is that the costs of

participating in international operations are far higher than the costs of

maintaining a national defence force.

Professional armed forces appear to be more attractive to women than

conscript-based forces.

There has been a bigger influx of women to the military after the

suspension of conscription in all four countries. It is difficult to decide,

however, whether this due to the reforms themselves or whether it can

be ascribed to general changes in the labour market and gender culture.

But it can be noted in all of the countries that, after suspending

conscription, there has been focus on enlarging the field of applicants

for positions in the military and that all of the statements indicate that

professional armed forces have greater prestige than conscript-based

forces had.

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Recruitment is important, but retaining personnel is at least equally

important.

It is important not to focus exclusively on recruitment when changing

from conscription to professional armed forces. In principle, each

contract prolongation means a saving on the recruitment budget. The

decision made in the Netherlands was to regard the costs of

maintaining the politically-established personnel force as a single pool,

in which recruitment costs and incentives designed to retain personnel

are two aspects of the same calculation. Experience in the Netherlands

and France has shown that the most cost-effective term of employment

for privates is eight years, and they have had dearly-bought experience

in Latvia and Slovakia with types of contract that were not flexible

enough. Systems have been introduced in both the Netherlands and

France that offer bonuses for prolonging contracts – military service in

both Latvia and the Netherlands entitles soldiers to acquire

competencies during their term of service that can be used in civilian

life.

Keep a conscription-type window open for young people who are

interested – it can be used to watch in both directions!

The final year of conscription in Latvia and Slovakia was the most

popular ever. Assessments from both countries indicate that the young

people saw it as their last chance to try out life in the armed forces in a

non-binding manner before conscription was suspended. One-year

contracts, which are easy to terminate for both parties after the first

year, have been retained in France. In practice this means that both

parties can look each other over before a binding contract is signed or

the young people are sent out on international missions. The shortest

possible contract term in the Netherlands is two years and this is the

only country where it has been stated that the quality of its forces has

deteriorated and that training procedures must be adapted because the

professionals are less intellectually able than conscripts were

previously. It must be remembered, however, that the selection of

conscripts in the Netherlands was extremely elitist so that the

alternative to conscripting only the most highly educated would

inevitably result in a decline in standards.

Assumption 2:

Conscription, international operations and national defence.

Professional armed forces are capable of performing a greater number

of and more complex international tasks than conscript-based forces.

Statements from all countries indicate that the ability to perform

INTOPS has improved, and the opinion in France, Slovakia and Latvia is

that the quality of their soldiers has generally improved. This is due,

among other things, to the fact that soldiers can now focus on their

core military tasks in a goal-oriented manner and training can take the

time necessary. Professional forces are therefore better able to operate

advanced equipment and the increased participation in INTOPS means

that equipment is modern and well functioning. Furthermore, the

military units can be set up and trained together to a greater extent,

which is important for esprit de corps and cooperation, and ensures

that the soldiers are all familiar with each other, their own tasks and

the tasks to be performed by the units. In the Netherlands, however, it

has been necessary to change the training system in the military

because the soldiers who are recruited generally have shorter and

lower levels of education than was the case with conscripts.78

But

statements from the Netherlands indicate that the conditions for

performing INTOPS have improved after the suspension of conscription.

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It is not possible to maintain military reserves in a professional

military to the same extent as with conscript-based forces.

There has been concern in all four countries studied regarding the

consequences of suspending conscription for national defence. This

problem has been handled in different ways, but it appeared in all cases

that the further training of reservists was either inadequate or non-

existent. This makes it probable that reservists have rather had

symbolic value than real military significance. None of the people

interviewed expressed concern about the development in the armed

forces' contribution to total defence after the suspension of

conscription since conscription in these countries was focused on

establishing a classic national defence.

If conscription is once discontinued, it will be extremely difficult to

reintroduce it.

If the structure on which a standardised conscript training programme

is based is once dismantled, not only will professional expertise be lost,

but the entire support structure in the form of uniforms, equipment,

weapons, stores will also disappear as will, not least, the garrisons and

training grounds that are necessary to train a large volume of

conscripts79. Experience from the countries studied shows that this

entire structure must be phased out rapidly in order to finance the

change to professional armed forces – including establishing recruiting

offices, acquiring new equipment, and possibly higher wages for the

professionals. The most decisive element is probably the physical

structure in the form of training grounds and garrisons. If these

facilities are first sold off, it will be extremely difficult to reverse the

development because, in all probability, it would make it necessary to

nationalise private property and confiscate nature reserves and similar

areas, and institute huge capital expenditure to reintroduce

conscription. Weapons and boots could be acquired relatively easily

while the training structure could also be left open in the professional

armed forces (which must naturally also perform training). So,

reacquiring barracks and training grounds would be the financially

weightiest and most difficult investments.

Assumption 3:

Conscription, transparency and social cohesion.

Conscription plays an important role as a link between the military and

the rest of the population, and there should be goal-oriented plans to

maintain this connection if conscription is suspended.

There was concern in all of the four countries studied with regard to

how the abolition or suspension of conscription would affect the

public's view of the military. A dedicated effort was therefore made in

all four countries to ensure the continued profiling of the military

through various initiatives. These measures worked, and the status of

the military was therefore not influenced in a negative, but rather a

positive, direction. Another recurring feature was that the professional

military cadre – after initial opposition – views the reforms as a

success. It was emphasised in all four countries that the role of

conscription as a link between the military and the rest of the

population is among the most important considerations to take into

account in connection with discontinuing conscription. Initiatives such

as the Youth Corps and summer camps, for instance, addressed to

young people were favourably received in Latvia and Slovakia, and

"Citizens' Day", with the mandatory participation of both sexes in

France and the centrally imposed military "open house arrangements"

in all countries can provide inspiration. "Veterans' Day" in the

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Netherlands fulfilled a function by drawing attention to the armed

forces and national unity around the nation's military contribution.

Assumption 4:

Conscription, justice and rights.

The concept of civic duty is not influenced by suspending conscription.

This is because the civilian population generally feels there is a

connection between duty and rights – and if special rights do not

accompany the special duty constituted by conscription, it is difficult to

discern the meaning of a duty. Furthermore, a majority of the

population believes that responsibility for the educative function and

upbringing in general lies with parents and the school system.

Subsidiary conclusion:

This study of four assumptions about conscription shows that the

central challenges that would be presented by discontinuing

conscription are connected with economy and capability. Economically,

professionalising the armed forces would require a number of initial

costs, which could partly be financed through savings on the

operational structure. Where recruitment and pay are concerned, an

increase in costs can be expected, but the greatest burden can be

expected to come from the additional costs consequent on participating

in international operations. This is due to the fact that fully

professional armed forces are capable of committing to such operations

more frequently and in more demanding scenarios than conscript-

based forces.

On the other hand, the study shows that there is no automatic

connection between suspending conscription and alienating the armed

forces from the population as a whole. But ensuring the connection

between professional armed forces and the civilian population requires

conscious prioritisation and careful planning. However, the study also

shows that the reputation of the armed forces improves with the

discontinuation of conscription. This is not least due to the fact that the

element of duty is seen as unjust when only a very small part of the

population is liable for conscription.

On the basis of this, the conclusion of the report will focus on the

connection between economy, recruitment, and military capability

because the influence of conscription on social cohesion, and the view

of the significance of the armed forces and conscription for the concept

of civic duty is only discussed at a general level. The conclusion will

similarly summarise the experience gained in the four countries that

could be of particular value for Denmark.

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09 Conclusion and

perspectives

Deciding whether there should be conscription in Denmark is a political

issue. As can be seen from the introductory sections of this report,

conscription is an institution which, over and above its purely military

function, serves a number of other practical and symbolic purposes.

The debate on conscription should therefore also include elements

other than those regarding how it would be possible to procure and

organise military forces after having suspended conscription.

Otherwise, there is a risk of overlooking the potential for developing

conscription and the functions it fulfils. As Pertti Joenniemi writes:

"There is, of course, no denying that conscription in its modern tapping

has had its day. To put it mildly, it is not booming as a system of

manpower recruitment, although it can also be stated that there exists

more options for the system than merely remaining on the scene in its

traditional form or going totally down the drain. The matter is not one

of either-or." 80

All deliberations should include the fact that conscription manifests

itself in a unique context in every country that has or has had it. As

Henning Sørensen's analysis shows, the Danish conscription model has

already been adapted to the ambition that the armed forces must be

able to contribute to international operations. It is also far removed

from the Norwegian and Swedish models, which to a far greater extent

focus on national defence and – he argues – on maintaining a popular

base for the military.81

The four countries studied thus represent four different political

inheritances, and these political differences lead to military traditions

that it is difficult to compare and that imply completely different

historical narratives on conscription and its significance. We cannot

therefore transfer experience or conclusions from the four countries

direct to Denmark, but we can observe the challenges the countries

were faced with and derive inspiration for our own debate on the

advantages, disadvantages, limitations and opportunities of a military

system with or without conscription.

The decision to suspend conscription in all four countries was part of a

broader vision for the armed forces. Where Latvia and Slovakia were

concerned, the goal was first and foremost NATO membership, as it was

expressed in the Membership Action Plans. The decision was thereby

made as part of a complete reorientation of security policy in the two

countries. Where France was concerned, the first Gulf War in 1991 was

an eye-opener as it prompted an analysis of the organisation of the

armed forces. Experience thus led directly to the recommendations in

the 1994 white paper to reduce the duration of conscription which,

based on the subsequent debate, paved the way for the decision to

professionalise the armed forces. In the Netherlands, the findings of a

commission led to the debate that resulted in the decision to suspend

conscription. This was thus a question in all four countries of a

compromise with broad support as a follow-up to a national vision of

reorganising the armed forces to handle new tasks. The debate on the

role of conscription should therefore not be held in isolation from a

general debate regarding what the armed forces should be used for. The

problem hereby resembles the deliberations regarding the future

Danish need for an air force – including fighter planes – which similarly

requires a general analytical, progressive approach, as pointed out in

Henrik Østergaard Breitenbauch's report "Kompas og kontrakt"

(Compass and contract) on the need for a Danish national security

strategy.82

The debate should also include the fact that the experience from all

four countries studied shows that conscripts are unable to perform all

of the tasks that are required in consideration of the focus of modern

warfare and contemporary focus on international operations. There

were thus deliberations in all countries regarding the extent to which

conscription could be continued in a reduced timespan of three to six

months. The conclusion in all of them was that conscription tied up

such a large share of military resources in the form of manpower in the

training structure, equipment and building structure that it was

necessary to discontinue it and release these resources so that they

could fulfil their military objectives.

The study thus shows more specifically that by reforming their armed

forces through the discontinuation of conscription, states find that they

can send out a larger proportion of their forces on international

operations, and that the ability of these forces to perform these

international tasks is improved. It also shows, however, that there is a

series of costs attendant on professionalising the military and that the

goal – enhanced ability to enter into international operations – also

leads to higher costs in the longer term.

The most important military point in the report is therefore that

professionalising the armed forces increases the quality of soldiers and

the general ability to send out troops to international operations. This

is first and foremost because technological developments and the

complexity of international operations make greater demands on

training soldiers that requires a goal-oriented effort on the part of the

armed forces as a whole – and focuses on tasks in the international

environment. The unanimous assessment in the four countries studied

was that these requirements could not be fulfilled within the actual

duration of conscription and that prolonging the duration of

conscription to a length that would make the necessary training

possible was not politically viable. Experience has also shown that

professional armed forces vis-à-vis conscript-based forces can to a

greater extent be mustered and deployed together – which offers a

number of military advantages in the form of esprit de corps, unified

training and personal knowledge of specific individual relationships

between soldiers.

Furthermore, the fact that the task of training conscripts kept a

significant part of the military organisation in a paradigm where the

focus was on putting conscripts through a brief course of training for

national defence purposes should not be underestimated. This meant

that major areas of the military training organisation devoted their

mind-set to optimising training for national defence and the ongoing

development, evaluation, and adjustment of basic military training

thereby received most of its input from conscripts who had never

intended to enter the professional cadre and therefore focused on

national defence. By discontinuing conscription it was possible to focus

on professional soldiers where basic military training was concerned –

and all development, evaluation and adjustment of training measures

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were therefore performed in the knowledge that, when their training

was completed, the soldiers would have to be capable of carrying out

complex tasks – also in international surroundings. This paradigm shift

(from the focus of basic training being on national defence to focus on

international operations) meant that the organisation could direct its

undivided attention towards a single task instead of two tasks and

thereby focus on the development of doctrine, for instance, and

acquiring equipment for international operations, without expending

energy on processing input which would support training for national

defence to a greater extent.

The most important economic point in the report is that

professionalising the military with the aim of committing more forces

to international operations led to more expenditure on the military.

This is not necessarily because maintaining professional armed forces

is more expensive than maintaining conscript-based forces – certainly

not if neither of them were used for any purpose. Paradoxically, the

reason for the higher expenditure is probably rather that professional

forces will actually be able to perform the tasks that politicians give the

modern military. As preparation for and participation in international

operations is far more expensive than the traditional drawing up of

national defence forces, more intensive participation in international

operations would in itself increase the costs of the armed forces. This

general development depends on whether or not there is conscription –

but when professionalisation proves to increase capability, the problem

becomes more acute. The greater applicability of professional forces

could present decision-makers with a dilemma because investments in

enhanced military efficiency will be unprofitable if the heightened

capability is not used. To return to the example of the four-wheel drive

vehicle, the Danish family could end up by selling their family car in

order to buy the vehicle which, while it might be decorative in the

garage, they would be inclined to leave there because it is too

expensive to fill up.

So, irrespective of whether the Danish conscription model has already

been optimised to prioritise international operations, full

professionalisation could exchange the approximately 2,150 conscript

man-years for professional forces – and this would unavoidably change

capability.

Another important point involves recruitment. Conscription has

traditionally been seen as an effective instrument from which the

military can acquire a constant flow of professional soldiers. The study

shows that this could probably be done equally well without

conscription. On the other hand, it would require sharper focus on

establishing employment criteria and on testing and screening

applicants. It would be necessary to develop testing systems that could

efficiently and rapidly measure applicants' skills against well-defined

criteria and establish terms of employment that resulted in retaining

them. In this connection, it is also the case that conscription today

fulfils an important function as, in its current form, it provides the

military with a four-month window through which it is possible to

observe and evaluate potential soldiers who could be employed under

contract, and allows potential soldiers to try out life in the military. If

conscription is discontinued, careful consideration should be given to

how it would be possible to create a similar trial period contractually –

with the help of short-term contracts with a mutually non-binding

termination clause, for instance. Furthermore, it would probably be

necessary to find more money for recruitment campaigns and perhaps

higher wages and more costs as incentives for professional forces.

The study also shows that that it is a mistake to become hypnotised by

the function of conscription as a recruiting mechanism. If there is a

wish to maintain an economically and professionally well balanced

military force, it is at least equally important to be able to retain

soldiers once they have been recruited and trained. Even the most

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efficient recruiting mechanism will run into major challenges and a

cumulative problem if the armed forces lose personnel at high speed.

The more people who resign prematurely, the greater the burden of

recruitment, and dissatisfied personnel would spread the story of why

they resigned and thereby contribute to the picture of an unsatisfactory

workplace – which could influence the public's general view of the

armed forces and that of the specific target groups recruits are to be

found in. Just as with a serious wound, the thing to do is stop the

bleeding as quickly as possible – the problem cannot be solved solely

with the help of blood transfusions. Retaining people and recruitment

are two sides of the same coin, namely maintaining the workforce.

The study also shows that "Citizens' Day" (as in France) and

maintaining a draft register (as in the Netherlands) provide military

recruitment staff with access to databases for direct-mail campaigns.

Irrespective of whether conscription in Denmark remains unchanged in

the future, is suspended, or adjusted, consideration should be given to

extending "Armed Forces' Day" to include young people of both sexes

and to use the arrangement to register interested women in a database

for the purpose of performing direct-mail campaigns. Experience shows

that the view of conscription as unjust was a strong argument for

discontinuing it. If conscription is maintained in Denmark, an effort

should be made to prevent it from appearing unjust by ensuring the

equality of young people of both sexes.

Furthermore, experience from Latvia and Slovakia shows that a goal-

oriented effort in relation to young people can lead to good results

where recruitment is concerned. This could take the form of the military

making an active contribution to open-air activities such as scouts'

camps. Initiatives of this kind, however, pose a number of political and

ethical questions and it is doubtful whether the experience from Latvia

and Slovakia in its specific form could be transferred to Denmark.

Where national defence is concerned, suspending conscription would

gradually lead to a reduction in reservists. This caused some concern in

the Netherlands, Latvia and Slovakia, but less in France. However, the

decision was made with open eyes in all countries – and in this

connection prioritising the ability to play an effective role at a high

level in international operations weighed more heavily than prioritising

the ability to draw up a national defence force. These countries have

hereby placed their security in the hands of their allies to a greater

extent. In the light of the historically long early-warning period and

what has become dramatically reduced conscript training and the

increasing demands made on soldiers on the modern battlefield, the

value of reservists is estimated to be limited under any circumstances.

Technological developments therefore present not only modern

military forces with challenges when they are sent out on international

operations, they also make it highly doubtful whether it would ever be

possible for a conscript-based military to be mobilised, trained and

deployed before the battle had been lost and the war ended.

No concerns were voiced in any of the countries regarding the

suspension of conscription in relation to the total defence of their

countries, and only in the Netherlands has specific legislation been

enacted on re-conscription in connection with such events as natural

catastrophes, for instance. This could be due to the fact that the total

defence in these countries is organised in essentially different ways

and places completely different emphasis on the role of the armed

forces in this area. As Denmark, however, has placed great emphasis on

the ability of the armed forces to help to perform tasks connected with

total defence, careful consideration should be given to how a change in

or discontinuation of conscription would influence the performance of

this task. This would make it an obvious step to look into which synergy

effects could be obtained by linking the remaining military purpose of

conscription – namely preparing conscripts to perform military-related

tasks in the total defence system – more permanently to the other

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military elements in the total defence system. This would first and

foremost mean a more central role for the Home Guard.

If there is a will to maintain conscription in Denmark, and if this is

justified by the need for resources for total defence, consideration could

be given to transferring part or all of the organisation of conscript

training to the Home Guard where volunteers are already trained in

disciplines and at a level that do not differ dramatically from the

training that conscripts receive.

A solution of this kind, as described by Christian Brøndum in his article

in Berlingske Tidende, could comprise the armed forces calling up

conscripts and handling the first part of their training, after which the

Home Guard could take responsibility for the remainder, which could

target their being drawn up in the total defence system,83

a suggestion

which would mean the armed forces were still visible to conscripts.

Furthermore, considerations could also include the possibility that this

solution would enable armed forces' personnel to be used during those

periods when they were not taking part in international operations, but

the model is problematic. This is because a period lasting only four

months would mean that transferring conscripts between two

authorities alone would be a heavy administrative burden. It would be

necessary to maintain the organisation and structure to train

conscripts both in the armed forces and the Home Guard and it would

probably require additional resources to perform the administrative

transfer of about 6,300 people a year between the two authorities.84

In

addition, this thinking is symptomatic of conscript-based national

defence. And if conscriprion was discontinued there would be no need

to search for tasks for the forces between the periods of deployment to

international operations: A professionalised military that takes part in

international operations would have enough to do recovering after

missions or planning and preparation for the next mission. There would

be no need to maintain conscription as a “gap-filler” between missions.

Another, more far-reaching model could be to place the entire

conscription period under the Home Guard. This is particularly

appropriate if the most important function of conscription is still seen

to be the maintenance of a force of reservists who can be drawn up in

the total defence system. This would make it possible for conscript

training to be planned, organised, performed and checked in a goal-

oriented manner with the aim of drawing up conscripts for the total

defence system – and under the same authority. In the long term, this

would make it possible to obtain the greatest rationalisation benefits

because complete training in the Home Guard would to a great extent

make it possible to utilise the existing administration, training

structure, buildings and support facilities. Over and above enhancing

the role of the Home Guard in the total defence system and its public

profile, a solution of this kind would ensure that training conscripts for

tasks in the total defence system could be coordinated to the optimum

and would also maintain conscription as a recruitment base for the

armed forces. Additionally, it would allow the armed forces to

concentrate on the operative tasks of preparing and performing

international operations. The costs of basic training for conscripts

would be defrayed by the Home Guard where there is already basic

military training, and it would clarify what conscription actually costs

society as the appropriations for the armed forces and the Home Guard

would necessarily require adjustment after the changes in their

complex of tasks. It would also maintain an opportunity for young

people to try out military life at the same time as it would be possible to

assess their ability to pursue a professional career in collaboration with

the Home Guard. For the armed forces, a scheme of this kind would

make it possible to concentrate efforts on preparing and performing

international operations.

It is considered that conscription under the auspices of the Home Guard

would also make it possible to maintain the recruitment base for the

Page 59 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

armed forces. However, this would make it necessary for conscripts to

consider service in the Home Guard as part of their common military

reality. This could be achieved, for instance, by allowing the armed

forces' personnel to teach modules or entire courses in connection with

conscript training or lending out instructors. The armed forces could

teach a module on "international operations", for example. It is felt to

be less complicated, however, to maintain a close link between

conscription and posting on international operations if this remains

with the armed forces rather than it being performed by the Home

Guard. It would therefore be much more appropriate for the Home

Guard to perform the entire training course for conscripts in relation to

these deliberations.

If allowing the Home Guard to take over responsibility for conscription

in whole or in part is considered, deliberations on this should include

which purpose conscription and the Home Guard are expected to serve

in the future. This also indicates a need for a unified strategic vision for

the armed forces.

Two other functions of conscription are looked into in greater detail in

this report. The first, the significance of conscription in creating

transparency and social cohesion, was paid close attention to in the

reform processes of all four countries investigated. The study shows

that assessments of the image of the armed forces were carried out in

all of them – and that all of these assessments indicated that the image

had been enhanced after the discontinuation of conscription. Goal-

oriented and structured campaigns were also carried out in all four

countries – in the form of "open house arrangements", for instance, and

"Veterans' Day" and, in this connection, the military units were all

directed to carry out local attention-attracting arrangements. In

summary, this was regarded in the four countries as a important area

to carry out measures in – if conscription were discontinued – but

neither those asked, nor the general developments in society, indicated

that the reorganisation had been of consequence for the cohesion of the

state.

The other function investigated in the study was the element of duty in

conscription. That is, the extent to which importance should be ascribed

to conscription as a civic duty and whether suspending conscription

basically influences the public's view of the relationship between rights

and duties. The study shows that in all four countries, one of the two

common central decision-making parameters was that conscription

affected people unevenly and unjustly. (The other common central

decision-making parameter was the desire to send out more forces on

international operations). As only a small percentage of young people

from a particular year were called up, it appeared odd to talk about

duty. And as those called up were sorted by gender and qualifications,

at the same time as the national economy was running in top gear, the

view of conscription as unjust was exacerbated.

With regard to timing, experience from the four countries showed that

when and how conscription was discontinued was not unimportant. If

the reform is carried out during a period of favourable economic

development, the armed forces would appear as a new player on a

market where competition for young people was fierce and ruthless. In

such a situation, a concerted effort to recruit the young people it

needed would have to be made even at the most experienced company

– and, in this connection, the armed forces would lose out to companies

that could adjust wages. Experience from the four countries shows that

job security, development and career opportunities, and a prestigious

job are all incentives it would be more realistic for the armed forces to

play up.

Furthermore, attention must also be paid to demographic

developments. Suspending conscription during a period when the

number of young people from a particular year is declining will in itself

Page 60 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

lead to heightened competition for these people. If this coincides with

economic growth into the bargain, it will present recruitment staff with

an extremely challenging task.

One of the more innovative and successful measures highlighted in this

conclusion is the Dutch model for acquiring operating teams that

specialise in combat surgery. It must be possible to find a broader

application for the idea of entering into a mutually-binding

collaboration with the private sector or other elements of the public

sector in order to acquire specialised professional groups – and this is

not necessarily connected with making a decision on the future of

conscription. In the specific case, this is a question of a contract that

obliges hospitals to provide the armed forces with operating teams at a

given term of notice and on agreed terms in return for the armed forces

paying the wages of the operating teams. The model can therefore be

used directly in areas that, under domestic conditions, are covered by

instances other than the armed forces, but where the armed forces are

obliged to take over the task during international operations (e.g. also

dentists). Consideration should also be given to whether the model

could also be adapted to other areas where the armed forces perform

tasks under domestic conditions, but where the extent of the task, its

urgency or character, changes during international operations – for

instance workshop and maintenance tasks that do not necessarily

require a military background. Depending on the status the people in

question are given when they are sent out on international operations,

the concept is to a greater or lesser extent related to the use of what are

known as private military companies that perform tasks in mission

areas in return for payment so that the military need not use soldiers to

perform them. The Dutch model might possibly provide an opportunity

to avoid some of the problems connected with the use of private

military companies and to make agreements with professionals in

areas these companies do not cover.

Over and above the authors' conclusions, this conclusion also includes

two pieces of good advice that the people interviewed in all countries

pointed out on their own initiative:

First, conscription should not be abolished − it should only be put on

standby. This maintains the constitutional possibility of reintroducing

it, which makes good sense. Over the years, several countries have

discontinued and then reintroduced conscription – among them Great

Britain and the USA – but where most countries are concerned,

amending the constitution requires either a referendum or at least a

large parliamentary majority.

Second, and this piece of advice may appear to contradict the first, it

should be noted that once conscription has been discontinued, there is

broadly speaking no way out. History naturally shows that conscription

can certainly be reintroduced – but the cost of doing so for a society

that lacks manpower and when there is only a small number of young

people from a particular year – would be enormous. It would not only

make it necessary to regain lost expertise and change the culture of the

professional armed forces (which would differ from conscript-based

forces), it would also be necessary to made huge investments in

equipment, uniforms, weapons, exercise grounds and buildings.

Whether or not conscription should continue in Denmark is, as

mentioned above, a political question. And this is due to the fact that

the significance of conscription outreaches its formal military function.

Today, this formal function comprises training personnel who can form

part of a force of 12,000 men for total defence. Conscription in its

present form does not produce soldiers who are ready for combat, but it

does help to draw young people's attention to the armed forces.

Recruitment to the armed forces thereby has an important, relevant

function. However, there are also many costs connected with it in the

form of a training structure, buildings, administration and logistics.

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Consequently, the training structure ties up a large number of the

armed forces' most experienced personnel – who are not preparing

purposefully to take part in international operations, but on the

contrary, are booking shooting ranges and preparing teaching materials

when they could be on their way to international operations instead. It

also follows that each year, the armed forces finance approximately

2,150 conscript man-years distributed between about 6,300 young men.

But each year, the armed forces send home about 75 percent – or a total

of 5,000 of them – without them signing contracts. Payroll costs and

board for conscripts who are sent home without signing contracts alone

amount to at least DKK 250 million a year and to this must be added

the costs of billeting and training as well as a considerable amount of

administration.85 This money could be spent instead on making service

in the armed forces as a professional more attractive and thereby help

to retain highly-qualified and experienced soldiers. If an enlisted

private with five years seniority prolongs his contract, important

expertise is retained that it would take several years to regain through

recruitment, training, and posting abroad. In this sense, successfully

retaining personnel is more cost-effective than recruitment. If this fails,

the armed forces lose expertise that is at present compensated for by

recruiting new soldiers. Focusing on recruitment rather than on

retaining personnel therefore leads to the view that the military is

dependent on conscription. This view can prevent new thinking in

relation to the overall manpower situation in the armed forces. Such

new thinking could range from specific incentives designed to retain

personnel to work on creating an organisational culture that

corresponds to politicians' visions for the armed forces.

A rigid view of conscription must not be allowed to stand in the way of

the progressive development of the armed forces.

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10 Recommendations

The question as to whether conscription in Denmark should be

suspended, modified, or retained is outside the perspectives of this

report. The recommendations therefore fall into three categories:

recommendations that should be given consideration if conscription is

discontinued; recommendations that are relevant if it is maintained in

some form or other; and finally, recommendations that are relevant

irrespective of whether conscription is discontinued or maintained.

Recommendations independent of whether conscription is

discontinued or maintained in Denmark

Prepare a national security strategy.

A national security strategy would help politicians to organise

professional armed forces that are well balanced in relation to visions

and goals, as well as threats and opportunities. The future of

conscription could thereby be clarified for politicians as part of an

overall evaluation of the opportunities and limitations it provides for

the role of the armed forces and an assessment of its other functions in

society.

Maintain "Armed Forces' Day" – and let it include both sexes.

Maintaining "Armed Forces' Day", based on the French model "Citizens'

Day" (which includes both sexes) would give the armed forces the

opportunity to prepare a direct-mailing list of all young people in the

recruitment target group. Extending "Armed Forces' Day" to include

both sexes could only be seen by politicians and the public as just and

in line with Danish efforts on behalf of gender equality. Irrespective of

whether conscription is maintained or discontinued in Denmark, men

and women should be regarded as equally qualified – and women are

therefore entitled to the same purposeful orientation on the armed

forces and the same job offers as men.

Recruitment to and retaining personnel in the armed forces should to a

greater degree be seen as two sides of the same coin.

If the armed forces are more successful at retaining personnel this

would save money not only on recruitment, but on training as well. The

Armed Forces' Personnel Service should therefore work on the basis of

flexible budgets that make it possible to reorder the priorities between

training personnel and recruitment. It might be more cost-effective to

cancel recruiting campaigns and spend the money on bonus schemes

for specialists instead.

Age composition in the armed forces should be adapted to the tasks

that are to be performed.

Experience from France and the Netherlands shows that professional

armed forces are better served if manual-level personnel are employed

for an average of eight years. Consequently, very short-term

employment is not financially viable, but it would also mean that

professional armed forces would need fewer administrative jobs and

training positions that are used in conscript-based forces as classic

"withdrawal" posts. Professional armed forces also need fewer lifelong

jobs and this would bring about a need for schemes designed to

facilitate reabsorption into society. Age composition should also be

given close consideration in conscript-based armed forces – regardless

of whether or not a career in the armed forces begins with conscription.

A complex of tasks that is very physically demanding would make it

necessary to have more 25 year-old than 55 year-old personnel.

The "Dutch hospital model" should be tried out in Denmark – and be

enlarged with functions other than a surgeon's team.

An investigation should be carried out in the armed forces to see if

there are areas in which contracts could be signed with the business

community or public sector institutions that oblige them to provide the

armed forces with technical specialists at a given term of notice and on

agreed terms in return for the armed forces defraying payroll costs. A

scheme of this kind would help to make the armed forces more flexible

in areas that require a high degree of specialisation, but where the need

to man specialised functions under "barracks conditions" in Denmark is

limited.

There should be a "Veterans' Day" in Denmark.

The armed forces' image in the four countries investigated was

enhanced after the suspension of conscription, but great attention was

paid to the challenge of maintaining contact between the public and the

armed forces. Professional armed forces that primarily perform tasks

outside the borders of a country will need to celebrate their own heroes

while emphasising their links with the population as a whole. A

"Veterans' Day" could contribute to this. A scheme of this kind could be

used as a marketing measure that would help to "brand" the armed

forces and provide an opportunity to strengthen the image of the

individual soldier.

The Danish armed forces should be allowed to make an active, visible

contribution to youth activities with a military strain such as scouts'

camps and sports arrangements.

Even though the models in Latvia and Slovakia described above could

not be directly transferred to Denmark under existing conditions, it is

not unthinkable that the armed forces could increase their visibility

among young people – through "branding" the armed forces' sports

culture, for instance, by directly and indirectly supporting open-air

activities. Such activities could strengthen the profile of the armed

forces with regard to the target group for recruitment.

Recommendations if conscription is discontinued in Denmark:

Do not abolish conscription – simply put it on standby.

Putting conscription on standby maintains a constitutional opportunity

to reintroduce it. A change in the constitution would therefore not be

necessary. In addition, the standby option – at least at a symbolic level

– would maintain the connection between the public and the armed

forces. A solution of this kind would make it easier for politicians to

reintroduce conscription if this should be appropriate and the duty to

take part in defending the country in cases of crises or wars would

continue to have a place in the minds of the public.

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Make a greater effort to strengthen recruitment – this should include a

bigger organisation and more money.

Experience shows that more money is necessary to market the armed

forces as a workplace and that the recruitment organisation must be

enlarged when conscription is discontinued. In connection with

recruiting campaigns, account should also be taken of the fact that

experience shows that when conscription is discontinued, the armed

forces attract a higher proportion of female applicants. A greater effort

to recruit people would mean that more money would have to be set

aside for this purpose and new methods of screening applicants

developed.

Establish clear purposes and goals for the armed forces – create

balance between ways and means.

It would be possible for professional armed forces to perform a larger

number of and more advanced military tasks than could conscript-

based forces. Therefore, this makes it even more important for

politicians to balance their priorities and objectives in accordance with

a general strategy.

Make the decision at a time when competition for manpower is

declining.

Experience shows that a coincidence between a small number of young

people from a particular year and a lack of manpower get

professionalisation off to a poor start. An effort should therefore be

made to implement any abolition or suspension during a period when

this would create as little as possible turmoil in the armed forces and

the business community.

Create flexible contracts that offer young people the opportunity to try

out life in the armed forces before they bind themselves for a longer

period of time and would also make it possible for the armed forces to

evaluate them.

One-year contracts have proved to be very suitable in creating a

broader view of matters for both parties. In practice, such a contract

term would resemble the conscription models that were current in

Denmark during the 1990s – but with the great difference that all

participants would be volunteers.

Pay close attention to the relationship between the population and the

armed forces.

Make open-house arrangements and other attention-creating activities

established production targets for military units. In addition to public

support, visibility and transparency also give results in the form of

higher recruitment. Consider activities that address young people in

particular, for instance – and hold a "Veterans' Day" at which soldiers

who have returned from international operations and veterans are

celebrated.

Establish cost-benefit balances for terms of service and try to design a

motivation structure in accordance with these.

If, for instance, it proves to be the case that eight years is the optimum

term of employment in a given function, the incentive structure should

be arranged in accordance with this. A bonus could perhaps be given

after five years and another after eight years to those who prolong their

contracts and comply with the terms of these. This would dramatically

reduce training costs in the armed forces − and the level of experience

among personnel would also rise.

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Recommendations if conscription is maintained in Denmark:

Transfer conscription to the Home Guard.

A partial transfer to the Home Guard would possibly ensure a more

goal-oriented training effort in the direction of a total defence system.

However, it would unavoidably lead to doubling-up on some

administrative and logistics functions and it would only release limited

resources in the armed forces. Savings would therefore also be limited.

On the other hand, transferring the entire conscription system to the

Home Guard would concentrate the responsibility for training and

drawing up reservists in a total defence system and relieve the armed

forces of a heavy burden, so that it would be possible focus on

international tasks and military training proper. Unlike a partial

transfer, a complete transfer would make it possible to utilise the

existing training structure in the Home Guard and possibly also ensure

a higher utilisation rate of the Home Guard's facilities.

A scheme of this kind would release armed forces' personnel so that

they could become part of the operative structure which is at present

tied up with training reservists for the total defence system. In addition,

all of the armed forces could focus on development and training in

connection with their operative tasks and international operations.

Extend both "Armed Forces' Day" and conscription to include both

sexes.

There is no practical obstacle to women doing military service and no

rational reason why women should not take part in Armed Forces' Day.

Experience has shown that the view of conscription as unjust is a

powerful argument for discontinuing it. If there is a desire in Denmark

to maintain conscription, an effort should be made to prevent it from

being seen as unjust, so young people of both sexes should be placed

on an equal footing. This would improve opportunities for the armed

forces to market their training with regard to women and could result in

broadening the group of applicants. For the public, it would mean

gender equality in the area of conscription.

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11 Appendix

Interview guide: Defence without conscription

Intro

•

Short presentation of the persons representing DIMS and DIMS

as an Institution.

•

Tell where the report will be published and what purpose the

report is hoped to serve.

•

The topic in our report is ”Defence without Conscription”.

Foreign experiences with abolition of conscription”. Theoretical

articles. Your ”story” is giving the theoretical a face by painting

a picture of the debates, arguments and motives, which were

behind your decision before you decided to abolish

conscription.

•

The experiences you are telling us about don’t need to be your

own. It can also be knowledge about the process you have heard

about from other people involved in the process.

Name

Rank/job

Institution

What role/position did the interviewed person have during the abolition

of conscription?

Questions

We would like to begin this interview with some questions regarding

the organisation of the conscripts system you had before abolition.

Please tell us a little about the demographic in regard to

conscription before abolition.

•

Did conscription apply to both genders? If not: was there any

special arrangement for those not included in the draft?

•

At what minimum age could conscripts be drafted?

•

What was the total number of personnel/youths potentially

available for conscription? (Please provide details of the

development over the last ten years of conscription.)

•

What was the total number of youths potentially fit for

conscription? (Please provide details of the development over

the last ten years of conscription.)

•

How many conscripts were actually drafted per year? (Please

provide details of the development over the last ten years of

conscription.)

How was the conscription system organised before the abolition?

What was the total number of man-year available from conscription?

How and how much were conscripts paid? (Please provide models and

details of development over time.)

•

What was the duration of conscription when it was abolished?

And have the duration changed in the last 10 years? If yes: How

has it changed?

•

Please describe if there were any forms of mechanisms to avoid

conscription available? (E.g. moral considerations.)

•

For how long (if possible) and until what age could conscription

be postponed?

•

Please describe what mechanisms and reasons were valid for

postponing conscription (E.g. educational considerations.)

What was the role of the conscripts in the armed forces?

•

Did conscription provide personnel for other services than the

military sector? If yes: which?

•

How was conscripts organised – in units with only conscripts or

in mixed units?

•

Were conscripts allowed to fill in functional duties in regular

military units (i.e. provide regular military service) or were they

only allowed to go through training?

•

Were conscripts trained or enrolled as NCOs, or in the officer

corps (as regulars or reserves) while conscripted?

Please tell us a little about conscription and re-drafting before the

abolition of conscription.

•

How often could conscripts be legally re-drafted after their

initial duty?

•

How often were they actually re-drafted? (Please provide details

of the development.)

•

What was the maximum age, maximum number of re-drafts and

maximum time that conscripts were obliged to serve after their

initial duty?

We would like to hear how conscription and INTOPS was organised

before the abolition.

•

Were conscripts obliged to serve in national operations outside

national territory as part of their initial duty? (Please provide

details.)

•

Were conscripts allowed to serve in national operations outside

national territory as part of their initial duty? (Please provide

details.)

•

Were conscripts obliged to serve in international operations as

part of their initial duty?

•

Were conscripts allowed to serve in international operations as

part of their initial duty?

•

If conscripts were obliged to serve in international operations:

Could they then be re-drafted to take part in international

operations?

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Did the MoD encourage conscripts to sign a contract and thereby

become professional soldiers?

•

Were there special recruitment campaigns targeting conscripts

for professional military duty? (Please describe.)

•

Were there special incentives for conscripts who signed up for

professional military duty? (Please describe.)

We will now like to know something about the decision process, which

went before the final decision was taken to abolish conscription.

How was the decision process initiated?

•

Who initiated the debate for or against conscription? (Military,

politicians or the public?)

•

Were there any specific reasons why the debate started at the

given time? (Bigger focus on INTOPS etc.)

•

If possible please try to describe the arguments, motives and

reasons for and against abolition of conscription, which must

have surfaced before the decision to abolish conscription was

taken? (Were the motives economic, political, horizontal

legitimacy or something else?)

•

Who were the first people/institutions to raise these

arguments? Was it inside military, political or the general

public?

•

Did the argument about conscription seen as a question of duty

ever surface during the debate?

We will now like to know something about how the decision of

abolishing conscription was implemented.

How was the decision implemented?

•

When the decision about abolition of conscription was taken

was conscription then totally abolished by constitution or was it

put on standby?

•

If conscription was put on standby: What is the national alert

(expected time frame) to re-activate conscription?

•

If conscription was put on standby: Please describe the

considered organizational response to re-activate?

•

Under which circumstances can conscription be re-activated?

We have now heard and talked about how the conscription system was

organized before the decision to abolish conscription was taken, what

initiated the abolition process and how the decision was implemented

after the decision to abolish conscription was taken. We would now like

to hear about the situation in the armed forces after the abolition of

conscription. So please tell us about the results/consequences within

the military establishment.

What were the results/consequences within the military establishment?

•

Was the garrison structure affected? (Were garrisons or military

installations closed?)

•

Did recruitment to the professional military forces drop after

the abolition of conscription? (Please provide details of

recruitment statistics stating internal and external

recruitment.)

•

What was the development in expenses to recruitment after the

abolition of conscription?

Has the development of male-to-female ratio of professionals changed

since the abolition of conscription? If yes: how?

Page 69 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

•

How has the ability to generate troops to international

operations been affected since abolition of conscription?

Please tell us what the societal results/consequences have been since

the abolition of conscription.

In your opinion what considerations for the future military structure

and employment do the experiences with the abolition of conscription

pose?

How was and has the decision about abolition of conscription been

perceived within the society, political and military apparatus?

Have there been any forms of change of opinion within these segments

over time?

Finally we would like to know if you think there are any questions or

topics we haven’t talked about and which you regard as important.

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Page 71 of 81 Never Gonna Give You Up? Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2009

Schematic list

Questions

Recruitment/economic

Territorial

defence/International

Operations

Horizontal legitimacy

Question of duty

Please tell us a little about the

demographic in regard to conscription

before abolition.

What was the role of the

conscripts in the armed

forces?

How was the decision

process initiated?

Please tell us what the

societal

results/consequences

have been since the

abolition

of

conscription.