—"whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union's objective was preservation of work for [the primary employer's] employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere.... The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis …

"The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees."

NLRA § 8 (b)(4) is not meant to prohibit "primary activity" but rather "secondary boycotts whose `core concept'is `union pressure directed at a neutral employer the object of which [is] to induce or coerce him to cease doing business with an employer with whom the union [is] engaged in a labor dispute.'"

We cannot give probative weight to these affidavits, however, because "[s] uch statements `represent only the personal views of th [is] legislato [r], since the statements were [made] after passage of the Act.'"

Toll Bros. also contends section 2810 is preempted under Garmon because it violates the "hot cargo" ban, section 8 (e) of the NLRA (29 USC § 158 (e)), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to agree to subcontract work only to unionized subcontractors

The Act thus reflects Congress' decision to "abolis [h], for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction between primary activity between the'immediate disputants' and secondary activity in which the employer and the members of the union do not stand'in the proximate relation of employer and employee.'"

I recognize that the statements of opponents may be of limited value in discerning legislative intent.

For more than 50 years, the Supreme Court has reiterated that § 8 (e) "must be interpreted in light of the statutory setting and the circumstances surrounding its enactment [,]" in line with the " `familiar rule [] that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.'"

The Board's brief argues that, in deciding whether the agreement between the Union and the Association had a work preservation objective or instead was "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,"