The Supreme Court has "consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places

We also note that the speech in this case occurred on public streets—locations that have been "held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."

"*** We have here, then, an ordinance which gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights."

—a New York City ordinance which made it unlawful to hold public worship meetings on the streets without first obtaining a permit.

—invalidating a New York City ordinance forbidding public worship meetings on the streets without a permit because the ordinance was a prior restraint

But appellant does not rely on the overbreadth doctrine under which a person may challenge a statute that infringes protected speech even if the statute constitutionally might be applied to him.

Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.

I) t is very easy to read a statute to permit some hypothetical violation of civil rights but difficult to draft one which will not be subject to the same infirmity.

Regulation short of absolute prohibition is also invalid when expression is made dependent on state approval by the obtaining of a permit

Such unfettered discretion in imposing prior restraints on speech in public forums violates the First Amendment.