It is well-settled that the plain language of the Jencks Act precludes a court from compelling the disclosure of Jencks Act material prior to the completion of a government witness' testimony on direct examination.

The determination of whether a counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance turns in each case on the totality of facts in the entire record.

Moreover, the right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute, as is the right to assistance of counsel.

Although the disclosure of Jencks material prior to the conclusion of direct examination of the Government's witness cannot be compelled, early disclosure to obviate trial interruptions is encouraged.

—district court has broad discretion as an aspect of its inherent right and duty to manage its own calendar

In reality, the disclosure of such statements is typically made before the witness' direct examination to avoid delay in the trial.

As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "[t] he `great mass' of cases refuse to grant a severance despite [any] anticipated exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant. "

If we assume, without deciding, that this conclusion was correct, Ojeda's right to invoke his fifth amendment privilege would trump the defendant's sixth amendment right to present a defense.

Definitions of the two types of investigatory reports differ, the timing of production differs, and compliance with the statutory requirements of the Jencks Act does not necessarily satisfy the due process concerns of Brady.

—holding that trial court did not err in providing parties less than the [then-applicable] full ten-day period to file objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where exigencies existed, stating that the ten-day objections period constituted a "maximum, not a minimum

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