—had held that § 20 immunized from the antitrust laws only those union activities "directed against an employer by his own employees."

Upon the same principle, the Anti-Trust Act has been applied to the conduct of employees engaged in production.

Nor does it matter that the financing is considered to be local activity per se, for it is well settled that the federal government may under the Sherman Act regulate local commerce which is intimately related to interstate commerce or local activity which obstructs or burdens interstate commerce.

Our Supreme Court and other courts have held on many occasions that mere numbers can make wrong an otherwise innocent act

That remedy is characteristically available even though the plaintiff has not yet suffered actual injury

—in the one case, a secondary boycott, and in the other, the refusal of the union to work on a product in the hands of the purchaser, were carried on on a country-wide scale by a national labor organization, in order to induce the purchasers of a manufactured product shipped in interstate commerce to withdraw their patronage from the

Interstate commerce was the direct object of attack; and the restraint of such commerce was the necessary consequence of the acts and the immediate end in view.

So far, therefore, the case at bar is on all fours with a number of earlier decisions, except that they dealt with goods instead of services.

This court later declined to interpret the Clayton Act as manifesting a congressional purpose wholly to exempt labor unions from the Sherman Act.

And combinations and conspiracies to restrain interstate commerce, or to monopolize any part of it, are none the less within the reach of the Anti-Trust Act (15 USCA § 1 et seq.) because the conspirators seek to attain their end by means of intrastate activities.

[CITATION] Pennington v. JEWEL TEA COMPANY, Inc.