—previous Washington death penalty statute needlessly chilled defendant's right to plead not guilty and demand a jury trial

A defendant who pleaded not guilty but was later convicted after a jury trial could not be sentenced to death under the Washington aggravated murder death penalty statute, because the Washington Supreme Court in Frampton held that such a penalty would be unconstitutional, in light of the fact that only those defendants who chose to go to trial could be sentenced to …

—life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole (RCW 9A. 32.040 (2)), and life imprisonment (RCW 9A. 32.040 (3)).

In both cases, this court rejected the State's invitation to fix the statute by empanelling a sentencing jury or requiring the defendant to plead not guilty (which would have violated other principles of Washington law).

Where, pursuant to statutory procedure, the death penalty is imposed upon conviction following a plea of not guilty and a trial, but is not imposed when there is a plea of guilty, that statute is unconstitutional.

Noting that the legislative history suggested the Legislature did not intend to provide that procedure and penalty, the Supreme Court declined to judicially supply them.

By the middle of the 19th century, "hanging was the `nearly universal form of execution'in the United States. "

—the Washington state supreme court ruled that the state's death penalty statute was unconstitutional under Jackson.

In Frampton, the question was whether the then-current statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty was unconstitutional in light of our Supreme Court's decision in Martin.

Not long after the task force submitted its recommendation, the 1977 capital punishment statute was found unconstitutional as a result of Washington State Supreme Court rulings in 1980 and 1981.