"That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."

When, for example, "the presiding officers" of the House and Senate sign an enrolled bill (and the President "approve [s]" it), "its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable."

—explaining that an Act did not "in any real sense, invest the President with the power of legislation

When the plenary power of Congress and the general rule so established are regarded, it is manifest that a limitation upon the excepted class is not a delegation of legislative power.

For the same reasons, we have often refused to resolve the constitutionality of a particular provision of a statute when the constitutionality of a separate, controlling provision has been upheld.

Further, the Supreme Court of the United States has long adhered to the conclusive presumption of regularity in the enactment of laws.

"The true distinction... is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

We have not referred to a contention that because certain administrative powers to enforce the act were conferred by the statute upon the Secretary of the Treasury, therefore it was void as unwarrantedly delegating legislative authority, because we think to state the proposition is to answer it.

—it was decided that the third section of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, was not repugnant to the Constitution as conferring legislative and treaty-making power on the President, because it authorized him to suspend the provisions of the act relating to the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides.

[CITATION] Clinton v. City of New York