"The federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative, executive, or administrative branch of government."

Due process and equal protection require that inferences based on race, ethnicity, or nationality be excluded at trial so that the court does not create arbitrary and irrational state action.

Indeed, we have previously struck down as a violation of due process a state court's decision denying an individual taxpayer any practicable opportunity to contest a tax on federal constitutional grounds.

—the United States Supreme Court has declared that procedural due process is an important constitutional right that cannot be destroyed by state legislative enactment: "But, while it is for the state courts to determine the adjective as well as the substantive law of the State, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due process of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or …

"Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights."

—i) f the result above stated were attained by an exercise of the state's legislative power, the transgression of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be obvious,'and'The violation is none the less clear when that result is accomplished by the state judiciary in the course of construing an otherwise valid*** state statute.'Id., 281 US at 679—680, 50 S. Ct …

W] hile it is for the state courts to determine the adjective as well as the substantive law of the state, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due process of law

It is clear to us that the primary sense of due process is "an opportunity to be heard and to defend its substantive right."

Whether acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.

Contrariwise, once the legislature has clearly spoken, as here, forbidding the particular injunctive relief, we believe such legislation should be stricken down by the court only when a person has been deprived "of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right,"