"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."

—held that the Contract Clause applies to grants of "private" powers—such as the charter that the colonial government issued to Dartmouth—and not to grants of "political" powers—state laws affecting public institutions.

On more than one occasion, this court has expressed the cautions circumspection with which it approaches the consideration of such questions; and has declared, that in no doubtful case, would it pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution.

It is hard to imagine a constitutional guarantee that could be more inherently personal and therefore unavailable to a corporate entity, "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."

In light of Article 1, Section 10 of the US Constitution and the bright line standard established in the landmark US Supreme Court decision in

To be sure, it must be a contract concerning property, not a mere civil contract, such as that of marriage.

Such rule is stated as follows in 6 RCL § 442, p. 446: `... In fact one of the most famous and perhaps the most often quoted definition of due process of law is that of Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case

The plaintiff, like all corporations, was created by the State, and possesses only those properties which the enabling act conferred upon it

There can be no contract in which the party does not receive some personal, private, individual benefit. To make... a private contract, there must be a private beneficial interest vested in the party who pays the consideration

[CITATION] Cuomo v. CLEARING HOUSE ASSN., LLC