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==Government career==
==Government career==
In 1973, he began work in the [[Federal government of the United States|federal government]] as a management intern<ref>[[Lawrence Wright]], ''[[The Looming Tower|The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11]]'', New York: [[Alfred A. Knopf]], 2006, p.206.</ref> in the [[U.S. Department of Defense]]. Beginning in 1985, Clarke served in the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence. During the Presidential administration of [[George H.W. Bush]], as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, he coordinated diplomatic efforts to support the 1990-1991 [[Gulf War]] and the subsequent security arrangements. During the Clinton administration, Clarke became the counter-terrorism coordinator for the National Security Council. He also advised [[Madeleine Albright]] during the [[Genocide in Rwanda]], to request the UN to withdraw all UN troops from Rwanda. She refused and permitted Gen. Dallaire to keep a few hundred troops who managed to save thousands from the genocide. Later Clarke told Samantha Power “It wasn’t in American’s national interest. If we had to do the same thing today and I was advising the President, I would advise the same thing."
In 1973, he began work in the [[Federal government of the United States|federal government]] as a management intern<ref>[[Lawrence Wright]], ''[[The Looming Tower|The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11]]'', New York: [[Alfred A. Knopf]], 2006, p.206.</ref> in the [[U.S. Department of Defense]]. Beginning in 1985, Clarke served in the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence. During the Presidential administration of [[George H.W. Bush]], as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, he coordinated diplomatic efforts to support the 1990-1991 [[Gulf War]] and the subsequent security arrangements. During the Clinton administration, Clarke became the counter-terrorism coordinator for the National Security Council. He remained counter-terrorism coordinator during the first year of the George W. Bush administration, and later was the Special Advisor to the President on cybersecurity and cyberterrorism. He resigned from the Bush administration in 2003.
He directed the authoring of PDD-25<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm |title=Text of Presidential Decision Directive 25 |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |date=May 6, 1994 |accessdate=January 9, 2009}}</ref> which outlined a reduced military and economic role for the United States in Rwanda as well as future peacekeeping operations. He remained counter-terrorism coordinator during the first year of the George W. Bush administration, and later was the Special Advisor to the President on cybersecurity and cyberterrorism. He resigned from the Bush administration in 2003.


Clarke's positions inside the government have included:
Clarke's positions inside the government have included:
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** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, 1985–1988
** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, 1985–1988


===Clinton administration===
===Early warnings about Al-Qaeda threat===
Clarke advised [[Madeleine Albright]] during the [[Genocide in Rwanda]], to request the UN to withdraw all UN troops from Rwanda. She refused, but permitted Gen. Dallaire to keep a few hundred troops who managed to save thousands from the genocide. Later Clarke told Samantha Power “It wasn’t in American’s national interest. If we had to do the same thing today and I was advising the President, I would advise the same thing."
He directed the authoring of PDD-25<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm |title=Text of Presidential Decision Directive 25 |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |date=May 6, 1994 |accessdate=January 9, 2009}}</ref> which outlined a reduced military and economic role for the United States in Rwanda as well as future peacekeeping operations.

Islamists took control in [[Sudan]] in a 1989 coup d'état and the United States adopted a policy of disengagement with the authoritarian regime throughout the 1990s. After the [[September 11 attacks|September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks]], however, some critics charged that the U.S. should have moderated its policy toward Sudan earlier, since the influence of Islamists there waned in the second half of 1990s and Sudanese officials began to indicate an interest in accommodating U.S. concerns with respect to 9/11 mastermind [[Osama bin Laden]], who had been living in Sudan until he was expelled in May 1996. [[Timothy M. Carney]], U.S. ambassador to Sudan between September 1995 and November 1997, co-authored an [[op-ed]] in 2002 claiming that in 1997 Sudan offered to turn over its intelligence on bin Laden but that Rice, as NSC Africa specialist, together with the then NSC terrorism specialist Richard A. Clarke, successfully lobbied for continuing to bar U.S. officials, including the CIA and FBI, from engaging with the Khartoum government.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/103P52.htm|title=Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan|last=Carney|first=Timothy|author2=Mansoor Ijaz|date=June 30, 2002|work=The Washington Post|accessdate=December 1, 2008}} Retrieved from www.mafhoum.com/ Jan. 2015.</ref> Similar allegations (that Rice joined others in missing an opportunity to cooperate with Sudan on counterterrorism) were made by ''[[Vanity Fair (magazine)|Vanity Fair]]'' contributing editor David Rose<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2002/01/osama200201?currentPage=1|title=The Osama Files|last=Rose|first=David|date=January 2002|work=[[Vanity Fair (magazine)|Vanity Fair]]|accessdate=December 1, 2008}}</ref> and [[Richard Miniter]], author of ''Losing Bin Laden''.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.worldmag.com/articles/8206|title=Clinton did not have the will to respond|last=Belz|first=Mindy|date=November 1, 2003|work=[[World (magazine)|World]]|accessdate=December 1, 2008}}</ref>

===Bush administration===
Clarke's role as a counter-terrorism advisor in the months and years prior to [[9/11]] would lead to the central role he played in deconstructing what went wrong in the years that followed. Clarke and his communications with the Bush administration regarding bin Laden and associated terrorist plots targeting the United States were mentioned frequently in Condoleezza Rice's public interview by the 9/11 investigatory commission on April 8, 2004. Of particular significance was a memo<ref>http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20memo.pdf</ref> from January 25, 2001, that Clarke had authored and sent to Rice. Along with making an urgent request for a meeting of the National Security Council's Principals Committee to discuss the growing [[al-Qaeda]] threat in the greater Middle East, the memo also suggests strategies for combating al-Qaeda that might be adopted by the new Bush administration.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/index.htm |title=Bush Administration's First Memo on al-Qaeda Declassified |publisher=Gwu.edu |date=January 25, 2001 |accessdate=January 9, 2009}}</ref>
Clarke's role as a counter-terrorism advisor in the months and years prior to [[9/11]] would lead to the central role he played in deconstructing what went wrong in the years that followed. Clarke and his communications with the Bush administration regarding bin Laden and associated terrorist plots targeting the United States were mentioned frequently in Condoleezza Rice's public interview by the 9/11 investigatory commission on April 8, 2004. Of particular significance was a memo<ref>http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20memo.pdf</ref> from January 25, 2001, that Clarke had authored and sent to Rice. Along with making an urgent request for a meeting of the National Security Council's Principals Committee to discuss the growing [[al-Qaeda]] threat in the greater Middle East, the memo also suggests strategies for combating al-Qaeda that might be adopted by the new Bush administration.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/index.htm |title=Bush Administration's First Memo on al-Qaeda Declassified |publisher=Gwu.edu |date=January 25, 2001 |accessdate=January 9, 2009}}</ref>



Revision as of 17:06, 20 January 2015

Richard A. Clarke
Clarke in October 2007
Born
Richard Alan Clarke

(1950-10-27) October 27, 1950 (age 73)
NationalityAmerican
CitizenshipUnited States
EducationMaster's Degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Alma materUniversity of Pennsylvania
Occupation(s)Counter-terrorism expert/analyst
Author
Notable workAgainst All Enemies
The Scorpion's Gate, Breakpoint
Political partyDemocratic
Websitehttp://www.richardaclarke.net/

Richard Alan Clarke[1] (born October 27, 1950) is the former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States.

Clarke worked for the State Department during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.[2] In 1992, President George H.W. Bush appointed him to chair the Counter-terrorism Security Group and to a seat on the United States National Security Council. President Bill Clinton retained Clarke and in 1998 promoted him to be the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism, the chief counter-terrorism adviser on the National Security Council. Under President George W. Bush, Clarke initially continued in the same position, but the position was no longer given cabinet-level access. He later became the Special Advisor to the President on cybersecurity. Clarke left the Bush administration in 2003.

Clarke came to widespread public attention for his role as counter-terrorism czar in the Clinton and Bush administrations in March 2004, when he appeared on the 60 Minutes television news magazine, released his memoir about his service in government, Against All Enemies, and testified before the 9/11 Commission. In all three instances, Clarke was sharply critical of the Bush administration's attitude toward counter-terrorism before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and of the decision to go to war with Iraq.

Background

Richard Clarke was born in 1950, the son of a Boston chocolate factory worker and a nurse.[3] He studied at the Boston Latin School (graduated in 1968), received a Bachelor's degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1972 where he was selected to serve in the Sphinx Senior Society.[4] After working for the Department of Defense as an analyst on European security issues, Clarke earned a master's degree in management in 1978 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.[5]

Government career

In 1973, he began work in the federal government as a management intern[6] in the U.S. Department of Defense. Beginning in 1985, Clarke served in the Reagan administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence. During the Presidential administration of George H.W. Bush, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, he coordinated diplomatic efforts to support the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the subsequent security arrangements. During the Clinton administration, Clarke became the counter-terrorism coordinator for the National Security Council. He remained counter-terrorism coordinator during the first year of the George W. Bush administration, and later was the Special Advisor to the President on cybersecurity and cyberterrorism. He resigned from the Bush administration in 2003.

Clarke's positions inside the government have included:

Clinton administration

Clarke advised Madeleine Albright during the Genocide in Rwanda, to request the UN to withdraw all UN troops from Rwanda. She refused, but permitted Gen. Dallaire to keep a few hundred troops who managed to save thousands from the genocide. Later Clarke told Samantha Power “It wasn’t in American’s national interest. If we had to do the same thing today and I was advising the President, I would advise the same thing." He directed the authoring of PDD-25[7] which outlined a reduced military and economic role for the United States in Rwanda as well as future peacekeeping operations.

Islamists took control in Sudan in a 1989 coup d'état and the United States adopted a policy of disengagement with the authoritarian regime throughout the 1990s. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, however, some critics charged that the U.S. should have moderated its policy toward Sudan earlier, since the influence of Islamists there waned in the second half of 1990s and Sudanese officials began to indicate an interest in accommodating U.S. concerns with respect to 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden, who had been living in Sudan until he was expelled in May 1996. Timothy M. Carney, U.S. ambassador to Sudan between September 1995 and November 1997, co-authored an op-ed in 2002 claiming that in 1997 Sudan offered to turn over its intelligence on bin Laden but that Rice, as NSC Africa specialist, together with the then NSC terrorism specialist Richard A. Clarke, successfully lobbied for continuing to bar U.S. officials, including the CIA and FBI, from engaging with the Khartoum government.[8] Similar allegations (that Rice joined others in missing an opportunity to cooperate with Sudan on counterterrorism) were made by Vanity Fair contributing editor David Rose[9] and Richard Miniter, author of Losing Bin Laden.[10]

Bush administration

Clarke's role as a counter-terrorism advisor in the months and years prior to 9/11 would lead to the central role he played in deconstructing what went wrong in the years that followed. Clarke and his communications with the Bush administration regarding bin Laden and associated terrorist plots targeting the United States were mentioned frequently in Condoleezza Rice's public interview by the 9/11 investigatory commission on April 8, 2004. Of particular significance was a memo[11] from January 25, 2001, that Clarke had authored and sent to Rice. Along with making an urgent request for a meeting of the National Security Council's Principals Committee to discuss the growing al-Qaeda threat in the greater Middle East, the memo also suggests strategies for combating al-Qaeda that might be adopted by the new Bush administration.[12]

In his memoir, "Against All Enemies", Clarke wrote that when he first briefed Rice on Al-Qaeda, in a January 2001 meeting, "her facial expression gave me the impression she had never heard the term before." He also stated that Rice made a decision that the position of National Coordinator for Counterterrorism should be downgraded. By demoting the office, the Administration sent a signal through the national security bureaucracy about the salience they assigned to terrorism. No longer would Clarke's memos go to the President; instead they had to pass through a chain of command of National Security Advisor Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley, who bounced every one of them back.

Within a week of the inauguration, I wrote to Rice and Hadley asking 'urgently' for a Principals, or Cabinet-level, meeting to review the imminent Al-Qaeda threat. Rice told me that the Principals Committee, which had been the first venue for terrorism policy discussions in the Clinton administration, would not address the issue until it had been 'framed' by the Deputies.[13]

At the first Deputies Committee meeting on Terrorism held in April 2001, Clarke strongly suggested that the U.S. put pressure on both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda by arming the Northern Alliance and other groups in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, that they target bin Laden and his leadership by reinitiating flights of the MQ-1 Predators. To which Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz responded, "Well, I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden." Clarke replied that he was talking about bin Laden and his network because it posed "an immediate and serious threat to the United States." According to Clarke, Wolfowitz turned to him and said, "You give bin Laden too much credit. He could not do all these things like the 1993 attack on New York, not without a state sponsor. Just because FBI and CIA have failed to find the linkages does not mean they don't exist."[13]

Clarke wrote in Against All Enemies that in the summer of 2001, the intelligence community was convinced of an imminent attack by al Qaeda, but could not get the attention of the highest levels of the Bush administration, most famously writing that Director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet was running around with his "hair on fire".[13]

At a July 5, 2001, White House gathering of the FAA, the Coast Guard, the FBI, Secret Service and INS, Clarke stated that "something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon." Donald Kerrick, a three-star general who was a deputy National Security Advisor in the late Clinton administration and stayed on into the Bush administration, wrote Hadley a classified two-page memo stating that the NSA needed to "pay attention to Al-Qaida and counterterrorism" and that the U.S. would be "struck again."

9/11 Commission

On March 24, 2004, Clarke testified at the public 9/11 Commission hearings.[14] At the outset of his testimony Clarke offered an apology to the families of 9/11 victims and an acknowledgment that the government had failed: "I also welcome the hearings because it is finally a forum where I can apologize to the loved ones of the victims of 9/11...To the loved ones of the victims of 9/11, to them who are here in this room, to those who are watching on television, your government failed you. Those entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn't matter because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness."[14]

Many of the events Clarke recounted during the hearings were also published in his memoir. Among his highly critical statements regarding the Bush administration, Clarke charged that before and during the 9/11 crisis, many in the Administration were distracted from efforts against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization by a pre-occupation with Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Clarke had written that on September 12, 2001, President Bush pulled him and a couple of aides aside and "testily" asked him to try to find evidence that Saddam was connected to the terrorist attacks. In response he wrote a report stating there was no evidence of Iraqi involvement and got it signed by all relevant agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA. The paper was quickly returned by a deputy with a note saying "Please update and resubmit."[15] After initially denying that such a meeting between the President and Clarke took place, the White House later reversed its denial when others present backed Clarke's version of the events.[16][17]

Prior to the 9/11 Commission, portions of Clarke's August 6 Daily Briefing Memo, entitled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US" to President Bush were subsequently redacted by The White House for national security reasons. Despite the title of the memo, in response to aggressive questioning from Richard Ben-Veniste – a Democratic member of the 9/11 Commission – Rice stated that the document "did not warn of attacks inside the United States."[18] Clarke then asked on several occasions for early principals meetings on these issues, and was frustrated that no early meeting was scheduled. No principals committee meetings on Al-Qaida were held until September 4, 2001.[19]

Former Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, the only member of the 9/11 Commission to read the President's Daily Brief, revealed in the hearings that the documents "would set your hair on fire" and that the intelligence warnings of al-Qaida attacks "plateaued at a spike level for months" before 9/11.[20]

Criticism

Before and after Clarke appeared before the 9/11 Commission, defenders of the Bush administration tried to attack his credibility, launching a full-scale offensive against him: impugning his personal motives, claiming he was a disappointed job-hunter, that he sought publicity, and that he was a political partisan. They charged that he exaggerated perceived failures in the Bush administration's counterterrorism policies while exculpating the former Clinton administration from its perceived shortcomings.[21]

According to some reports, the White House tried to discredit Clarke in a move described as "shooting the messenger."[22] New York Times economics columnist Paul Krugman was more blunt, calling the attacks on Clarke "a campaign of character assassination."[23]

Republicans inside and outside the Bush administration vigorously attacked both Clarke's testimony and his tenure during the hearings. In the furor over Clarke's revelations before the 9/11 Commission, Senate Republican Majority Leader Bill Frist immediately took to the Senate floor to make a speech accusing Clarke of telling "two entirely different stories under oath", pointing to congressional hearing testimony Clarke gave in 2002, but Frist later admitted to reporters that he was unaware of any actual discrepancies in Clarke's testimony.[24] During Clarke's earlier testimony, he stated that Bill Clinton did not have a comprehensive plan on dealing with terrorism. During later testimony, he stated that President Clinton did have a comprehensive plan on dealing with terrorism. As summarized by the Toledo Blade, "In his August 2002 briefing, Mr. Clarke told reporters (1) that the Clinton administration had no overall plan on al-Qaeda to pass on to the Bush Administration; (2) that just days after his inauguration, Mr. Bush said he wanted a new, more comprehensive anti-terror strategy; (3) that Mr. Bush ordered implementation of anti-terror measures that had been kicking around since 1998, and (4) that before Sept. 11, Mr. Bush had increased fivefold the funding for CIA covert action programs against al-Qaeda. ... It's reasonable enough to argue that Mr. Bush could have done more to guard against terror, though it isn't clear what. What is incredible is to argue - as Mr. Clarke did before the 9/11 Commission - that President Clinton was more concerned about al-Qaeda than Mr. Bush was." [25]

Some White House attempts to discredit Clarke were inconsistent. Specifically, the day after Clarke's revelations Vice President Dick Cheney went on the Rush Limbaugh radio program to claim that Clarke's account of the events leading to the 9/11 attacks was not credible because Clarke "wasn't in the loop" on pre-9/11 counter-terrorism planning, while at the same time National Security Adviser Rice was telling reporters that Clarke was the center of all counter-terrorism efforts.[26]

Clarke was also criticized by defenders of the Bush administration who seized on 1999 suggestions by Clarke himself of intelligence indicating a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, despite the fact that by 2001, after investigation, Clarke and others concluded that no link had been established. Specifically, in February 1999 Clarke wrote the Deputy National Security Advisor that one reliable source reported Iraqi officials had met with Bin Ladin and may have offered him asylum. Therefore, Clarke advised against surveillance flights to track bin Laden in Afghanistan: Anticipating an attack, “old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad”, where he would be impossible to find.[27] Clarke also made statements that year to the press linking Hussein and al-Qaeda to an alleged joint-chemical-weapons-development effort at the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.[28] In Against All Enemies he writes, "It is certainly possible that Iraqi agents dangled the possibility of asylum in Iraq before bin Laden at some point when everyone knew that the U.S. was pressuring the Taliban to arrest him. If that dangle happened, bin Laden's accepting asylum clearly did not," (p. 270). In an interview on March 21, 2004, Clarke claimed that "there's absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda, ever."[29]

Clarke claimed in his book that this conclusion was understood by the intelligence community at the time of 9/11 and the ensuing months, but top Bush administration officials were pre-occupied with finding a link between Iraq and 9/11 in the months that followed the attack, and thus, Clarke argued, the Iraq war distracted attention and resources from the war in Afghanistan and hunt for Osama bin Laden. Clarke's account of the post-9/11 period was supported in later years by Marine Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, former director of operations on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who retired in 2002, and by Army General John Batiste, former commander of the First Infantry Division, who retired in November 2005, and who in 2001 and 2002 had been the Senior Military Advisor to Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The two were among several retired generals who came out in 2006 calling for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Consistent with Clarke's account of the period, Newbold told an interviewer in 2007 of his dismay over the focus on Iraq, which seemed "irrelevant", in meetings in late 2001, and "that Saddam, and not Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar, was most on the Bush administration's mind." Batiste, who would go on to have a primary role in the war in Iraq, saw the Iraq war plan develop "even before 9/11" and then "solidify" thereafter, in his position on the Wolfowitz staff according to a 2007 interview.[30]

Another point of attack for Clarke's critics was his role in allowing members of the bin Laden family to fly to Saudi Arabia on September 20, 2001. According to Clarke's statements to the 9/11 Commission, a member of the Bush administration relayed to Clarke the request of the Saudi embassy to allow the members of the bin Laden family living in the U.S. to fly to Saudi Arabia. Clarke testified to the commission that he relayed this decision in turn to the FBI via Dale Watson, and that the FBI at length sent its approval of the flight to the Interagency Crisis Management Group.[31] However, FBI spokesman John Iannarelli denied that the FBI had a role in approving the flight: "I can say unequivocally that the FBI had no role in facilitating these flights."[32]

Clarke has also exchanged criticism with Michael Scheuer, former chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center at the CIA. When asked to respond to Clarke's claim that Scheuer was "a hothead, a middle manager who really didn't go to any of the cabinet meetings," Scheuer returned the criticism as follows: "I certainly agree with the fact that I didn't go to the cabinet meetings. But I'm certainly also aware that I'm much better informed than Mr. Clarke ever was about the nature of the intelligence that was available against Osama bin Laden and which was consistently denigrated by himself and Mr. Tenet."[33] Matthew Continetti writes: "Scheuer believes that Clarke’s risk aversion and politicking negatively impacted the hunt for bin Laden prior to September 11, 2001. Scheuer stated that his unit, codename 'Alec,' had provided information that could have led to the capture and or killing of Osama bin Laden on ten different occasions, only to have his recommendations for action turned down by senior intelligence officials, including Clarke."[34]

In response to Clarke's charges against the Bush administration, Fox News, with the Administration's consent, identified and released a background briefing that Clarke gave in August 2002, at the Administration's request, to minimize the fallout from a Time magazine story about the President's failure to take certain actions before 9/11.[35] In that briefing on behalf of the White House, Clarke stated "there was no plan on Al-Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration," and that after taking office President Bush decided to "add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, fivefold, to go after Al-Qaeda."[36] At the next day's hearing, 9/11 Commission member James Thompson challenged Clarke with the 2002 account, and Clarke explained: "I was asked to make that case to the press. I was a special assistant to the President, and I made the case I was asked to make... I was asked to highlight the positive aspects of what the Administration had done and to minimize the negative aspects of what the Administration had done. And as a special assistant to the President, one is frequently asked to do that kind of thing. I've done it for several Presidents."[14]

On March 28, 2004, at the height of efforts to undermine his critique of the Bush administration during the 9/11 Commission Hearings, Clarke went on NBC's Sunday morning news show, Meet the Press and was interviewed by journalist Tim Russert. In responding to and rebutting the criticism, Clarke challenged the Bush administration to declassify the whole record, including closed testimony by Bush administration officials before the Commission.[37]

Cyberterrorism and cybersecurity

Clarke, as Special Advisor to the President on Cybersecurity, spent his last year in the Bush administration focusing on cybersecurity and the threat of terrorism against the critical infrastructure of the United States. At a security conference in 2002, after citing statistics that indicate that less than 0.0025 percent of corporate revenue on average is spent on information-technology security, Clarke was famously heard to say, "If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, then you will be hacked. What's more, you deserve to be hacked."[38]

In June 2012 Clarke discussed issues of cybersecurity in depth in an interview on The Colbert Report in which he was seemingly misled into thinking that they were discussing cyber-security threats from the Chinese through the use of mobile devices such as iPads. Instead, Stephen Colbert was doing a humorous piece on the threats of Orangutans learning to use iPads. Indeed, when confronted on the issue directly, Clarke himself clarified that he was not discussing non-human primate based cyberterrorism threats. "Orangutans? You mean like apes?" said Clarke, "Are you sh**tin' me? I'm talking about the Chinese."[39]

Post government career

Clarke is currently Chairman of Good Harbor Consulting and Good Harbour International, two strategic planning and corporate risk management firms; an on-air consultant for ABC News, and a contributor to the Good Harbor Report, an online community discussing homeland security, defense, and politics. He is an adjunct lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School and a faculty affiliate of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.[40] He has also become an author of fiction, publishing his first novel, The Scorpion's Gate, in 2005, and a second, Breakpoint, in 2007.

Clarke wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post on May 31, 2009 harshly critical of other Bush administration officials, entitled "The Trauma of 9/11 Is No Excuse".[41] Clarke wrote that he had little sympathy for his fellow officials who seemed to want to use the excuse of being traumatized, and caught unaware by Al-Qaeda's attacks on the USA, because their being caught unaware was due to their ignoring clear reports a major attack on U.S. soil was imminent. Clarke particularly singled out former Vice President Dick Cheney and former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

In April 2010 Clarke released his book on Cyber War. In April 2012, Clarke wrote a New York Times op-ed addressing cyber attacks. In stemming cyber attacks carried out by foreign governments and foreign hackers, particularly from China, Clarke opined that the U.S. government should be authorized to "create a major program to grab stolen data leaving the country" in a fashion similar to how the U.S. Department of Homeland Security currently searches for child pornography that crosses America's "virtual borders." Moreover, he suggested that the US president could authorize agencies to scan Internet traffic outside the US and seize sensitive files stolen from within the United States. Clarke then stated that such a policy would not endanger privacy rights through the institution of a privacy advocate, who could stop abuses or any activity that went beyond halting the theft of important files. The op-ed did not offer evidence that finding and blocking files while they are being transmitted is technically feasible.[42]

In September 2012, Clarke stated that Middle Eastern governments were likely behind hacking incidents against several banks.[43] During the same year, he also endorsed Barack Obama's reelection for President of the United States.

Following the 2013 high-speed fatal car crash of journalist Michael Hastings, a vocal critic of the surveillance state and restrictions on the press freedom under the Obama Administration tenure, Clarke was quoted as saying "There is reason to believe that intelligence agencies for major powers -- including the United States -- know how to remotely seize control of a car. So if there were a cyber attack on the car -- and I'm not saying there was, I think whoever did it would probably get away with it."[44]

In 2013, Clarke served on an advisory group for the Obama administration, as it sought to reform NSA spying programs following the revelations of documents released by Edward Snowden.[45] The report mentioned in 'Recommendation 30' on page 37, "...that the National Security Council staff should manage an interagency process to review on a regular basis the activities of the US Government regarding attacks, that exploit a previously unknown vulnerability in a computer application." Clarke told Reuters on 11 April 2014 that the NSA had not known of Heartbleed.[46]

Written works

On March 22, 2004, Clarke's book, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror—What Really Happened (ISBN 0-7432-6024-4), was published. The book was critical of past and present Presidential administrations for the way they handled the war on terror both before and after September 11, 2001 but focused much of its criticism on Bush for failing to take sufficient action to protect the country in the elevated-threat period before the September 11, 2001 attacks and for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which Clarke feels greatly hampered the war on terror, and was a distraction from the real terrorists.

  • Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, 2004. In this book Clarke outlines his idea of a more effective U.S. counterterrorism policy. (ISBN 0-87078-491-9)
  • The Scorpion's Gate, 2005 (novel). (ISBN 0-399-15294-6)
  • Breakpoint, 2007 (novel). (ISBN 0-399-15378-0).
  • Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters, 2008. (ISBN 9780061474620)
  • Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, 2010. with Robert K. Knake (ISBN 9780061962233)
  • How China Steals Our Secrets, 2012. Op-ed in the New York Times[42]
  • Sting of the Drone, 2014, Thomas Dunne Books.

Affiliations

  • Chairman, Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, a strategic planning and corporate risk management firm.
  • Contributor, Good Harbor Index, an online resource for homeland security, defense and political issues, operated by Good Harbor Consulting, LLC.
  • Faculty Affiliate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
  • Advisory Board Member, Civitas Group, LLC
  • Cyber Security Consultant, SRA International, Inc.
  • On-air consultant, ABC News.

References

  1. ^ Dobbs, Michael. "An Obscure Chief in U.S. War on Terror". The Washington Post, April 2, 2000.
  2. ^ "Profile: Richard Clarke". BBC News. March 22, 2004. Retrieved January 9, 2009.
  3. ^ "Richard Clarke Biography". Encyclopedia of World Biography. Advameg, Inc. Retrieved April 3, 2012.
  4. ^ Senior Society, Sphinx. "Class of 1972". Sphinx Senior Society. Retrieved April 3, 2012.
  5. ^ Bio.Richard Clarke, "NNDB.com"
  6. ^ Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p.206.
  7. ^ "Text of Presidential Decision Directive 25". Federation of American Scientists. May 6, 1994. Retrieved January 9, 2009.
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August 8, 1989 – July 10, 1992
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