According to the DOE, the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act is a subsidy [1] for nuclear power investors. Passed in 1957 to encourage private production of uclear power plants, the Act Indemnifies operators against the otherwise insurmountable risk of a nuclear accident. It makes available a pool of funds to compensate people who incur damages from a nuclear or radiological incident, regardless of who is liable. The act covers all nuclear facilities constructed before 2002 — it is widely thought that no new power plants would be commissioned if standard insurance were required rather than subsidized indemnity.

The Atomic Energy Act, which was enacted several years before Price-Anderson, was supposed to spur the development of America's nuclear power industry. But industry did not begin constructing plants because companies were unwilling to risk the financial liability that would result from a catastrophic accident at a nuclear plant. At the same time, lawmakers in the United States Congress began to worry that there was not adequate financial protection for the public. Price-Anderson was born from those dual concerns; the act established a mechanism for compensating the public for injury or property damage in the event of a nuclear accident, and encouraged the development of nuclear power by indemnifying the industry from fault. However, the Price-Anderson Act is not without its detractors, including Greenpeace International, Public Citizen, Taxpayers for Common Sense, and other interest groups.

The pool of money — which as of 2004 stood at about $9.5 billion — is contributed entirely by the nuclear industry, primarly through power reactor licensees, who are required to have $200 million worth of primary insurance as of 2001.

In the event that claims deplete the pool of funds, the Congress of the United States would be required to consider covering the excess cost, possibly by establishing additional assessments against the industry. A catastrophic nuclear event — such as the 1986 Chernobyl accident — would arguably deplete the current pool of money. Though the Soviet Union never released official estimates of the accident's economic impact, Greenpeace International estimated it to have been about $280 billion, not including medical costs for victims. However, were similar circumstances to be repeated in America, the scale of the disaster likely would be less — Chernobyl were RBMKs, unlike American plans, and the Chernobyl units did not have containment buildings around its reactors.

The Department of Energy states "It is widely perceived that no new nuclear plants would be built in the United States without the cap on liability provided by the Price-Anderson Act." [2] The act is regarded by the Department of Energy as "essentially a subsidy" [3] for investors in nuclear power.

Without the Price-Anderson Act, nuclear plant operators would have to insure for the full cost of any possible nuclear incident. Because no one had (or has) quantified what the maximum coverage necessary would be for a PWR or BWR, financiers were unwilling to insure the possible risk. Therefore, no private operator in the United States would have built a nuclear facility without the Price-Anderson Act. Thus the extension of the Price-Anderson Act is probably essential to the construction of future nuclear power plants in the US [4] (see Nuclear Power 2010 Program).

Price-Anderson covers DOE facilities but not the nuclear Navy (which has not had a nuclear accident).

The constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act was challenged in 1975 and upheld by the Supreme Court in June, 1978.

Nuclear insurance pools have paid $151 million ($70 million of which was related to the 1979 Three Mile Island meltdown) and the DOE $65 million since Price-Anderson was enacted 48 years ago.

External Links and references

• Industry synopsis of Price-Anderson
• ANS synopsis of Price-Anderson
• GAO report on Price-Anderson