Point 5353
Point 5353 Location in Gilgit-Baltistan Show map of Gilgit Baltistan Point 5353 Point 5353 (Pakistan) Show map of Pakistan
Highest point
Elevation	5,353 m (17,562 ft)
Coordinates	34°31′30.10″N 75°41′55.31″E / 34.5250278°N 75.6986972°E / 34.5250278; 75.6986972
Geography
Location	Line of Control, Kashmir
Parent range	Himalayas

Point 5353 (also called Point 17561, and Marpo La Peak^[1]) is a mountain peak on the Line of Control dividing the Indian- and Pakistani-administered portions of Kashmir in the vicinity of Drass in the Kargil district.^[2][3][4] It is the highest peak along the Marpo La ridge and dominates the entire area on both the sides of the Line of Control.^{[5][6][7][8][9]}

The peak became a subject of controversy after the Kargil War. Soon after the war had ended The Hindu correspondent Praveen Swami and an Indian opposition party leader, Ram Kumar Anand claimed that the peak was inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) and it was captured by the Pakistan Army during the Kargil War. They also claimed that the Indian troops had unsuccessfully tried to recapture Point 5353 on 18 May 1999.

Geography

8km
5miles

5070

Gultari

Marpo La

Mushkoh

Sando

Bhimbat

Drass

Tololing

Tiger Hill

5240

5353

  

Line of Control near Drass

The Marpo La pass is one of very few passes in the high Himalayas of Ladakh that allows north–south communication.^[a] The 1949 Cease-Fire Line between India and Pakistan as well as the 1972 Line of Control pass through the Marpo La pass. The ridge adjoining the pass to the east, which is also referred to as the 'Marpo La ridge', runs in a northwest-southeast axis and contains a number of tall peaks. The point 5353, so named because of its height in metres, is the tallest peak on the Marpo La ridge. Its older name is Point 17561, representing its height in feet.^[2][10][11]

The Line of Control in this area is flanked by the Shingo River valley of Pakistani-administered Kashmir in the north and the Dras River valley of Indian-administered Kashmir in the south. Both these valleys represent major lines of east–west communication in the respective regions of Kashmir. The Shingo and Dras rivers join together further east near Kakshar. To the south of the Line of Control is India's Kargil district and to the north is Pakistan's Skardu district.

According to the Indian Army sources, the Point 5353 itself is on the Line of Control. However, after the end of the Kargil War, a controversy erupted in India as to which side of the Line of Control the peak lay.^[11]

Point 5070, 3 km west of Point 5353 is the closest peak to the Marpo La pass.^[12] The second tallest peak on the Marpo La ridge, Point 5240, is 1.2 km southeast of the Point 5353. It is on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Both points 5070 and 5240 are currently held by India. Tiger Hill, to the southwest of the Marpo La ridge across the Sando nullah is also held by India.^[11][13][b]

The Sando nullah (stream) starts just below the Marpo La pass and flows southeast, joining the Drass River. A track running along side the Sando Nullah is the key communication link between Drass and the Marpo La pass.^[15]

Strategic significance

The Point 5353 is at an aeral distance of 12 km from Drass, through which passes the strategic National Highway 1 of India linking Srinagar to Leh. In 1999, Pakistani intruders occupied all the peaks in the vicinity and directed artillery fire at the highway, which led to Indian retaliation and the Kargil War. The Indian Army focused on clearing the invaders off the Tiger Hill and Tololing peaks, which posed a more direct threat to the highway. Point 5240 and 5353 were not cleared during the war. Their status was settled during the negotiations after the end of hostilities.^[11][13]

The Indian Army admits that Point 5353 offers a view of the National Highway. However, it say that the peak is not comparable in strategic importance to Tololing and Tiger Hill.^[11]

The Point 5353 dominates the eastern shoulder of the Marpo La pass and the Sando nullah approach to the pass. Since it is the tallest peak in the area, it can be called the "dominating feature". Former Lt. Col. Kuldip Singh Ludra states, "it dominates, by observation and fire, the complete area on both side of the Line of Control."^{[5][6][7][8][9][16]}

Line of Control

Kuldip Singh Ludra states that, after passing through the Marpo La pass (which is "not inclusive to either side"), the Line of Control runs along the Marpo La ridge line until Point 5353. The 1949 cease-fire line, defined at the end of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, went over the Point 5353 and the peak did not belong to either country. In 1971, prior to the Indo-Pakistani War, Point 5353 was occupied by a company of the 18 Punjab battalion led by Major S. S. Sahota. It was held by the Indian Army until the end of hostilities. Thus, the 1972 Line of Control was defined making a small ring to the north of the peak, leaving the peak itself under Indian control.^{[17][18][unreliable source?]}

The 1972 Line of Control is part of the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan, whereby the two countries ageed to respect the line without prejudice to their respective positions in the Kashmir dispute.^[19]

Controversy after the Kargil War

Soon after the Kargil War was over, some Indian media reported that Point 5353, a strategically important peak in the Dras sector, was still under Pakistan's control. After this, the Indian Army said that the campaign in the media that Indian troops had lost Point 5353 to Pakistan was a "inspired" campaign to malign their image because the peak was never in Indian possession.^[20][21]

The Hindu Business Line report

On 11 August 2000, The Hindu Business Line published a report titled Pakistan still occupies key Drass point, authored by noted journalist and security specialist Praveen Swami. It stated that the Point 5353 was "inside the Indian side of the Line of Control" and the Pakistani troops "held the mountain through the Kargil war and continue to do so today." According to Swami, "Artillery observers on peak 5,353 metres can direct accurate artillery fire on to up to 20 km of the National Highway 1A, and cripple Indian defensive positions from Mushkoh to Bhimbet."^[13]

Swami narrated that, during the war, the Commander Amar Aul of the 56 Mountain Brigade was given the objective of securing point 5353, but he was unable to do so within the timeframe available. Instead, he occupied two peaks on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, point 4875 and point 4251 before the ceasefire came into force. In the negotiations carried out between the Brigadier Aul and a Pakistani interlocuter called Colonel Saqlian in August 1999, both sides committed themselves to leave the points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied.^[13]

In October 1999, according to the report, Brigadier Aul decided to take control of the point 5240 as well as 5353. 16 Grenadiers successfully took control of 5240. However, 1-3 Gurkha Rifles tasked with taking control of 5353 were unable to do so. Pakistani troops, detecting Indian activity at 5240, retailiated at point 5353 and by November 1999, established themselves at the peak. Subsequently, they put up concrete bunkers on the peak and constructed a road linking the base of the peak to Benazir Post. Swami believed that the Indian Army then attempted to force a territorial swap by taking positions on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control. But, despite some fierce fighting, these attempts did not succeed. Swami concluded by noting that "the end of the conflict is...not quite yet in sight."^[13]

Swami also claimed in his report that besides Points 4875 and 4251, the Indian troops also captured Point 5310 in retaliation, situated one kilometer inside the Pakistani side of the LoC.^[13]

The then Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Nirmal Chander Vij responded on the same day, issuing a press release with "elaborate notes and maps" asserting that "in accordance with the Simla Agreement the LoC passes through Point 5353. This point was never under our control either before or after Operation Vijay in Kargil."^[14][22]

However, Praveen Swami stood by his report, stating that The Hindu had in its possession copies of the army maps as well as orders issued to the commanders to capture Point 5353.^[23][24]

The Times of India quoted Indian Army officers saying that the Line of Control in the area follows an imaginary line connecting high points such as Points 5070, 5353, 5245 and 5608. Indian forces control the highest one, Point 5608, whereas the Pakistanis control Point 5353, because that is what the terrain allows. They believed that the tactical advantage to Pakistan from controlling the point 5353 to be minimal.^[20] The Hindu reported that the Indian troops captured Point 5070 in the vicinity to neutralise the Pakistani edge in the area.^[25]

Ram Kumar Anand's allegations

At a press conference on 30 August 2000, an opposition party leader, Ram Kumar Anand, alleged that besides Point 5353, which, he said was 300 to 500 metres inside the Indian territory, Pakistan was still in occupation of five other peaks in Kargil on the Indian side along the LoC. He supplied reporters with several documents to challenge the Indian Army's claim that Point 5353 was never in Indian possession. He also claimed that an Indian Army platoon, led by Major Navneet Mehta had tried to recapture the peak on 18 May 1999 but the attempt had failed. He demanded that "a fact-finding team of five Parliamentarians should be constituted to go to the LoC to verify the facts."^[26] Pakistan, the very next day, on 31 August, denied the allegations.^[27] BBC News quoted Pakistan's Foreign Ministry's spokesman as saying that "Pakistan respected the Line of Control (LoC) with India" and its troops had not violated the ceasefire line. The BBC news report noted that Anand's claim "followed a report in an Indian newspaper that a strategic peak, Point 5353, was under Pakistani occupation."^[27] In response to Anand's allegations, Indian defence ministry on 1 September 2000 issued a press release that stated: "It is clarified that Point 5353 is on the line of control and not inside the territory under India's control" and "the controversy being raked up on this issue is based on distorted facts as borne out from maps of delineation between India and Pakistan in 1972." It further stated that "the ground situation is well-known to the government and India’s posture along the LoC is militarily sound with an edge over the other side", adding that "the latest controversy appears to be motivated and is harmful to India's security interest."^[28][29]

Ashok Mehta said that in the encounter with RK Anand, the Indian Army was "forced to reveal certain information, which in national interest should have remained under wraps", adding that "Pakistan was prompt to report that it had not violated the Line of Control in Kargil."^[30]

General Ved Prakash Malik, Indian Army Chief of Staff during the Kargil war, in an interview to Rediff.com on July 27, 2001, when asked about to "clarify the controversy about Point 5353, which has reportedly been taken over by Pakistan?", said: "That is not true. The 1972 letter clearly shows, both on the map and in writing, that the LoC passes through 5353. Some of the Point's features are occupied by them and some by us. But the fact is that if you want to attack Point 5353, you would have to come via the Pakistani side. It is not with us. We had never occupied it. Point 5353 had been vacated by them for a while when the talks were going on. Then they reoccupied it, that's all. I don't know how this controversy started. But I saw the hand-sketched map in which somebody had put 5353 right next to Tiger Hill. That is wrong!"^[31]

Operation Parakram

The Point 5353 controversy erupted once again during "Operation Parakram" (India's Code name for its military mobilization along the India–Pakistan border) which began on 13 December 2001, in response to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.^[14] By this time the area north and east of Zojila Pass, including Leh, came under the newly raised XIV Corps.^[14]

In August 2002, The Hindu correspondent Praveen Swami reported that Pakistani troops had occupied Point 5070 in the early summer of 2002,^[32] and in July, "after eight weeks of steady skirmishes, India reoccupied Point 5070 in the Drass sector." He further said: "Point 5070, named for its altitude in metres, dominates the strategically vital Mushkoh nullah in the Drass sub-sector." ^[33]

The Telegraph of 27 August 2002, reported that "In a map shown to The Telegraph today at the army headquarters, Point 5353 is depicted on the Line of Control, at an aerial distance of about 12 km from Dras", and a battalion of the Pakistan Army's Baloch Regiment was in possession of the peak, which it said was flanked on either side (east and west) by a battalion each of Northern Light Infantry and Punjab Regiment, supported by the Pakistani brigade headquarters at Gultari. It further reported that "A spur of the hill feature is connected to Pakistan's Benazir Post. Point 5353 is on the Marpo La ridgeline that runs on or parallel to the Line of Control. Other spurs of the peak run south into the Dras sector. To its immediate south is Tiger Hill and the Mushkoh Valley. In 1999, Pakistani intruders occupying the heights in this sector were directing artillery fire on Dras and National Highway 1A and were alleged to have planned to secure routes for infiltration into the Valley." The newspaper quoted army officers as saying that, "There are heights from which we have a view of the PoK side and there are heights from where they have a view of our side. Besides, air observation posts (artillery observers on aircraft) can also mount a watch to direct fire. The view from Point 5353 does not seriously threaten our supply lines." It also quoted the then Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, as saying in 1999 that "5353 is the point over which the Line of Control goes. The fact is our troops never occupied it. The normal practice has been that where the line goes over a peak, nobody occupies it." Nonetheless, it noted that "even if Fernandes is taken at his word, the continued occupation of Point 5353 by the Baluch battalion means that Pakistan has departed from “normal practice”."^[11]

Ashok Mehta, in his article in The Tribune, said, "Parakram had opened a window of opportunity in the Kargil sector for the new 14 Corps to complete the Army's unfinished agenda for the Kargil war: seize Point 5353. While throughout April and May 2002, Point 5353 was pulverised with metal from Bofors guns, sometimes 10,000 rounds a day, Concourse missiles, cargo ammunition and air defence guns in direct fire, by May-end, Point 5070, a pivotal feature about 10 km west of Point 5353, was quietly seized in a brilliant stealth operation. The post was named Balwan after the Jat regiment that took it. Balwan had turned the flank of Pakistani defences in the Dras sector. The Indian Army now had a grand view and domination of the Gultari valley through which Pakistani posts are maintained in Dras."^[14]

The surprise loss of Point 5070 drew furious reaction from Pakistan Army, who used to occupy this peak during summer. The Pakistani troops launched several counter-attacks, in which the Indians suffered heavy casualties, but failed to retake Point 5070. Consequently, an enraged General Pervez Musharraf removed entire Pakistani chain of command, including the Pakistani Brigade Commander and GOC of the Northern Areas for losing this peak. Subsequently, a new Commander of the Northern Areas was appointed.^[14][34]

On 10 June 2002, an Indian Army patrol managed to make their way to Point 5353, where they found several wounded Pakistani soldiers crying for help. Afterwards, the date of the attack on Point 5353 was fixed for 17 June. The then Indian Army's northern area commander, Lieutenant general R.K. Nanavaty went to New Delhi with the final plan and for the green signal. Richard Armitage, then American Deputy Secretary of State had arrived in Delhi a few days earlier, where he had revealed General Musharraf's pledge, in his words: "To end cross-border terrorism permanently, visibly, irreversibly and to the satisfaction of India."^[14][35] Hence, George Fernandes, then India's defence minister denied permission to General Nanavaty to attack Point 5353 and thus the attack was called off.^[14]

Other views

After the war ended, the Indian and Pakistani local military commanders agreed to a plan to vacate Points 5353, 5240 and 5165 through which passed the Line of Control.^[14][36] According to Ashok K. Mehta, a retired Major general in the Indian Army and a columnist on defence and security affairs, "None of these was ever with the Indian Army. Nor were these at the time in Pakistani possession."^[14] In late October 1999, units of 8 Mountain Division of the Indian Army captured Point 5240. They subsequently captured Point 5165 as well apparently to forestall their capture by Pakistanis.^[14] According to Ashok Mehta, "Taking Points 5240 and 5165 was not difficult, keeping them was tough. The mystery was over not taking Point 5353. It appears the unit asked to do so said it was impossible to get there. But Pakistan had breached the local commanders' agreement and turned Point 5353 into a rope-maintained permanent post."^[14]

In his book Kargil: Turning the Tide Lieutenant general Mohinder Puri, PVSM, UYSM, who was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 8 Mountain Division during the Kargil War^[37][38] states,

A lot of controversy was generated on the status of Pt 5353 after the war. This feature lies on the Pakistan side and to capture it, the attacking troops have to approach from the north entailing crossing the LC. Since the LC was not to be crossed and the feature being on Pakistan side, we had no plans to secure it. The enemy occupied Pt 5353 as an observation post. In turn, we were in occupation of a feature on the LC. The Pakistani CO established radio contact with CO 16 GREN and requested vacation from this feature. We asked him to reciprocate and vacate Pt 5353 to which he agreed. However, he reoccupied Pt 5353 on 2 August and in retaliation besides occupying the feature vacated by us, 16 GREN was directed to occupy Pt 5245 which was southeast of Pt 5353. With this event the war ended in the Mushkoh–Drass sector.^[36]

Praveen Swami wrote on 10 March 2004,

When Operation Parakram began a little over three years ago, both the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army began trading ferocious artillery fire up and down the LoC. In the high mountains, sudden winds and unpredictable atmospheric conditions ensure that shells rarely land where gunners intend them to. But, with a direct line of observation available to them, the Pakistani forces on Point 5353 should have been able to pass on corrections that would have enabled their artillery to obliterate Sando Top. If, that is, the Pakistani troops on Point 5353 had been given the chance. Indian soldiers on three posts, namely Point 5165, Point 5240 and Point 5100, guided their superior 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers with devastating accuracy. Pakistani troops on Point 5353 were first hit with smoke-filled mortar shells, to flush them out of their bunkers, and then with air-burst artillery, which showered down shards of metal at great speed. Well over 40 Pakistanis are believed to have died on Point 5353. Pakistan could not reinforce the troops since the Indian soldiers on Point 5165 and Point 5240 were in a position to hit their supply lines.^[39]

See also

• List of mountains in Pakistan
• Shangruti

Notes

References

Bibliography

• Ludra, Kuldip Singh (2000), The Kargil Strike: (A Study of the Failure of Indian Strategic Thought), T.K.S. Ludra, ISBN 978-81-901218-9-7
• Ludra, Kuldip Singh (2004), The Pen Supports the Sword, Kargil--A Report, Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis, ISBN 978-81-901361-8-1
• Malik, General V. P. (2010), Kargil-From Surprise to Victory, HarperCollins Publishers India, ISBN 978-93-5029-313-3
• Rammohun, E. M. (2011), Countering Insurgencies in India: An Insider's View, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, ISBN 978-93-81411-66-7
• Singh, Amarinder (2001), A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999, Motibagh Palace, ISBN 9788193107416