Eric Maskin
Born	December 12, 1950 New York City
Nationality	American
Alma mater	Harvard University
Known for	Game theory, mechanism design
Awards	Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (2007)
Scientific career
Fields	Economics
Institutions	the Institute for Advanced Study

Eric Stark Maskin (born December 12, 1950) is an American economist and co-winner, along with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, of the 2007 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory."

Biography

Eric Maskin is the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, and a visiting lecturer with the rank of Professor in the Princeton University Economics Department. He attended Harvard University where he received his A.B. and Ph.D. After he earned his doctorate from Harvard University, Eric went to the University of Cambridge in 1976 where he was employed as a research fellow at Jesus College. In 1977, he received an honorary M.A. from the University. He went to Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1980 to 1984 as an assistant professor with a brief interlude at Churchill College of the University of Cambridge between 1980-82.

He has worked in diverse areas of economic theory, such as game theory, the economics of incentives, and contract theory. He is particularly well known for his papers on mechanism design/implementation theory and dynamic games. His current research projects include comparing different electoral rules, examining the causes of inequality and studying coalition formation. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, and the European Economic Association, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was president of the Econometric Society in 2003.

Software patents

Maskin suggested that software patents might inhibit innovation rather than stimulate progress. Software, semiconductor, and computer industries have been innovative despite historically weak patent protection, he argued. Innovation in those industries has been sequential and complementary, so competition can increase firms' future profits. In such a dynamic industry, "patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare." A natural experiment occurred in the 1980s when patent protection was extended to software," wrote Maskin. "Standard arguments would predict that R&D intensity and productivity should have increased among patenting firms. Consistent with our model, however, these increases did not occur." Other evidence supporting this model includes a distinctive pattern of cross-licensing and a positive relationship between rates of innovation and firm entry. ^[1]

References

External links

Webpage from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Profile in The Daily Princetonian