Template:Totallydisputed

After the U.S. presidential election on November 2, 2004, during which incumbent president George W. Bush defeated challenger John Kerry, some sources have made allegations that data irregularities and systematic flaws may have affected the outcome of the election.

Although the unofficial result of the election has been accepted by the U.S. Senator Kerry, the Democratic candidate, some people and groups (including the media, independent candidate Ralph Nader, Kerry's brother and legal advisor Cameron Kerry, members of the House Judiciary Committee, Democratic Party lawyers [1] and many Democratic groups) are currently analyzing the available data.

"We're not expecting to change the outcome of the election," Dan Hoffheimer, the statewide counsel for the Kerry campaign, said.

No comprehensive analyses have yet been produced, but there is a large volume of primary and secondary data. Preliminary analyses, reports and observations have been made by a variety of commentators ranging from computer scientists to voting rights organizations, and many others. One preliminary attempt to analyze the issue from Caltech concluded that "there is no evidence, based on exit polls, that electronic voting machines were used to steal the 2004 election for President Bush." Another preliminary analysis by a PhD at U Pennsylvania calculates the chance of the exit poll - vote count discrepancies to be less than 1 in 10⁸.

Part of the controversy is concern over electronic and optical-scan voting machines. These were used in greater numbers than in previous elections, as a result of concerns over the reliability of manual machines raised during the 2000 election. Other reported problems relate to abnormally high voter turnout (In some precincts, more votes were reported than there were registered voters), discrepancies between exit poll data and actual results especially in swing states and the complications which arose due to long lines; particularly in high-population areas and in closely contested states.

Another part of the controversy is the perception of discrepancies between party registration and vote results. It has been said that instead these discrepancies, wherein many registered Democrats voted for George Bush, represent the "Dixiecrat" South, areas which have high numbers of Democratic Party-registered voters with broadly Republican politics.

Key issues

• Electronic touch screen voting machines. The reliability and accuracy of these machines has not been established, and in most cases they were not designed with a paper trail or auditability in mind. Many computer scientists have claimed the potential of these machines to be tampered with was high, citing such possibilities as the machines being reprogrammed on election day. The election incident reporting system (EIRS) has recieved many reports from voters and election officials of votes for Kerry being recorded as votes for Bush. The fact that the CEO of one electronic voting machine company was quoted in 2003 as saying he wanted to "deliver" the next election for Bush has further fuelled suspicions of fraud.
• Problems with non-electronic voting machines. In some counties there are larger statistical discrepancies than electronic voting machines. See below.
• Voter suppression, intimidation, lost ballots, efforts to discredit citizens that may be validly registered. This has the aim of reducing turn out for people believed to support the other side.
• Disagreement between exit poll data and actual results, especially in swing states (apparently not matched by similar discrepancies in most non-swing states or other election matters).
• Disagreement between party affiliation registration statistics for counties and results for that county, especially in swing states. For example, in one Florida county where 77 percent of registered voters are Democrats, Bush received 77 percent of the vote.
• Current voting incidents: Over 31,000 incidents reported (minor errors through to large scale direct voter intimidation, mishandled absentee and provisional ballots, malfunctioning or inaccurate machines and/or apparent hacking and vote tampering) (Source [2] description of incidents [3]). There are currently 10 states of the Union with more than 1000 incidents reported:

AZ: (1299 Incidents), CA: (2367), CO: (1106), FL: (4502), IL: (1371) NJ: (1458), NY: (2379), OH: (2805), PA: (4009), TX: (2251) (Source: EIRS)

• Internal emails from voting machine manufacturers from 2001, and formal certification reports of those voting machines, shows that the manufacturers concealed even basic security issues since 2001, and that the ultimate certifying company (Ciber Inc) recommended the machines as passing certification in both of two sample cases, without in fact testing core firmware, and without attempting to verify any of the crucial security aspects of the voting machines. #Certification of Voting Machines

Voting machines

In many cases there were concerns as to whether votes were fairly, reliably, and accurately recorded and reported by the electronic machines involved. The charts below demonstrate this.

File:Voting incidents.jpg

Voting machine companies with partisan ties to political parties

In 2003 Wally O'Dell CEO of Diebold said in a letter to Ohio Republican officials that he was committed, "to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President". [4]However, Punch card voting took place in 68 of Ohio's 88 counties, including three of the four most populous -- the counties which include Cleveland, Dayton, and Cincinnati.[5] Diebold is the company which makes electronic touch screen voting machines used in Ohio and other states, most significantly Florida. Ohio and Florida were two of the "swing" states critical to the 2004 election.

Diebold’s political ties are not limited to Republicans. [6]"Diebold’s election-systems division is run by a registered Democrat" and Mark Radke (Director of Marketing for Diebold Election Systems) "has an exclusive Democratic donation history"..."including the legal limit of $2000 to John Kerry in the recent campaign".

Chuck Hagel, the previous chairman of ES&S, another major manufacturer of voting machines and still a $1m stock-holder in McCarthy & Co which owns a quarter of ES&S, became a Republican candidate. Hagel's Democratic opponent made a formal protest to the state of Nebraska over the conflict of interest.

Specific issues relating to Diebold machines and practices

• Unreported faults and problems known to manufacturer

Oct. 27, 2004 -- The state of California has ordered that 15,000 brand new touch-screen voting machines not be used in next week's presidential election. These electronic machines were manufactured by Diebold Inc., a North Canton, Ohio-based company that also specializes in automated teller machines and electronic security.

"Of course we would have wished the situation would not have happened, but it did," Rapke told ABC News. "There was back up available. But again, with additional familiarity with the system, again, this problem would not have happened." But a former Diebold technical worker, James Dunn, told ABC News the company was aware of the software and electronic problems before the election, and never reported them. "The machine would lock up or lose its software load. A very uncommon thing and not a good thing," said Dunn. "And once that machine's locked up you're unable to produce voter cards, which means you're unable to open the election voting machine and people can't vote. But they shipped it anyway."

• Poor security against hacking and other electronic fraud

The same source also claims that

"Experts have raised questions about the machines' security features, which some say can be easily defeated, making it possible to manipulate the actual vote count.

"In all of my consulting work and all of my work in industry I've never seen a system that I thought was this vulnerable to abuse," said Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University in Maryland, who, along with other security experts, analyzed Diebold's source code for the electronic voting machines."

In at least one case it appears a voting machine was hacked during a primary election in King County Washington and a warning was issued to disconnect all voting machines from the internet. But this would not prevent the effects of hacking totally [7].

• Recent historical voting anomalies

March 5, 2004 : "Harris has also posted a post-mortem [of the 2000 election] by CBS detailing how the network managed to call Volusia County for Bush early in the morning. The report states: "Had it not been for these [computer] errors, the CBS News call for Bush at 2:17:52 AM would not have been made." As Harris notes, the 20,000-vote error shifted the momentum of the news reporting and nearly led Gore to concede.

What's particularly troubling, Harris says, is that the errors were caught only because an alert poll monitor noticed Gore's vote count going down through the evening, which of course is impossible. Diebold blamed the bizarre swing on a "faulty memory chip," which Harris claims is simply not credible. The whole episode, she contends, could easily have been consciously programmed by someone with a partisan agenda. Such claims might seem far-fetched, were it not for the fact that a cadre of computer scientists showed a year ago that the software running Diebold's new machines can be hacked with relative ease. The hackers posted some 13,000 pages of internal documents on various web sites -- documents that were pounced on by Harris and others. A desperate Diebold went to court to stop this "wholesale reproduction" of company material."

(Sources for this section: 1) ABC News [8] and 2) [9])

Voting Machine problems (including Diebold): Electronic voting#Problems with electronic voting

• "Libel Chill"

[10], an US online encyclopedia similar to Wikipedia covering "people, issues, groups and the public agenda" describes the position under the title "Libel Chill" as follows:

On the above issues, most journalists within the media establishment have been silent. Given Diebold's history of libel chill and the Rathergate issue, it's not hard to guess why, though political motives may also be involved. There has been a report from a MMOB member on a 'lockdown' on covering the story, coming from executive levels within the media. However, MSNBC's Keith Olbermann featured a good story about the vote discrepancies on his Nov. 8th show."

"Libel chill in this case is highly strategic since there is only a short time window - from November 2, 2004 to December 13, 2004 - to contest the results."

"In such a legally and politically charged situation, accurate verifiable data is hard to come by. Bev Harris and her team at blackboxvoting.org [11] have filed the largest number of FOIA's - Freedom of Information Act requests - in history. She is asking 3,000 counties for the internal audit logs of their voting machines , which are public records, as well as for other key data."

Evidence of electronic voting bias

Note: As with all statistics, it is very important to consider other causes of apparent anomalies, and to provide verifiable and neutral source data that can be checked in a neutral way by third parties. All the information and sources below appear prima facie to be statistically reasonable in terms of both analysis and assumptions, and to be based upon verifiable public data.

(1) An analysis of Florida counties with 80,000 - 500,000 registered voters concluded (with a few caveats of a usual kind) that machine type (E-Touch vs Op-Scan) was a "significant predictor" of vote at the p < 0.001 level (less than one chance in a thousand of this degree of anomaly happening by chance) [12][13][14]Source data and calculations [15]. Contrarily, the New York Times ran a story stating that "...three political scientists, from Cornell, Harvard and Stanford... [pointed out] many of those Democratic counties in Florida have a long tradition of voting Republican in presidential elections". [16]

(2) An error with an electronic voting system gave President Bush 3,893 extra votes in suburban Columbus according election officials. [17]

One thread on the "democraticunderground" website discusses the results in Gahanna, Franklin Co. Ohio and notes that:

• Gahanna has some 20,000 people elegible to vote and the reported turnout was around 70%. On a casual reckoning approximately 14,000 people voted, and yet nearly 21,000 votes were reported by voting machines.
• Furthermore the 3,893 extra individuals who are said to have queued to vote for Bush, and were therefore presumably Republican, did not appear to vote on any other matter bar the Presidency. (These other matters included the Senate race, County Commissioner, several County and State officials, and the infamous Gay Unions vote, issues of great importance in the election.)

Source: [18], source data from govt website pdf

(3) An analysis reported in the New Zealand press looks at the differences between exit polls and reported voting in more detail. It identifies that in a selection of non-swing states, the exit polls and final results match. However in a large proportion of what were identified before the election as key swing states (Wisconsin, Pennysylvania, Ohio, Florida, New Hampshire, etc.), the exit polls and final votes do not match.

The error was in each case a statistically anomalous and electorally critical 4 - 15% swing (change between exit polls and electronic voting) and furthermore the anomalies were not random. In each of the above swing states, this variation between what voters said they voted and what the machines reported was in favour of Mr. Bush. Source [19], article discussing here, graphs here.

(4) An interesting article comments that:

• Exit polls into the evening of Nov. 2 actually showed Kerry rolling to a clear victory nationally and carrying most of the battleground states, including Florida and Ohio, whose totals would have ensured Kerry's victory in the Electoral College.
• The exit polls covered both the Presidential and Senate races. The votes reported by voting machines for the Senate races were in line with the exit polls for the Senate race, however the votes reported by the same voting machines for the Presidency often significant disagreed with the exit polls for the Presidency.
• It also comments that "Democratic suspicions also were raised by Republican resistance to implementing any meaningful backup system for checking the results on Diebold and other electronic-voting machines."

(5) There were additional reports of significantly large data irregularities with the "optical scan" type voting machines in at least Florida. In one county using optical scan voting machines for example, election records showed 77% registered democrats but Bush received 77% of the vote.

(6) Wired Newshas examined this issue and reports that, "...according to academics, the internet pundits are reading the data out of context. Demographic figures and vote trends over several years show the numbers to be consistent with previous elections. According to University of California at Berkeley political scientist Henry Brady, the Republican vote share has been going up in Florida's rural optical-scan counties for years."

Wired further reports that, "[t]hree professors of government also examined the numbers after being pressured by many people, including lawyers for the Democratic Party, and concluded the same thing."

Certification of Voting Machines

(being written, please leave)

BlackBoxVoting.org Investigations

Source for section: blackboxvoting.org

(1) blackbboxvoting.org in "breaking news" summarises the security on Diebold's central voting servers:

All Diebold central voting servers are "...installed on unpatched, open Windows computers and use RAS (Remote Access Server) to connect to the voting machines through telephone lines. Since RAS is not adequately protected, anyone in the world, even terrorists, who can figure out the server's phone number can change vote totals without being detected by observers. The passwords in many locations are easily guessed, and the access phone numbers can be learned through social engineering or war dialing. Under some configurations, attacks by remote access are possible even if the modem appears to be turned off."

(Reports obtained through a public records request)

(2) The Washington voting system which lost 3 hours of audit trail is referred to earlier:

Report here, audit log copy here, summary reports signed with date and time by King County elections chief now found to be missing from audit log here.

(The audit log is a computer-generated automatic record similar to the "black box" in an airplane, that automatically records access to the Diebold central tabulator. The central tabulator audit log is an Federally (FEC) required security feature. The kinds of things it detects are the kinds of things you might see if someone was tampering with the votes: Opening the vote file, previewing and/or printing interim results, altering candidate definitions - a method that can be used to flip votes)

Three hours between 9:52 pm and 1:31 am is missing altogether from the Sept. 14 2004 Washington State primary, King Co. WA. During this period, 4 summary reports were produced, each of which should have appeared in the audit log if complete and correct. According to King County records the log was complete, and as the article points out, "The audit log is 168 pages long and spans 120 days, and the 3 hours just happen to be missing during the most critical three hours on election night."

A 2001 internal memo at the manufacturers cited below is referring to a vote or audit or similar database held on a voting machine when it says:

Jane ... did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before.

(3) According to blackboxvoting, "Diebold's own internal memos show they have known the audit log could be altered since 2001"

Diebold internal email memos:

From: owner-support@gesn.com On Behalf Of Nel Finberg

Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2001 11:32 PM

Subject: alteration of Audit Log in Access

Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log without entering a password. What is the position of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?

To: <support@gesn.com>

Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access

From: "Ken Clark" <ken@gesn.com>

Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700

In-reply-to: <ODEFIJCCLAAIGHHAOEJIKECACCAA.nfglobal@earthlink.net>

...Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course everyone knows perception is reality...

I've threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before.

Note however that even if we put a password on the file, it doesn't really prove much. Someone has to know the password, else how would GEMS open it. So this technically brings us back to square one: the audit log is modifiable by that person at least (read, me). Back to perception though, if you don't bring this up you might skate through Metamor.

There might be some clever crypto techniques to make it even harder to change the log ... We're talking big changes here though, and at the moment largely theoretical ones. I'd doubt that any of our competitors are that clever. Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take to make them happy. You can try the old standard of the NT password gains access to the operating system, and that after that point all bets are off...

I sense a loosing battle here though. The changes to put a password on the .mdb file are not trivial and probably not even backward compatible, but we'll do it if that is what it is going to take.

(Followup: (1) No enhancement took place, as Ciber signed off security on the system as presented; (2) King County was the same county which suffered an audit trail loss for 3 hours referred to previously)

Black box voting comment: Black Box Voting has taken the position that fraud took place in the 2004 election through electronic voting machines. We base this on hard evidence, documents obtained in public records requests, inside information, and other data indicative of manipulation of electronic voting systems. What we do not know is the specific scope of the fraud. We are working now to compile the proof, based not on soft evidence -- red flags, exit polls -- but core documents obtained by Black Box Voting in the most massive Freedom of Information action [3000 requests] in history.

Expert testimony on quality of current voting machines

(1) Testimony of Dr. Aviel D. Rubin to U.S. Federal Election Assistance Commission, on Electronic Voting Systems, May 2004:

(Witness credentials: Professor of Computer Science, Technical Director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University, served on SERVE security peer review group for Dept. of Defense, member of National Committee on Voting Integrity, and 2004 election judge in local county)

• There is no way for voters to verify that their votes were recorded correctly.
• There is no way to publicly count the votes.
• In the case of a controversial election, meaningful recounts are impossible.
• With respect to the Diebold Accuvote TS and TSx, we found gross design and programming errors, as outlined in our attached report. The current certification process resulted in these machines being approved for use and being used in elections.
• We do not know if the machines from other vendors are as bad as the Diebold ones because they have not made their systems available for analysis.

"On the spectrum of terrible to very good, we are sitting at terrible. Not only have the vendors not implemented security safeguards that are possible, they have not even correctly implemented the ones that are easy. If I had more time I would debunk the myth of the security of the so-called triple redundancy in the Diebold machines. I would explain the limitations of logic and accuracy testing in an adversarial setting, I would explain how easy it would be for a malicious programmer to rig the election with today's DREs [voting machines], and I would describe the seriousness of the security flaws that we and others have found in the Diebold machines. These are all things that I could have done and would have been happy to do, before anybody started purchasing and using these DREs. But nobody asked."

"Since our study came out, three other major studies ... all cited serious security vulnerabilities in DREs. RABA, which is closely allied with the National Security Agency, called for a "pervasive rewrite" of Diebold's code. Yet, the vendors, and many election officials ... continue to insist that the machines are perfectly secure. I cannot fathom the basis for their claims. I do not know of a single computer security expert who would testify that these machines are secure. I personally know dozens of computer security experts who would testify that they are not."

(Source: [20])

List of complaints

• The Election Protection Coalition received a total of 32 reports of touch-screen voters who selected one candidate only to have another show up on the summary screen. [21] While some spotted this, there are fears that most may not have. There were numerous reports of voting machines doing this all day but nonetheless being used all day. [22] [23] [24]

(Anecdotally from websites, a common theme on this topic seems to be that claims of vote mis-statement are more often made by people who voted for Kerry but the vote showed for Bush. It's not clear whether were this to be studied, it would turn out to be urban myth or verified fact)

• Machines are supposed to not lose votes in a power outage. Voters cannot tell whether vote integrity was in fact maintained as intended when power goes down, as happened at least in one polling station (Dekalb Co. GA, 15 minutes powerout) [25]
• Machines are not robust against error [26] and [27]

A minor abberation: At least one machine began counting back down to zero when it reached 32000 votes; manufacturers ES&S are said to have known about (but not rectified) this issue for two years since the same problem had arisen in a previous mayoral election. (Broward Co., FL) [28]

(Also some machines malfunctioned and demo machines were used instead, hastily programmed to replace them. It is not clear to those who voted who did this or what was involved in this "programming" [29])

• Machines do not always produce an audit trail—that is, if there is a doubt as to whether the machine has accurately represented and counted votes, there may not always be a way to neutrally verify the stated result. [30]
• Machines do not have "open" software, so it has not been generally possible for people to confirm that the software does not mis-state votes periodically.
• Unexplained 3 hour gap in electronic voting machine security audit records intended to confirm no hacking has taken place (King Co., WA.)
• Discrepancies in claimed totals of provisional ballots (Ohio)
• "Votes" present in at least one electronic voting machine before polls opened
• Unless exceptionally well designed, computers can be "hacked" and manipulated in an undetectable manner by experts.
• Other sources of lost data include hard drive crashes, inappropriate deletion, and the like, including, when audit trails are kept, failure for the totals to match the tally of votes as reported by machines [31].

Some electronic voting machines are not only vulnerable to voting fraud, but also make it difficult to prove or disprove suspected instances of fraud.

Sample source: "Experts said the company designed the machines and software so that vote totals could easily be altered without leaving a trace. Losing candidates in one race charged that when the computer acted up on election night, a CES employee inserted control cards into the machine. The plaintiffs sued to retrieve the source code, and the court, for once, consented. When computer experts examined the software, they determined that CES had changed the computer's instructions for tallying votes on election night. But because the program lacked adequate auditing mechanisms to track the nature of those changes, no one could determine if the company had rigged the election." [32] for this and similar stories.

Charts, Graphs and Statistics

Result Plots - Florida

See http://www.ustogether.org/election04/florida_vote_patt.htm

Exit Polls

Exit polls have been used successfully in other countries to determine election fraud. [33] Because final published exit polls in America are matched to vote counts, they cannot be used to determine election fraud. However, in the 2004 election, pre-matched exit polls were leaked onto the internet. The exit poll results of one major consortium of news organizations, the National Election Pool ("NEP"), were based on interviews with voters in 49 states (omitting Oregon because its system of voting by mail eliminated the traditional polling place). The NEP results available during the day on Election Day showed Kerry leading Bush. These discrepancies led to charges that the exit polls were more accurate than the official counts, for various reasons. The co-director of NEP, Warren Mitofsky, said he suspected that the difference arose because "the Kerry voters were more anxious to participate in our exit polls than the Bush voters." [34]

Reliability of Exit Polls as a predictor of election popular vote is discussed below #Reliability of Exit Polls.

Discrepancies Map

Voting locations that used electronic or other types of voting machines that did not issue a paper receipt or offer auditability correlate geographically with areas that had discrepancies in Bush's favor between exit poll numbers and actual results. Exit polling data in these areas show significantly higher support for Kerry than actual results (potentially outside the margin of error). From a statistical perspective, this may be indicative of vote rigging, because the likelihood of this happening by chance is extremely low. A study of 16 states by a former MIT mathematics professor places the likelihood at 1 in 50,000. [35]

File:2004 us popular vote2.gif

Exit Polls vs. Machine Tallies, by State (9 States)

Supporting the same conclusions of the maps above, here are bar graphs indicating the differentials between Exit Polls and Machine Tallies for nine e-voting and paper ballot states. The discrepancies appear to affect the e-voting states to a significantly greater degree than they affect the Paper Ballot states.

File:Exit poll small.jpg Source and background discussion are listed here: http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00000893.htm

Source data and analysis: http://ustogether.org/Florida_Election.htm http://ustogether.org/election04/mitteldorf/Liddle.htm

Corroborating Data and Analysis: [36]

Other sources have provided explanations for these discrepancies. See for example the MIT-Caltech Voting Technology Project analysis which can be found here:

http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Election2004.html

In summary, they argue that these discrepancies are "not new or unique." but are within the expected margin of error.

Misrepresentation of exit poll data

The following tables compare final exit poll data with penultimate exit poll data, note the large swing of support towards Bush, with Kerry losing votes, which is impossible if votes are only being added. National Election Pool, the consortium which conducts exit polls, has stated that the early data was inaccurate due to regulations preventing pollsters from approaching voters, legal barriers, and their belief that Democrats are more willing to answer exit polls. The consortium dismissed the possibility that their early exit poll was accurate and that vote counts were wrong, due to the reasons they provided. The early exit poll data was not meant to be released to the public. The data that was meant to be released to the public was intended to be weighted by the actual vote count. Exit polling companies claim this is standard procedure. Critics argue exit poll data should never be weighted by final results and have requested access to the raw data.

Direct link to screenshots and data: CNN website 12.21am CNN website 1.41am

CNN screenshot #1:

12.21 am, 1963 respondents so far

Total vote: Male 47% , Female 53% of which:

	Male - Bush		47% x 49% x 1963		452
	Male - Kerry		47% x 51% x 1963		471
	Female - Bush		53% x 47% x 1963		489
	Female - Kerry		53% x 53% x 1963		551
	TOTAL - Bush				941
	TOTAL - Kerry				1022

(rounding: estimates of voters in each category accurate within +/- 10)

CNN screenshot #2:

1.41 am, 2020 respondents so far (57 more than above)

Total vote: Male 47% , Female 53% of which:

	Male - Bush		47% x 52% x 2020		499
	Male - Kerry		47% x 47% x 2020		451
	Female - Bush		53% x 50% x 2020		535
	Female - Kerry		53% x 50% x 2020		535
	TOTAL - Bush				1034
	TOTAL - Kerry				986

(rounding: estimates of voters in each category accurate within +/- 10)

The addition of an extra 57 voters at this station was therefore reported as +93 votes for Bush by AP and CNN at least, and voters monitoring the exit polls were told authoritatively that Bush had now taken a lead from Kerry.

Note that the counts for Kerry under Male voters changed in a negative direction after additional voters were included. The net subtraction of 20 votes from the Kerry total after adding new voters seems to reflect an adjustment process.

Reliability of Exit Polls

(1) the same US online encyclopedia cited above ([37]) states that

"Exit poll data - asking voters which way they voted as they leave the polls - are used around the world as excellent predictors of actual vote counts, usually accurate within a fraction of a point. Exit polls in this election seemed to be accurate, as usual, except in those areas using touchscreen voting machines (like the Diebold Accuvote) or other software or modem-mediated electronic systems (like those from ES&S) with no paper trail - used by approximately one third of voters, many in swing states. 80% of all US voters [emphasis in original article] use some kind of voting machine from one of these two companies."

(2) Dick Morris, a career pollster (Republican), states in the Hill News that the Election Night pattern of exit polls versus popular vote in six battleground states - Florida, Ohio, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada and Iowa - was "virtually inconceivable":

"Exit polls are almost never wrong ... So reliable are the surveys that actually tap voters as they leave the polling places that they are used as guides to the relative honesty of elections in Third World countries. … To screw up one exit poll is unheard of. To miss six of them is incredible."

(Speculative material alert: The article goes on to state that these differences demonstrate that the differences were due to "more than honest error". However it then proceeds directly to assumptive hypothesis as follows: "...To miss six of them is incredible. It boggles the imagination how pollsters could be that incompetent." Readers should note that this further hypothesis of pollster error is not in fact supported by a quoted source, nor is any explanation given to justify it, and for Wikipedia purposes is presently an unverified statement. The article has not in fact made any attempt to analyse or justify this assumption as to where the errors lay, but presumes the machine votes were correct and therefore the exit polls necessarily "bogus". However this does not cast doubt over the statement as to general accuracy of exit polls per se, which agrees with information from other sources)

(Source [38])

Vote Suppression

Long Lines

Long lines, though seemingly benign, were a problem with the 2004 election. In many places, lines were over 6 hours long.

Prior to the election, there was much ado about each precinct getting enough ballots. However another serious matter that seems to have been overlooked by voter rights activists is whether the precincts had a sufficient number of voting machines, so that the votes could be processed at a sufficient rate. Machine quantity as well as ballot quantity determines the saturation point of votes. Number of machines * Max. votes per hour per machine * hours poll is open = max. number of votes precinct is able to process. Every voter over this limit is effectively disenfranchised, just as if the precint had run out of ballots; the precinct runs out of voter-time-slots. Most polling places stayed open to accommodate all voters who were in line as of the official closing time, but voters still had to wait for hours before they could cast their vote, and many left because of the wait.

Although low population precincts had relatively plenty of voting machines and were well within the limits of processing capacity, high-population centers often did not, and sometimes had less than half the machines requested and were well outside the limits of processing capacity, effectively disenfranchising an undetermined number of voters.

This may explain the discrepancy between expected voter turnout in high-population areas and counted voter turnout in these areas. Since high-population areas are predominantly Democratic, this would primarily affect the Democratic constituency, and appear on the surface to reflect inefficacy in the Democratic get-out-the-vote effort.

941 incidents of this type have been reported, 263 of which are from Ohio, and 151 of which are from Florida. 140 such incidents (over 1/7 of the national total, an average of 9.75 per precinct (over 400 times the state avg. of .022 per precinct) The reported long line incidents in Cuyahoga per person is more than eight times as high as outside of Cuyahoga.) have been reported out of Cuyahoga county, Ohio.

In democratic counties in Ohio with at least three reported long line incidents, counties with higher voter turnouts have more long line incident reports per registered voter. Statewide voter turnout is 69.86%, whereas in said counties, which make up 34.34% of registered voters in Ohio, voter turnout averaged 66.01%, and elsewhere it averaged 71.87%, for a difference of 5.85%.

Minorities

Specific concerns were raised in the course of the election in respect of votes from key minorities, such as Blacks [39] or Cuban Hispanics.

Formal proceedings

On November 5, Ralph Nader filed a request for a recount of the votes in New Hampshire with that state's Secretary of State. Nader's request cited "irregularities in the vote reported on the AccuVote Diebold Machines in comparison to exit polls and trends in voting in New Hampshire" and added: "These irregularities favor President George W. Bush by 5 percent to 15 percent over what was expected." [40] As one of the candidates on the ballot, Nader has the right to demand a recount, but is required to pay for it (because he lost by more than 1 percent of the vote). The state Attorney General's office initially responded that Nader's request was not valid because, although the request was submitted by the deadline, it was not accompanied by a check for the expenses. [41] Thereafter, however, the Nader campaign conveyed a down payment. The state agreed to begin a partial recount.

Official viewpoints and responses

As of yet, neither major political party has made an official response to the issue.

Republican Party

None yet.

Democratic Party

Several Democratic members of the House Committee on the Judiciary have written to the GAO requesting a formal investigation. Their first letter was written three days after the election, on November 5 [42], and this was followed by a second letter on November 8 listing further matters which had since come to light [43].

House Committee website for later information

US Media

International Monitoring

Press comment by International Monitors:

"International monitors at a polling station in southern Florida said Tuesday that voting procedures fell short in many ways of the best global practices. The observers said they had less access to polls than in Kazakhstan, that the electronic voting had fewer fail-safes than in Venezuela, that the ballots were not so simple as in the Republic of Georgia and that no other country had such a complex national election system. Two-member observer teams fanned out across 11 states and included citizens of 36 countries, ranging from Canada and Switzerland to Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Slovenia and Belarus."

As for electronic voting, Gould said he preferred Venezuela's system to the calculator-sized touch pads in Miami. "Each electronic vote in Venezuela also produces a ticket that voters then drop into a ballot box," Gould said. "Unlike fully electronic systems, this gives a backup that can be used to counter claims of massive fraud." The United States is also nearly unique in lacking a unified voter registration system or national identity card, Gould said, adding that he would ideally require U.S. voters to dip a finger in an ink bowl or have a cuticle stained black after voting. "In El Salvador, Namibia and so many other elections, the ink was extremely important in preventing challenges to multiple voting," Gould said. "In Afghanistan it didn't work so well, because they used the dipping ink for the cuticles, so it wiped right off."

(Source: International Herald Tribune [44])

External links

Third party analysis

• University of Pennsylvania Professor Steven F Freeman's analysis, "The Unexplained Exit Poll Discrepancy" [45]

Organizations

• blackboxvoting.ORG
• blackboxvoting.COM

(Note, these two websites are not affiliated with each other, however both carry web pages relevant to this article))

• blackboxvoting Articles and voter field reports
• Institute for Public Accuracy
• truthout.org
• disinfopedia.org especially an article on the alleged fraud using Diebold systems

Other

• [46] Expert testimony as to procedures needed to make electronic voting secure
• [47] article written by the founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security Inc., on Electronic Voting.
• [48] Article by The Economist
• [49] e-voting experts' website and weblog, large amount of information and expert discussion (panellist credentials provided)
• Keith Olbermann's blog 11/07/04
• 11/08/04 Olbermann segment online
• [50] Voters Unite Listing of All Reported Irregularities
• [51] Tom Paine's article
• [52] Democratic Underground discussion board on the topic
• Common Dreams report
• Voting reopened in NC because of mistake
• 268,159 more votes than voters in florida
• VotersUnite.org Database of E-Voting Problems
• Public hearings are scheduled in Ohio the weekend of Nov 13-14, sponsored by Dean for America.

In the news

• Infernalpress.com. Alleges that Republicans suppressed votes and voting machine companies committed fraud and tampered with election results, "How George W. Bush Won the 2004 Presidential Election" [53]
• New York Times. "Vote Fraud Theories, Spread by Blogs, Are Quickly Buried" [54]
• CNN. Glitch gave Bush extra votes in Ohio [55]
• Salan.com. An article by Salon.com purporting to debunk many of the data irregularities. [56]
• Wired. Article purporting to debunk many of the data irregularities. [57]
• Consortiumnews.com. Summarizes world media viewpoints article
• Rutenberg, Jim. "Report Says Problems Led to Skewed Surveying Data." New York Times. November 5, 2004. [58] - Outlines alleged problems with the early exit poll data.
• AP. Democratic lawyers on "fact finding" mission in Ohio. [59]
• Shuster, David. "...The congressman demanding a Government Accountability Office investigation is not nuts" MSNBC.com [60]
• "Countinghouse Blues: Too many votes." WOWT (KN) News. [61]
• Fitrakis, Bob. "None dare call it voter suppression and fraud." The Free Press (OH). November 7, 2004. [62]
• Fitrakis, Bob. "And so the sorting and discarding of Kerry votes begins." The Free Press (OH). November 10, 2004. [63]
• Book, Sue. "Election problems due to a software glitch." Sun Journal (NC). November 5, 2004. [64]
• Johnson, Mark. Winner so far: Confusion; agriculture, education races change as counties fix vote-tally errors. The Charlotte Observer. [65]
• WCNC. .[66]
• Bronis, Jason. "Ballot counting turns into legal fiasco." News 14 Charlotte. November 10, 2004. [67]

• Gwin, Harold. "Democrats' leader decries voting glitches." The Vindicator (OH). November 6, 2004. [68]
• "Glitch gave Bush extra votes in Ohio." CNN. November 5, 2004. [69]
• Glitch Found in Ohio Counting [70]
• Voting Problems in Ohio Set Off an Alarm [71]
• Final Results Delayed in Rockland County, NY [72]
• Officials, printers examine flaws that slowed vote count (Nov 9, 2004) [73]
• Equipment glitch delays Escambia County vote tally (Nov 8, 2004) [74]
• Palm Beach Post article about their situation
• Solvig, Erica. "Warren's vote tally walled off." The Enquirer (OH). [75]
• [76] article summarising media viewpoints from many countries round the world.
• Warren Co. defends lockdown decision, FBI denies warning officials of any special threat [77]