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CHRIS SCHLOEMER
THE WAR OF 1812: THE “FORGOTTEN WAR”
The War of 1812 is sometimes called the “forgotten war.” Indeed, military
historian, professor of history, and author Donald R. Hickey, in his book, The War
of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, called the War of 1812 “probably our most obscure
war.”1 However, the War of 1812 had a great impact on the development of the
fledgling United States. Pulitzer-prize winning historian Gordon S. Wood, in his
book, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, called the
war “one of the most important wars in American history.”2 The War of 1812
impacted the nation in numerous ways, including improving the nation’s national
spirit and international reputation, as well as its transportation, manufacturing, and
military capabilities. The war also pushed military heroes into the political
spotlight and meant doom for many American Indians. The War of 1812 was vital
in pushing America towards becoming a powerful, continental country.
For Americans at the time, the War of 1812 was a significant event. For
many, it was a final break with Great Britain, and as Wood stated, “The
Americans’ emotional connection with Britain was at last broken, and they had
acquired a new sense of their own national character.”3 Some even thought of the
war as a continuation of the Revolutionary War—a “second struggle for
independence.”4 Americans at the end of the war who were forty years of age or
older and born in America had been born subjects of King George III or of his
predecessor Hanoverian monarchs; Americans younger than forty (eighty five
percent of the population) were born American citizens. Most Americans came out
of this war with a generally negative attitude towards Great Britain. Indeed, shortly
after the war, editor and publisher Hezekiah Niles wrote, “In the general prosperity,
we behold the downfall of that faction which would have made a common interest
with the British, during the late war . . . they are despised by the people they would
have given soul and body to serve; . . . they are laughed at by all who consider
them too contemptible for serious rebuke.”5 Americans also developed more pride
in the American nation and its political system.
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The War of 1812 unified the country and instilled pride and confidence in
the United States. The country had been unsure of itself and the war showed that
the United States could stand up to a major power. Many Americans had doubted
the country’s place in the world. However, the war helped. A September 1815
editorial in the Niles’ Weekly Register reported, “A high and honorable feeling
generally prevails . . . and the people begin to assume, more and more, a
NATIONAL CHARACTER.”6 The war gave Americans this feeling, and a new
nationalism grew among the population. Albert Gallatin, America’s Minister to
France, said that “the war renewed and reinstated the National Feelings and
character which the Revolution had given, and were daily lessened.”7 The war also
reinforced the American idea of republican government.
The War of 1812 reassured Americans, who had seemed unsure as to how
strong their country was, and if their new form of government could survive long.
“The War of 1812 did finally establish for Americans the independence and
nationhood of the United States that so many had doubted.”8 Historian Norman
Risjord, in his book Jefferson’s America, said “the experiment in republican
government—a source of concern to both Washington and Jefferson in their
inaugural addresses—had been made to work.”9 Thomas Jefferson confirmed that
the government was solid. He said, “Our government is now so firmly put on its
republican tack, that it will not be easily monarchised by forms.”10 The war
increased America’s citizens’ faith in the United States as a nation and in its
political system. People also took pride in standing up to a powerful Great Britain.
The results of the war reinforced the nation’s feelings as a strong,
sovereign nation. America was confident that it could now assert its authority.
Benson Lossing said that the war resulted in “the positive and permanent
independence of the United States,” and that the nation would not “tolerate an
insult, nor suffer its sovereignty to be questioned.” Americans were “truly free” to
begin “on a grand career of prosperity, with marvelous resources, developed and
undeveloped – known and unknown.”11
Hickey postulated, “[T]he heady
nationalism and expansionism that characterized American foreign policy
throughout the nineteenth century was at least partly a result of the War of 1812.”12
Although the nation suffered many defeats and really gained nothing in fighting
Great Britain to a standstill, many Americans felt they had won. In a special letter
to Congress, President James Madison said, “While performing this act I
congratulate you and our constituents upon an event which is highly honorable to
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the nation, and terminates with peculiar felicity a campaign signalized by the most
brilliant successes.”13 Although brilliant success was not what everyone thought,
the United States did gain international respect from the war.
Once again, the United States had fought one of the most powerful
nations in the world and survived. This increased the nation’s international
standing. Albert Gallatin wrote, “The character of America stands now as high as
ever on the European continent, and higher than it ever did in Great Britain.”14
John Quincy Adams was a bit reluctant about it all and thought Americans went a
bit too far, saying “my country men . . . look too intently to their Triumphs & turn
their eyes too lightly away from their disasters . . . rather more proud than they
have reason for the War.”15 However, he still said that the war “was more
beneficial than injurious to our Country,” and it “raised our national character in
the eyes of all Europe.”16 Some political groups did not reap success from the war.
Although the nation’s mood was positive after the war, during the war, Hickey
noted that the War of 1812 was “America’s most unpopular foreign war.”17
Politically, the Federalist and Republican parties were deeply divided and the
Federalists did not support the war, almost always voting in a bloc against it. They
wanted peace with Great Britain and were in favor of accepting early peace
offerings with terms that most Americans thought unacceptable. New England
states believed that they bore too much of the brunt of the war and worried about
their protection—their maritime industry also had suffered. This opposition led to
the Hartford Convention. This convention of New England states proposed seven
amendments to the Constitution, including one to end the three-fifths law (to
lessen southern influence) and one to insist requiring a two-thirds majority
Congressional vote to go to war, among others. They also proposed establishment
of a New England Confederation “for their own defence.”18 An extremist group of
Federalists (not those at the convention) even talked of secession. This could have
had major implications for the country’s political future but fortunately for the
United States, the war ended before it got that far. Even though secession was not
the position of most, the Federalist Party was destroyed as party. It never
overcame the stigma of being considered disloyal during the war. Rufus King ran
against James Monroe in 1816 as the party’s last presidential candidate. The
controversy ended America’s first two-party system, and the Republican Party
dominated politics for the next decade. Still, the United States’ new nationalism
and international respect allowed it to look inward and develop its capabilities.
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America was forced to develop business and manufacturing by the war.
The embargo and Non-intercourse Acts before the war and the war itself meant
imported manufactured goods from Britain were in short supply. Additionally, the
war had interrupted maritime trade and fishing; “American commerce was driven
from the seas.”20 This forced American investors to look at other avenues. They
looked towards manufacturing.
The short supply of manufactured goods resulted in greater demand and
higher prices. This led to “a sudden increase in the number of patents and also to
an inducement for more and more investors to shift their capital out of overseas
shipping into domestic manufacturing.”21 Before 1808 there were only fifteen
cotton mills in the United States; by 1814, 243 cotton mills were operating in
fifteen states. Americans started to change their minds about manufacturing. Even
Thomas Jefferson, who had been hostile to manufacturing, conceded, “that
manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort,” and
“[o]ur manufacturers are now very nearly on a footing with those of England. She
has not a single improvement which we do not possess, and many of them better
adapted by ourselves to our ordinary use.” He also said in a letter that “He,
therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us
either to dependence on that foreign nation, or to be clothed in skins, and to live
like wild beasts in dens and caverns.”22 This was a strong turnaround from his
earlier position supporting a rural farming culture. The country was ripe for the
spread of capitalism.
Because of the war America saw increased governmental expenditure,
extensive military mobilization, expanded banking and credit, and growth of
domestic manufacturing. These resulted in “hallmarks of capitalism” such as “a
heightened sense of individuality, the increasing importance of the consumption of
material goods, and extensive geographical and social mobility . . . a decisive
moment in the emergence of the United States as a modern capitalist society.”23
People who had previously seen capitalism and consumption of material goods as
evil were changing their tune. Americans also began to focus on the West.
The War of 1812 removed many obstacles to American expansion. The
British had always tried to bottle up this urge to expand. For a long time, they had
used Indians to prevent American expansion. The British believed that American
expansion would “produce Indian war, menace the British fur trade, and even
endanger the safety of Canada.”24 However, Americans were now free to move
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into the Ohio and Mississippi valley regions. According to Jesse Buel, editor of
the Albany Argus, Americans were eager. “What a field for splendid
contemplation does our western country unfold! . . . When we consider that
nature has strewn her gifts with a bountiful hand over this vast wilderness, and
take into view the benign influence of our government and the enterprise of our
population, the mind is lost in the magnitude of the objects which seem rising in
futurity.”25 Hickey said that “the war encouraged the heady expansionism that lay
at the heart of American foreign policy for the rest of the century.”26 British
observers noticed American expansionism and commented on it. William
Hamilton, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1809 to 1822,
noted in December 1815, “Seeds of unlimited expansion . . . have taken root in
that country.”27 Florida was one of the first to feel the urge for expansion.
There had been periodic conflict between Spanish Florida and America
for quite some time. After the War of 1812, the Spanish had little hope of
retaining Florida. The British had attacked America through these territories and
because the Spanish were an ally of Britain, the British had often protected them
in disputes. However, Spanish West Florida became the only permanent land
acquisition the United States made during the War of 1812. By 1819, Spain had
abandoned Florida, as well as a large part of its claims in the Pacific Northwest.
This helped make the United States a true continental power. However,
transportation through any areas opened up by the war was difficult.28
The War of 1812, and the expansion brought on afterwards, spotlighted
how weak the nation’s transportation systems were. The war itself had pushed
the nation towards developing other transportation options for military reasons.
Since transportation by way of the Atlantic Ocean was made hazardous by the
strong British Navy, the United States was forced to use internal roads for
transportation. The poor condition of these roads “greatly hampered the war
effort.”29 Additionally, Americans travelling west found horrible roads. The need
to improve travel and trade in the West, along with military considerations,
resulted in renewed calls for the state and national governments to “finance
internal improvements, or at least to invest in the stock of various road
companies.”30 The nation “pursued with new vigor” the National Road from
Cumberland Maryland to the Ohio River and several states approved canal
projects.31 The war showcased not only military transportation issues, however;
the military itself had serious issues.
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During the war, the United States military had many problems. Many of
the country’s military leaders were incompetent and the country had problems
getting enough enlistments. The militia was largely ineffective. In fact, they
proved to be “costly and inefficient and repeatedly refused to cross into Canada or
to hold their positions under enemy fire.” Militarily, the United States did not
achieve any of the goals it had attempted to achieve. It could not conquer Canada
or achieve its maritime goals—these issues were not even mentioned in the Treaty
of Ghent. Even the acquisition of West Florida came against a neutral power—not
from its enemy.32 However, there were some positive results.
The country realized it needed to make efforts to deal with its military
weaknesses exposed during the war. It was obvious the United States could no
longer rely upon the militia to defend the country. Americans were also wary of
future wars, especially with England, so they continued greater military and naval
expenditure after the war. America no longer saw it as beneficial to “rely on the
Jeffersonian panaceas of the 1800s.”33 Madison said, “Experience has taught us
that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert
disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the continuance of
peace.”34 The United States established the army at ten thousand men—the largest
standing army ever for the country. John C. Calhoun led the reform of the armed
forces during his tenure in the War Department (1817-1825). The war had proved
the excellence of military training at West Point and Calhoun recognized the
importance of professional training for its officers. After 1815 “an education at
West Point became an essential requirement for most men who sought a military
career.”35 Henry Adams pointed out that West Point had also developed scientific
engineering, and that “none of the works constructed by a graduate of West Point
was captured by the enemy . . . perhaps without exaggeration the West Point
Academy might be said to have decided, next to the navy, the result of the war.”
After the war, Adams noted that improvements “introduced a new and scientific
character into American life.”36 Staff organizations also expanded during
Calhoun’s watch. This was especially true with the Corps of Engineers, which
embarked on a program to systematically improve coastal fortifications and also to
establish arms depots. The navy was also expanded.
American naval power made great strides in the war. Although fighting
against one of the premier navies of the world, the American navy showed its
worth. They “instantly made improvements that gave them superiority.”38 The
107
naval capability of the United States began to elicit respect internationally.
Indeed, Gallatin said that the United States was “generally respected and
considered as the nation designed to check the naval despotism of England.”39
Realizing the power of a strong navy, the Naval Expansion Act of 1816 led to a
marked increase in the size of the navy.40 The war also enhanced the political
careers of many.
The War of 1812 was crucial in the political careers of many American
leaders. The war propelled Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison towards
the presidency—and three men into the vice-presidency—Daniel D. Tompkins,
John C. Calhoun, and Richard M. Johnson. Andrew Jackson gained much
political capital from the Battle of New Orleans which caused pride and
nationalism; “Congress voted him the thanks of the nation, and ordered a
commemorative gold medal to be given him.”41 William Henry Harrison ran for
office as “Old Tippecanoe,” and slogans such as “Tippecanoe and Tyler too”
touted his status as a war hero. Many others used war records to justify their
elections. The Battle of Thames alone produced one president and one vice
president, and in the state of Kentucky alone, “three governors, three lieutenant
governors, four U.S. senators, and a score of congressmen.”42 However, not
everyone benefited from the war.
The American Indians were the biggest losers in the aftermath of the
War of 1812. During the war the American Indians had “made their last great
effort to retain at least a portion of the land between the Ohio and the Mississippi
Rivers.”43 It was often difficult for them to decide who to side with, but in the
end, it did not matter. The American government did not differentiate much
between enemies, and allies after the war and American Indian power was soon
destroyed east of the Mississippi. The war was “a decisive defeat with lasting
consequences . . . for centuries the tribes had been able to retain much
autonomy—economic, political, and military—by playing off the British, French,
Spanish, and Americans against each other.” Now they could not. The defeat and
death of Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames and the destruction of the Creeks
at Horseshoe Bend “marked the end of the serious military power of the
American Indians in the Northwest and Southeast respectively.”44 The peace
treaty between the British and Americans did not help.
The Treaty of Ghent left the door wide open for American expansion.
The events after the war showed that “neither accommodation to nor resistance
108
against American encroachments would suffice to preserve their cultural and
political autonomy.”45 The Treaty of Ghent promised that both countries would
“make peace with the Indians and to restore to such tribes . . . all the possessions,
rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to, in one
thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities.”46 However, the
treaty did not include a permanent reservation for the Indians. This left them at the
mercy of a more nationalistic and self-reliant America, “an expansive people
determined to engross lands up to and even beyond the Mississippi River.”47 Soon
the United States “felt free to resume the negotiation of cessions of tribal lands.”48
The American Indians were doomed. Even those who had sided with America
suffered.
Even tribes that fought as allies of the United States were dealt with
severely and often underhandedly. The Choctaw lost their land under treaties of
1816 and 1830. The Cherokee allies suffered much the same fate. Andrew
Jackson “extorted a fraudulent treaty with unauthorized Cherokees” in 1816, and
the Senate ratified it, unwilling to “defy his popularity with southwestern
voters.”49 Through a series of treaties, Jackson obtained “vast lands . . . three
quarters of Alabama and Florida, one-third of Tennessee, one-fifth of Georgia and
Mississippi, and smaller portions of Kentucky and South Carolina.”50 American
Indian power east of the Mississippi River was irretrievably broken. In fact,
Secretary of War Calhoun said they “have, in great measure, ceased to be an
object of terror, and have become that of commiseration.”51
In conclusion, although the War of 1812 is often seen as the “forgotten
war,” it was an influential war, impacting the nation in numerous ways. The war
resulted in a surge in nationalism. Few still clung to Great Britain. Americans
enjoyed increased optimism about the United States and its political system. The
war also showed that the United States would be a force to be reckoned with
internationally. After surviving another war against an international powerhouse,
the United States’ prestige throughout Europe was never higher. Forced to turn
from maritime interests during the war, the United States began manufacturing
more of its own goods. Leaders soon realized that the country’s transportation and
communication systems were inadequate, and began diligently working on
improvements. All of this resulted in the country looking inward to capitalize on
its own internal resources. Capitalism thrived and the country was eager to
expand. The War of 1812 also made the nation realize its military was weak. No
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longer able to rely on militia to fight its wars, the United States created a standing
army that built on its successes like West Point and enlarged the navy, which had
proven so vital during the war; America began to be recognized as a naval power.
The war also pushed military heroes into the political spotlight; some used this
spotlight to catapult themselves into the running for the highest political offices.
Unfortunately, the War of 1812 was devastating for many American Indians. In
hindsight, it is not difficult to say that Gordon S. Wood was right—the War of
1812 was essential in driving changes that set the stage for the United States of
America to become a continental and international power. The nation was primed
to chase its (manifest) destiny.
Notes
1. Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1990), 1.
2. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 659.
3. Ibid., 701.
4. Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812: Or Illustrations, by Pen
and Pencil, of the History, Biography, Scenery, Relics, and Traditions of the Last War for American
Independence (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishing, 1868), accessed 13 Jan 2013, http://
freepages.history.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~wcarr1/Lossing2/Chap02.html.
5. H. Niles, ed. Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol XII September 1814-March 1815, accessed 12
Jan 2013, http://ia700406.us.archive.org/6/items/nilesweeklyregis12balt/nilesweeklyregis12balt.pdf.
6. Ibid.
7. Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott, 1879), accessed 12 Jan 2013, http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1953/122312.
8. Wood, Empire of Liberty, 699.
9. Norman K. Risjord, Jefferson’s America:1760-1815, 3d Ed. (Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1990), 406-407.
10. Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh
(Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1905), 289.
11. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812.
12. Hickey, The War of 1812, 304.
110
13. James Madison, Special Message to Congress on the Treaty of Ghent (February 18,
1815), accessed 12 Jan 2013, http://www.constitution.org/jm/18150218_peace.txt.
14. Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, n.p.
15. John Quincy Adams, The Writings of John Quincy Adams: Vol. VI 1816-1819, edited by
Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), 38.
16. John Quincy Adams, “Letters of John Quincy Adams to Alexander Hamilton Everett,
1811-1837,” The American Historical Review 11, no. 1 (October 1905): 103.
17. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 255.
18. Henry Adams, The War of 1812, ed. Major Harvey A. DeWeerd, with an introduction by
Colonel John R. Elting (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1999), 275.
19. John Quincy Adams, “Letters;” Henry Adams, The War of 1812, ed. Major Harvey A.
DeWeerd, with an introduction by Colonel John R. Elting (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1999),
275; Jeremy Black, Fighting for America: The Struggle for Mastery in North America 1519-1871,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 173; Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict,
277; Risjord, Jefferson’s America:1760-1815, 36; Edward C. Skeen, 1816: America Rising, (Lexington:
The University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 18-19.
20. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-
1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 132.
21. Wood, Empire of Liberty, 702.
22. Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to General Thaddeus Kosciusko, January 9 1816,” accessed 6
January 2013, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/
jefl238.php; Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Benjamin Austin, January 9 1816,” accessed 6 January 2013,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl238.php.
23. J. C. A. Stagg, The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 7.
24. Philip P. Mason, ed., After Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of the War of 1812 (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 2011), 60.
25. Skeen, 1816: America Rising, 18.
26. Hickey, The War of 1812, 3.
27. Black, Fighting for America, 174.
28. Stagg, The War of 1812, 166.
29. Skeen, 1816: America Rising, 32.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
111
32. Hickey, The War of 1812, 301, 303.
33. Black, Fighting for America, 174.
34. Madison, Special Message to Congress.
35. Stagg, The War of 1812, 174.
36. Adams, The War of 1812, 361.
37. Black, Fighting for America, 173.
38. Henry, Adams, The War of 1812, 357.
39. Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, n.p.
40. Black, Fighting for America, 173.
41. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812 n.p.
42. Hickey, The War of 1812, 2; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 573; Stagg, The War of
1812, 3.
43. Mason, After Tippecanoe, 60.
44. Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 74.
45. Stagg, The War of 1812, 156.
46. Treaty of Ghent, “Yale Law School Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and
Diplomacy,” accessed 16 February 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ghent.asp.
47. Hickey, The War of 1812, 296, 303.
48. Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 76.
49. Ibid.
50. Black, Fighting for America, 176; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 76.
51. Hickey, The War of 1812, 314.
112
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introduction by Colonel John R. Elting. New York: Cooper Square Press,
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Everett, 1811-1837.The American Historical Review 11, no. 1 (October
1905): 88-116.
______. The Writings of John Quincy Adams: Vol. VI 1816-1819. Edited by
Worthington Chauncey Ford. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916.
Black, Jeremy. Fighting for America: The Struggle for Mastery in North America
1519-1871. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
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http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1953/122312.
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Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America,
1815-1848. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Jefferson, Thomas. “Quotations on Manufacturing.” Accessed January 6, 2013.
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/quotations-manufacturing.
______. “Letter to Benjamin Austin, January 9 1816.” Accessed January 6, 2013.
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jefferson/jefl238.php.
______. “Letter to General Thaddeus Kosciusko, January 9 1816.” Accessed
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______. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Albert Ellery Bergh.
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of the Last War for American Independence. New York: Harper & Brothers
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Publishing, 1868. Accessed January 13, 2013. http://
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Accessed January 12, 2013. http://ia700406.us.archive.org/6/items/
nilesweeklyregis12balt/nilesweeklyregis12balt.pdf.
______. Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol XII March-September 1817. Accessed January
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Risjord, Norman K. Jefferson’s America:1760-1815, 3d Ed. Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1990.
Skeen, Edward C. 1816: America Rising. Lexington: The University Press of
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Stagg, J. C. A. The War of 1812: Conflict For a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge
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Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish
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Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Chris Schloemer holds a Master’s Degree in History with a concentration in Ancient
and Classical History (Honors), as well as a Master’s Certificate in American
History, both from American Military University. He also holds a Master’s Degree
in Management from Wayland Baptist University. Retired from the Air Force after
more than 25 years of service, Chris still works in human resource management for
the Air Force, but hopes to become a history teacher at the college level someday.
Chris lives in San Antonio with his wife, son, and daughter and enjoys spending
time with his family. His mother and one other son live in San Antonio, as well as
two of his six grandchildren. He also enjoys keeping his yard beautiful and, “a good
walk spoiled” by playing bad golf.

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