The NBA] has in view the erection of a system extending throughout the country, and independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and as numerous as the States

In an opinion citing, among other cases, Felton, the Court held: "Undoubtedly a State has the legitimate power to define and punish crimes by general laws applicable to all persons within its jurisdiction. So, likewise, it may declare, by special laws, certain acts to be criminal offences when committed by officers or agents of its own banks and institutions. But it is without …

Congress, having power to create a system of national banks, is the judge as to the extent of the powers which should be conferred upon such banks and has the sole power to regulate and control the exercise of their operations; it is not competent for state legislatures to interfere, whether with hostile or friendly intentions, with such banks or their officers in the exercise …

That history is one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental "powers" to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.

Congress did not intend, we explained, "to leave the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare and stability of national banks by direct legislation....[C] onfusion would necessarily result from control possessed and exercised by two independent authorities."

"If there be no conflict, the [NBA and a state law] can coexist, and be harmoniously enforced, but, if the conflict arises, the law of [the state] is from the nature of things inoperative and void as against the dominant authority of the Federal statute."

—the court held that a state statute prohibiting the acceptance of deposits by a bank when insolvent could not apply to a national bank.

A judicial decision that fails to directly confront the provision at issue cannot be deemed to have adopted the "authoritative" construction of the statute.[3] Petitioner's reliance on other decisions of this Court is misplaced for this very same reason.

The principles enunciated in [McCulloch] and in [Osborn], though expressed in respect to banks incorporated directly by acts of Congress, are yet applicable to the later and present system of national banks