A trial court's findings, including credibility, on the question of a defendant's confession must be sustained unless clearly erroneous.

In similar contexts, this court and others have held that trial by a judge with knowledge of a presentence report is not cause for reversal.

Criticism directed against the moving party, his attorney or a witness which does not indicate an opinion on the merits of the litigation is held not to be a valid ground for recusal

And no lesser light than Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Supreme Court, has expressed the same view: Certainly it is not the rule of judicial administration, that, statutory requirements apart,[citing the predecessor of 28 USC § 144], a judge is disqualified from sitting in a retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings.

—although critical comment of judge was unnecessary, it was accurate and did not demonstrate a bias on the merits of the case

This exception to the general rule permitting a defendant to cross-examine a government witness concerning his address is well settled.

Apart from the fact that one of the statements was elicited by defendant's own counsel on cross-examination, the argument is specious, because the statements were volunteered and were not responses to interrogation.

—assumed names of government witnesses withheld from defendant, where the FBI had arranged for the witnesses to take on totally new identities for their own protection

These remarks, if they were made, may have been intemperate, objectionable, or otherwise inappropriate, but they do not provide grounds for recusal under § 144.

The conflict between appellant's version of the circumstances surrounding his confession and that of the government presented a question of credibility for the trier of fact.

[BOOK] Moore's federal practice