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{{short description|Formalisation of dialectic}}
In the past few decades, European and American [[logic]]ians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for '''logic and dialectic''' by formalising '''dialectical logic''' or dialectical [[argument (logic)|argument]]. There had been pre-formal treatises on argument and [[dialectic]], from authors such as [[Stephen Toulmin]] (''The Uses of Argument''), [[Nicholas Rescher]] (''Dialectics''), and van Eemeren and Grootendorst ([[Pragma-dialectics]]). One can include the communities of [[informal logic]] and [[paraconsistent logic]]. However, building on theories of [[defeasible reasoning]] (see [[John L. Pollock]]), systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed assumptions, and rules for shifting burden. Many of these logics appear in the special area of [[artificial intelligence and law]], though the computer scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build [[decision support]] and computer-supported collaborative work systems.<ref>See Logical models of argument,
{{For|the meaning in Hegelian and Marxist thought|Dialectical logic}}
CI Chesñevar, AG Maguitman, R Loui - ACM Computing Surveys, 2000 and Logics for defeasible argumentation,
<!-- This article's sections "History", "Defeasibility", and "Dialog games" are transcluded in [[Dialectic#Formalism]]. Do not rename sections without fixing transclusions. -->
H Prakken, Handbook of philosophical logic, 2002 for surveys of work in this area.</ref>
[[Formal science|Formal scientists]] have attempted to combine [[formal logic]] (the science of [[Validity (logic)|deductively valid]] inferences or of [[logical truth]]s) and [[dialectic]] (a form of reasoning based upon dialogue of [[argument]]s and counter-arguments) through [[Formal system|formalisation]] of dialectic. These attempts include pre-formal and partially formal treatises on argument and [[dialectic]], systems based on [[defeasible reasoning]], and systems based on [[game semantics]] and [[dialogical logic]].

==History==
Since the late 20th century, European and American [[logic]]ians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectic through formalisation,<ref name="Eemeren">{{cite book |last1=Eemeren |first1=Frans H. van |author-link1=Frans H. van Eemeren |last2=Garssen |first2=Bart |last3=Krabbe |first3=Erik C. W. |last4=Snoeck Henkemans |first4=A. Francisca |last5=Verheij |first5=Bart |last6=Wagemans |first6=Jean H. M. |date=2014 |title=Handbook of argumentation theory |location=New York |publisher=Springer-Verlag |isbn=9789048194728 |oclc=871004444 |doi=10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5}}</ref>{{rp|201–372}} although logic has been related to dialectic since ancient times.<ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|51–140}} There have been pre-formal and partially-formal treatises on argument and dialectic, from authors such as [[Stephen Toulmin]] (''The Uses of Argument'', 1958),<ref>{{cite book |last=Toulmin |first=Stephen |date=2003 |origyear=1958 |title=The uses of argument |edition=Updated |location=Cambridge, UK; New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521827485 |oclc=51607421 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511840005}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Hitchcock |editor1-first=David |editor2-last=Verheij |editor2-first=Bart |date=2006 |title=Arguing on the Toulmin model: new essays in argument analysis and evaluation |series=Argumentation library |volume=10 |location=Dordrecht |publisher=Springer-Verlag |isbn=978-1402049378 |oclc=82229075 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5}}</ref><ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|203–256}} [[Nicholas Rescher]] (''Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge'', 1977),<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hetherington|first=Stephen|author-link=Stephen Hetherington|title=Nicholas Rescher: Philosophical Dialectics|url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25075-philosophical-dialectics-an-essay-on-metaphilosophy/|date=2006|journal=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews|issue=2006.07.16}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|editor-last=Jacquette|editor-first=Dale|title=Reason, Method, and Value: A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T65moyMMioYC|date=2009|location=Frankfurt|publisher=Ontos Verlag|doi=10.1515/9783110329056|isbn=9783110329056}}</ref><ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|330–336}} and [[Frans H. van Eemeren]] and [[Rob Grootendorst]] ([[pragma-dialectics]], 1980s).<ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|517–614}} One can include works of the communities of [[informal logic]] and [[paraconsistent logic]].<ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|373–424}}

==Defeasibility==
Building on theories of [[defeasible reasoning]] (see [[John L. Pollock]]), systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed assumptions, and rules for shifting burden.<ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|615–675}} Many of these logics appear in the special area of [[artificial intelligence and law]], though the computer scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build [[decision support]] and computer-supported collaborative work systems.<ref>For surveys of work in this area see, for example: {{cite journal |last1=Chesñevar |first1=Carlos Iván |last2=Maguitman |first2=Ana Gabriela |last3=Loui |first3=Ronald Prescott |date=December 2000 |title=Logical models of argument |journal=ACM Computing Surveys |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=337–383 |doi=10.1145/371578.371581|citeseerx=10.1.1.702.8325 }} And: {{cite book |last1=Prakken |first1=Henry |last2=Vreeswijk |first2=Gerard |date=2005 |chapter=Logics for defeasible argumentation |editor1-last=Gabbay |editor1-first=Dov M. |editor2-last=Guenthner |editor2-first=Franz |title=Handbook of philosophical logic |edition=2nd |volume=4 |location=Dordrecht; Boston |publisher=Kluwer Academic Publishers |pages=219–318 |isbn=9789048158775 |doi=10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_3|citeseerx=10.1.1.295.2649 }}</ref>

==Dialog games==
{{main|Game semantics|Dialogical logic}}
Dialectic itself can be formalised as moves in a game, where an advocate for the truth of a proposition and an opponent argue.<ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|301–372}} Such games can provide a [[semantics of logic]], one that is very general in applicability.<ref name="Eemeren"/>{{rp|314}}

==See also==
* [[Argumentation framework]]
* [[Argumentation theory]]
* [[Logic of argumentation]]


==References==
==References==
{{reflist}}
{{reflist}}

[[Category:Dialectic]]
[[Category:Formal logic]]




{{philosophy-stub}}
[[Category:Logic]]

Latest revision as of 19:20, 9 March 2024

Formal scientists have attempted to combine formal logic (the science of deductively valid inferences or of logical truths) and dialectic (a form of reasoning based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments) through formalisation of dialectic. These attempts include pre-formal and partially formal treatises on argument and dialectic, systems based on defeasible reasoning, and systems based on game semantics and dialogical logic.

History[edit]

Since the late 20th century, European and American logicians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectic through formalisation,[1]: 201–372  although logic has been related to dialectic since ancient times.[1]: 51–140  There have been pre-formal and partially-formal treatises on argument and dialectic, from authors such as Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of Argument, 1958),[2][3][1]: 203–256  Nicholas Rescher (Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 1977),[4][5][1]: 330–336  and Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (pragma-dialectics, 1980s).[1]: 517–614  One can include works of the communities of informal logic and paraconsistent logic.[1]: 373–424 

Defeasibility[edit]

Building on theories of defeasible reasoning (see John L. Pollock), systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed assumptions, and rules for shifting burden.[1]: 615–675  Many of these logics appear in the special area of artificial intelligence and law, though the computer scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build decision support and computer-supported collaborative work systems.[6]

Dialog games[edit]

Dialectic itself can be formalised as moves in a game, where an advocate for the truth of a proposition and an opponent argue.[1]: 301–372  Such games can provide a semantics of logic, one that is very general in applicability.[1]: 314 

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i Eemeren, Frans H. van; Garssen, Bart; Krabbe, Erik C. W.; Snoeck Henkemans, A. Francisca; Verheij, Bart; Wagemans, Jean H. M. (2014). Handbook of argumentation theory. New York: Springer-Verlag. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5. ISBN 9789048194728. OCLC 871004444.
  2. ^ Toulmin, Stephen (2003) [1958]. The uses of argument (Updated ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840005. ISBN 978-0521827485. OCLC 51607421.
  3. ^ Hitchcock, David; Verheij, Bart, eds. (2006). Arguing on the Toulmin model: new essays in argument analysis and evaluation. Argumentation library. Vol. 10. Dordrecht: Springer-Verlag. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5. ISBN 978-1402049378. OCLC 82229075.
  4. ^ Hetherington, Stephen (2006). "Nicholas Rescher: Philosophical Dialectics". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2006.07.16).
  5. ^ Jacquette, Dale, ed. (2009). Reason, Method, and Value: A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. doi:10.1515/9783110329056. ISBN 9783110329056.
  6. ^ For surveys of work in this area see, for example: Chesñevar, Carlos Iván; Maguitman, Ana Gabriela; Loui, Ronald Prescott (December 2000). "Logical models of argument". ACM Computing Surveys. 32 (4): 337–383. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.702.8325. doi:10.1145/371578.371581. And: Prakken, Henry; Vreeswijk, Gerard (2005). "Logics for defeasible argumentation". In Gabbay, Dov M.; Guenthner, Franz (eds.). Handbook of philosophical logic. Vol. 4 (2nd ed.). Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219–318. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.295.2649. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_3. ISBN 9789048158775.


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