that other editor only took action because your unproductive edit rendered the text unreadable and why do you revert my edits whole scale? |
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The [[feminism|feminist]] Beverly Harrison once said, "...the well-being of the woman and the value of her life plan should always be recognised as of intrinsic nature". [http://books.google.com/books?id=CinU6Vy_sYMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=the+well-being+of+the+woman+and+the+value+of+her+life+plan+should+always+be+recognised+as+of+intrinsic+nature&source=web&ots=psieJyoOyf&sig=kIZPP2bQ7TgrVK_1rflNYmnwD64&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result] Some pro-choice advocates argue that a woman has the right to control her own [[body]], and thus is under no [[moral obligation]] to give [[birth]] and should have [[self-determination]] in all [[reproductive]] matters. |
The [[feminism|feminist]] Beverly Harrison once said, "...the well-being of the woman and the value of her life plan should always be recognised as of intrinsic nature". [http://books.google.com/books?id=CinU6Vy_sYMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=the+well-being+of+the+woman+and+the+value+of+her+life+plan+should+always+be+recognised+as+of+intrinsic+nature&source=web&ots=psieJyoOyf&sig=kIZPP2bQ7TgrVK_1rflNYmnwD64&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result] Some pro-choice advocates argue that a woman has the right to control her own [[body]], and thus is under no [[moral obligation]] to give [[birth]] and should have [[self-determination]] in all [[reproductive]] matters. |
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[[Judith Jarvis Thomson]], in her [[1971]] paper ''[[A Defense of Abortion]],'' assumed for the sake of argument that [[person]]hood begins at [[Fertilisation|conception]]. She went on to argue that the pregnant woman is under no moral compulsion to support a [[fetus]] against her desire, using an [[analogy]] in which the reader is asked to [[thought experiment|imagine]] awakening to find that they are being used as a living [[dialysis]] machine for a [[violin]]ist who has suffered [[renal failure]]. Ultimately, Jarvis Thomson concludes, the right to [[consent]] outweighs the [[right to life]] in both cases.<ref>Jarvis Thomson, Judith. (1971). [http://www.utdallas.edu/~jfg021000/thomson.html A Defense of Abortion]. ''Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1),'' p. 47. Retrieved [[April 28]], [[2006]].</ref> |
[[Judith Jarvis Thomson]], in her [[1971]] paper ''[[A Defense of Abortion]],'' assumed for the sake of argument that [[person]]hood begins at [[Fertilisation|conception]]. She went on to argue that the pregnant woman is under no moral compulsion to support a [[fetus]] against her desire, using an [[analogy]] in which the reader is asked to [[thought experiment|imagine]] awakening to find that they are being used as a living [[dialysis]] machine for a [[violin]]ist who has suffered [[renal failure]]. Ultimately, Jarvis Thomson concludes, the right to [[consent]] outweighs the [[right to life]] in both cases.<ref>Jarvis Thomson, Judith. (1971). [http://www.utdallas.edu/~jfg021000/thomson.html A Defense of Abortion]. ''Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1),'' p. 47. Retrieved [[April 28]], [[2006]].</ref> |
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A common argument implemented by those who are [[pro-life]] is that the [[sanctity of life]] extends to all [[human]]s. The right to life of the fetus would thus overrule the woman's right to choose abortion since abortion would be equivalent to [[murder]]. |
A common argument implemented by those who are [[pro-life]] is that the [[sanctity of life]] extends to all [[human]]s. The right to life of the fetus would thus overrule the woman's right to choose abortion since abortion would be equivalent to [[murder]]. |
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Paul Ramsey and [[Charles Curran (theologian)|Charles Curran]] asserted that abortion, before 14th day of pregnancy, was acceptable, because after this point the division of the zygote through the process of [[twins|monozygotic twinning]] becomes impossible.<ref>Ramsey, P. (1970). "Reference points in deciding about abortion," in T.J. Noonan (ed.), ''The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives,'' pp. 60-100. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.</ref><ref>Curran, C.E., "Abortion: Contemporary debate in philosophical and religious ethics," in W.T. Reich (ed.), ''Encyclopedia of Bioethics 1'', pp. 17-26. London: The Free Press.</ref><ref>Prijić-Samaržija, Snježana. (2004). [http://www.univ.trieste.it/~etica/2004_2/SAMARZJIA.htm Embryo Experimentation and Sorites Paradoxes]. ''Etica & Politica, 2''. Retrieved [[April 28]], [[2006]].</ref> Current research suggests that fertilised embryos naturally fail to implant some 30% to 60% of the time.<!-- |
Paul Ramsey and [[Charles Curran (theologian)|Charles Curran]] asserted that abortion, before 14th day of pregnancy, was acceptable, because after this point the division of the zygote through the process of [[twins|monozygotic twinning]] becomes impossible.<ref>Ramsey, P. (1970). "Reference points in deciding about abortion," in T.J. Noonan (ed.), ''The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives,'' pp. 60-100. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.</ref><ref>Curran, C.E., "Abortion: Contemporary debate in philosophical and religious ethics," in W.T. Reich (ed.), ''Encyclopedia of Bioethics 1'', pp. 17-26. London: The Free Press.</ref><ref>Prijić-Samaržija, Snježana. (2004). [http://www.univ.trieste.it/~etica/2004_2/SAMARZJIA.htm Embryo Experimentation and Sorites Paradoxes]. ''Etica & Politica, 2''. Retrieved [[April 28]], [[2006]].</ref> Current research suggests that fertilised embryos naturally fail to implant some 30% to 60% of the time.<!-- |
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--><ref>Kennedy, T.G. [http://publish.uwo.ca/~kennedyt/t108.pdf Physiology of implantation]. <u>10th World Congress on ''in vitro'' fertilisation and assisted reproduction</u>. Vancouver, Canada, 24-28 May 1997.</ref> |
--><ref>Kennedy, T.G. [http://publish.uwo.ca/~kennedyt/t108.pdf Physiology of implantation]. <u>10th World Congress on ''in vitro'' fertilisation and assisted reproduction</u>. Vancouver, Canada, 24-28 May 1997.</ref> Of those that do implant, about 25% are [[miscarriage|miscarried]] in the first two to three weeks after pregnancy can be detected.<!-- |
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--><ref>Wilcox AJ, Baird DD, Weinberg CR. ''Time of implantation of the conceptus and loss of pregnancy.'' New England Journal of Medicine. 1999;340(23):1796-1799. PMID 10362823.</ref> Curran also suggested that the developing embryo should not be considered a person until its chance of survival to live birth was greater than [[one half]]. |
--><ref>Wilcox AJ, Baird DD, Weinberg CR. ''Time of implantation of the conceptus and loss of pregnancy.'' New England Journal of Medicine. 1999;340(23):1796-1799. PMID 10362823.</ref> Curran also suggested that the developing embryo should not be considered a person until its chance of survival to live birth was greater than [[one half]]. |
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=== Sanctity of human life === |
=== Sanctity of human life === |
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In [[1982]], the late [[John Paul II]] said, in a speech pertaining to embryonic experimentation, "I condemn in the most explicit and formal way, experimental manipulation of the human embryo, since the human being, from conception to death, cannot be exploited for any purpose whatsoever". |
In [[1982]], the late [[John Paul II]] said, in a speech pertaining to embryonic experimentation, "I condemn in the most explicit and formal way, experimental manipulation of the human embryo, since the human being, from conception to death, cannot be exploited for any purpose whatsoever". {{Fact|date=February 2007}} Members of the [[Catholic Church]], in general, believe that all human life is [[sacred]], and, thus, that the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life is never a conscionable act.[http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm] |
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However, a reverse argument could be made, in which factors that would reduce the future [[quality of life]] for the [[fetus]] to what might be defined as an insufferable degree could also be seen as violation of the [[sanctity of life]]. |
However, a reverse argument could be made, in which factors that would reduce the future [[quality of life]] for the [[fetus]] to what might be defined as an insufferable degree could also be seen as violation of the [[sanctity of life]]. |
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If the pregnant woman's life is at risk, then, arguably, [[abortion]] could be viewed as the [[Lesser of two evils principle (politics)|lesser of two evils]]. The [[Principle of Double Effect]] could thus be applied, as the intent of the abortion would be to preserve the life of the woman, and the death of the fetus would be a secondary consequence of this attempt. |
If the pregnant woman's life is at risk, then, arguably, [[abortion]] could be viewed as the [[Lesser of two evils principle (politics)|lesser of two evils]]. The [[Principle of Double Effect]] could thus be applied, as the intent of the abortion would be to preserve the life of the woman, and the death of the fetus would be a secondary consequence of this attempt. |
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In the words of [[Jeremy Bentham]], "The question is not can they reason nor can they talk, but can they suffer?"<ref> Palmer, M. (1991). ''Moral Problems,'' chap. 3. Cambridge: Lutterworth Press.</ref> Thus, under the ethical theory of [[utilitarianism]], people must consider the happiness of all those involved; actions must be chosen which will result in the greatest amount of good for the highest number of people. |
In the words of [[Jeremy Bentham]], "The question is not can they reason nor can they talk, but can they suffer?"<ref> Palmer, M. (1991). ''Moral Problems,'' chap. 3. Cambridge: Lutterworth Press.</ref> Thus, under the ethical theory of [[utilitarianism]], people must consider the happiness of all those involved; actions must be chosen which will result in the greatest amount of good for the highest number of people. |
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From a more practical utilitarian perspective, abortion might be considered acceptable if performed within the period in which the fetus is incapable of experiencing [[Pain and nociception|pain]], theorized |
From a more practical utilitarian perspective, abortion might be considered acceptable if performed within the period in which the fetus is incapable of experiencing [[Pain and nociception|pain]], theorized to be around the 23rd week of gestation.<ref>Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. (1997). ''[http://www.parliament.uk/post/pn094.pdf Fetal Awareness].'' Retrieved [[2006-01-11]].</ref> [[Mifepristone]], the "abortion pill," could be considered a painless method; [[prostaglandin]] abortion, on the other hand, could not, as it causes painful [[Contraction (childbirth)|contraction]]s in the woman and aborts the fetus through [[asphyxiation]].{{Fact|date=February 2007}} |
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== Abortion and natural law == |
== Abortion and natural law == |
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Revision as of 01:09, 27 January 2009
Template:Abortion debate sidebar The ethical aspects of abortion are much discussed in all major philosophies and religions in the world, particularly (but not exclusively) in the Christian religion.[citation needed]
Main ethical issues in abortion
Comparative rights
The feminist Beverly Harrison once said, "...the well-being of the woman and the value of her life plan should always be recognised as of intrinsic nature". [1] Some pro-choice advocates argue that a woman has the right to control her own body, and thus is under no moral obligation to give birth and should have self-determination in all reproductive matters.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, in her 1971 paper A Defense of Abortion, assumed for the sake of argument that personhood begins at conception. She went on to argue that the pregnant woman is under no moral compulsion to support a fetus against her desire, using an analogy in which the reader is asked to imagine awakening to find that they are being used as a living dialysis machine for a violinist who has suffered renal failure. Ultimately, Jarvis Thomson concludes, the right to consent outweighs the right to life in both cases.[1]
A common argument implemented by those who are pro-life is that the sanctity of life extends to all humans. The right to life of the fetus would thus overrule the woman's right to choose abortion since abortion would be equivalent to murder.
Question of personhood
Establishing the point in time when a zygote/embryo/fetus becomes a "person" is open to debate since the definition of "personhood" is not universally agreed upon.
Peter Singer argued that something can only be a person if it is self-aware and has temporal awareness. Therefore, abortion is morally acceptable, because a fetus does not meet this definition of personhood. Singer also concluded that infanticide would be permissible until the 3rd month after birth, because, at that point, self-awareness has still not been acquired.[2]
A religious individual, on the other hand, might argue that one becomes a person at the moment of ensoulment. The precise point at which this event occurs, however, varies depending upon the religion, sect, or theologians.
Paul Ramsey and Charles Curran asserted that abortion, before 14th day of pregnancy, was acceptable, because after this point the division of the zygote through the process of monozygotic twinning becomes impossible.[3][4][5] Current research suggests that fertilised embryos naturally fail to implant some 30% to 60% of the time.[6] Of those that do implant, about 25% are miscarried in the first two to three weeks after pregnancy can be detected.[7] Curran also suggested that the developing embryo should not be considered a person until its chance of survival to live birth was greater than one half.
In 1988, the Anglican Archbishop of York, John Habgood, argued that personhood begins with cellular differentiation. [citation needed]
The teaching of the Catholic Church holds that a human being's life begins at fertilization, and therefore abortion is always wrong. Because there are Biblical verses [which?] that can be interpreted to suggest that personhood begins at fertilization, this belief is generally held by other orthodox Abrahamic religions as well.
Sanctity of human life
In 1982, the late John Paul II said, in a speech pertaining to embryonic experimentation, "I condemn in the most explicit and formal way, experimental manipulation of the human embryo, since the human being, from conception to death, cannot be exploited for any purpose whatsoever". [citation needed] Members of the Catholic Church, in general, believe that all human life is sacred, and, thus, that the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life is never a conscionable act.[2]
However, a reverse argument could be made, in which factors that would reduce the future quality of life for the fetus to what might be defined as an insufferable degree could also be seen as violation of the sanctity of life.
If the pregnant woman's life is at risk, then, arguably, abortion could be viewed as the lesser of two evils. The Principle of Double Effect could thus be applied, as the intent of the abortion would be to preserve the life of the woman, and the death of the fetus would be a secondary consequence of this attempt.
The Catholic Church accepts the Principle of Double Effect when the death of the fetus is a secondary effect of treating the mother. For example, chemotherapy for cancer treatment may cause a miscarriage, and surgical removal of an ectopic pregnancy results in the death of the embryo. However, direct abortion with a side effect beneficial to the mother violates the Principle of Double Effect — so abortion prior to chemotherapy, or Methotrexate for ectopic pregnancy, are not acceptable.
Abortion from a utilitarian perspective
In the words of Jeremy Bentham, "The question is not can they reason nor can they talk, but can they suffer?"[8] Thus, under the ethical theory of utilitarianism, people must consider the happiness of all those involved; actions must be chosen which will result in the greatest amount of good for the highest number of people.
From a more practical utilitarian perspective, abortion might be considered acceptable if performed within the period in which the fetus is incapable of experiencing pain, theorized to be around the 23rd week of gestation.[9] Mifepristone, the "abortion pill," could be considered a painless method; prostaglandin abortion, on the other hand, could not, as it causes painful contractions in the woman and aborts the fetus through asphyxiation.[citation needed]
Abortion and natural law
According to the theory of natural law, reproduction is acknowledged to be an inherent component of the natural human condition (e.g., fertilization, differentiation and birth are all a part of the natural human life span), and, thus, abortion is counter to this design. [citation needed]
However, abortion can be seen as a furtherance of the human ability to reason. The aforementioned principle of double effect, in addition to proportionality, can also be used to justify abortion.[10]
References
- ^ Jarvis Thomson, Judith. (1971). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1), p. 47. Retrieved April 28, 2006.
- ^ Singer, P. (1976). Practical ethics, chap. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Ramsey, P. (1970). "Reference points in deciding about abortion," in T.J. Noonan (ed.), The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, pp. 60-100. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- ^ Curran, C.E., "Abortion: Contemporary debate in philosophical and religious ethics," in W.T. Reich (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics 1, pp. 17-26. London: The Free Press.
- ^ Prijić-Samaržija, Snježana. (2004). Embryo Experimentation and Sorites Paradoxes. Etica & Politica, 2. Retrieved April 28, 2006.
- ^ Kennedy, T.G. Physiology of implantation. 10th World Congress on in vitro fertilisation and assisted reproduction. Vancouver, Canada, 24-28 May 1997.
- ^ Wilcox AJ, Baird DD, Weinberg CR. Time of implantation of the conceptus and loss of pregnancy. New England Journal of Medicine. 1999;340(23):1796-1799. PMID 10362823.
- ^ Palmer, M. (1991). Moral Problems, chap. 3. Cambridge: Lutterworth Press.
- ^ Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. (1997). Fetal Awareness. Retrieved 2006-01-11.
- ^ Moore, Michael. (1992). "Law as a Functional Kind," in Robert P. George (ed.), Natural Law Theories: Contemporary Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
See also
External links
- The Ethics of Abortion - a site that looks at the issues, case studies and ethical and Christian responses
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Feminist Ethics
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Natural Law Tradition in Ethics