"[E] ven when the plain meaning [of the statute] did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one `plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole'this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. "

When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination."

`There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.

It is true that interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.

"In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress."

"Where the statute is ambiguous, it is well established that we may look to its legislative history and to the reason for its enactment."

However, as to such rulings, the Supreme Court has said: "In any case such interpretations are entitled to great weight. This is peculiarly true here where the interpretations involved `contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet …

To recapitulate, the objective of statutory interpretation is "to give effect to the intent of Congress."

Although the Motor Carrier Act does not define "employee," the Supreme Court has held that "the meaning of employees in [49 USC § 31502 (b)(1)] is limited to those employees whose activities affect the safety of operation."