—held that "the courts will not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the order".

L. 539, chap. 309; Judicial Code, § 207 [36 Stat. at L. 1148, chap. 231, US Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 216]) with respect to enjoining or setting aside the orders of the Commission, like the authority previously exercised by the Federal circuit courts, was confined to determining whether there had been violations of the Constitution, or of the power conferred by statute, or …

"In determining these mixed questions of law and fact, the court confines itself to the ultimate question as to whether the Commission acted within its power. It will not consider the expediency or wisdom of the order, or whether, on like testimony, it would have made a similar ruling. `The findings of the Commission are

Of course the consideration and decision of questions of law may involve a consideration of controverted facts to determine what the question of law is, but it is settled that any finding of fact by the commission, if supported by evidence, is final and conclusive on the courts.

The orders of the Commission are final unless (1) beyond the power which it can constitutionally exercise;(2) beyond its statutory right; or (3) based upon mistake of law.

"The courts will not review determinations of the Commission made within the scope of its powers or substitute their judgment for its findings and conclusions.

—in speaking of the carriers' concession that they were unable to determine the cost of the particular traffic in question and that a former rate had not been `less than cost,'the court said: "This concession... establishes an important fact in dealing with the difficult question of determining what is a reasonable rate on a particular article. Where the rates as a whole are under …

An order of the Secretary may, of course, be set aside for violation of the due process clause by prescribing rates which, on the facts found, are confiscatory; for the order of an administrative tribunal may be set aside for any error of law, substantive or procedural.

Thus it may be set aside where the facts are established if "in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law", or if the Commission acted "so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it", or "if the authority therein involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable manner as to …

This results from the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Commerce Act as amended in 1906 and 1910 (34 Stat. 589-591, c. 3591; 36 Stat. 551-554, c. 309), expounded in familiar decisions.