Later cases confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not on formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of "the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact by the Crown."

There, the question was whether "the Court of Queen's Bench [can] be debarred from making an order in favour of a British citizen unlawfully or arbitrarily detained" in Northern Rhodesia, which was at the time a protectorate of the Crown.

—it was held that the Queen's Bench Division had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in respect of a detention in a British protectorate.

Likewise, Blackstone explained that the writ "run [s] into all parts of the king's dominions" because "the king is at all times entitled to have an account why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained." 3 Blackstone 131 (emphasis added).

—can hardly be viewed as evidence of the historic scope of the writ, only confirms the ongoing relevance of the sovereign-subject relationship to the scope of the writ.

It is clear that Lord Mansfield was saying that the writ extended outside the realm of England proper, not outside the sovereign territory of the Crown

Each judge made clear that the detainee' s status as a subject was material to the resolution of the case.

Cf. Re Ning Yin Ching and others (1939) 56 TLR 3 (habeas corpus would not go in respect of imprisonment of Chinese nationals in British leased territory in China). However

On the unique co-seigneury of Andorra see Cruzel v. Massip, ILR 39, 412; Re Boedecker and Ronski, ibid. 44, 176; Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, iii. 3, 325; Rousseau, ii. 342-7; Crawford, 55 RDI (Sottile), 258-72. 47

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