—decided the issue in the context of the applicability of the notice provisions of TCA to claims brought under the Law Against Discrimination, NJSA 10: 5-1 to-49 ("LAD").

We begin our assessment with the familiar proposition that the clear public policy of this State is to eradicate invidious discrimination from the workplace.

In enacting the TCA, the Legislature intended to "provide a comprehensive scheme for adjudicating tort claims against public entities."

—it was not considered an alter-ego of the State but rather a "person" subject to liability for purposes of a federal action under 42 USCA § 1983.

Our Supreme Court has consistently noted the remedial objectives of the LAD and has "described the goal of the LAD as being nothing less than the eradication `of the cancer of discrimination.'"

We recognize that the TCA's notice requirements, NJSA 59: 8-8, do not apply to these statutory claims.

—the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked Urbano to determine that the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey would not qualify as an alter ego of the State for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity and hence qualified as a "person" subject to liability for discrimination claims brought under 42 USC § 1983 and the NJLAD.

The LAD was enacted by the New Jersey Supreme Court to “protect not only the civil rights of individual aggrieved employees but also to protect the public's strong interest in a discrimination-free workplace

Plaintiff relies on our Supreme Court holdings that claims arising under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), NJSA 10: 5-1 to-49, and "constitutional torts" are exempt from the notice requirements of the TCA.

I begin with a brief review of the prohibitions, protections and encouragements the Legislature established in the LAD and CEPA. "[T] he essential purpose of the LAD is the `eradication of the cancer of discrimination.'"