"It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination."

For the rare and extraordinary situations in which we have held that deprivation of a protected interest need not be preceded by opportunity for some kind of hearing,

—plaintiffs ask this Court for relief which, if granted, would preempt future FDA enforcement action such as injunctions, civil penalties, or seizures under the FDCA.

—can also be incalculable by the mere institution of proceedings. Yet it has never been held that the hand of government must be stayed until the courts have an opportunity to determine whether the government is justified in instituting suit in the courts. Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due process that there be judicial inquiry before …

—the Court held that the seizure without a prior hearing of allegedly misbranded articles under Section 304 (a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 334 (a), did not violate due process.

—the Supreme Court upheld the multiple seizure provision of § 334 and, in so doing, concluded that district courts are without jurisdiction to review the FDA's determination of probable cause necessary for the initiation of enforcement actions.

The Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order becomes effective."

"Deprivation of property to protect public health and safety is `one of the oldest examples' of permissible summary action. "

—we upheld under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause the summary seizure and destruction of drugs without a preseizure hearing.

The Court has often acknowledged, however, that summary administrative action may be justified in emergency situations.