—e] ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself,... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties

The Supreme Court has held that "[t] here is no absolute rule... against Congress' delegation of authority to define criminal punishments."

Congress [may] delegate authority to the President to define the aggravating factors that permit imposition of a statutory penalty

The Supreme Court has held that "[t] he clear assignment of power to a branch... allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance."

—recognizing that Congress may delegate its authority, but that it may not delegate its constitutional power to make law

—noting that "[e] ven before the birth of this country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny

"The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress, and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity."

—holding that the non-delegation doctrine prevents Congress from transferring to another branch "powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative

Because a governing body cannot give away its ultimate authority, the delegation contemplated by Falcon, and permitted in this case by ARS § 15-341 (F), must be of powers less than those reserved only to the governing body.

The narrowing may also be achieved, however, in the definition of the capital offense, in which circumstance the requirement that the sentencer "find the existence of the aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the constitutionally required narrowing process."