The state action must place the plaintiff "in a worse position than that in which he would have been had the state not acted at all."

ECF No. 24 at 110. "Under the state-created danger doctrine, a state actor can be held liable for failing to protect a person's interest in his personal security or bodily integrity when the state actor affirmatively and with deliberate indifference placed that person in danger."

A state may be held liable under the Due Process Clause for its omissions "when the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with `deliberate indifference'to a `known or obvious danger.'"

"The affirmative act must have exposed the plaintiff to `an actual, particularized danger,'and the resulting harm must have been foreseeable. "

W] e do have jurisdiction, construing the facts and drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, to decide whether the evidence demonstrates a violation... and whether such violation was in contravention of federal law that was clearly established at the time

—however, the Ninth Circuit differentiated between the constitutional right to a safe working environment, which the Supreme Court rejected in Collins, and the application of the state-created danger exception into the workplace, which Plaintiffs allege here.

—recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising from an employer's deliberate indifference to workplace conditions that exposed an employee to dangerous airborne mold.

The defendant must have acted with "[d] eliberate indifference," which "requires a culpable mental state more than gross negligence."

A county agency is not entitled to qualified immunity and may be held liable for constitutional violations by its employees under Monell [] and related cases