Although courts often merge the two inquiries, "the proper course is first to determine whether a statement is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning and then to determine whether it is libel per se or per quod."

The separate delineation of the emphasized portion concerning profession or trade libel seems to have led to the importation of the slander per se standards discussed in Liberman and Aronson into the context of libel per se.

This is the same standard that is frequently applied to determine whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning, the difference being that courts delete that portion of the standard which refers to special damages and pick up the language with the phrase "tends to expose."

—where sports column focused on character of boxer, statements about manager who was only a “bit player” in column were not reasonably susceptible to defamatory inference by average reader

However, the attack must relate to a "matter of significance and importance" to the plaintiff's work.

—same, citing Golub and Aronson and noting that both cases offer a slightly different articulation of the standard, referring, respectively, to "apprehension" as opposed to "incompatib [ility]" with plaintiff's business

[CITATION] MLRC 50-State Survey: Media Libel Law 2009-10