Certainly, the cases that first defined the concept of the public welfare offense almost uniformly involved statutes that provided for only light penalties such as fines or short jail sentences, not imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

NW 414 (1934), the Supreme Court construed a predecessor statute in a similar context and stated: "While this Court has held that the statutes impose criminal liability upon those selling adulterated foods, regardless of the absence of proof of criminal intent or guilty knowledge

—it was said by this court:'• The act may work hardship in many cases, but that question is one to be addressed to the legislature and not to the courts.

These penalties are a far cry from the petty punishments, such as a fine or short jail sentence, typically associated with a crime that does not require mens rea.

—defense that the person so manufacturing or selling vinegar below the standard has no knowledge that it is not within the standard prescribed.

Historically, when the courts first considered regulatory laws containing reduced intent requirements, the laws almost uniformly provided for very light penalties such as a fine or a short jail term, not imprisonment in a penitentiary

—the defendant was convicted of selling adulterated mustard and the maximum penalty was a $500 fine or imprisonment in the county jail.

Thus, an honest mistake by a magistrate as to age will not excuse him for joining minors in marriage without the consent of parents or guardians: Beckham V. Nacke, 56 Mo. 546; and the statute may punish as a criminal the ignorant seller of an adulterated or forbidden article: Common.

[BOOK] Defining Crimes