Moreover, "the two provisions share a common raison d'être. The plaintiffs in school cases are `private attorneys general'vindicating national policy in the same sense as are plaintiffs in Title II actions. The enactment of both provisions was for the same purpose— `to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief....'"

—we held that the statute is not to be applied retroactively "to the expenses incurred during the years of litigation prior to its enactment."

A judgment or order is final for purposes of appealability when it ends the litigation on the merits and comprehends only execution of the court's decree.

At the time of the 1971 and 1972 decisions, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were not recoverable absent a showing that the School Board had acted obdurately and obstinately in failing to adopt an acceptable desegregation plan.

—holding that the "strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu" because of a similarity in language was reinforced by the fact that "the two provisions share a common raison d'être

The court concluded that it does not and then wrote that "[s] ince most school cases involve relief of an injunctive nature, district courts will maintain jurisdiction long after determining the issues in controversy. `The ultimate approach to finality must be an individual and pragmatic one. Such a matter should be committed to the determination of the trial court.'"

—the Fifth Circuit characterized the legislative history of § 718 as' inconclusive,'471 F. 2d, at 87.

The Supreme Court has long considered Congress to intend similar or identical language to have the same meaning in two different statutes when "the two provisions share a common raison d'etre."