—the Third Circuit has concluded that a state law claim "relates to"—and is thus preempted by—ERISA if "the existence of an ERISA plan [is] a critical factor in establishing liability, and... the trial court's inquiry would be directed to the plan."

In the ERISA context, in particular, it has been noted that the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act's exceptions, and not the fact that ERISA preempts state-law claims brought by employees against employee benefit plans, is the basis on which the injunction issue is to be resolved.[5] See

In US Steel, for example, the district court had enjoined the plaintiffs from proceeding with their claims in state court under any law other than ERISA despite a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in their favor based on state law.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the employees' claims " `relat [ed] to'"an ERISA plan and thus were preempted by Section 514 (a).

In Nobers, the Third Circuit considered whether a suit by former employees who had been promoted to salaried, non-union positions alleging breach of contract by their employer that resulted in the lowering of their pensions was preempted by Section 514 (a).

—was guided by Ingersoll-Rand, and held that the state law claims in that case were preempted because they depended on the existence of the ERISA plans.

The relevant definition of "control" as a noun is "the act or power of controlling; regulation; domination or command."

Thus, a state law claim for breach of contract based on the settlement agreement here is preempted by ERISA

While we presume for discussion purposes that IAEA, if held to be covered by ERISA, could seek to enjoin the state court proceeding, this proposition is at least arguable.

Further, the Third Circuit has stressed that the literal construction that Plaintiff suggests should be rejected in favor of an examination the "practical result" of the relief sought.

[BOOK] Moore's federal practice