Even were we to assume—what I do not concede—that there could be a lawful non-discriminatory license tax of a percentage of the gross receipts collected by churches and other religious orders in support of their religious work

—plaintiffs brought suit for declaratory relief as to the Arizona Excise Revenue Act of 1935, and challenged the constitutionality of the act upon the grounds here mentioned.

Early cases in lower federal and state courts concerning the application of business and occupation taxes to newspapers are also relevant.

Moreover, shortly after Grosjean was decided, the same Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a state court judgment refusing to invalidate the application to newspapers of a tax on the gross income of businesses.

The defendants convicted under the Alabama ordinance urged that since the license required was revocable by local authorities in their sole discretion, the law exacts an invalid censorship upon uInstant case, at p. 1239

Taxes on the press upheld in the wake of Grosjean included a privilege tax on the gross proceeds of sales or gross income of the business of publishing newspapers, periodicals, and other publications, the court ultimately finding that the tax was part of the general sales tax without hostility to the press.

Like other economic enterprises, newspapers could not escape nondiscriminatory, general tax liabilities

—occupation, business and license taxes can constitutionally be imposed upon publishers by municipal corporations

[CITATION] Bowden v. Fort Smith

[BOOK] The Hughes Court: Justices, Rulings, and Legacy