Legality of Cannabis by U.S. Jurisdiction

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Manually reverted changes made by 2A10:BCC2:2029:6030:F584:3A84:D1B0:D4C0 (talk). See https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kansas_v._Hendricks&diff=prev&oldid=1209598253 ,& other uncited & generally false edits by same IP within a 29-minute period. Felony disenfranchisement exists but isn't equivalent to loss of citizenship in the US; cf. Trop v. Dulles.
 
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{{Use mdy dates|date=September 2023}}
{{Infobox SCOTUS case
{{Infobox SCOTUS case
|Litigants=Kansas v. Hendricks
|Litigants=Kansas v. Hendricks
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|Prior=''In re Hendricks,'' 259 Kan. 246, 912 [[P.2d]] 129 (1996); [[Certiorari|cert]]. granted, {{ussc|518|1004|1996|el=no}}.
|Prior=''In re Hendricks,'' 259 Kan. 246, 912 [[P.2d]] 129 (1996); [[Certiorari|cert]]. granted, {{ussc|518|1004|1996|el=no}}.
|Subsequent=
|Subsequent=
|Holding=Reverses Kansas State Supreme Court and agrees with the state's procedures for the indefinite [[civil commitment]] procedures for sex offenders meeting the definition of a "mental abnormality" upon release from prison
|Holding=Reverses Kansas Supreme Court and agrees with the state's procedures for the indefinite [[civil commitment]] procedures for sex offenders meeting the definition of a "mental abnormality" upon release from prison
|Majority=Thomas
|Majority=Thomas
|JoinMajority=Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
|JoinMajority=Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
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}}
}}


'''''Kansas v. Hendricks''''', 521 U.S. 346 (1997), was a [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] case in which the Court set forth procedures for the indefinite [[civil commitment]] of prisoners convicted of a [[sex offense]] whom the state deems dangerous due to a mental abnormality.
'''''Kansas v. Hendricks''''', 521 U.S. 346 (1997), was a [[United States Supreme Court]] case in which the Court set forth procedures for the indefinite [[civil commitment]] of prisoners who are convicted of a [[sex offense]] and are deemed by the state to be dangerous because of a mental abnormality.


== Background ==
== Background ==
Under [[Kansas]]'s [[Sexually Violent Predator Act]] (Act), any person who, due to "mental abnormality" or "[[personality disorder]]", is likely to engage in "predatory acts of [[sexual violence]]" can be indefinitely confined.<ref name=justia>{{ussc|name=Kansas v. Hendricks|volume=521|page=346|pin=|year=1997}}.</ref> Leroy Hendricks and Tim Quinn had extensive histories of [[Child sexual abuse|sexually molesting children]]. When they were due to be released from prison, Kansas filed a [[petition]] under the Act in state court to involuntarily commit Hendricks and Quinn. Hendricks and Quinn challenged the [[constitutionality]] of the Act and requested a trial by [[jury]] which the court granted. Hendricks and Quinn [[testimony|testified]] during the trial that they agreed with the [[diagnosis]] by the state [[psychiatrist]] that Hendricks and Quinn suffer from [[pedophilia]] and admitted that they continued to experience uncontrollable [[sexual desire]]s for children when under extreme stress. The jury decided that they qualified as sexually violent predators. Since pedophilia is defined as a mental abnormality under the Act, the court ordered that Hendricks be [[Civil law (common law)|civilly]] committed.<ref name=justia/>
Under [[Kansas]]'s [[Sexually Violent Predator Act]] (Act), any person who has "mental abnormality" or "[[personality disorder]]" and so is likely to engage in "predatory acts of [[sexual violence]]" may be indefinitely confined.<ref name=justia>{{ussc|name=Kansas v. Hendricks|volume=521|page=346|pin=|year=1997}}.</ref> Leroy Hendricks and Tim Quinn had extensive histories of [[child sexual abuse|sexually molesting children]]. When they were due to be released from prison, Kansas filed a [[petition]] under the Act in state court to involuntarily commit Hendricks and Quinn. Hendricks and Quinn challenged the [[constitutionality]] of the Act and requested a trial by [[jury]], which the court granted. Hendricks and Quinn [[testimony|testified]] during the trial that they agreed with the [[diagnosis]] by the state [[psychiatrist]] that Hendricks and Quinn suffer from [[pedophilia]] and admitted that they continued to experience uncontrollable [[sexual desires]] for children when under extreme stress. The jury decided that they qualified as sexually violent predators. Since pedophilia is defined as a mental abnormality under the Act, the court ordered that Hendricks be [[covil law (common law)|civilly]] committed.<ref name=justia/>


Hendricks appealed the validity of his commitment as well as claiming that the state was [[unconstitutionally]] using [[ex post facto]] and [[double jeopardy]] law, to the [[State Supreme Court]]. The court ruled that the Act was invalid on the grounds that the condition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy the "[[Substantive law|substantive]]" [[due process]] requirement that [[Involuntary commitment|involuntary civil commitment]] must be based on the finding of the presence of a "[[mental disorder|mental illness]]". It did not address the claims of ex post-facto and double jeopardy.<ref name=justia/>
Hendricks appealed the validity of his commitment and claimed that the state was [[unconstitutionally]] using ''[[ex post facto]]'' and [[double jeopardy]] law to the [[Kansas Supreme Court]]. The Court ruled that the Act was invalid on the grounds that the condition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy the "[[substantive law|substantive]]" [[due process]] requirement that [[Involuntary commitment|involuntary civil commitment]] must be based on the finding of the presence of a "[[mental disorder|mental illness]]." It did not address the claims of ex post facto and of double jeopardy.<ref name=justia/>


The Supreme Court granted Kansas' [[certiorari]].
The [[US Supreme Court]] granted Kansas ''[[certiorari]]''.


==Decision==
==Decision==
The Supreme Court ruled against Hendricks in a 5–4 decision. It agreed with the Act's procedures and the definition of a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree that such person is a menace to the health and safety of others."<ref name=guilford>{{cite web
The Supreme Court ruled against Hendricks in a 5–4 decision. It agreed with the Act's procedures and the definition of a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree that such person is a menace to the health and safety of others."<ref name=guilford>{{cite web
|url = http://www.guilford.com/cgi-bin/cartscript.cgi?page=etc/courts_updates.html&cart_id=#part_two
|url = http://www.guilford.com/cgi-bin/cartscript.cgi?page=etc/courts_updates.html&cart_id=#part_two
|archive-url = https://archive.is/20121216081130/http://www.guilford.com/cgi-bin/cartscript.cgi?page=etc/courts_updates.html&cart_id=%23part_two#part_two
|archive-url = https://archive.today/20121216081130/http://www.guilford.com/cgi-bin/cartscript.cgi?page=etc/courts_updates.html&cart_id=%23part_two#part_two
|url-status = dead
|url-status = dead
|title = Psychological Evaluation for the Courts, Second Edition – A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers – 9.04 Special Sentencing Provisions (b) Sexual Offender Statutes
|title = Psychological Evaluation for the Courts, Second Edition – A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers – 9.04 Special Sentencing Provisions (b) Sexual Offender Statutes
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|accessdate = 2007-10-19
|accessdate = 2007-10-19
|archive-date = 2012-12-16
|archive-date = 2012-12-16
}}</ref> It agreed with Kansas that the Act limits persons eligible for confinement to persons who are not [[Volition (psychology)|able to control]] their dangerousness.
}}</ref> It agreed with Kansas that the Act limits persons eligible for confinement to persons who are not [[volition (psychology)|able to control]] their dangerousness.


Further, the court decided the Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition nor the ban on ex post-facto law because the Act does not establish [[criminal]] proceedings and therefore involuntary confinement under it is not punishment. Because the Act is [[Civil law (common law)|civil]], Hendricks' confinement under the Act is not a second prosecution nor is it double jeopardy. And finally, the court said the Act is not considered punitive if it fails to offer treatment for an untreatable condition.<ref name=justia/><ref name=oyez>{{cite web
Further, the Court decided the Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition or the ban on ''ex post facto'' law because the Act does not establish [[criminal]] proceedings and so involuntary confinement under it is not punishment. Because the Act is [[civil law (common law)|civil]], Hendricks' confinement under the Act is not a second prosecution or double jeopardy. Finally, the Court said the Act is not considered punitive if it fails to offer treatment for an untreatable condition.<ref name=justia/><ref name=oyez>{{cite web
|author=
|author=
|year=1997
|year=1997
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==Significance==
==Significance==
The court's finding that preventative long-term confinement of mentally disordered persons has previously been justified on the grounds that some people's behavior cannot be prevented, and it does not violate their rights to confine them to deter [[antisocial behavior]]. However, it has also been argued that upholding the Act expands involuntary civil commitment to people with [[personality disorder]]s, possibly allowing for the commitment of large numbers of [[criminal]]s if the [[Evidence (law)|proof]] of the likelihood of re-offending required is sufficiently inclusive, which could happen if the requirement of dangerousness is not limited to those with a [[mental disorder|mental illness]], and that if mental abnormality (rather than mental illness) can be the basis for [[sex offender]] commitment, there is a danger that it may expand the basis for traditional civil commitment to personality disorders as well.<ref name=guilford/>
The court's finding that preventive long-term confinement of mentally-disordered persons has previously been justified on the grounds that some people's behavior cannot be prevented, and the confinement does not violate their rights to confine them to deter [[antisocial behavior]]. However, it has also been argued that upholding the Act expands involuntary civil commitment to people with [[personality disorders]], which possibly allows for the commitment of large numbers of [[criminal]]s if the [[evidence (law)|proof]] of the likelihood of re-offending required is sufficiently inclusive, which could happen if the requirement of dangerousness is not limited to those with a [[mental disorder|mental illness]], and if mental abnormality (rather than mental illness) can be the basis for [[sex offender]] commitment, there is a danger that it may expand the basis for traditional civil commitment to personality disorders as well.<ref name=guilford/>


In the subsequent ''[[Kansas v. Crane]]'' (2002), this decision was upheld for an individual that suffered from [[exhibitionism]] and [[antisocial personality disorder]].<ref name="google">{{cite book|title=Legal Aspects of Corrections Management|author1=Cripe, C.A.|author2=Pearlman, M.G.|date=2004|publisher=Jones and Bartlett Publishers|isbn=9780763725457|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6MQj-mjHgBIC|page=248|accessdate=2014-12-13}}</ref>
In the subsequent ''[[Kansas v. Crane]]'' (2002), this decision was upheld for an individual that suffered from [[exhibitionism]] and [[antisocial personality disorder]].<ref name="google">{{cite book|title=Legal Aspects of Corrections Management|author1=Cripe, C.A.|author2=Pearlman, M.G.|date=2004|publisher=Jones and Bartlett Publishers|isbn=9780763725457|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6MQj-mjHgBIC|page=248|accessdate=2014-12-13}}</ref>
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{{USArticleI}}
{{USArticleI}}


[[Category:Mental health law in the United States]]
[[Category:Mental health case law in the United States]]
[[Category:Civil commitment of sex offenders]]
[[Category:Civil commitment of sex offenders]]
[[Category:United States Constitution Article One case law]]
[[Category:United States Constitution Article One case law]]
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[[Category:United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court]]
[[Category:United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court]]
[[Category:1997 in United States case law]]
[[Category:1997 in United States case law]]
[[Category:Legal history of Kansas]]

Latest revision as of 06:53, 6 March 2024

Kansas v. Hendricks
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 10, 1996
Decided June 23, 1997
Full case nameKansas v. Leroy Hendricks
Citations521 U.S. 346 (more)
117 S. Ct. 2072; 138 L. Ed. 2d 501
Case history
PriorIn re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246, 912 P.2d 129 (1996); cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1004 (1996).
Holding
Reverses Kansas Supreme Court and agrees with the state's procedures for the indefinite civil commitment procedures for sex offenders meeting the definition of a "mental abnormality" upon release from prison
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
MajorityThomas, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
DissentBreyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg
Laws applied
Due Process, Miscellaneous; Criminal Procedure, Ex Post Facto

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court set forth procedures for the indefinite civil commitment of prisoners who are convicted of a sex offense and are deemed by the state to be dangerous because of a mental abnormality.

Background[edit]

Under Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act), any person who has "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" and so is likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" may be indefinitely confined.[1] Leroy Hendricks and Tim Quinn had extensive histories of sexually molesting children. When they were due to be released from prison, Kansas filed a petition under the Act in state court to involuntarily commit Hendricks and Quinn. Hendricks and Quinn challenged the constitutionality of the Act and requested a trial by jury, which the court granted. Hendricks and Quinn testified during the trial that they agreed with the diagnosis by the state psychiatrist that Hendricks and Quinn suffer from pedophilia and admitted that they continued to experience uncontrollable sexual desires for children when under extreme stress. The jury decided that they qualified as sexually violent predators. Since pedophilia is defined as a mental abnormality under the Act, the court ordered that Hendricks be civilly committed.[1]

Hendricks appealed the validity of his commitment and claimed that the state was unconstitutionally using ex post facto and double jeopardy law to the Kansas Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the Act was invalid on the grounds that the condition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy the "substantive" due process requirement that involuntary civil commitment must be based on the finding of the presence of a "mental illness." It did not address the claims of ex post facto and of double jeopardy.[1]

The US Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

Decision[edit]

The Supreme Court ruled against Hendricks in a 5–4 decision. It agreed with the Act's procedures and the definition of a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree that such person is a menace to the health and safety of others."[2] It agreed with Kansas that the Act limits persons eligible for confinement to persons who are not able to control their dangerousness.

Further, the Court decided the Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition or the ban on ex post facto law because the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and so involuntary confinement under it is not punishment. Because the Act is civil, Hendricks' confinement under the Act is not a second prosecution or double jeopardy. Finally, the Court said the Act is not considered punitive if it fails to offer treatment for an untreatable condition.[1][3]

Significance[edit]

The court's finding that preventive long-term confinement of mentally-disordered persons has previously been justified on the grounds that some people's behavior cannot be prevented, and the confinement does not violate their rights to confine them to deter antisocial behavior. However, it has also been argued that upholding the Act expands involuntary civil commitment to people with personality disorders, which possibly allows for the commitment of large numbers of criminals if the proof of the likelihood of re-offending required is sufficiently inclusive, which could happen if the requirement of dangerousness is not limited to those with a mental illness, and if mental abnormality (rather than mental illness) can be the basis for sex offender commitment, there is a danger that it may expand the basis for traditional civil commitment to personality disorders as well.[2]

In the subsequent Kansas v. Crane (2002), this decision was upheld for an individual that suffered from exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.[4]

See also[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
  2. ^ a b "Psychological Evaluation for the Courts, Second Edition – A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers – 9.04 Special Sentencing Provisions (b) Sexual Offender Statutes". Guilford.com. Archived from the original on December 16, 2012. Retrieved October 19, 2007.
  3. ^ "Kansas v. Hendricks". oyez.org. 1997. Retrieved February 19, 2008.
  4. ^ Cripe, C.A.; Pearlman, M.G. (2004). Legal Aspects of Corrections Management. Jones and Bartlett Publishers. p. 248. ISBN 9780763725457. Retrieved December 13, 2014.

External links[edit]

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kansas_v._Hendricks&diff=1212115994&oldid=1045126927