Harrow and Wealdstone rail crash
Details
Date	8 October 1952 08:19
Location	Harrow and Wealdstone
Line	West Coast Main Line (BR London Midland)
Cause	SPAD
Statistics
Trains	3
Deaths	112
Injured	340

The Harrow and Wealdstone rail crash was a major railway disaster and collision on the British railway system on 8 October 1952.

The accident took place 11.5 miles (18.5 km) from central London. The crash was the worst railway disaster in England and the worst peacetime railway crash in Great Britain, surpassed only by the 1915 accident at Quintinshill, Scotland, in which a troop train collided with a stationary passenger train and another express train ran into the wreckage.

The accident

The crash, which took place at 08.19, was a double collision involving three trains. The 07.31 local passenger train from Tring to Euston station, London was standing at the up main platform of Harrow & Wealdstone station when it was hit in the rear at 50–60 mph by the 20.15 express sleeper train from Perth, Scotland.

Seconds after the first collision, the double-headed 08.00 express from London Euston to Liverpool and Manchester, which was traveling at about 50 miles per hour (80 km/h), ran into the wreckage strewn across the down main line. Its locomotives were deflected to the left, ploughed across the down fast platform and came to rest across the electrified local lines opposite. Its carriages, which overran the wreckage from the first collision, brought down part of the station footbridge. All six lines through the station were blocked by the collision.

Rescue work took several days, as survivors had to be extricated from the piled-up wreckage of three trains. 112 people died and 340 were injured in the accident. The dead included 108 passengers (including 39 railway employees en route to their jobs) and four on-duty railwaymen.

The first collision was attributed to the Perth express passing a colour light distant railway signal at "caution" and the outer and inner semaphore home signals at "danger". The reason for this error is unknown, as the driver and fireman of the Perth express were killed. The crewmen on the down express were unable to avoid the second collision.

Details

Composition of trains^[1]:

• The 07.31 up local passenger train from Tring to Euston was made up of nine non-corridor coaches hauled by a LMS 2-6-4 tank engine.

• The 20.15 up express passenger train from Perth to Euston consisted of 11 vehicles (which included four sleepers and 3 vans) hauled by 46242 City of Glasgow, an LMS Coronation Class 4-6-2 tender engine.

• The 08.00 down express passenger train from Euston to Liverpool and Manchester consisted of 15 vehicles (including four vans) and was double-headed by 45637 Windward Islands, an LMS Jubilee Class 4-6-0 tender engine and 46202 Princess Anne, an LMS Princess Royal Class 4-6-2 tender engine.

The official report on the accident noted that 16 railway vehicles (coaches, vans, and kitchen cars) were essentially destroyed, and 13 of these vehicles were compressed into a space 45 yards (41 m) long, 18 yards (16 m) wide and 30 feet (9.1 m) high.

It was believed that 64 fatalities occurred in the local train, 23 in the Perth express and 7 in the Liverpool train. Another 14 could not be ascertained, but probably occurred among passengers on the station platforms or footbridge at the time of the collisions. The driver of the lead engine of the Euston to Liverpool express was killed, but the fireman had a remarkable escape, being thrown clear and coming to a few minutes after the accident lying on wreckage from the engine behind, the crew of which also survived.

Patchy fog had been noted in the vicinity prior to the accident, particularly near the vital distant signal, but the sun was breaking through the fog with improved visibility. No exceptions were taken to the proper functioning of the signals, nor to the signalmen's observance of the absolute block rules. The engine leading the Perth express, Class 8P 4-6-2 No. 46242 "City of Glasgow", was examined after the collision and no defect was found that might have distracted the driver and fireman from seeing the signals as they approached Harrow. Nor was there any evidence that Driver Jones might have been incapacitated before the collision. He had clearly been alert only minutes before, when he braked the train to a standstill for signals at Watford, and a post mortem revealed no traces of sudden illness or anything else that could have affected his judgement.

It is known from the signalman's train register that the signalman had adopted fog working (in this case double block working) some time prior to the accident. However, that same train register also shows that the fog had dissipated before the accident and that normal block working had been resumed. It was conjectured that the patchiness of the fog may have hindered the Driver's view of the signals, but by the time any accident investigation was carried out, conditions had improved considerably and so it remained conjecture. It was also possible that exhaust from a northbound goods train which passed the Perth express somewhere in the vicinity of Headstone Lane station might have temporarily obscured the distant signal, but again this could not be ascertained. The official report conjectured that having missed the distant signal, which was a colour-light set at eye level, Driver Jones may have continued to look for it and in doing so missed the following outer home signal, which was a mechanical semaphore set at a greater height, and thereby not realised the danger until he sighted the inner home signal, which was only 188 yards behind the standing local train. None of this could be proven, however, and the report could only conclude that for reasons unknown Driver Jones had relaxed his vigilance in the crucial minutes as the train approached Harrow and Wealdstone, and then made an emergency brake application when he realised his mistake. By then it was too late.

It should be noted that fog conditions are not a matter of signalman's judgement. Every semaphore signal box in the UK has associated with it a 'fog object' located 200 yards away. If the fog object is not visible, then the signalman is required to adopt fog working. This could entail the deployment of special fog signalman to ensure that signal indications are relayed to drivers, often by placing and removing detonators on the track. Alternatively, double block working can be used (and has to be used until fog signalmen are properly deployed) if the fog is expected to be short lived. In this regime, a home signal cannot be cleared into the station limits until the box in advance has accepted the train. This gives an extra set of signals before any potential obstruction.

The locomotives hauling the combined Euston to Liverpool and Manchester train were so badly damaged that they were scrapped. They were Class 5XP ("Jubilee") 4-6-0 No. 45637 "Windward Islands" and Class 8P 4-6-2 No. 46202 "Princess Anne". The latter was a rebuild in conventional form from an experimental steam turbine locomotive "turbomotive" and had been in service as "Princess Anne" for only a few months. Remarkably, the battered engine of the Perth train, 46242 "City of Glasgow", was repairable despite having taken the force of both collisions.

The accident would almost certainly have been prevented if Automatic Warning System (AWS) had been installed on the engine of the Perth express. This crash, together with the Lewisham accident five years later, accelerated the introduction of AWS throughout Britain's railways.

A memorial plaque concerning the disaster was placed above the main entrance on the northern side of the station to mark the 50th anniversary in 2002. A mural was also created along the bordering road featuring scenes from Wealdstone's history. It was completed by children from local Harrow schools and dedicated to the victims' memory.

References

• Coombs, I.F.E. (1977). The Harrow Railway Disaster: 25 Years On. David and Charles. ISBN 0-7153-7409-5.
• Hamilton, J.A.B. (1967). British Railway Accidents of the 20th Century (reprinted as Disaster down the Line). George Allen and Unwin / Javelin Books. ISBN 0-7137-1973-7.
• Nock, O.S. (1980). Historic Railway Disasters (2nd ed. ed.). Ian Allan. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Rolt, L.T.C. (1956 (and later editions)). Red for Danger. Bodley Head / David and Charles / Pan Books. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)
• Tatlow, Peter (2002). Harrow and Wealdstone 50 Years On: Clearing up the Aftermath. The Oakwood Press. ISBN 0-85361-593-4.
• University of York, Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History (February 10, 2003), Railway Readings: Harrow and Wealdstone. Retrieved September 30, 2005.
• Images of the wreck from britishrailways.tripod.com
• Ministry of Transport accident report from www.railwaysarchive.co.uk

References

External links

• Photograph of accident site
• Pathé Newsreel report (Adobe Flash)

51°35′32″N 0°20′06″W / 51.59222°N 0.33500°W / 51.59222; -0.33500